789
Submitted March 28, affirmed May 25, 2022
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSHUA RAY JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Deschutes County Circuit Court
18CR55781; A174381
511 P3d 82
Defendant appeals the revocation of his probation, challenging the trial
court’s finding that he violated a condition of probation requiring him to “obey
all laws” after he was convicted of a separate offense. Defendant argues that the
judgment of conviction was legally insufficient evidence of his failure to obey all
laws because it was entered after a no contest plea. Defendant does not contend
that any of the procedural safeguards required for the acceptance of a no contest
plea were absent in his case, nor does he assert that he was unaware of the consequences that entering that plea could have on his probation. Held: A judgment of
conviction is sufficient evidence to prove that defendant violated probation, even
if that conviction stemmed from a plea of no contest. Consequently, the trial court
did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, in finding that defendant
failed to obey all laws, and in revoking his probation.
Affirmed.
Raymond D. Crutchley, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Sarah De La Cruz, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Affirmed.
790 State v. Jackson
KAMINS, J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking his
probation, challenging the trial court’s order finding that he
violated a condition of probation requiring him to “obey all
laws.” We conclude that a judgment of conviction is sufficient
evidence to prove that defendant violated probation, even
if that conviction stemmed from a plea of no contest, and
affirm.
While on probation for coercion and harassment,
defendant entered a no contest plea to a new harassment
charge and was convicted of that offense. The state moved
to revoke defendant’s probation on the basis that he violated
the probation condition to “[o]bey all laws.” ORS 137.540(1)(j).
At the show cause hearing, the state’s only evidence was the
judgment of conviction for harassment. Defendant moved to
dismiss, arguing that evidence of the conviction was legally
insufficient, because it arose from a no contest plea, whereby
he did not admit guilt. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant then testified that he did not commit harassment and explained that he pleaded no contest because
it was “the fastest way through this process.” The court
found that defendant violated the condition and revoked
probation.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss, in concluding that the
state proved that he failed to obey all laws, and in revoking
his probation. With regard to each claim of error, defendant
argues that the judgment of conviction was legally insufficient evidence of his failure to obey all laws because it was
entered after a no contest plea, raising both the question of
whether a conviction stemming from a no contest plea can
serve as evidence that defendant violated his probation and
the question of whether that evidence is legally sufficient for
a trial court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant failed to obey all laws. See State v. Donovan, 305
Or 332, 335,
751 P2d 1109 (1988) (noting that the state must
prove that a defendant violated a condition of probation by
a preponderance of the evidence). Those are legal questions
that we review for errors of law. State v. Hardges,
294 Or
App 445, 448,
432 P3d 268 (2018).
Cite as
319 Or App 789 (2022) 791
A person charged with a crime may plead “guilty,”
“not guilty,” or “no contest.” ORS 135.335. The no contest plea
was made available in Oregon “to provide for an ‘Alford’ type
of plea.” Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission
Proposed Oregon Criminal Procedure Code, Final Draft
and Report § 252, 149 (Nov 1972) (citing North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 US 25,
91 S Ct 160,
27 L Ed 2d 162 (1970)). “An
Alford plea is a guilty plea in which the defendant does not
admit commission of the criminal act or asserts that he is
innocent.” State v. Sullivan,
197 Or App 26, 28 n 1,
104 P3d
636 (2005), rev den,
340 Or 673 (2006) (concluding that it
was not plain error for a trial court to rely on an Alford plea
as an admission of facts justifying a sentence enhancement).
With an Alford plea, a defendant does not admit guilt “but
admits that sufficient evidence exists to convict him of the
offense.” United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez,
755 F3d 1267,
1273 (11th Cir 2014).
Before entering a judgment of conviction from a
plea of guilty or no contest, the trial court must “mak[e]
such inquiry as may satisfy the court that there is a factual
basis for the plea.” ORS 135.395. The “ ‘factual basis for the
plea’ refers to facts concerning the defendant’s guilt—i.e.,
facts regarding whether the defendant committed the crime
to which the defendant is pleading.” State v. Heisser, 232 Or
App 320, 329,
222 P3d 719 (2009). The convicting trial court
must also “address[ ] the defendant personally and determin[e] that the defendant understands the nature of the
charge,” inform the defendant of the rights they are waiving
and certain potential consequences of the plea, and determine “that the plea is voluntary and intelligently made.”
ORS 135.385(1)-(2); ORS 135.390(1).
Although defendant did not affirmatively admit
guilt in the criminal proceeding, he did not contest the
charges against him and acknowledged that a factual basis
supported those charges. The trial court did not err by
considering the judgment of conviction as probative as to
whether defendant failed to obey all laws. Defendant does
not contend that any of the procedural safeguards required
for the acceptance of a no contest plea were absent in his case,
nor does he assert that he was unaware of the consequences
792 State v. Jackson
that entering that plea could have on his probation. As a
result, the trial court was entitled to rely on the judgment
of conviction as evidence that defendant committed a crime
and to weigh that evidence against the credibility of defendant’s testimony at the probation hearing. Further, given
the record in this case, we conclude that the judgment of
conviction was legally sufficient evidence for the trial court
to find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
failed to obey all laws in violation of ORS 137.540(1)(j).
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, in finding
that defendant failed to obey all laws, and in revoking his
probation.
Affirmed.
