¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: June 11, 2024
¶4 S24A0101. FORD v. THE STATE.
¶5 PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
¶6 William Jordan Ford appeals his convictions related to the
¶7shooting death of Travron Gill. 1 On appeal, Jordan argues that the
¶8evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for malice
¶9murder and armed robbery. He also argues that the trial court erred
¶10 1 Gill was killed on August 4, 2017. In December 2017, a Fulton County
¶11grand jury indicted Ford for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony murder (Counts 2-4, predicated on armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer), armed robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 6), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 7), and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer (Count 8). At a March 2019 trial, the jury found Ford guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Ford to life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive life sentence on Count 5, a five-year term on Count 7 consecutive to Count 5, and a five-year term on Count 8 consecutive to Count 7. The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Ford filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. The trial court denied Ford’s motion for new trial in June 2023, and he timely appealed. His appeal was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. in allowing a forensic witness to testify about aspects of a blood test
¶12that the witness did not perform and that the court should have
¶13granted him a mistrial because the forensic witness was not timely
¶14disclosed as a witness. Ford also argues that the trial court erred in
¶15admitting certain exhibits into evidence because they were not
¶16properly authenticated. We conclude that the evidence was
¶17sufficient to support Ford’s convictions, the trial court did not err in
¶18allowing the forensic witness to testify or in denying Ford’s mistrial
¶19motion, and any error in admitting the exhibits was harmless.
¶20Therefore, we affirm.
¶21 The trial evidence showed the following. Travron Gill (also
¶22known as Travion Gill) operated a “trap house,” from which he sold
¶23large quantities of high-grade marijuana. 2 On August 4, 2017, Ford
¶24reached out to Wilbert “Ola” Stephenson, a friend of Gill’s who also
¶25sold drugs. Ford went to Stephenson’s workplace driving a Ford
¶26 2 Because this case turns on an assessment of whether an error was
¶27harmless, we lay out the evidence as reasonable jurors would have viewed it rather than in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts. See Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 264 (1) n.2 (882 SE2d 227) (2022). 2 Fusion and told Stephenson that he wanted to buy a pound of
¶28marijuana and that he had a firearm for sale. Stephenson was not
¶29interested in the firearm and did not have marijuana to sell, but he
¶30directed Ford to Gill. Stephenson reached out to Gill to let him know
¶31a “white boy” was on his way to the trap house.
¶32 Around that time, Makeith Riggins was renovating a house
¶33located across the street from the trap house. Riggins testified that
¶34he encountered a white male later identified as Ford. Ford pulled
¶35into the driveway of the house Riggins was working on, got out of
¶36his car, and was “looking kind of crazy.” Ford said he was looking for
¶37an “ounce.” Riggins said that Ford did not look like a “weed smoker,
¶38he looked like he wanted something else.” Riggins knew Gill sold
¶39only marijuana, so he directed Ford to a different location. Ford left,
¶40but Riggins saw Ford driving up and down the road a few more
¶41times.
¶42 Ford contacted Stephenson, saying he could not find the trap
¶43house, and Stephenson sent Ford a picture of the house around 6:20
¶44p.m. Ford confirmed with Stephenson that he had arrived at the
¶45 3 house. Stephenson and Gill were on the phone at the time, and Gill
¶46told Stephenson that Stephenson’s “buddy” was there. Stephenson
¶47heard Gill “fixing up the bags” before he hung up.
¶48 Riggins saw Ford back his car onto the driveway of the trap
¶49house and enter it, and Riggins heard a gunshot while Ford was
¶50inside. About five minutes later, Riggins saw Ford exit the house,
¶51throw a black bag into the trunk of his car, and drive away quickly.
¶52The house Riggins had been renovating that day had security
¶53cameras. He obtained the surveillance video and provided it to the
¶54police. The recording, which was played for the jury, showed Ford
¶55talking to Riggins, backing into the trap house driveway at 6:23
¶56p.m., and leaving the house at 6:28 p.m.
