¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: December 20, 2024
¶4 S24A1327. PARKER v. THE STATE.
¶5 PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
¶6 Stefan Parker appeals his convictions related to the shooting
¶7death of Shelbra Lee Stallings. 1 On appeal, Parker argues that the
¶8evidence was insufficient to disprove his claim of self-defense, the
¶9trial court erred in denying his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw as
¶10counsel, the court erred by admitting a book entitled “The 48 Laws
¶11of Power,” and he received ineffective assistance of counsel for
¶12 1The crimes occurred on February 28, 2021. In November 2021, a Rockdale County grand jury indicted Parker for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A jury found Parker guilty on all counts at a March 2023 trial, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison for malice murder and a consecutive five-year term for the firearms offense. The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Parker filed a motion for new trial in June 2023, which he later amended. The trial court denied the motion in April 2024 following a hearing. Parker timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. stipulating to the authenticity of evidence that showed his presence
¶13at the crime scene. We conclude that the evidence authorized the
¶14jury to reject Parker’s self-defense claim, the trial court did not
¶15commit reversible error in denying counsel’s motion to withdraw or
¶16admitting the book into evidence, and Parker has not shown that
¶17counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the authenticity of evidence
¶18that was consistent with Parker’s self-defense claim. We therefore
¶19affirm.
¶20 Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the trial
¶21evidence showed the following. On the morning of February 28,
¶222021, Parker and his cousin, Michael Walker, made a trip from
¶23Walker’s workplace to Stallings’s residence in Rockdale County and
¶24then back to Walker’s workplace. They travelled in Walker’s gray
¶252013 Acura RDX, leaving at 8:23 a.m. and returning at 8:45 a.m.
¶26Upon returning to Walker’s workplace, Walker went inside to begin
¶27his shift, letting Parker use his vehicle.
¶28 Parker admitted at trial that he returned to Stallings’s
¶29residence alone. Surveillance cameras from a house across the street
¶30 2 recorded the following. A dark-colored SUV drove down the road,
¶31and then a male in a gray hooded sweatshirt, dark pants, and white
¶32shoes walked across Stallings’s front yard from the direction where
¶33the SUV had driven. Shortly thereafter, there was a sound of
¶34approximately eleven gunshots, and the same male ran across the
¶35front yard of the residence toward the SUV. At least two neighbors
¶36heard the gunshots. One neighbor saw a male in a gray hooded
¶37sweatshirt walking quickly towards a gray Acura SUV and saw the
¶38vehicle leave. Another neighbor saw a man in a gray hooded
¶39sweatshirt running across Stallings’s yard and carrying a gun that
¶40had the handle wrapped in a plastic bag.
¶41 Police arrived shortly after and found Stallings lying on her
¶42back in her carport and blood pooling around her. Stallings died from
¶43four gunshot wounds. Police searched Stallings’s residence,
¶44recovering nine 9mm casings in the carport and front yard. Police
¶45did not locate any firearms or ammunition inside. Police located a
¶46bullet and a bullet fragment at the scene, and a medical examiner
¶47found two bullets inside Stallings’s body during the autopsy.
¶48 3 Police interviewed Donald Harris, Stallings’s boyfriend, later
¶49that day, and Harris was “crying” and “very emotional” about the
¶50shooting. Harris testified at trial that he was sleeping at Stallings’s
¶51residence at the time of the shooting, was awakened by the
¶52gunshots, but went back to sleep because people had hunted
¶53previously in the area behind Stallings’s house.
¶54 Police also talked to Stallings’s son. After being told about the
¶55Acura, Stallings’s son identified Walker as a suspect, as Walker had
¶56previously sold marijuana to Stallings and him. Police investigated
¶57but learned that Walker had an alibi, as surveillance footage showed
¶58him at work at the time of the shooting.
¶59 Police discovered that a GPS tracker had been installed on
¶60Walker’s vehicle and, accessing that system, located the vehicle at
¶61an apartment complex in Decatur. Police eventually found Parker in
¶62an apartment, detained him, and obtained consent to search the
¶63apartment. During the search, police found a backpack in a hall
¶64closet; the backpack contained a Taurus 9mm handgun with an
¶65empty extended magazine and a book entitled “The 48 Laws of
¶66 4 Power.” A GBI firearms examiner determined that the recovered
¶67handgun fired all nine casings found at the crime scene and one of
¶68the bullets found in Stallings’s body. 2
¶69 During a custodial interview that was recorded and played for
¶70the jury, Parker denied any involvement in the shooting and claimed
¶71that Walker was the shooter and was wearing Parker’s clothing at
¶72the time. But at trial, he admitted that he had lied to police about
¶73his involvement, admitted that he shot Stallings, and claimed that
¶74he did so in self-defense. Parker stated that during the initial trip to
¶75Stallings’s residence, Walker got out of the vehicle and talked to
¶76someone at the door. Parker said that he went back to the residence
¶77to get money that Walker forgot. Parker also testified that he was
¶78wearing the clothing shown in the surveillance videos and was
¶79carrying the murder weapon.
¶80 According to Parker, when he got to Stallings’s residence the
¶81second time, he knocked on the front door and went to the side door
¶82 2 The other bullet found in Stallings’s body was “very damaged,” so the
¶83firearms examiner was unable to determine whether it was also shot by the Taurus. 5 when he heard it open. Parker saw a male, whom he identified as
¶84Harris, stick his head out and say something angrily. Parker said
¶85that Harris then exited the residence with a firearm, followed by
¶86Stallings. When Harris began to raise his firearm, Parker began
¶87firing his gun and continued to fire as he ran back to the Acura.
