Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
03/14/2025 08:09 AM CDT
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Detron L. Perry, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed March 14, 2025. No. S-24-225.
1. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress:
Appeal and Error. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an
appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear
error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment
protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.
2. Motions to Suppress: Trial: Pretrial Procedure: Appeal and Error.
When a motion to suppress is denied pretrial and again during trial on
renewed objection, an appellate court considers all the evidence, both
from the trial and from the hearings on the motion to suppress.
3. Trial: Investigative Stops: Warrantless Searches: Appeal and Error.
The ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop and probable cause to perform a warrantless search
are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact are reviewed for clear error,
giving due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the
trial judge.
4. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal
conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, whether the evidence is
direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same:
An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on
the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are
for the finder of fact. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
6. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Investigative Stops: Motor
Vehicles. A traffic stop is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, and
therefore is accorded Fourth Amendment protections.
7. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs:
Probable Cause. As a general matter, the decision to stop a vehicle is
reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred. A traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates
probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.
8. Appeal and Error. Plain error is error plainly evident from the record
and of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage
to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.
9. Sentences: Appeal and Error. A sentence that is contrary to the court’s
statutory authority is an appropriate matter for plain error review.
10. ____: ____. An appellate court has the power on direct appeal to remand
a cause for the imposition of a lawful sentence where an erroneous one
has been pronounced.
11. Statutes. Basic principles of statutory interpretation generally require a
court to give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning.
12. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not resort to interpretation of statutory language to ascertain the meaning of words which
are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
13. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning into
a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a
statute.
14. Words and Phrases. As a general rule, the word “shall” is considered
mandatory and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
15. Criminal Law: Judgments: Sentences. In a criminal case, the judgment is the sentence.
Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County, Michael
A. Smith, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part vacated and
remanded for resentencing.
Thomas P. Strigenz, Sarpy County Public Defender, and
Christopher J. Lathrop and Ryeson Berne, Senior Certified
Law Student, for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss
for appellee.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Papik, JJ.
Funke, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Detron L. Perry was convicted of driving under suspension, a Class III misdemeanor, and operating a motor vehicle
to avoid arrest, a Class IV felony, and sentenced to probation.
Perry assigns error to the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress and to the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. The parties also dispute whether, under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-905(3)(b) (Reissue 2016), a 2-year license revocation is
mandatory and, by extension, whether it was plain error for the
district court not to impose such a revocation. We conclude that
Perry’s arguments are without merit and that § 28-905(3)(b)
does, in fact, require a mandatory 2-year license revocation
or impoundment. We affirm in part, but because we find plain
error in the sentencing, we vacate Perry’s sentence and remand
the cause for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
Traffic Stop
Just before midnight on September 8, 2021, Officer Molly
Coon of the Bellevue Police Department observed a vehicle
driving slowly. Coon ran the license plate number and discovered that the owner of the vehicle, Perry, had a suspended
license. At that time, Coon could not determine whether Perry
was the operator of the vehicle. After Coon followed the
vehicle for a few moments, the vehicle changed lanes. Coon
noticed that the vehicle’s left rear turn signal was not working
and that the only visible turn signal came from the left side
mirror. Coon conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle and identified Perry as the driver. Coon then informed Perry of the issue
with his turn signal.
Coon waited for a second officer to arrive before informing Perry that he needed to exit the vehicle because his
license was suspended. Although not expressed to Perry, Coon
intended to tow the vehicle. When Perry did not comply with
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
the request to exit the vehicle, Coon instructed him to put his
hands on the steering wheel, to which Perry complied.
Up to this point, Coon had remained on the passenger side
of the vehicle for safety purposes. Once Perry put his hands
on the steering wheel, Coon walked around the vehicle to the
driver’s side to “compel” Perry to exit the vehicle. As Coon
was opening the driver’s-side door, Perry accelerated, driving
away from the scene at a high rate of speed. Perry proceeded
to run a red light, weaving around the car in front of him to
do so.
