Johnson v. State

FINAL COPY

                 S24A0633. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.


      PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

      Deand’re Dwayne Johnson appeals his convictions related to

the stabbing death of Louis Tyler and non-fatal assault of Vicki

Robinson.1 On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court plainly


      1 The crimes occurred on November 10, 2018, and Louis died the next

morning. A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Johnson on December 18, 2018,
and a subsequent reindictment was returned on September 5, 2019, charging
Johnson with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2 to 4),
aggravated assault of Louis (Count 5), first degree burglary (Count 6),
aggravated stalking (Count 7), aggravated assault of Robinson (Count 8), and
possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 9). At an October
2019 trial, the jury found Johnson guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced
Johnson to a total of life without the possibility of parole plus 25 years.
Specifically, the trial court sentenced Johnson to life without the possibility of
parole for Count 1, vacated Counts 2 to 4, purported to merge Counts 5 to 7
with Count 1, sentenced Johnson to 20 consecutive years in custody for Count
8, and sentenced Johnson to five consecutive years in custody for Count 9.
Although there may have been a merger error with respect to the burglary and
aggravated stalking counts, we decline to address that issue here because any
error benefited the defendant and the State has not challenged the merger of
those counts. See Dixon v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2017)
(explaining that even when no party raises a merger error, we have discretion
to correct it on direct appeal, but when the error benefits the defendant and
the State fails to raise it by cross-appeal, we exercise our discretion to correct
the error only in exceptional circumstances). Johnson timely moved for new
trial on November 26, 2019, and amended that motion through new counsel on
June 30, 2023. After a hearing on August 14, 2023, the trial court denied the
erred by failing to charge impeachment of a witness based on bias,

failing to charge knowledge, failing to charge the defense of accident,

and permitting a witness to testify about the victim’s hearsay

statement. Johnson has not shown that the trial court clearly erred

by omitting the instructions regarding the impeachment of a witness

based on bias, knowledge, or accident, and Johnson has failed to

show how any error related to the trial court’s admission of the

alleged hearsay testimony likely affected the outcome. Therefore,

Johnson’s claims of plain error fail, and we affirm.

     The evidence at trial showed the following. Johnson and

Jasmine Tyler began dating in May 2016. They had one son, K. J.,

together in September 2017 and broke up in August 2018. Upon

breaking up, Johnson and Jasmine agreed that Johnson would

watch K. J. while she worked, and K. J. otherwise lived with

Jasmine at her grandmother’s house down the road from where

Johnson lived. Jasmine later arranged for her father, Louis Tyler,


motion on September 28, 2023. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal through
appellate counsel, and the case was docketed to the April 2024 term of this
Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                     2
and his long-term girlfriend, Vicki Robinson, to watch K. J. instead

of Johnson.

      On October 23, 2018, Johnson “pop[ped] up” at Louis and

Robinson’s apartment uninvited, and Robinson let Johnson in to see

K. J. At Louis’s request, Robinson asked Johnson to leave, and

Johnson responded that calling the police was “the only way [she]

was going to be able to stop him[,]” “forcibly took” K. J., bruising

Robinson, ran from the apartment, and got in a car that drove away.2

Robinson called the police, who found Johnson with K. J. and

returned K. J. to her; an audio recording of this call was played for

the jury. Johnson never legitimized his relationship with K. J. and

did not see K. J. much after that incident.

      On October 31, 2018, Johnson texted Jasmine two photographs

of her grandmother’s car with a broken window and communicated



      2 Johnson testified in his own defense that he took K. J. because he did

not think the apartment was the best place for K. J.’s health, given that he was
sick and the apartment smelled like cigarette smoke. According to Johnson,
the physical struggle arose because Robinson “was elbowing [K. J.] in the
stomach basically trying to forcefully keep [K. J.] away from” him. Johnson
claimed that another relative “pulled [Robinson] off” of K. J. and him, letting
them go.
                                       3
that someone had tried to break into her grandmother’s car. Jasmine

was at work and called Louis, who arrived at her grandmother’s

house around midnight and called the police. Jasmine testified that

she believed that Johnson did it, and when she challenged Johnson

via text message as to whether he had called the police to report the

broken window like Johnson told her that he had, Johnson told her

“don’t come back on this street” and that his “cousin was going to

basically beat [her] up.” He also sent threatening text messages

about Louis, saying he was “going to beat [that] man to sleep[.]”At

trial, when asked if there was “any sort of altercation, verbal or

physical, between [Louis] and the defendant[,]”3 the following

exchange ensued:

     JASMINE: Yes. My father said that he hit him.
     STATE: Deand’re hit your dad?
     JASMINE: Yes. Deand’re hit my father.

