683
Argued and submitted January 24, affirmed April 6, 2022
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KEVIN MICHAEL RAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Deschutes County Circuit Court
17CR76930; A173399
509 P3d 171
Defendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At the time of his arrest, defendant took a breath test on an
Intoxilyzer 8000, which showed his blood-alcohol content (BAC) to be .08 percent. Under ORS 813.010(1)(a), a person commits the crime of DUII by driving a
vehicle with “0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood … as shown
by chemical analysis of the breath or blood.” During trial, defendant questioned
the reliability of the breath-test result, suggesting that the machine had a .003
margin of error in both directions. The state then called a forensic scientist to
testify regarding “validation tests” that his lab has performed on the Intoxilyzer
8000 to determine its accuracy. That testimony was admitted over an objection
by defendant. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred under
OEC 401, OEC 702, and OEC 403 when it allowed the results of the validation
tests into evidence. Held: The trial court did not err. The evidence was relevant
under OEC 401, because defendant called the machine’s accuracy into question.
The evidence was admissible under OEC 702, because the state made a sufficient
showing of scientific validity, and any weaknesses in the testing methodology
were of a type that could be addressed in cross-examination to undermine the
strength of the evidence, not of the type that would preclude admission. Finally,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence after conducting the required balancing of relevance and risk under OEC 403.
Affirmed.
Beth M. Bagley, Judge.
Brett J. Allin, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
684 State v. Ray
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and
Sercombe, Senior Judge.
AOYAGI, J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 318 Or App 683 (2022) 685
AOYAGI, J.
Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, after he blew .08 on
a breath test. See ORS 813.010(1)(a) (driving a vehicle with
“0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood …
as shown by chemical analysis of the breath or blood” constitutes DUII). Defendant contends that the trial court erred
by allowing a forensic scientist to testify regarding “validation tests” used to determine the accuracy of the breathtesting instrument. In defendant’s view, that evidence was
irrelevant under OEC 401, not established to be scientifically valid under OEC 702, and unfairly prejudicial under
OEC 403. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
Defendant was arrested for DUII. At the jail, he
took a breath test on an Intoxilyzer 8000 instrument. The
test showed a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of .08 percent.
Specifically, defendant’s first sample came back as .084, his
second sample came back as .081, and the instrument automatically threw out the higher result (.084) and rounded
down the lower result (.081) to the hundredth place (.08).
Defendant was charged with DUII and proceeded
to a jury trial. We limit our discussion of the trial to facts
pertinent to the issue on appeal.
At trial, during cross-examination of the arresting officer who conducted the breath test, defense counsel
pursued a line of questioning to the effect that defendant’s
true BAC might have been less than .08 percent when he
took the breath test. Defense counsel reasoned—as shown
through his questioning—that the control sample that the
instrument ran along with defendant’s samples came back
.003 lower than expected (.082 instead of .085), that .003
was therefore the “margin of error,” that defendant’s second sample was .081, and that it was therefore possible
that defendant’s true BAC was .078. The officer declined
to endorse defense counsel’s characterization of .003 as the
machine’s “margin of error,” stating that she did not know
how that was determined. However, she agreed with defense
counsel’s math: .081 minus .003 equals .078; the machine
would round .078 down to .07; and .07 is less than .08.
686 State v. Ray
The state subsequently called Jackson to testify.
Jackson is a forensic scientist at the Oregon State Police’s
crime lab. He has both a bachelor’s degree and a Ph.D. in
chemistry, did a post-doctoral fellowship, and has worked
for the Oregon State Police for 12 years. As a result of his
police training, Jackson is allowed to perform certifications and assessments of field instruments, including the
Intoxilyzer 8000. The Intoxilyzer 8000 uses infrared spectrophotometry to identify ethanol in a breath sample. Before
deployment into the field, the instrument is calibrated and
goes through a verification check. Once deployed, it must be
certified every 90 days, and it is subject to voluntary assessment every 30 days. Jackson described the certification and
assessment processes. He also described how the Intoxilyzer
8000 works, walking through what occurs inside the instrument when breath samples are taken, including the testing
of a control sample of .085 percent certified ethanol.
Jackson then discussed validation tests—sometimes
called blood/breath correlation studies—that must be done
before an Intoxilyzer 8000 is released into the field and that
his lab periodically conducts to ensure that the instruments
are still reading correctly. To conduct these tests, volunteers
come to the crime lab with empty stomachs. They drink
alcohol for an hour, take a preliminary breath test for safety
purposes, are given some food, drink alcohol for another
hour, are observed for 15 minutes, take a breath test followed by a blood test, wait an hour, and then take another
breath test followed by a blood test. In the validation tests
that his lab performed on 188 volunteers between June 2006
and June 2019, there were two instances of the breath result
being .002 percent higher than the blood result; one incident of the breath and blood results being identical; and 185
instances of the blood result being higher than the breath
result. On average, the Intoxilyzer 8000 underestimated
true BAC by approximately .02 percent, which is consistent
with its design, in that certain aspects of the testing process
are designed to produce a conservative estimate of BAC.