¶57 Stephenson subsequently tried to call Gill and became worried
¶58when he could not reach him. Stephenson then tried to contact Ford,
¶59calling him, sending him text messages, and reaching out on
¶60Instagram. At a certain point, Stephenson’s calls to Ford would not
¶61go through and he was blocked on Ford’s Instagram.
¶62 The next day, Gill’s girlfriend, Brittani Tarver, went to the trap
¶63 4 house because he had not responded to any of her messages. When
¶64she found Gill in the house, unresponsive, she called 911. Police
¶65responded and found Gill lying on the kitchen floor with a gunshot
¶66wound to his head. Police also saw blood on an interior doorknob, a
¶67cartridge casing next to Gill’s leg, and a bullet in the crevice between
¶68the stove and a kitchen cabinet. Police collected the casing and bullet
¶69for evidence. Police also found marijuana and a digital scale in the
¶70kitchen. Police also recovered more than $900 in cash from Gill.
¶71 Gill was pronounced dead at the scene and his body was
¶72transported to a medical examiner, who performed an autopsy that
¶73same day. The medical examiner determined that Gill died from a
¶74gunshot wound to the head and testified that the fatal gunshot
¶75entered behind Gill’s left ear and exited to the right of his eyebrow.
¶76The medical examiner also testified that the condition of Gill’s body
¶77was consistent with Gill having been shot between 6:15 p.m. and
¶786:30 p.m. on the day before.
¶79 Based on their investigations, police questioned Stephenson,
¶80who told them about his interactions with Ford and provided a
¶81 5 picture of Ford. Police confirmed Ford’s identity and learned that he
¶82had a 2016 grey Ford Fusion registered in his name. Ford was on
¶83first-offender probation at the time.
¶84 Police went to Ford’s workplace to execute an arrest warrant.
¶85When approached by police, Ford attempted to flee. Ford was
¶86ultimately arrested, and the clothing and shoes he was wearing at
¶87the time were submitted for testing by the GBI. The testing of Ford’s
¶88jeans revealed the presence of gunshot residue, and one of his
¶89sneakers had blood on it that matched Gill’s DNA. Police later
¶90searched Ford’s car and found a 9mm Beretta under the driver’s
¶91seat. Police also found a bag of marijuana next to a black bag in the
¶92trunk. A forensic analysis revealed that the recovered gun fired the
¶93spent casing found next to Gill’s body and the bullet recovered next
¶94to the stove in the kitchen. Ford argues that under the standard set
¶95forth in Jackson v.
¶96Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the
¶97evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for malice
¶98murder and armed robbery. We disagree.
¶99 6 When evaluating the legal sufficiency of evidence, we view the
¶100evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and inquire
¶101whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
¶102beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “Under
¶103this review, we must put aside any questions about conflicting
¶104evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence,
¶105leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of
¶106fact.” Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 853 (1) (a) (823 SE2d 325) (2019)
¶107(citation and punctuation omitted).
¶108 The evidence described above was plainly sufficient to support
¶109Ford’s murder conviction. There was testimony that Ford went to
¶110Gill’s house to purchase marijuana, Gill confirmed to Stephenson
¶111that Ford had arrived, and Riggins saw Ford enter Gill’s house and
¶112heard a gunshot shortly thereafter. Surveillance video footage
¶113played for the jury confirmed Ford’s presence at Gill’s house at the
¶114time of the shooting. Forensic evidence showed that the gun
¶115recovered from Ford’s vehicle was the murder weapon and that one
¶116of his sneakers had blood on it that matched Gill’s DNA. Ford’s
¶117 7 conduct following the shooting also showed a consciousness of guilt.