Both parties agree that Coon did not explicitly state, at any
point during the interaction, that Perry was under arrest. Perry
was later located and placed under arrest.
Video Evidence and Subsequent
Motion to Suppress
During discovery, video evidence from both Coon’s body
camera and police cruiser camera was reviewed. The video
evidence showed that Perry’s turn signal had, in fact, been
blinking during his lane change but that it was blinking at an
irregular pace and was rather dim.
Based on this evidence, Perry filed a motion to suppress
“any and all statements made and/or evidence seized as a result
of the stop.” Perry argued that since his turn signal had been
functioning in some capacity, the stop was unconstitutional
because there had been no probable cause for the stop and no
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
At a subsequent hearing on the matter, Coon testified that at
the time of the incident, she had been unable to see that the rear
turn signal was functioning in a limited capacity, but that upon
review of the video, she could clearly see “[t]he bottom light
was blinking . . . really fast and at a very low output.” Citing
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,226 (Reissue 2021), Coon testified that
even with that type of output, however, the light would not be
considered in “proper working order.”
The court denied Perry’s motion to suppress, and the matter
proceeded to trial. Perry did, however, preserve his objection
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
to the admission of any evidence obtained as a result of the
traffic stop.
Trial and Sentencing
Prior to opening arguments and outside the presence of
the jury, the State offered exhibit 8, which contained Perry’s
records from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV),
including copies of the letters notifying him of his license
suspension. Perry objected to the introduction of the exhibit
based on relevance. Perry’s objection was overruled, and the
court received exhibit 8 as evidence.
Exhibit 8 lists Perry’s current address as being on Ruggles
Street in Omaha, Nebraska. This address is, in fact, Perry’s
current address. Perry testified that at the time of the incident,
his address was “506 Kings Drive” in Bellevue, Nebraska. The
notice of suspension and order of suspension letters included
in exhibit 8, however, were sent to an address on North 87th
Avenue in Omaha. Further, the letter indicating that Perry’s
license had been reinstated, which was sent after the incident
in question but before trial, was addressed to an apartment on
“506 Canes Drive” in Bellevue.
In light of this, after the State presented its evidence, Perry
moved to dismiss all charges. Specific to exhibit 8, Perry
argued that the State had not presented sufficient evidence
to convict him of driving under suspension because exhibit
8 does not show that any of the notices were sent to his
“last-known mailing address,” as required by Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 60-4,100(6) (Reissue 2021). Therefore, Perry asserted that
the notices were improper and that he could not have known
of the suspension.
The court denied the motion, finding, under the same statute, that a notice of suspension need only be sent to the “last
known address” in the DMV’s records, not an individual’s
current address.
Perry was found guilty of both counts. Under
§ 28-905(3)(a)(iii), Perry’s conviction for operating a motor
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
vehicle to avoid arrest was classified as a Class IV felony due
to his reckless driving as he left the scene.
At sentencing, neither party made any arguments regarding
the license revocation or impoundment requirement set out
in § 28-905(3)(b). In fact, Perry specifically mentioned that
since the incident, his license had been reinstated. Ultimately,
Perry was sentenced to 36 months’ probation. During the
sentencing hearing, however, the district court judge warned,
“If I find [a probation] violation, you’ll get every bit of the
sentence that I can impose upon you.”
Perry appealed, and we moved the matter to our docket. 1
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Perry assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1)
overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a
result of the vehicle stop, (2) finding that there was sufficient
evidence to convict him of driving under suspension, and (3)
finding that there was sufficient evidence to convict him of
operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest.
