571
Submitted June 3, 2021, affirmed March 30, 2022
In the Matter of V. L., Jr.,
a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
V. L., JR.,
Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
19JU03861; A172636
509 P3d 142
Youth appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court finding him within
the court’s jurisdiction for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute
unlawful delivery of a marijuana item, ORS 475C.345. On appeal, youth argues
that facts about a youth’s age are among the “facts alleged in the petition showing
the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court” that “must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt” under ORS 419C.400(2), and that the juvenile court
erred by determining otherwise. Held: The Court of Appeals examined the text,
context, and legislative history of ORS 419C.400(2), concluding that a youth’s
age—though required in a petition under ORS 419C.255—is not a fact that the
state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt under ORS 419C.400(2) in a
juvenile delinquency adjudication; therefore, the juvenile court did not err.
Affirmed.
Cheryl A. Pellegrini, Judge.
Erica Hayne Friedman and Youth, Rights & Justice
Attorneys at Law filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and
Armstrong, Senior Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Affirmed.
572 State v. V. L.
TOOKEY, P. J.
This case requires us to determine whether, in a
juvenile delinquency adjudication, facts about a youth’s
age are among the “facts alleged in the petition showing
the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court” that
“must be established beyond a reasonable doubt” under ORS
419C.400(2).1
Youth appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court
finding him within the court’s jurisdiction for acts that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute unlawful delivery of a marijuana item, ORS 475C.345.2 On appeal, youth
argues that the juvenile court erred when it determined
that the state was not required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that youth was under 18 years of age.
We conclude that a youth’s age—though required
in a petition under ORS 419C.255(1)(a)—is not a fact that
the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in
a juvenile delinquency adjudication; therefore, the juvenile
court did not err, and we affirm.3
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are largely procedural and not
in dispute. Youth, a high school student, was accused of
selling marijuana products to middle school students. In
an amended petition pursuant to ORS 419C.250, the state
alleged that youth was 16 years old and was within the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction for acts that, if committed by
an adult, would constitute unlawful delivery of a marijuana
item, ORS 475C.345.
At a hearing on that petition, after the close of the
state’s evidence, youth argued that the state had not met
1
ORS 419C.400(2) provides, “The facts alleged in the petition showing the
youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court as provided in ORS 419C.005,
unless admitted, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
2
Youth was adjudicated under former ORS 475B.346 (2019), renumbered as
ORS 475C.345(2) (2021); however, because that renumbering does not affect our
analysis, we refer in this opinion to the current version of the statute.
3
In a second assignment of error, youth argues that the state failed to adduce
legally sufficient evidence that he was under 18 years of age. Our disposition as to
youth’s first assignment of error obviates the need to address his second assignment of error.
Cite as 318 Or App 571 (2022) 573
its burden to prove youth’s age beyond a reasonable doubt.
The state responded that youth’s age was “not a material
element” of the alleged offense that must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt; instead, the state argued, youth’s age
pertained to “a preliminary jurisdictional question” as to
“whether [youth’s] case should be heard in a juvenile court
or [in] a criminal court.”
The juvenile court briefly reviewed recordings from
earlier proceedings, determined that youth’s attorney had
not previously confirmed youth’s age, and declined to reopen
the record for the state to introduce evidence of youth’s age.
Ultimately, the juvenile court concluded that youth’s age
was relevant to whether the juvenile court could adjudicate
youth’s case, but that it was not an element of the offense
that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In
reaching that conclusion, the juvenile court explained:
“[ORS] 419C.005 I think makes clear that the juvenile
court has exclusive jurisdiction in any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and who has committed
an act that is a violation or that, if done by an adult, would
constitute a violation of law ….
“… [I]t seems to me that the matter of a [youth’s] age
determines whether or not this court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate the case ….
“…
“I’m going to find for purposes of this proceeding that
age is not a material element of the offense and, therefore,
need not be proven by the state, which means that it would
have to be raised by the defense or by youth’s attorney if he
sought to challenge whether or not this court properly had
jurisdiction.”
On appeal, youth argues that the juvenile court
erred in reaching that conclusion, because being “ ‘under 18
years of age’ is a fact necessary to establish juvenile court
jurisdiction, and, therefore, that fact must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt in a juvenile delinquency adjudication
under ORS 419C.400(2).” The state responds that the “juvenile court correctly concluded that the state did not have to
574 State v. V. L.
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that youth was under 18
years of age,” because “being under 18 is not a material element of” the offense alleged in the state’s amended petition;
instead, the state contends, youth’s “age is pertinent only to
determining which court has jurisdiction to hear his case—
the juvenile court or the adult court.”