Jackson’s testimony regarding the validation test
results was admitted over defendant’s objection. When
Jackson was first asked about the results, defense counsel
Cite as 318 Or App 683 (2022) 687
objected and said, “Your Honor, these studies are not scientifically validated. I believe there’s no peer review. We may
have to do a 104 hearing, if necessary.” At that point, the
prosecutor asked Jackson about the validity of the described
methodology. Jackson testified that it is a valid way to test
the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer 8000, because his lab uses
procedures that are “commonly found in the literature” and
that are the “predominant method” used to verify instrument accuracy. As for lack of peer review, Jackson explained
that he cannot publish as they are not doing anything
“new or novel.” Based on Jackson’s testimony, the prosecutor argued that the methodology used was “accepted in the
field” and “also common sense.” Asked whether she had anything further to add to her objection, defense counsel said,
“I would just add that there’s a problem with sample size,
too. It looks like these aren’t the normal size of studies that
would be done and conducted that would actually fall into
those peer-reviewed and verified validated studies. It’s not
the same size.” The court overruled defendant’s objection
to the testimony, noting that defense counsel could inquire
about the sample size on cross-examination.
Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of DUII.
ANALYSIS
On appeal of his DUII conviction, defendant raises
a single assignment of error. He contends that the trial
court erred by admitting Jackson’s testimony regarding
his lab’s blood/breath validation studies on the Intoxilyzer
8000, because that testimony was irrelevant under OEC
401, not established to be scientifically valid under OEC
702, and unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403. He further
contends that the error was not harmless, because Jackson’s
testimony was “highly persuasive” in rebutting defendant’s
argument that his true BAC was less than .08 percent at the
time of the breath test.
In response, the state asserts that defendant’s relevancy and OEC 403 arguments are unpreserved; that they
would fail on the merits in any event; and that the trial court
correctly denied defendant’s OEC 702 objection, because
there was sufficient evidence of scientific validity.
688 State v. Ray
Scientific evidence must satisfy three evidentiary
rules to be admissible: “It must be relevant, OEC 401; it must
possess sufficient indicia of scientific validity and be helpful
to the jury, OEC 702; and its prejudicial effect must not outweigh its probative value, OEC 403.” State v. Southard, 347
Or 127, 133,
218 P3d 104 (2009). We review relevancy rulings for errors of law. State v. Titus,
328 Or 475, 481,
982 P2d
1133 (1999). The same is true of rulings on scientific validity
under OEC 702. Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
331 Or
285, 301,
14 P3d 596 (2000). We review OEC 403 balancing
for abuse of discretion. State v. Shaw,
338 Or 586, 615,
113
P3d 898 (2005).
Regarding relevancy, defendant did not preserve
a claim of error under OEC 702. We disagree with defendant’s assertion that objecting to the scientific validity of
the evidence and suggesting that a “104 hearing”1 might be
necessary was enough to preserve all possible challenges to
the admission of scientific evidence. But, even if we were to
agree with defendant that the claim of error was adequately
preserved,2 defendant’s argument fails on the merits.
Evidence regarding the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000,
including its margins of error in validation testing, might
not normally be relevant in a DUII case. However, defendant pointedly suggested to the jury that the instrument
had a .003 margin of error in both directions, which could
have created reasonable doubt as to the reliability of defendant’s .08 breath-test result. That made Jackson’s testimony
relevant to the state’s per se theory of DUII. In so concluding, we emphasize that defendant’s breath-test result was
over the legal limit and that the state offered Jackson’s testimony only to establish that the .08 test result was reliable
to establish a .08 BAC. This would be an entirely different
1
OEC 104 provides for hearings on “preliminary matters,” including questions concerning witness qualifications, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence. It is not specific to scientific evidence or to particular admissibility issues.
2
Defendant firmly maintains that he adequately preserved all of his arguments. He does not request discretionary plain-error review, and so we do not
consider plain error. See ORAP 5.45(1) (allowing for discretionary review of
“a plain error” where the claim of error was not preserved in the trial court);
State v. Ardizzone, 270 Or App 666, 673,
349 P3d 597, rev den,
358 Or 145 (2015)
(“Defendant does not request plain error review in this case, and we therefore do
not undertake that analysis.”).
Cite as
318 Or App 683 (2022) 689
case if defendant’s breath-test result had been under the
legal limit and the state had offered Jackson’s testimony
to prove that defendant’s actual BAC was higher than the
breath-test result.
As for scientific validity, that claim of error is preserved, but it fails on the merits. Scientific evidence “possesses an unusually high degree of persuasive power.” State
v. O’Key, 321 Or 285, 291,
899 P2d 663 (1995). As such, OEC
702 gives the trial court a gatekeeping function to ensure
that the persuasive appeal of such evidence is legitimate.
Id. Before admitting such evidence, the court must determine whether it is scientifically valid.
