763
Submitted January 27, affirmed February 24, 2022
In the Matter of D. L.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
D. L.,
Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
21CC02786; A176108
505 P3d 1101
Petitioner appeals a judgment involuntarily committing him to the Oregon
Health Authority for up to 180 days, challenging the determination that he is
dangerous to others due to a mental disorder, ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C). Petitioner
argues that the Court of Appeals should reconsider the definition of dangerousness relevant to that determination. The state responds that petitioner’s behavior provided a clear foundation for dangerousness, and the legislative history of
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A) supports a reconsideration of the dangerousness standard.
Held: The Court of Appeals declined to revisit the dangerousness standard and
found that petitioner was dangerous to others due to a mental disorder under the
definition set forth in State v. E. J. J., 308 Or App 603, 612,
479 P3d 1073 (2021).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding petitioner was dangerous to
others due to a mental disorder.
Affirmed.
Julia A. Philbrook, Judge pro tempore.
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the briefs for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Christopher Page, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before James, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
JAMES, P. J.
Affirmed.
764 State v. D. L.
JAMES, P. J.
Appellant appeals a judgment involuntarily committing him to the Oregon Health Authority for up to 180
days, contending that the trial court erred because the
record lacked clear and convincing evidence to establish
that he was dangerous to others due to a mental disorder
under ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C). We affirm.
Unless we exercise our discretion to review de novo,
which we do not in this case, “we view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was
legally sufficient to permit that outcome.” State v. L. R.,
283 Or App 618, 619,
391 P3d 880 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. S. R. J.,
281 Or App
741, 748-49,
386 P3d 99 (2016) (“Whether the evidence of
danger is legally sufficient to support a determination that
appellant is ‘dangerous’ for purposes of ORS 426.005(1) is a
determination that we review as a matter of law.”). Having
reviewed the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, we
note that a more detailed discussion of the facts and our
analysis in this particular case would not significantly benefit the bench, the bar, or the public.
The trial court found that appellant had a mental
disorder and was dangerous to others. In addition, the court
entered an order prohibiting the purchase or possession of
firearms. In finding appellant dangerous, the court reasoned that appellant’s violence towards his sister in addition
to other threatening behavior was the result of his mental
illness:
“[P]sychotic beliefs … compelled him to hit her in the head
while she was driving, and it was those psychotic beliefs
that caused him to grab the steering wheel to try to direct
the car to a hotel that he was unable to explain where it
was or who was in there[.] …
“And it was his psychotic beliefs that led him to confront
the person in the Plaid Pantry while the police were being
called to assist his sister, who had just suffered a very traumatic incident that could have resulted in death.”
Cite as 317 Or App 763 (2022) 765
Furthermore, the trial court found that appellant’s assault
on his sister was not an isolated incident—as evidenced by
his confrontations with others and his delusional behavior
that continued on the day of the commitment hearing.
Appellant’s sole assignment of error is that the trial
court erred in determining that he was a person with a mental illness within the meaning of the civil commitment statutes, specifically that he was dangerous to others as a result
of his mental disorder. Appellant asks us to “define the
word, ‘dangerous,’ in the phrase ‘dangerous to … others’
in the same manner as [we do] with ‘dangerous to self.’ ”
In other words, appellant argues that the standard should
be “that due to a mental disorder a person presents a particularized and highly probable threat of causing death or
serious physical harm in the near future to self or others.”
The state responds that appellant’s conduct should suffice
to provide a clear foundation for predicting future dangerousness because the assault on his sister was not an isolated
incident. Furthermore, the state argues that if we do not
find the evidence sufficient to support the commitment, we
should reconsider our interpretation of the dangerousness
standard under ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A); the state provides
legislative history to support that argument. We appreciate
that our decisions in this area may benefit from further consideration, and we do not foreclose undertaking that effort
in the future. Nevertheless, this case is not the vehicle for
such exploration.
A court may order that a person be involuntarily
committed if, “based upon clear and convincing evidence,”
the court determines that he or she is a “person with mental
illness” and is unwilling or unable to participate in voluntary treatment under ORS 426.130(1). The phrase “person
with mental illness” is defined, in relevant part, in ORS
426.005(1)(f)(A) and includes someone who because of a
mental disorder is “[d]angerous to self or others.” “A person
is ‘dangerous to others’ for purposes of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A)
if his ‘mental disorder makes [him] highly likely to engage
in future violence towards others, absent commitment.’ ”
State v. E. J. J., 308 Or App 603, 612,
479 P3d 1073 (2021)
(quoting State v. S. E. R.,
297 Or App 121, 122,
441 P3d 254
(2019)).
766 State v. D. L.
To determine whether or not someone is dangerous
to others due to a mental disorder, “we consider the conduct
itself and the circumstances under which it occurred, all as
viewed in light of appellant’s personal history and other contextual clues.” E. J. J., 308 Or App at 615 (citing State v. J. G.,
302 Or App 97, 100-01,
458 P3d 721 (2020)). Frequently, we
have found that multiple violent acts or a violent act coupled
with additional threats will demonstrate that a person is
highly likely to engage in future violence; however, “[a]cts
of violence are not required to establish that a person is
dangerous; verbal threats may be sufficient, if the evidence
provides a foundation for predicting future violent behavior.”
State v. J. D.,
315 Or App 316, 321,
499 P3d 113 (2021) (citing
J. G.,
302 Or App at 101 n 3).
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the
trial court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that
appellant was dangerous to others. Not only did appellant
assault his sister while she was driving, but he engaged in
other threatening behaviors based on the same psychotic
and delusional thinking that motivated that attack.
Affirmed.