As we understand the parties’ arguments, we must
determine whether, in a juvenile delinquency adjudication,
facts about a youth’s age are among the “facts alleged in the
petition showing the youth to be within the jurisdiction of
the court” that “must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt” under ORS 419C.400(2).4
II. ANALYSIS
The parties’ dispute “presents a matter of statutory
construction, which we review for legal error.” State v. J. R.,
318 Or App 21, 29,
507 P3d 778 (2022). “In conducting
our review, our job is to ascertain the legislature’s intent,
which we do by examining the statutory text, context, and
any pertinent legislative history.”
Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In so doing, we are mindful of our obligation to “identify[ ] the correct interpretation, whether or not
asserted by the parties.” Stull v. Hoke,
326 Or 72, 77,
948
P2d 722 (1997).
A. Text
The text of ORS 419C.400(2) provides:
“The facts alleged in the petition showing the youth to
be within the jurisdiction of the court as provided in ORS
419C.005, unless admitted, must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
That text requires that a certain set of facts in a petition
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt—namely, the
set of facts “showing the youth to be within the jurisdiction
of the court.” But nothing in the text of ORS 419C.400(2)
explicitly provides whether that set of facts includes facts
about a youth’s age. Consequently, we must turn to the context of ORS 419C.400(2).
4
Youth has not claimed to be 18 years of age or older; rather, youth argues
that the state bears the burden of proving youth’s age beyond a reasonable doubt.
Cite as 318 Or App 571 (2022) 575
B. Context
A statute’s context includes “other provisions of
the same statute and related statutes.” Dalbeck v. Bi-Mart
Corp., 315 Or App 129, 135,
500 P3d 711 (2021).
1. ORS 419C.005(1)
One related statute specifically referenced in ORS
419C.400(2) is ORS 419C.005, which concerns the juvenile
court’s “exclusive original jurisdiction.” Youth contends that
the text of ORS 419C.400(2) must be “read together” with
ORS 419C.005(1), which provides:
“The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction
in any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age
and who has committed an act that … if done by an adult
would constitute a violation, of a law or ordinance ….”
“Read together,” youth contends, “ORS 419C.005(1) and
ORS 419C.400(2) plainly support a conclusion [that] being
‘under 18 years of age’ is one of the facts to which [ORS]
419C.400(2) is referring.” We disagree.
The text of ORS 419C.005(1) plainly refers to
a person’s age. But, as we explain, “[t]here are, generally
speaking, two uses of the term jurisdiction” in the juvenile
context, and the reference to age in ORS 419C.005(1) concerns whether a case is within the juvenile court’s “exclusive original jurisdiction”—i.e., its “subject matter jurisdiction”; it does not refer to a fact showing that a youth is
“within the jurisdiction of the court”—i.e., the “factual
determination that the child is … delinquent” for having violated a particular law. Dept. of Human Services v.
C. M. H., 301 Or App 487, 494-96,
455 P3d 576 (2019), aff’d,
368 Or 96,
486 P3d 772 (2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As noted, ORS 419C.005(1) provides that the juvenile court has “exclusive original jurisdiction” in “any case”
involving “a person who is under 18 years of age.” We have
previously observed that that “jurisdictional wording” in
ORS 419C.005(1) relating to delinquency matters “is identical to that used in juvenile dependency matters under ORS
576 State v. V. L.
419B.100(1).”5 State v. L. P. L. O., 280 Or App 292, 299,
381
P3d 846 (2016). That identical wording reflects the fact that
the “grant of ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ to the juvenile
court dates to 1959, when the legislature enacted a comprehensive juvenile code comprising a single set of statutes
to govern both dependency and delinquency proceedings.”
Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. H.,
368 Or 96, 105,
486 P3d
772 (2021) (citing Or Laws 1959, ch 432).
In 1959, the legislature enacted the predecessor to
current ORS 419C.005(1)—former ORS 419.476(1) (1959),
repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373. In a report prepared by the legislative committee tasked with revising
the juvenile code, the committee explained that the “juvenile court should have original exclusive jurisdiction in
all cases involving criminal offenses by persons under 18.”
Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on Judicial
Administration, Part II Juvenile Law, 8 (Jan 1959) (emphasis added). That report further explained the problem that
former ORS 419.476 was intended to solve:
“Although the present juvenile law was probably
intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction over children on
the juvenile court, see ORS 419.544, its provisions are not
clear on the point, and the Supreme Court concluded that
the criminal courts retained concurrent jurisdiction over
juvenile offenders. See In re Loundagin, 129 Or 652 (1929).