Johnson did not object. Similarly, Robinson testified that Louis

called and placed her on speaker phone during that encounter, and



     3 It is unclear from the record whether Jasmine’s testimony referred to

an altercation between Louis and Johnson “that night” or “ever.”
                                      4
that Johnson had punched Louis in the stomach after Louis told him

to stop “doing all this foolishness” and “to grow up and get a job and

start taking care of his son.” Johnson did not object to this testimony,

which he elicited on cross-examination. Johnson also elicited

Robinson’s testimony that police who responded to the scene

concluded that Louis had instigated the incident.

     In the early morning of November 2, 2018, Robinson had K. J.

at her apartment when she heard a “big boom” as though a tree had

fallen on the house. She looked out her bedroom window and saw

Johnson running behind the apartment. In the living room, she saw

a “big boulder rock through [her] whole front window” and called

911, and an audio recording of this call was played for the jury. Louis

and Robinson pressed charges against Johnson; Jasmine testified

that Johnson admitted to her that he broke Louis and Robinson’s

window.

     On the same day, Jasmine obtained an ex parte temporary

restraining order prohibiting Johnson from “harassing, harming, or

abusing the Petitioner’s family or household” and stating that

                                   5
Johnson had no legal right to visit and had no custodial rights

regarding K. J. Johnson “kept calling” and texting Louis and

Robinson about K. J. so much that they “had to . . . turn the phone

off in order to go to sleep [and] to go to work.”4

     Jasmine testified that on November 3, 2018, before the

restraining order was served, she received a text message with a

picture of herself in a dress, reading “this is the nice dress to die in.”5

Jasmine called the police, who arrived on the scene but informed her

there was nothing they could do absent the order being served; an

audio recording of that call was played for the jury. Also on that date,

Robinson overheard a phone call between Louis and Johnson in

which Johnson said that he “wanted to apologize” but did not admit



     4 A cell phone extraction of Louis’s cell phone, displayed to the jury,
revealed 43 calls and nine text messages from different phone numbers
associated with Johnson to Louis’s phone between November 2, 2018, and
November 10, 2018. While some call logs indicated that Louis’s phone was
answered, the records show no communications initiated from Louis’s cell
phone to the numbers associated with Johnson.
      5 Although Jasmine did not associate the phone number sending that

message with Johnson, Johnson immediately texted her again from another
number displaying knowledge about the threatening text message and
blaming the message on his cousin. And Jasmine testified that Johnson
routinely contacted her from multiple numbers.
                                     6
to breaking Louis and Robinson’s window. The restraining order was

served on November 7, 2018.

     Robinson testified that around 7:00 a.m. on November 10,

2018, when K. J. was at Louis and Robinson’s apartment, Johnson

called Louis and Robinson because he “wanted to bring the baby

some money[,]” but they declined the money. At one point, Louis left

the apartment, but he returned shortly after seeing Johnson

walking near the apartment. Around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m., a neighbor

knocked on their door and said, “this guy asked [him] to knock on

your door to tell you it’s a old friend out here who wants to see you.”

Robinson testified that they assumed it was Johnson and were going

to ignore him, but Louis went outside because his “car alarm kept

going off[.]” Robinson called 911; an audio recording of this call was

played for the jury.

     According to Robinson, Johnson was “already out there with a

butcher knife[,]” and Robinson heard Louis “hollering, ‘Dre, put the

knife down[.]’ ” She went outside with a door bar, saw Johnson, who



                                  7
“walked a long way with a butcher knife to come to [their] house[,]”6

“going at Louis” and “sticking at Louis with the knife.”7 Robinson

attempted to hit and Louis did hit Johnson with the door bar.

Johnson ran in the open apartment door, where K. J. was in a car

seat on the couch, and tried to close the door. Louis got inside, where

Johnson “was charging at Louis with the knife, so Louis grabbed him

and . . . the knife went in Louis. But Louis held [Johnson] down with

the knife” as Robinson tried to “pry the knife out” of Johnson’s hand,

and he twice stabbed her in the hand before she threw the knife

away and realized that Louis had been stabbed. Louis affirmed that

Johnson had stabbed him in the chest. Johnson tried to give CPR to

Louis, but Robinson stopped him, and the neighbor returned to help

and restrained Johnson.

