Volume 32 — United States Reports

This action was brought on the 14th of August 1829 in the circuit court by the United States, to recover from fhn-defendant the sum of nine hundred and eighty-eight dollars and ninety-four cents, alleged to have been found due on a settlement of his accounts by the accouñting officers of the treasury . department. The case was tried in May 1831, and a verdict and judgment'rendered for the defendant; to réverse which Judgment,. the United States prosecuted this writ of error.

ERROR from the district court of the eastern district of Louisiana.

Held: that' the allowance of compensation by a fixed salary to the defendant, as the secretary of the board of the navy hospital commissioners, 'did not exclude his right to claim extra compensation for the disbursement of moneys belonging to the navy hospital fund.

Held: that this was not a final action on the claim in the sense those words are used in the act of the 26th of May 1830, en- . titled “ an act supplementary to,” &c. Evdn in cases of conquest, it is very unusual for .the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country.

<p>What will be deemed sufficient evidence of diligent and sufficient search for a lost or mislaid original paper, to permit a copy to be read as secondary evidence.</p> <p>The rules of evidence are adopted for practical purposes in the administration of justice. And although it is laid down in the books as a general rule, that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit of, must be given; yet it is not understood that this rule requires .the strongest possible assurance of the matter in question. The extent to which the rule is to be pushed is governed, in some measure, by circumstances. If any suspicion hangs over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld, a more rigid inquiry should be made into the reasons for its non-production; But where there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required is reasonable diligence to obtain the original.</p>

The plaintiff in error instituted a_ suit on a promissory note dated at Georgetown, October 22d, 1821, for the sum of one hundred and one dollars, payable to the order of S. and J. Fearson, the defendants, and by them indorsed.

Held: that upon a collateral undertaking of this sort,' no such suit is maintainable.

AN appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington.

Held: that this was an offence within the provisions of the law. It is clear that the policy of the act extends to the case. The object is to guard the public from false and counterfeit paper, purporting on its face to be issued by the bank. It could not be presumed that persons in general could be cognizant of the fact who, at particular periods, wer; the president and cashier of the bank.

ON a certificate of division from the circuit court of the United States for the district of North Carolina.

That the petitioner, Samuel Legerwood, under whose father and testator William Legerwood, the said defendants who were tenants claimed, was, with the said tenants, made defendant; and in 1798 a judgment was obtained in the said court in favour of Pickett, hut no writ of possession was executed in favour of Pickett.

United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833), was a case in the United States in which the defendant, George Wilson, was convicted of robbing the US Mail, and putting the life of the carrier in danger, in Pennsylvania and sentenced to death. Due to his friends' influence, Wilson was pardoned by Andrew Jackson.

Held: that a genuine instrument, of which the forged and counterfeited' instrument is an imitation, is not a bill issued by order of the president, &c. of the Bank of the United States, according to the true intent and meaning of the eig iteenth section of the act incorporating the bank., ON a certificate of division of opinion from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.

In the circuit court of the county of Alexandria the appellants filed a bill setting forth that a certain Mary Resler being indebted to the Farmers Bank of Alexandria, as drawer of certain promissory notes,. amounting to one thousand.’ two hundred and sixty-seven dollars, which notes were renewed and were, afterwards reduced by payments, in order to secure the payment of the sum remaining due to the bank on the 10th of September 1823, made and executed a deed'to John Hooff,…

Held: invalid upon proof like this, in Humphreys v. Lewis, 4 Monroe, 337; also Miller’s Heirs v. Haw’s Heirs, Hardin, 30. Patton’s entry does not state what species of tree was marked, nor on what side of the creek it is, nor how far from it. The beginning claimed is forty poles short of two miles from the mouth of the creek.

<p>Motion to dismiss an appeal.' A decree was pronounced by the district court of the United States for the district of Alexandria, in December 1829, from which the defendants appealed, but did not bring, up the record. At January term 1832, the appellees, in pursuance of the rule of court, brought up the record and filed it; and on motion of their counsel, the appeal was dismissed. On the 9th of March 1832, a citation was signed by the chief justice of the court for the district of Columbia, citing the plaintiffs in the original action to appear before the supreme court; then in session, and show cause why the decree of the circuit court should ' not be corrected, A copy of the record was returned with the citation, “ executed” and filed with the clerk. By the court. The record is brought up irregularly, and the cause must be dismissed.</p> <p>The act of March 1803, which gives the appeal from decrees in chancery, subjects it to the rules and regulations which govern.writs of error. Under this act it has been always held that an appeal may be prayed in court when the decree is pronounced. But if the appeal be prayed after the court Has risen, the party must proceed in the same mariner as had been previously directed in writs of error.</p> <p>The judicial act directs that a writ of error must be allowed by a judge, and that a citation shall be returned with the record; the adverse party to have at least twenty days notice. This notice, the court understands, is twenty days before the return day of the writ.</p>

Held: that these proceedings were legal, and were authorized by the act of the 5th of May 1830. Altnost every law providing a new'remedy, affects and operates upon causes of action-existing at the time the law is passed. -The law of 1830 is in no respect the exercise of judicial powers; it only organizes-a tribunal with the.powers to entertain judicial proceedings. The act, in terms, applies to bills filed, or to be filed.

Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in 1833, which helped define the concept of federalism in US constitutional law. The Court ruled that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the state governments, establishing a precedent until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case is also significant for highlighting the separation between federal government and state government.

APPEAL lVom the circuit -court of the United States for the dist rict of Ohio. This case was before the court at January term 1828,1 Peters, 241, on an appeal by the parties who are now appellants.

Held: that the act of congress being general in'its terms, extending to all suits against consuls, it applied to this suit. A suit on a recognizance of bail is an original proceeding. A scire facias upon a judgment, is to some purposes only a continuation of the former suit. But an action of debt on a judgment is an original suit.

<p>Whether certain facts in reference to an alleged notice to the indorser, and demand of payment of a promissory note by the drawer, amounted to a waiver of the objection to the want of demand and notice, is a question of fact, and not matter of law for the consideration of the jury.</p> <p>The court are entirely satisfied with their former decision in the case of the Union Bank of Georgetown v. Magruder, 3 Peters’s Rep. 87.</p>

Held: that at common law, an author, by publishing a literary composition, does not abandon his right, is referred to as illustrative of the principle. Several decisions by the circuit courts of the United States are cited to sustain the right of the plaintiff.

Held: that this was a case of admiralty jurisdiction. By the civil code of Louisiana, workmen employed in the construction or repairs of ships or boats enjoy the privilege of a lien on such ships or boats, without being bound to reduce their contracts to writing, whatever may be their amount; but this privilege ceases if they have allowed the ship or boat to depart without exercising their rights.

In the circuit court of Pennsylvania, at October sessions 1826, a feigned issue was made, up betweén the plaintiffs and the defendant, to try the question of the ability of the defendant to pay a debt acknowledged to be due to the plaintiffs, and for which judgments had been obtained in their favour.

In the circuit'court of Kentucky, Andrew Kincannon, the appellee, filed a bill on the 28 th of December 1815, claiming a tract of land, by virtue of a prior entry to that under which the persons named in the bill asserted a title to, and held possession of the land; and praying the court to compel the defendants to release all claim to the, same, and that he might be quieted in the enjoyment and possession thereof.

of the United States for the southern district of New York. In the district court of the -United States for the southern district of New York, a libel was filed by the United States, for the forfeiture of eighty-five hogsheads of sugar, alleging them to have been entered for the benefit, of drawback under a false denomination; viz, as refined sugars, with intent to defraud the revenue.

Held: that although the suit beiiig against two of the three obligors might not be sustained at common law; yet as the courts of Louisiana do not proceed according to the rules of the common law, their code being founded on the civil law, this suit is properly brought.

Held: that there was no error in these decisions of the district court of Louisiana. This is an. official bond, and was given in pursuance of a law of .the United States. By .this law, the conditions of the bond were fixed ; and also the *436 manner in which its obligations should be enforced.

Held: . that the value in controversy was the value of the property at the time of the seizure, exclusive of the duties, and that the claimant had a right to appeal to this court. The statute under which these sugars were seized and condemned, is S highly penal law, and should, in conformity with the rule on the subject, be .construed strictly.

Held: that the process of execution for the sale of the land, under which it was sold by the sheriff was a direction to the sheriff to sell the specific property, which was already in his possession, by virtue of the attachment, and'was already condemned by the competent tribunal.

In the circuit court, the plaintiffs, in error instituted an ejectment for a tract of land in the county of Franklin, in the state of Pennsylvania. They showed title to the land as the heirs of John Nicholson, who was seised of the same.at the time of his death, under a warrant, survey and return of survey, and payment of the purchase money to the. state.

This was an action of ejectment prosecuted by Eliza Harmer, Josiah Harmer and William Harmer, children and heirs at law of Josiah Harmer, deceased, against George Morris and David Gwynne, to recover possession of a part of a town lot in the city of Cincinnati. On the trial of the cause, the defendants excepted to the admission of certain evidence, and to the instructions given by the court to the jury upon matters of law.

Held: that an award of a writ of habeas corpus by the supreme court was an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. On that occasion the court said, so far as the case of Marbury v. Madison had distinguished between .original and appellate jurisdiction, that which the court is asked to exercise is clearly appellate. It is the decision of an inferior court, by which a citizen has been committed to jail.