The consequence is that under present law, the decision
whether a child should be proceeded against in criminal
court or circuit court is vested, at least in the first instance,
in the district attorney. We believe this decision should be
made by the juvenile court and, accordingly, specify that it
has exclusive original jurisdiction.”
Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on Judicial
Administration, Part II Juvenile Law at 13.
The committee’s explanations indicate that a person’s age in former ORS 419.476(1) was relevant to determining which court should hear that person’s case; nothing
5
ORS 419B.100(1) provides, in part:
“[T]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any case
involving a person who is under 18 years of age and” whose circumstances
fall within one of the categories enumerated in paragraphs (1)(a) - (h).
Cite as 318 Or App 571 (2022) 577
in that legislative history suggests that the matter of age in
former ORS 419.476(1), the predecessor to ORS 419C.005(1),
concerned what facts in a petition must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Years later, in 1993, “the legislature split the
grant of ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ from former ORS
419.476(1) into ORS 419B.100(1), governing juvenile court
jurisdiction over dependency, and ORS 419C.005(1), governing juvenile court jurisdiction over delinquency.” C. M. H.,
368 Or at 106 (citing Or Laws 1993, ch 33, §§ 53, 149).
Importantly, however, we said that, in “splitting the dependency and delinquency codes, the legislature did not make
any changes to that text that would evince a legislative
intention to treat the identical text in those two statutes
differently from each other, or differently from the case law
previously applying it.” L. P. L. O.,
280 Or App at 301. Over
the years, Oregon case law has repeatedly stated that the
juvenile code provisions conferring “exclusive original jurisdiction” pertain to subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dept.
of Human Services v. K. W.,
307 Or App 17, 30,
476 P3d 107
(2020), rev den,
368 Or 347 (2021) (“[W]hen the understanding of ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ concerning former
ORS 419.476 (1991) is applied to ORS 419B.100, those terms
refer to subject matter jurisdiction.”); C. M. H.,
301 Or App
at 497 (“ORS 419B.100 grants subject matter jurisdiction to
a juvenile court.”); see also C. M. H.,
368 Or at 98, 104 (“[T]he
juvenile court possesses ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ over
certain cases involving a person under the age of 18,” and
“the phrase ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ refers to the
juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”).
For those reasons, we conclude that ORS 419C.005(1)’s
reference to a person’s age relates to whether the juvenile
court has subject matter jurisdiction over that person’s
case; it does not prescribe what facts in a petition must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt under ORS 419C.400(2)—
i.e., the facts concerning a youth’s violation of a particular law that “bring the youth within the jurisdiction of
the court.” Consequently, we reject youth’s argument that
the textual reference to age in ORS 419C.005(1) requires
facts about a youth’s age to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
578 State v. V. L.
2. ORS 419C.255
Another related statute that is particularly relevant here is ORS 419C.255, which specifies the facts that
must be included in a juvenile delinquency petition. ORS
419C.255 provides, in relevant part:
“(1) The petition shall set forth in ordinary and concise language such of the following facts as are known and
indicate any which are not known:
“(a) The name, age and residence of the youth.
“(b) The facts which bring the youth within the jurisdiction of the court as provided in ORS 419C.005.”
Two features of ORS 419C.255 are especially noteworthy. First, paragraph (1)(a) requires the petition to
include facts about the youth’s “name, age and residence.”
(Emphasis added.) Paragraph (1)(b) separately requires the
petition to include the facts that “bring the youth within the
jurisdiction of the court.” The choice to require facts about
a youth’s name, age, and residence in paragraph (1)(a) and
to separately require facts that “bring the youth within the
jurisdiction of the court” in paragraph (1)(b) evinces a legislative intention to treat those two sets of facts as distinct
from each other. In other words, the legislature’s decision to
separately enumerate those two sets of facts suggests that
the set of facts that “bring the youth within the jurisdiction
of the court” is separate from, and does not include, facts
about a youth’s age. If, instead, the facts required under
paragraph (1)(b) were understood to include facts about a
youth’s age, such an understanding would render at least
part of paragraph (1)(a) superfluous—a circumstance incompatible “with the interpretive principle that, if possible, we
give a statute with multiple parts a construction that ‘will
give effect to all’ of those parts.” State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68,
98,
261 P3d 1234 (2011) (quoting ORS 174.010).
There is a second noteworthy feature of ORS
419C.255: Under paragraph (1)(b), the petition must include
the facts that “bring the youth within the jurisdiction of
the court,” which, again, refers to the factual determination that the youth has violated a particular law, 318 Or
App at 575, and, under ORS 419C.400(2), it is the facts in
Cite as
318 Or App 571 (2022) 579
the petition “showing the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court” that must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, reading ORS 419C.255 together with
ORS 419C.400(2) suggests that the facts in a juvenile petition that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt are the
set of facts described in ORS 419C.255(1)(b)—i.e., the set of
facts showing that a youth is “within the jurisdiction of the
court” for having violated a particular law—which, as we
determined above, does not include the facts about a youth’s
age separately enumerated in ORS 419C.255(1)(a).