     Paramedics took Louis to a hospital, where he died the next

morning. An autopsy revealed defensive injuries on Louis’s right




     6 The record makes clear that Johnson walked about three miles to get

to their apartment.
      7 Robinson testified that there was no talking and that Johnson “came

with rage.”
                                    8
arm, a small injury on his back, and a stab wound. The autopsy

report classified the cause of death as a “stab wound to the chest[,]”

or put another way, “the stabbing object causing a fatal injury of the

heart[.]”

     The neighbor who had knocked on the door, Isaiah Rogers,

testified that he was walking around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. on November

10, 2018, when a man approached and offered to pay him to knock

on the door of the apartment and “let them know there’s an old

friend out here trying to see them.” Rogers did so, and “after about

five minutes” he heard screaming from that apartment. He returned

and saw “Louis and the person that [he] knocked on the door for,

wrestling around sort of in the yard.” Johnson had a knife “wielded

at” Louis, and Louis had what Rogers thought was a broom or a

white stick; Rogers saw blood around the rib area of Louis’s shirt

and knew “that he got stabbed.” Johnson then “dashed inside the

house[,]” where Robinson remained, and “tried to shut the door but

Louis stuck the broom inside the door[.]” Inside, Rogers saw a baby

crying on the couch, Louis on top of Johnson, holding his hands

                                  9
down, and Robinson holding his wrists down with her feet. Rogers

grabbed the knife, threw it outside, and put Johnson “in [a] headlock

and made sure he stayed until the police arrived.” When police

arrived, Rogers told them Johnson “stabbed Louis.”

     Rogers’s former roommate, Nicholas Herndon, testified that he

arrived and saw Louis bleeding on the ground, Robinson helping

Louis, a baby on the couch, Johnson on the couch, and Rogers

“making sure [Johnson] stayed on the couch.” Herndon called 911,

and an audio recording of that call was played for the jury, during

which another neighbor arrived and asked what happened, and

Johnson responded, “I stabbed him.”

     Officer Nathan Foster responded to the scene and testified that

he immediately took Johnson into custody, and Johnson later

volunteered “that it was self-defense.”

     Johnson testified in his own defense at trial and denied the

following: (1) threatening Jasmine or Louis via text message, (2)

breaking Jasmine’s grandmother’s car window, (3) telling Jasmine

that he broke the car window, (4) getting in a physical fight with

                                 10
Louis about the car window, (5) breaking the apartment window, or

(6) admitting while Herndon was on the phone with 911 that he

stabbed Louis. According to Johnson, on November 10, he walked to

the apartment to ask if he could help financially with K. J., not

knowing that the temporary restraining order meant that he could

not be near his son anymore. Johnson said that Louis attacked him,

so Johnson “end[ed] up having to use the knife.” Johnson said that

he carried the knife tucked in his pants for protection, as he often

did, because he had gotten robbed before in that area.

     According to Johnson, he asked the neighbor to help because

he did not want to cause an altercation. Louis came outside, told

Johnson “you messed up my daughter’s life” and grabbed and

threatened him. Louis grabbed Johnson “[u]p towards the neck

area” with two hands and would not let him go, despite Johnson

yelling for him to do so. Robinson came outside with a door bar,

Johnson pulled out the knife, and Louis let him go. The defense

elicited testimony that Louis was around six feet tall and weighed



                                11
248 pounds, while Johnson was around five feet and four inches tall

and weighed around 110 to 118 pounds.

     Johnson testified that he ran to the house to escape, not

knowing that K. J. was there, and tried to leave when he saw K. J.

Johnson claimed that Louis pushed open the door with the door bar,

charged at Johnson, and swung the door bar. That is “when

[Johnson] jab[bed] with the knife.” Louis slammed him on the

ground, hit him in the face, and tried to grab the knife while they

tussled. Johnson broke his grip and “hit” Louis again out of fear of

“what he would do if he had the knife.” Louis pinned Johnson’s

hands down and instructed Robinson to get the knife, and Johnson

opened his hand to “let her get the knife.” Johnson tried to give CPR

and did not try to run because he said, “I kn[e]w I didn’t do anything

wrong.” On cross-examination, Johnson admitted that he “swung

the knife as a jab” and stabbed Louis in the chest, but he insisted

that it was “[i]n defense.”