The State separately argues that it was plain error for the
district court not to revoke Perry’s license for 2 years under
§ 28-905(3)(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment,
an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. 2
Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial
court’s findings for clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of
law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial
court’s determination. 3
1
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
2
State v. Anderson,
317 Neb. 435,
10 N.W.3d 334 (2024).
3
Id.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
[2] When a motion to suppress is denied pretrial and again
during trial on renewed objection, an appellate court considers
all the evidence, both from the trial and from the hearings on
the motion to suppress. 4
[3] The ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory stop and probable cause to perform a
warrantless search are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the trial judge. 5
[4] In reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the
evidence, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a
combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate
court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the
credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters
are for the finder of fact. The relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 6
[5] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. 7
ANALYSIS
Perry’s Assignments of Error
Are Without Merit
We have considered Perry’s three assignments of error, and
we find them all to be without merit.
First, Perry argues that because his rear turn signal was
blinking, albeit in a diminished capacity, there was no probable
cause for the stop and, therefore, the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence from the vehicle stop.
4
Id.
5
State v. Shiffermiller,
302 Neb. 245,
922 N.W.2d 763 (2019).
6
State v. Npimnee,
316 Neb. 1,
2 N.W.3d 620 (2024).
7
Mullins v. Box Butte County,
317 Neb. 937,
13 N.W.3d 67 (2024).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
[6,7] A traffic stop is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore is accorded Fourth Amendment protections. 8 As a general matter, the decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred. A traffic violation, no matter how
minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle. 9
This probable cause is not defeated simply because the officer
makes a mistake, so long as that mistake is reasonable. 10 In
this case, it cannot be said that it was unreasonable for Coon to
believe Perry’s turn signal was not functioning properly, since
it was blinking rapidly at a low output. Accordingly, there was
probable cause to stop Perry’s vehicle.
Second, Perry argues that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of driving under suspension, because notice of the
suspension was improper. Perry notes that his address at the
time of the incident was “506 Kings Drive” in Bellevue but
that the notices of suspension were sent to an address on North
87th Avenue in Omaha.
Section 60-4,100(6) details the manner in which notice of
suspension is to be accomplished and provides that notice of
suspension should be sent “by regular United States mail to
the resident’s last-known mailing address as shown by the
records of the [DMV].” Our case law has established that the
statute does not require that notice of revocation or suspension of an operator’s license be actually received or that the
person involved have actual knowledge of the suspension or
8
State v. Barbeau,
301 Neb. 293,
917 N.W.2d 913 (2018).
9
See
id.
10
See
id. See, also, Heien v. North Carolina,
574 U.S. 54,
135 S. Ct. 530,
190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014) (federal case holding that officer’s mistake of
law was reasonable and citing Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177,
110 S.
Ct. 2793, Ill L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990), and Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S.
160,
69 S. Ct. 1302,
93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949), for the same holding regarding
mistakes of fact).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
revocation of his or her license. 11 Instead, the plain meaning
of the statutory language only requires a letter be sent to the
address shown in the records of the DMV. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we cannot say
that a reasonable trier of fact could not have concluded that
the address on North 87th Avenue in Omaha was Perry’s “last-known” address, as contemplated by the § 60-4,100(6).
Third, Perry similarly argues that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of operating a motor vehicle to avoid
arrest under § 28-905, since Coon had not yet specifically told
him that he would be arrested or cited. We disagree with this
contention; our case law has held to the contrary. 12
Again, finding no merit to any of the above three assignments of error, we focus our attention on the State’s argument
regarding plain error in sentencing.
District Court’s Sentence Constituted
Plain Error Under § 28-905(3)(b)
The penalties for a conviction of operating a motor vehicle
to avoid arrest are set out in § 28-905. As mentioned above,
the penalties for this conviction are enhanced to a Class IV
felony if the act of avoiding arrest is combined with willful,
reckless driving. Although Perry disputes whether the conviction itself was proper, neither party disputes that if it is
proper, then Perry’s behavior constituted a felony and therefore
11
See State v. Moderow, 226 Neb. 470,
411 N.W.2d 647 (1987). See, also,
State v. Garst,
175 Neb. 731,
123 N.W.2d 638 (1963).
12
See State v. Armagost,
291 Neb. 117,
864 N.W.2d 417 (2015) (concluding
that crime of operating motor vehicle to avoid arrest occurs before arrest
can take place, meaning that whether defendant is actually placed under
arrest is not material to conviction for this crime). See, also, State v.