¶118Ford had been in frequent contact with Stephenson until he arrived
¶119at Gill’s house but subsequently did not respond to Stephenson’s
¶120messages and blocked him on social media. He also attempted to flee
¶121when police approached him. See Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 89 (3)
¶122(868 SE2d 205) (2022) (an accused’s flight, resistance to arrest,
¶123concealment, and other related conduct “is admissible as evidence of
¶124consciousness of guilt for the charged offense, and thus of guilt itself”
¶125(citations and punctuation omitted)). This evidence far exceeds the
¶126threshold for sufficiency under Jackson.
¶127 Ford argues that he countered the State’s evidence that he shot
¶128Gill with malice, because there was money left behind at the scene
¶129of the crime. But as we have stated before, “[i]t is for a jury to
¶130determine from all the facts and circumstances whether a killing is
¶131intentional and malicious.” Benton v. State, 305 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (a)
¶132(824 SE2d 322) (2019). Because the evidence showed that Gill was
¶133shot in the head while Ford was in the house and that Ford left the
¶134scene without rendering aid, the jury was authorized to conclude
¶135 8 that Ford was guilty of the crime of malice murder. See, e.g., Benton,
¶136305 Ga. at 244 (1) (a) (evidence sufficient to support finding of malice
¶137murder where, among other things, appellant left the victim after
¶138shooting him); Moran v. State, 302 Ga. 162, 163 (1) (b) (805 SE2d
¶139856) (2017) (jury authorized to find evidence of malice where, among
¶140other things, the defendant shot the victim in the back of the head).
¶141 Ford argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
¶142armed robbery conviction solely because the State did not prove he
¶143took anything from Gill when cash and other items of value were
¶144found at Gill’s house following the shooting, and the State could not
¶145prove that the marijuana found in his trunk was taken from Gill.
¶146His argument fails.
¶147 The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Ford at
¶148least took marijuana. The evidence clearly established that Ford
¶149was attempting to acquire marijuana, and he went to Gill’s house
¶150for that purpose. Stephenson said that when Gill confirmed Ford’s
¶151arrival, it sounded like Gill was “fixing up the bags.” The evidence
¶152shows that after Gill was shot in the kitchen, which contained
¶153 9 marijuana and a digital scale, Ford left Gill’s house with a black bag
¶154and placed it in his trunk. When Ford was later arrested, marijuana
¶155was found in the trunk of Ford’s vehicle and located next to a black
¶156bag. Although there is no specific evidence that the marijuana found
¶157in Ford’s vehicle was similar to the marijuana that Gill sold, a jury
¶158could infer from the circumstances, especially Ford leaving Gill’s
¶159residence with a black bag, that Ford at least took marijuana from
¶160Gill. Accordingly, Ford’s argument to the contrary fails. See
¶161Thornton v. State, 312 Ga. 224, 227-228 (1) (862 SE2d 113) (2021)
¶162(rejecting argument that there was no evidence showing when or
¶163how the defendant obtained the victim’s property because the
¶164defendant had a knife when he encountered the victim and jury
¶165could conclude from evidence whether he obtained property by
¶166armed robbery); Waller v. State, 311 Ga. 517, 522-523 (2) (a) (858
¶167SE2d 683) (2021) (based on evidence presented, the jury was
¶168authorized to make the reasonable inference that the defendant took
¶169the victim’s property).
¶170 2. Ford next argues that the trial court erred in allowing
¶171 10 forensic technician Angela McCray to testify about a “blood stain
¶172card” that was later used to compare Gill’s blood against that
¶173collected from Ford’s sneaker. McCray testified that she was present
¶174for the autopsy and personally drew Gill’s blood and placed blood
¶175droplets on the blood stain card. Ford argues that McCray’s
¶176testimony was based on hearsay testimony, pointing to her response
¶177to questioning about how she knew she had some personal
¶178involvement with the blood stain card. The prosecutor asked
¶179McCray, “How do you know that you had any connection with the
¶180autopsy regarding [the blood stain card]?” McCray responded, “Well,
¶181I know because I was able to look over the case before I came here,
¶182and I saw that I was the assigned technician on that case, meaning
¶183that I assisted the pathologist with the autopsy on that case.”