     1. Johnson contends that the trial court plainly erred by failing

to instruct the jury on the impeachment of a witness based on a

                                 12
witness’s bias for or against a party, on knowledge, and on the

defense of accident. We disagree.

     As Johnson concedes on appeal, his trial counsel did not

request any of these instructions or object to their omission at trial,

so we review these claims for plain error only. See OCGA § 17-8-58.8

To establish plain error, Johnson must prove that the instructional

error (1) was not affirmatively waived, (2) was clear and obvious

beyond reasonable dispute, (3) likely affected the outcome of the

proceedings, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Collins v. State, 

 (5) (

) (2021). “An appellant must establish

all four elements of the test in order to demonstrate plain error, so

satisfying this test is difficult, as it should be.” 

 (citation and

punctuation omitted). Indeed, if an appellant fails to satisfy any one


     8 Under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b):

           Failure to object in accordance with subsection (a) of this
     Code section shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the
     jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes
     plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties. Such
     plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought
     to the court’s attention as provided in subsection (a) of this Code
     section.
                                     13
prong of the plain error test, we need not consider the other prongs.

See State v. Kelly, 

 (2) (b) n.5 (

) (2011).

    (a) The trial court did not clearly err by omitting the
impeachment for bias instruction.

     Johnson contends that the trial court plainly erred by failing

to instruct the jury on impeachment of a witness based on a

witness’s bias when ample evidence supported this instruction and

the trial court instructed the jury on prior difficulties evidence. “In

evaluating a claim that the trial court was required to give certain

jury instructions, we view the charge as a whole to determine

whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed.” Clark v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2023) (citation and punctuation

omitted); see also Taylor v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2000) (no error in omission of instruction when charge as given

substantially   covered   all   legal   principles   relevant   to   the

determination of the appellant’s guilt).

     Here, the trial court directed the jury to “determine the

credibility of the witnesses” and to consider among other things “all


                                  14
of the facts and circumstances of the case, including . . . their interest

or lack of interest in the outcome of the case and their personal

credibility[.]”9 Even assuming that slight evidence supported an

instruction on impeachment for bias, we have said that an

instruction directing jurors to consider a witness’s interest or lack of

interest in the outcome of the case substantially covers the possible

motive, interest, or bias of the State’s witnesses. See, e.g., Baker v.

State, 

 (2) (

) (2024) (no clear error in

trial court’s omission of instruction on impeachment of a witness for

bias); Isaac v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2024)


     9 The full instruction was as follows:

            You are not required to accept the testimony of any
     witnesses, expert or otherwise. Testimony of an expert, like that of
     all witnesses, is to be given only such weight and credit as you
     think it is properly entitled to receive. The jury must determine
     the credibility of the witnesses. In deciding this, you may consider
     all of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the
     witnesses’ manner of testifying, their means and opportunity for
     knowing the facts about which they testify, the nature of the facts
     about which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
     testimony, their interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the
     case and their personal credibility as you observe it. To impeach a
     witness is to show that witness is unworthy of belief. A witness
     may be impeached by disproving the facts to which the witness
     testified.


                                      15
(pretermitting whether slight evidence supported a charge on bias,

trial court did not err when the charge as given substantially

covered the declined charge); Foster v. State, 

 (7)

(

) (2014) (instruction that the jury determine each

witness’s credibility and consider each witness’s interest or lack

thereof in the case adequately covered the possible motive, interest,

or bias of the State’s witnesses). Therefore, when evaluated in the

context of the jury instructions as a whole, Johnson has not shown

that the trial court clearly erred in omitting the impeachment-for-

bias instruction, and his claim of plain error fails.

     (b) The trial court did not clearly err by omitting the knowledge
instruction.