Claussen,
276 Neb. 630,
756 N.W.2d 163 (2008) (holding that evidence
was sufficient to convict of operating motor vehicle to avoid arrest where
police officers attempted to block in vehicle for purpose of arresting
driver, but driver fled at high rate of speed before officers could make any
contact with driver).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
falls under subsection (3)(b) of the statute. Specifically,
§ 28-905(3)(b) states as follows:
The court shall, as part of the judgment of conviction under subdivision (a) of this subsection, order that
the operator’s license of such person be revoked or
impounded for a period of two years and order the person not to drive any motor vehicle for any purpose in
the State of Nebraska for a like period. The revocation
or impoundment shall be administered upon sentencing,
upon final judgment of any appeal or review, or upon the
date that any probation is revoked.
Neither party made any arguments at sentencing regarding
this statute. Nonetheless, the State now argues that the district
court committed plain error by failing to revoke Perry’s license
for a period of 2 years, in accordance with § 28-905(3)(b).
Under § 28-905(3)(b), the State contends that the use of the
phrase “[t]he court shall” makes clear that the license revocation or impoundment is mandatory in the case of all felony
convictions.
Perry counters that the plain language of the statute demonstrates the opposite—that revocation or impoundment is not
mandatory. He points to the second sentence in § 28-905(3)(b),
stating that revocation or impoundment can take place “upon
sentencing, upon final judgment of any appeal or review, or
upon the date that any probation is revoked.” Perry claims
that because the statute permits revocation or impoundment at
any of these three times, it must mean that the revocation or
impoundment is a matter of discretion left to the district court.
Accordingly, Perry posits that the court’s warning at sentencing that “[i]f I find [a probation] violation, you’ll get every
bit of the sentence that I can impose upon you,” shows that
the court chose to impose a license revocation only if Perry’s
probation was revoked. As such, he asserts that it is improper
for this court to comment on matters of discretion on plain
error review.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
We agree with the State and conclude that a 2-year license
revocation or impoundment is mandatory for all felony convictions under § 28-905(3)(b) and, therefore, it was plain
error for the district court not to impose such a revocation or
impoundment.
[8-10] We first explain our framework for plain error
review. Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and
of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in
damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial
process. 13 A sentence that is contrary to the court’s statutory
authority is an appropriate matter for plain error review. 14 An
appellate court has the power on direct appeal to remand a
cause for the imposition of a lawful sentence where an erroneous one has been pronounced. 15 Accordingly, in order to
determine whether Perry’s sentence constituted plain error, we
must determine whether § 28-905(3)(b) imposes a mandatory
2-year license revocation.
In State v. Collins, 16 we briefly touched on this question
and indicated that as compared to the misdemeanor provision
in § 28-905(2), the statutory language in subsection (3)(b)
required mandatory revocation. This, however, was not the
legal basis for that decision, and no analysis was conducted on
the issue. In State v. Janis, 17 the Nebraska Court of Appeals,
relying on the language from Collins, specifically concluded
that revocation was mandatory in the case of a Class IV
felony under § 28-905(3)(b). Although on slightly different
grounds, we have also come to a similar conclusion when
interpreting Nebraska’s driving under the influence statutes,
13
State v. Dat, ante p. 311,
15 N.W.3d 410 (2025).
14
State v. Roth,
311 Neb. 1007,
977 N.W.2d 221 (2022).
15
Id.
16
State v. Collins,
307 Neb. 581,
950 N.W.2d 89 (2020).
17
State v. Janis,
32 Neb. App. 49,
992 N.W.2d 772 (2023).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
which include language nearly identical to that at issue here. 18
We agree with the outcome of the above-mentioned cases and
use this opportunity to provide a fuller analysis as it relates to
the specific statutory language at issue in this case.