¶184 Ford’s hearsay claim is meritless. Hearsay is defined as “a
¶185statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
¶186the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
¶187matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801 (c). But McCray did not testify
¶188about something someone else told her; instead, she testified about
¶189 11 what she personally did. See OCGA § 24-6-602 (a witness’s own
¶190testimony may prove that she has personal knowledge of the matter
¶191at issue); see also Brown v. State, 314 Ga. 193, 200 (3) (875 SE2d
¶192784) (2022) (witnesses’ knowledge of shooting was not based on
¶193hearsay where they were present at crime scene and described their
¶194observations of shooting); Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 478 (3) (b) (819
¶195SE2d 468) (2018) (reviewing case law that a witness can testify only
¶196as to that of which the witness has personal knowledge and that
¶197relaying information told to the testifying witness constitutes
¶198inadmissible hearsay).
¶199 Ford also claims that McCray’s testimony constituted
¶200“surrogate testimony” under Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.
¶201647 (131 SCt 2705, 180 LE2d 610) (2011). There, the United States
¶202Supreme Court held that testimony about a lab test by a witness
¶203who did not perform or observe the test reported in the certification
¶204violates the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. But McCray
¶205testified that she personally drew the blood and placed it on the
¶206blood stain card, and McCray provided no testimony about the
¶207 12 results of any tests run on that blood stain card. Therefore, Ford’s
¶208Bullcoming claim fails.
¶209 3. Ford alternatively argues that the court should have granted
¶210his request for a mistrial because McCray was not identified on any
¶211of the State’s witness lists or in discovery. We disagree.
¶212 A trial court has broad discretion as to whether to grant a
¶213mistrial, and we will not disturb a court’s decision not to grant one
¶214unless there is a showing that a mistrial was essential to preserve a
¶215party’s right to a fair trial. See Jordan v. State, 305 Ga. 12, 15 (2)
¶216(823 SE2d 336) (2019); Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 833-834 (3) (792
¶217SE2d 342) (2016). A trial court has the discretion to fashion an
¶218appropriate remedy for a violation of the discovery statutes,
¶219including whether to grant a mistrial. See OCGA § 17-16-6; Tubbs
¶220v. State, 276 Ga. 751, 753-754 (3) (583 SE2d 853) (2003). Ford fails
¶221to show that a mistrial was necessary to preserve his right to a fair
¶222trial.
¶223 On the fourth day of his trial, the State notified Ford just after
¶224lunch that it intended to call McCray in order to establish the chain
¶225 13 of custody for the blood stain card. McCray was not the next witness
¶226to be called. Ford moved for a mistrial because he was not provided
¶227McCray’s name prior to trial, but he made no request for a
¶228continuance or any other remedy for the purported discovery
¶229violation. The trial court denied his mistrial motion without
¶230explanation.
¶231 Ford argues that the court should have granted him a mistrial
¶232because he was not prepared to cross-examine McCray, as he did not
¶233even know of her existence before trial. But McCray’s testimony was
¶234very brief, limited only to her description of having collected blood
¶235from Gill and placing it on the blood stain card. Ford makes no
¶236showing of how advance notice of McCray’s testimony would have
¶237made any difference with respect to his cross-examination of her. He
¶238also argues that, due to the lack of notice, he was unable to
¶239investigate the collection of the blood stain card prior to trial. He
¶240makes no claim, however, that he was unaware that blood was
¶241collected from Gill, placed on a blood stain card, or tested. In other
¶242words, he has not shown how McCray’s omission from witness lists
¶243 14 precluded him from investigating the blood stain card, nor has he
¶244shown how additional time would have helped his defense. Ford’s
¶245arguments about how he was harmed by the omission of McCray’s
¶246name from the State’s witness list are purely speculative and are
¶247insufficient to show that the denial of a mistrial motion was an
¶248abuse of discretion. See Platt v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (2) (i) (__ SE2d
¶249__) (2024) (rejecting claim that the trial court erred in denying
¶250motion for mistrial based on State’s failure to disclose the existence
¶251of a recording of a statement by the defendant, because the
¶252defendant did not show how an earlier disclosure would have
¶253benefitted him, and his suggestion that he would have cross-
¶254examined witnesses differently if he was aware of the recording was
¶255“vague and unsupported”).