     Johnson contends that the trial court’s failure to instruct the

jury on knowledge was plain error because this is an element that

the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt and this is a pattern

jury instruction given in most criminal trials.10


     10 The pattern jury instruction on knowledge states:

           Knowledge on the part of the defendant that the crime of
     [specific crime] was being committed and that the defendant

                                    16
      Here, the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on the

presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, the definition

of a crime, and intent. These instructions adequately informed the

jury that it could not find Johnson guilty if he did not knowingly and

intentionally participate in the crimes. See Sauder v. State, 

 (5) (b) (

) (2024) (no clear or obvious error

when trial court failed to instruct the jury on mere presence and

knowledge, because the court instructed on the presumption of

innocence, the State’s burden of proof, criminal intent, and parties

to a crime). Accordingly, considering the jury instructions as a




     knowingly and intentionally participated in or helped in the
     commission of such crime must be proved by the State beyond a
     reasonable doubt. If you find from the evidence in this case that the
     defendant had no knowledge that a crime was being committed or
     that the defendant did not knowingly and intentionally commit,
     participate, or help in the commission of (and was not a conspirator
     in) the alleged offense, then it would be your duty to acquit the
     defendant.
           On the other hand, should you find, beyond a reasonable
     doubt, that the defendant had knowledge that the crime of [specific
     crime] was being committed and that the defendant knowingly and
     intentionally participated or helped in the commission of it, then
     you would be authorized to convict the defendant.
Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases § 1.43.10.
                                      17
whole, the trial court’s omission of the knowledge instruction was

not a clear or obvious error, and Johnson’s claim for plain error fails.

     (c) The trial court did not clearly err by omitting the instruction
on the defense of accident.

     Johnson contends that the trial court plainly erred by omitting

an instruction on the defense of accident. To authorize a requested

jury instruction, there need be only “slight evidence to support the

theory of the charge, and the necessary evidence may be presented

by the State, the defendant, or both.” McIver v. State, 

 (2) (g) (

) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

The accident instruction applies “where it satisfactorily appears

there was no criminal scheme, undertaking, intention, or criminal

negligence.” OCGA § 16-2-2. Put another way, this defense “arises

when a defendant contends that his acts were accidental or a

product of misfortune rather than criminal intent or negligence.”

Stepp-McCommons v. State, 

 (2) (a) (

)

(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).




                                  18
      Here, Johnson contends that Robinson’s testimony that

Johnson stabbed Louis when Louis grabbed Johnson and held him

down during the fight for control over the knife constituted slight

evidence supporting the defense of accident. But this account

mischaracterizes Robinson’s testimony, which makes clear that

before Louis grabbed Johnson, Johnson “was charging at Louis with

the knife[.]”11 Therefore, the testimony that Johnson points to as

slight evidence actually undercuts his contention that the stabbing

was an accident.

      Even assuming that Johnson stabbed Louis during the fight for

control over the knife, Johnson insisted at trial that he intended to

brandish the knife in self-defense, and the mere fact that the

stabbing may have occurred during a fight for control over the knife

does not render the stabbing an accident. Although a defendant may

assert both the defense of accident and the defense of self-defense,




      11 Indeed, Robinson testified that Johnson “was charging at Louis with

the knife, so Louis grabbed him and . . . the knife went in Louis. But Louis held
[Johnson] down with the knife” as Robinson tried to “pry the knife out of
Johnson’s hand[.]”
                                       19
the defendant is entitled to charges on both only if slight evidence

supports both charges. See Hudson v. State, 

 (4)

(

) (2008) (evidence supported both charges when

defendant testified that she used a knife to “force” the threatening

victim “to get back” but did not mean to stab him or understand how

the knife became lodged in his chest). By asserting these alternative

defenses, “the defendant in essence tells the jury, ‘I didn’t mean to

[stab] the victim. But if you find that I [stabbed] him intentionally,

I was justified in doing so, because it was the only way to stop him

from seriously injuring me.’” McClure v. State, 

 (1)

(

) (2019).

     Here, Johnson points to no evidence that he did not intend to

stab Louis. Rather, Johnson testified at trial that he used the knife

in self-defense, he “swung the knife as a jab[,]” he stabbed Louis in

the chest, and he hit Louis again after the stabbing out of fear of

what Louis would do if he had the knife. Given this evidence, the

trial court did not clearly err by omitting the accident instruction.

See Stepp-McCommons, 

 (2) (a) (no error in

                                 20
omitting accident instruction where defendant testified he shot the

victim in self-defense without intending to “murder” the victim);

Morris v. State, 

 (V) (C) (

) (2018)

(accident instruction unwarranted when evidence supported only a

self-defense instruction); Dolensek v. State, 

 (6) (

) (2002) (no error in omitting accident instruction when

evidence demonstrated only that the defendant acted intentionally

“to defend himself and to scare off his attackers”).