Based on the foregoing, we understand that the facts
in a juvenile petition that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt under ORS 419C.400(2) are the facts described
in ORS 419C.255(1)(b), and that that set of facts is separate
from, and does not include, facts about a youth’s age. Thus,
ORS 419C.400(2) does not require facts about a youth’s age
to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
That understanding is further supported by the legislative history of ORS 419C.255. See State v. Stamper, 197
Or App 413, 420,
106 P3d 172, rev den,
339 Or 230 (2005)
(“Also considered part of the broader context of a statute is
the legislative history of related statutes.”).
As noted above, ORS 419C.255 specifies the facts
that must be included in a juvenile delinquency petition. The
text of that provision has remained virtually unchanged
since its statutory predecessor—former ORS 419.484 (1959),
repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373—was enacted in
1959. See Or Laws 1959, ch 432, § 7. Former ORS 419.484
(1959) provided, in relevant part:
“(2) The petition shall set forth in ordinary and concise language such of the following facts as are known and
indicate any which are not known:
“(a) The name, age and residence of the child.
“(b) The facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court as provided in subsection (1) of [former]
ORS 419.476.”
The purpose of those provisions was explained in the same
1959 legislative report mentioned above:
580 State v. V. L.
“[ORS 419.484] sets forth the matters which must
appear in the petition. Present law, ORS 419.504, provides
that the petition must set forth ‘the facts’ without saying
what the necessary facts are. The proposed code spells this
out, requiring the indispensable minimum of information
which the court ought to have. In addition to identifying
information, the petition must contain the ‘facts which
bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court as provided in [former ORS 419.476].’ Thus, the petition must
allege the facts concerning violation of a designated law
….”
Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on Judicial
Administration, Part II Juvenile Law at 16 (emphasis
added).
As that report explains, facts about a youth’s
“name, age and residence” (i.e., “identifying information”)
are required “in addition to” the set of facts “which bring the
child within the jurisdiction of the court” (i.e., “the facts concerning violation of a designated law”). (Emphases added.)
That explanation further indicates that facts about a youth’s
age—though required in a petition—are distinct from the
set of facts alleged in a petition which “bring the child
within the jurisdiction of the court.” It follows, then, that
the set of “facts alleged in the petition showing the youth to
be within the jurisdiction of the court” that “must be established beyond a reasonable doubt” under ORS 419C.400(2)
are the facts concerning a youth’s violation of a particular
law, and not the facts about a youth’s age.
To summarize, the aforementioned text and context indicate as follows: First, under ORS 419C.400(2), the
facts in a petition that must be established beyond a reasonable doubt are the set of facts “showing the youth to be
within the jurisdiction of the court”; and second, under ORS
419C.255(1)(b), the set of facts “which bring the youth within
the jurisdiction of the court” does not include facts about a
youth’s age.
3. ORS 419C.050
Another statute in the juvenile code—ORS
419C.050—further indicates that age is not a fact in a petition that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but is
Cite as 318 Or App 571 (2022) 581
instead relevant to determining which court has subject
matter jurisdiction over a youth’s case. ORS 419.050 provides, in relevant part:
“If during the pendency of a proceeding involving an
allegation of a crime in any court other than a juvenile
court it is ascertained that the age of the person who is the
subject of the proceeding is such that the matter is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, it is the duty
of the court in which the proceeding is pending to transfer
the proceeding to the juvenile court of the county in which
the proceeding is pending.”
That text indicates that ascertainment of age is something
to be done toward the outset of a proceeding and relates to
whether a person’s case is to receive juvenile court treatment
or adult court treatment—an indication that also weighs
against treating age as a fact that must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt in a delinquency adjudication.
C. Legislative History
Having discussed text and context, we note that our
review of the legislative history relevant to ORS 419C.400(2)
provided no indication that facts about a youth’s age in a
delinquency petition must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that a youth’s
age—though required in a petition—is not a fact that the
state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a
juvenile delinquency adjudication; therefore, the trial court
did not err when it determined that the state was not
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that youth was
under 18 years of age in that proceeding. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Affirmed.