Id. at 292. The goal
is to keep out “bad science.” Marcum v. Adventist Health
System/West,
345 Or 237, 244,
193 P3d 1 (2008). In performing its gatekeeping role under OEC 702, the court is to
screen “proffered scientific testimony to determine whether
it is sufficiently valid, as a matter of science, to legitimately
assist the trier of fact” and exclude “bad science” that would
be confusing, misleading, erroneous, prejudicial, or useless.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time,
importantly, weaknesses in a given scientific study or errors
in an expert’s analysis do not render scientific evidence
invalid. Thoens v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Oregon,
272 Or App 512,
537,
356 P3d 91 (2015). They go to the weight of the evidence,
not whether the factfinder should be allowed to hear it in the
first place.
Id.
Here, Jackson’s testimony was sufficient to establish the scientific validity of the Intoxilyzer 8000 validation
test results for the purpose for which they were offered.3 Any
weaknesses in the testing methodology, such as the relatively
small sample size, could be explored on cross-examination
(as the trial court noted) and might cause the jury to give
3
On appeal, defendant argues that Jackson’s testimony should have been
excluded under OEC 702 as “incompatib[le] with the statutory scheme governing
DUII.” That argument is founded on defendant’s breath-test result being presumptively scientifically valid under the statutory scheme, such that the state
was not required to establish its scientific validity at trial. See State v. Helgeson,
220 Or App 285, 293,
185 P3d 545 (2008) (discussing the legislative presumption
of scientific validity for blood and breath tests to determine BAC). That might be
persuasive as a relevancy argument, if defendant had not challenged the accuracy of his breath-test result, but he did challenge the accuracy of his breath-test
result.
690 State v. Ray
the evidence less weight. The same is true of the various
attacks on the methodology that defendant makes for the
first time in his reply brief on appeal. But the evidence was
not “bad science” of the sort that had to be excluded under
OEC 702. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s OEC 702 objection.
The final issue is whether the trial court erred by
not excluding Jackson’s testimony as unfairly prejudicial.
See OEC 403 (allowing relevant evidence to be excluded “if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”); State v. Mayfield, 302 Or 631, 645,
733 P2d 438 (1987) (describing procedure for OEC 403 balancing). As with defendant’s relevancy argument, we are
unpersuaded that this issue is preserved, but, even if we
were to agree with defendant on preservation, defendant’s
argument fails on the merits.
We have already explained why the validation test
results were relevant, contrary to defendant’s view that they
had no probative value. As for unfair prejudice, the fact that
the evidence might have persuaded the jury that defendant’s
.08 breath-test result was reliable is not “unfair prejudice”
within the meaning of OEC 403. And we are unpersuaded
that the jury would have used the evidence for some other,
improper purpose that would have been unfairly prejudicial.
We disagree with defendant that this case is controlled by State v. Hillier, 132 Or App 40,
887 P2d 845 (1994).
On appeal from a DUII conviction, the defendant in Hillier
argued that it was error to admit into evidence, over his
objection, a single exhibit consisting of “certified copies of
the Oregon Administrative Rules 257-30-005 through 257-
30-100, pertaining to alcohol breath testing, along with
documentation apparently relating to the promulgation of
those rules,” including “memoranda from the Oregon State
Police, results of studies measuring the accuracy of various
Breathalyzers and Intoxilyzers, a letter from a drunk driving committee and virtually illegible data sheets concerning the Model 4011-A Intoxilyzer and the Stephenson Model
900 Breathalyzer.”
Id. at 42. We agreed that it was error
to admit the exhibit.
Id. Documents concerning machines
other than the model used to test the defendant’s breath
Cite as
318 Or App 683 (2022) 691
were irrelevant.
Id. As for documents concerning the Model
4011-A Intoxilyzer that was used, we concluded that those,
too, should have been excluded, because, even if relevant,
“they were highly prejudicial and likely to confuse the jury.”
Id. at 43. Those documents included 10 pages of “illegible
and indecipherable” data, letters from lay people to the legislature referencing that the Intoxilyzer produces lower BAC
measurements than blood testing, and “test results” indicating that the Intoxilyzer produces lower BAC measurements
than blood testing. Id.
Defendant argues that this case is “indistinguishable” from Hillier and our exclusion of the “test results” in
that case. We disagree. Hillier is distinguishable from this
case in several regards. First, beyond referring to them as
“results of studies” and “test results,” we gave no description
of the documents at issue in Hillier, which limits Hillier’s
value as precedent, because study/test results may vary
dramatically in terms of relevance, reliability, risk of unfair
prejudice, risk of confusion, and so on. Second, the study/
test results in Hillier were offered as part of a stand-alone
exhibit, without context or supporting testimony, whereas
Jackson testified to his methodology and was available for
questions and cross-examination. See id. at 42 (the Hillier
defendant objected to the documents as “irrelevant, hearsay and highly prejudicial” and argued that “admitting the
results of scientific studies violated his right to confrontation, because he had no way of cross-examining those
who performed the tests or of attacking the validity of the
results”). Third, in Hillier, unlike here, there is no indication
that the reliability of the defendant’s breath-test result was
put into question. Hillier does not even mention the defendant’s breath-test result or say whether he was tried for
DUII on a per se theory, an impairment theory, or both. See
id. at 42-43.
In sum, we reject defendant’s assignment of error
and affirm the judgment of conviction.
Affirmed.