     2. Johnson contends that the trial court plainly erred by

admitting Jasmine’s testimony that Louis previously told her that

Johnson hit him on the night the car window was broken.

Specifically, Johnson argues the admission of this testimony was

plain error because the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and

impermissible character evidence. We disagree.

     As Johnson concedes on appeal, his trial counsel failed to object

to the admission of this evidence, so we review this claim for plain

error only. See Merritt v. State, 

 (6) (

)

(2021) (reviewing admission of evidence at trial without objection for

                                  21
plain error); OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section

shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting

substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the

attention of the court.”).

     Here, even if we assume that the trial court’s admission of the

testimony was a clear or obvious error under any of the grounds

asserted by Johnson, Johnson cannot obtain reversal because he has

failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights. Rather,

the contested testimony was merely cumulative of other testimony,

and the evidence of Johnson’s guilt was overwhelming.

     To begin, Jasmine’s testimony that Louis told her Johnson hit

him was cumulative of Robinson’s testimony describing what she

heard on speaker phone during the encounter and recounting

Louis’s depiction of the confrontation. Therefore, Jasmine’s

testimony    added    nothing   to    Robinson’s   depiction   of   the

confrontation and was merely cumulative of other unchallenged

testimony. See Allen v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2020) (admission of challenged testimony did not affect

                                 22
defendant’s substantial rights when that testimony was cumulative

of other unchallenged evidence); McKinney v. State, 

(2) (b) (

) (2019) (any error in admission of conviction

resulting from defendant’s prior attack against the victim did not

affect defendant’s substantial rights when the challenged evidence

was cumulative of other testimony and the jury heard substantial

testimony about other prior difficulties between the defendant and

the victim).

     Moreover, evidence of Johnson’s guilt was overwhelming.

Weeks before the stabbing, a phone number associated with Johnson

sent messages about Louis to Jasmine’s phone number threatening

that the sender was “going to beat [that] man to sleep.” The jury

heard substantial testimony about other prior difficulties between

Louis and Johnson, including testimony regarding conflict over the

broken apartment window and Johnson’s role as a father, and audio

recordings of various 911 calls related to prior difficulties between

Jasmine, Robinson, Louis, and Johnson were played for the jury.



                                 23
     It was uncontested that Johnson walked about three miles to

Louis and Robinson’s apartment while carrying a butcher knife and

that Johnson stabbed Louis. Two eyewitnesses besides Johnson

testified that Johnson stabbed Louis. Robinson testified that she

saw Johnson “going at Louis[,]” “sticking at Louis with the knife[,]”

and “charging at Louis with the knife” before “the knife went in

Louis.” And Louis affirmed to her that Johnson stabbed him in the

chest. Similarly, Rogers testified that within five minutes of

knocking at Johnson’s request on the apartment door, he heard

screaming and returned to see Louis and Johnson “wrestling” as

Johnson had a knife “wielded at” Louis. By then, Louis already had

blood around his rib area, and Rogers knew “that he got stabbed.”

Rogers later told police that Johnson “stabbed Louis.”

     In addition to those eyewitness accounts, Rogers’s former

roommate, Herndon, testified that shortly after the stabbing he

heard Johnson admit that he had stabbed Louis. Officer Foster

similarly testified that Johnson volunteered that he had stabbed



                                 24
Louis. And Johnson himself testified that he pulled out the knife,

“jab[bed] with the knife[,]” and “hit” Louis again after the stabbing.

     Accordingly, given that the contested testimony was merely

cumulative of other admitted evidence and that evidence of

Johnson’s guilt was overwhelming, Johnson has not met his burden

under the plain error standard to show a reasonable probability that

the outcome of his trial would have been different absent the

contested testimony, and his claim of plain error fails.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




                                  25
                     Decided August 13, 2024.

     Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Adams.

     Frances C. Kuo, Jonathan O. Oden, for appellant.

     Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Joshua M. Geller, Tyshawn Y.

Jackson, Lenny I. Krick, Deborah D. Wellborn, Assistant District

Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton,

Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill, Senior

Assistant Attorneys General, Eric C. Peters, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.




                                26