¶256 4. Ford argues that the trial court erred in admitting into
¶257evidence exhibits containing cellphone data extracted from four
¶258cellphones. Ford argues that the exhibits were not properly
¶259authenticated. But any error in admitting the exhibits was
¶260harmless.
¶261 15 At trial, Detective Mark Taylor testified that he was
¶262responsible for downloading or extracting data from mobile devices.
¶263The State tendered into evidence State’s Exhibits 90 through 93, and
¶264Detective Taylor identified the exhibits as thumb drives containing
¶265data extracted from certain cellphones, and the labels on the thumb
¶266drives corresponded to the owner of the cell phone. The thumb drives
¶267were labeled “Ford Dump”, “Vic Dump,” “Ola Stephenson,” and
¶268“Tarver.”
¶269 Ford objected based on lack of foundation and failure to
¶270establish a chain of custody because “we do not have the phones to
¶271know which actual phones were dumped.” Detective Taylor testified
¶272that he reviewed the exhibits, and they contained the data extracted
¶273from the devices. He testified that he received the actual phones
¶274from the lead detective and took photographs of the phones,
¶275including the identification numbers for each. The court admitted
¶276the exhibits, overruling Ford’s objections based on hearsay and
¶277chain of custody grounds.
¶278 On appeal, Ford argues that the State failed to authenticate
¶279 16 Exhibits 90 through 93 properly because Detective Taylor had no
¶280personal knowledge about the ownership of the cell phones and his
¶281knowledge was based on hearsay information gained from the lead
¶282detective. But regardless of whether Exhibits 90 through 93 were
¶283properly authenticated, any error in their admission was harmless.
¶284 “The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is
¶285whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
¶286verdict.” Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 478 (3) (c) (819 SE2d 468)
¶287(2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). The State bears the
¶288burden of showing harmlessness. Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704, 708
¶289(2) (a) (808 SE2d 671) (2017).
¶290 Any error here was harmless because the evidence of guilt was
¶291overwhelming. The surveillance video shows Ford inside Gill’s house
¶292between 6:23 p.m. and 6:28 p.m. on the day of Gill’s death, and the
¶293medical examiner testified that the condition of Gill’s body was
¶294consistent with a time of death between 6:15 p.m. and 6:30 p.m.
¶295Riggins said that after he saw Ford go inside Gill’s house, he heard
¶296a gunshot and then saw Ford leave. When Ford was arrested, the
¶297 17 murder weapon was found in his car, and one of his shoes had blood
¶298on it that had the presence of Gill’s DNA.
¶299 Ford argues that the data contained in Exhibit 90 through 93
¶300were critical to the State’s case because it corroborated important
¶301aspects of Stephenson’s testimony, including that Ford went to Gill’s
¶302house shortly before 6:30 p.m. on the day of Gill’s death and that
¶303Stephenson sent Ford a text message containing a picture of Gill’s
¶304house when Ford was lost. Ford argues that the State needed to
¶305corroborate Stephenson’s testimony because he was arguably an
¶306accomplice based on conspiring with Ford to arrange a drug
¶307transaction with Gill.
¶308 But even if this were true, other evidence corroborated
¶309Stephenson’s testimony: surveillance video footage showed that
¶310Ford arrived at Gill’s house around 6:23 p.m. and Riggins testified
¶311that Ford was driving around looking for drugs. Therefore, the
¶312exhibits were not critical to the State’s case. Under these
¶313circumstances, it is highly probable that any error in admitting the
¶314exhibits did not contribute to the verdicts.
¶315 18 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶316 19