In the circuit court; an action of assumpsit was brought by-the plaintiffs in error for the recovery of one thousand find one' pounds four shillings and eight pence -sterling, with interest; asserted to be due to them by the defendants in error, for merchandize sold and delivered. The declaration was in the usual form.

the circuit court of the United States for the county of Alexandria in the district of Columbia.

<p>It is not necessary to the validity of a deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors, that creditors should be consulted; though the propriety of pursuing such a course will generally suggest it, when they can be conveniently assembled. But be this as it may, it cannot be necessary that the fact should appear on the face of the deed.</p> <p>That a general assignment of all a man’s property is per se fraudulent, has never been alleged iii this country. The right to make it results from the absolute ownership which every man claims over that which is his own. An assignment was made by Francis West, to certain trustees of all his property, giving a preference to particular creditors; who were to be paid their claims in full, before any portion of the property assigned was to be divided among his other creditors. By the courtthe preference given in this deed to favoured creditors, though hable to abuse, and perhaps to serious objections, is the exercise of a power resulting from the ownership of property which the law has not yet restrained. It cannot be treated as a fraud.</p> <p>The assignment excluded from the benefit of its provisions, all creditors who should not within ninety days, execute a release of all claims and demands on the assignor of any nature or,kind whatsoever. By the court: This stipulation cannot operate to the exemption of atiy portion of a debtor’s property, from the payment of his debts. If a surplus should remain after their extinguishment, that would be rightfully his. Should the fund not be adequate, no part of it is relinquished. The creditor releases his claim only to the future labours of his debtor. If this release were voluntary; it would be unexceptionable. But it is induced by the necessity arising from the certainty of being postponed to all those creditors who shall accept the terms, by giving.the release. It is not therefore voluntary. Humanity and policy both plead so strongly in favour of leaving the product of his future labours to the debtor, who has surrendered all his property, that in every commercial country known to the court, except our own, the principle is established by law. This certainly furnishes a very imposing argument against its being denied. The objection is certainly powerful, that it tends to delay creditors. If there be a surplus, the surplus is placed in some degree out of the reach of those who do not sign the release, and thereby entitle themselves under the deed. But the property is not entirely locked up. - A court of equity, exercising chancery jurisdiction, will compel the execution of the trust, and decree what may remain to those creditors who have not acceded to the deed, Yet the court are far from being satisfied, that upon general principle, such a deed ought to be sustained.</p> <p>Whatever maybe the intrinsic weight of objections to such assignments, they seem not to have prevailed in Pennsylvania. The construction which the courts of that state have put on the Pennsylvania statute of frauds, must be received in the courts of the United States.</p> <p>The assignment transferred to the assignees a debt due to the assignor by the complainant. The complainant filed a bill against the assignees, claiming to set off against the'debt assigned to them, the amount of a-judgment obtained by him against the assignor, after the assignment. By the court: if subsequent to the assignment being made, and before notice of it, any counter claims be acquired by a debtor to the assignor, these claims may, unquestionably, be sustained. But if they be acquired after notice, equity will not sustain them. If it were even true that they might have been offered in evidence in a suit at law brought m the name of the assignor, he who neglected to avail himself of that advantage, cannot, after judgment, avail himself of such discount as plaintiff in equity.</p> <p>To deprive a party of the fruits of a judgment at law, it must be against conscience that he should enjoy them. The party complaining, must show that he has more equity than the party in whose favour the law has decided.</p> <p>Construction of the laws of Pennsylvania relative to foreign attachments.</p>

<p>A complex and intricate account is an unfit subject for examination in a court, and ought always to be referred to a commissioner, to be examined by him and reported, in order to a final decree. To such report the parties may take any exceptions, and thus bring any question they may think proper before the court.</p>

Ex parte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1833), was a US Supreme Court case involving the suit of Juan Madrazo, a Spanish citizen, against the State of Georgia.

<p>A mandamus was issued by the superior court oi appeals of the eastern middle district of Florida, directed to the register and receiver of the western land district of Florida, commanding them to permit the entry and purchase of certain lands. From this proceeding, the register and receivér appealed to this court." The appeal was dismissed; the proceeding at mandamus being at common law, and therefore the removal to this court should have been by writ of error.</p>

Held: that the refusal to allow the amendment to the writ and .count, by inserting the averment of the value of the property, was not the subject of. examination in this court. The allowance of amendments, to pleadings is in the discretion of the judge of the inferior court; and no control over the action of the judge in refusing or admitting them will be exercised by this- court.

MR ROBBINS,'solicitor for the complainant, having renewed his motion of last term in this case, prayed the court to award such process, and in such form, as the court may deem proper