[11-13] Basic principles of statutory interpretation generally
require a court to give statutory language its plain and ordinary
meaning. 19 An appellate court will not resort to interpretation
of statutory language to ascertain the meaning of words which
are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 20 It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning into a statute that is not
there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute. 21
[14] The first sentence of § 28-905(3)(b) states that “[t]he
court shall, as part of the judgment of conviction” revoke or
impound an individual’s license for 2 years. We have consistently concluded that, as a general rule, the word “shall”
is considered mandatory and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion. 22 The lack of discretion in this mandate becomes
even clearer when subsection (3)(b) is contrasted with other
provisions in § 28-905 that use the word “may.”
[15] As to the phrase in § 28-905(3)(b) that revocation or
impoundment shall occur “as part of the judgment of conviction,” Black’s Law dictionary defines “judgment of conviction”
as “1. [t]he written record of a criminal judgment, consisting
of the plea, the verdict or findings, the adjudication, and the
sentence. . . . 2. A sentence in a criminal case.” 23 Accordingly,
18
See State v. Hense,
276 Neb. 313,
753 N.W.2d 832 (2008) (concluding that
15-year license revocation is mandatory part of any sentence for felony
conviction under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.06 (Cum. Supp. 2006), even
when sentence is probation).
19
Mullins v. Box Butte
County, supra note 7.
20
State v. Godek,
312 Neb. 1004,
981 N.W.2d 810 (2022).
21
Id.
22
See, Fountain II v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.,
315 Neb. 633,
999 N.W.2d
135 (2024); State v. Irish,
298 Neb. 61,
902 N.W.2d 669 (2017).
23
Black’s Law Dictionary 1007 (12th ed. 2024). See, also, State v. Gnewuch,
316 Neb. 47,
3 N.W.3d 295 (2024).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
our case law recognizes that in a criminal case, the judgment is
the sentence. 24 We also recognize that probation is a sentence. 25
In accordance with the above review of the relevant language, it seems clear that the statute’s plain meaning calls for
a mandatory license revocation or impoundment in cases of
Class IV felony convictions under § 28-905, regardless of the
type of sentence imposed.
Perry’s approach to § 28-905(3)(b), which focuses almost
exclusively on the second sentence, would essentially require
us to read the entirety of the first sentence out of the provision.
The plain and unambiguous mandate imposed by the use of the
word “shall” does not, however, permit such an approach. The
second sentence does not change the clear and unambiguous
meaning of the first sentence and, as such, the first sentence
is decisive.
We clarify, however, that nothing in our holding here should
be read to indicate that revocation or impoundment must
begin at the time of sentencing. We acknowledge that, in other
contexts, we have interpreted language like that found in the
second sentence of § 28-905(3)(b) to grant the court discretion
regarding when a license revocation may take effect, but not
as to whether it would be imposed. 26
As noted above, there is no dispute in this case that because
of Perry’s willfully reckless driving to avoid arrest, he was
convicted of the greater felony offense, thereby placing the
offense within the purview of subsection (3)(b) of § 28-905.
Accordingly, based on the plain and unambiguous meaning of
the words “shall” and “judgment of conviction,” we conclude
that Perry’s license should have been revoked or impounded,
24
State v.
Irish, supra note 22.
25
See State v.
Hense, supra note 18 (citing
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2246(4)
(Cum. Supp. 2006) and 29-2260(4) (Reissue 1995)).
26
See, State v. Policky,
285 Neb. 612,
828 N.W.2d 163 (2013); State v.
Fuller,
278 Neb. 585,
772 N.W.2d 868 (2009).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. PERRY
Cite as 318 Neb. 613
without discretion, for a period of 2 years as part of his sentence of probation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we conclude that Perry’s
assignments of error lack merit. However, we also conclude that
in accordance with the mandatory language of § 28-905(3)(b),
the district court plainly erred by not imposing a 2-year license
revocation or impoundment as part of Perry’s sentence.
Affirmed in part, and in part vacated
and remanded for resentencing.
Freudenberg, J., not participating.