¶88Parker said that Harris definitely fired a shot. Parker also stated,
¶89however, that because “it happened so quick,” he did not really know
¶90if Harris raised a firearm. Parker said that he did not report the
¶91shooting and had lied to police during his interview because he was
¶92scared. Although Parker maintained that he remained scared at the
¶93time of the police interview, he testified that he did not hide the
¶94murder weapon because he did nothing wrong.
¶95 In rebuttal testimony, Harris denied ever seeing Parker prior
¶96to trial, pointing a firearm at Parker, or seeing the shooting.
¶97 1. Parker argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict
¶98him because the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim
¶99beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
¶100 When we consider whether the trial evidence was sufficient as
¶101 6 a matter of federal due process, “we view the evidence in the light
¶102most favorable to the verdict and evaluate whether a rational trier
¶103of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
¶104doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Davenport v. State,
¶105309 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
¶106443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). In conducting that
¶107review, “[w]e put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the
¶108credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the
¶109resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of fact.”
¶110Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762, 766-767 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 150) (2022)
¶111(citation and punctuation omitted).
¶112 “When a defendant presents evidence that he was justified in
¶113using deadly force, the State bears the burden of disproving the
¶114defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147,
¶115150 (1) (886 SE2d 818) (2023) (citation omitted). But “[i]t is the role
¶116of the jury to evaluate the evidence and, when doing so, the jury is
¶117free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and
¶118to accept the evidence that the [act] was not done in self-defense.”
¶119 7 Id. (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Gibbs v. State, 309
¶120Ga. 562, 565 (847 SE2d 156) (2020) (“[T]he question of justification
¶121. . . is for the jury to decide.”).
¶122 We conclude that the trial evidence was sufficient to sustain
¶123the verdicts. Parker admitted that he shot Stallings, but claimed
¶124that he did so only in response to a purported threat from Harris.
¶125His claim was based solely on his testimony, which the jury was
¶126authorized to reject. Parker’s testimony was self-contradictory,
¶127claiming at one point that Harris definitely fired a shot and at
¶128another saying that he was not even sure if Harris raised a gun.
¶129Parker’s testimony also conflicted with Harris’s testimony that he
¶130did not point a gun at Parker and had not even seen Parker prior to
¶131trial. And despite Parker’s claim that Harris fired a shot, the only
¶132shell casings recovered from the crime scene were linked to Parker’s
¶133gun. Under these circumstances, the jury was authorized to find
¶134Parker not credible, resolve conflicts in the evidence against him,
¶135and find him guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See
¶136Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 624, 626 (1) (814 SE2d 353) (2018) (“It is the
¶137 8 role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine
¶138the credibility of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts
¶139adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence
¶140insufficient.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶141 2. Parker argues that the trial court erred in denying trial
¶142counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record. We disagree.
¶143 Trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on
¶144February 28, 2022. At a hearing on March 1, 2022, the prosecutor
¶145represented that the case had been continued from the court’s
¶146January and February motions calendars, first for the State to
¶147finalize the discovery it had sent to counsel, and then to allow
¶148counsel adequate time to review the “voluminous discovery.” Trial
¶149counsel confirmed that it was “a lot of data” in discovery, but said
¶150Parker consented to his withdrawal, and said he believed Parker
¶151qualified for indigent defense. Trial counsel argued that new counsel
¶152would have plenty of time to prepare for trial. The prosecutor noted
¶153in response that the case was set for a May trial, so new counsel
¶154would have a “voluminous amount of work” to do to “catch up,” and
¶155 9 that even trial counsel conceded that there was a “considerable
¶156amount” of discovery.
¶157 When asked why Parker was interested in appointed counsel
¶158when he had hired counsel, trial counsel said that, although Parker
¶159had originally been appointed counsel, Parker’s mother paid to
¶160retain trial counsel, that Parker had no assets or income of his own,
¶161and the family was unable to keep “their end of [the] fee
¶162arrangement,” which was why he was seeking a withdrawal. Parker
¶163told the court that he “ran out of money” since he had been
¶164incarcerated for about a year and his mother could not afford to
¶165continue paying the fees. Trial counsel said he was “[a]bsolutely”
¶166more than willing to share the discovery with new counsel. The
¶167court took the matter under advisement, and later denied the motion
¶168without explanation. In reconsidering this issue as a part of Parker’s
¶169motion for new trial, the court concluded that it did not err in
¶170denying the motion to withdraw because granting it would have
¶171unnecessarily delayed the trial.
¶172 Parker argues that the trial court made no findings in initially
¶173 10 denying counsel’s motion to withdraw representation and that there
¶174was no basis for the court’s retroactive finding that procuring new
¶175counsel would unnecessarily delay the trial. Neither of these
¶176arguments prevail.
¶177 The decision whether to grant a motion to withdraw
¶178representation falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.
¶179See, e.g., Rouse v. State, 275 Ga. 605, 608-609 (9) (571 SE2d 353)
¶180(2002); White v. State, 365 Ga. App. 101, 104-105 (877 SE2d 649)
¶181(2022).
¶182 Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the trial court is afforded substantial deference that allows for a range of permissible outcomes, as long as that discretionary decision is based on a correct understanding of the law and facts. Accordingly, those findings will generally not be disturbed as long as they are within the bounds of the law, based on correct, relevant facts, and within the range in which reasonable jurists could disagree.
¶183Burns v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (2) (907 SE2d 581) (2024) (citation
¶184and punctuation omitted). An attorney’s request to withdraw will be
¶185granted unless the judge determines that doing so “would delay the
¶186trial or otherwise interrupt the orderly operation of the court[.]”
¶187 11 Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.3 (1).
¶188 To the extent Parker argues that the trial court’s initial
¶189determination was erroneous because it did not include express
¶190findings of fact or conclusions of law, this argument fails because
¶191Parker points to no authority mandating a detailed order in this
¶192context. Parker’s main argument is that the trial court’s later
¶193finding is not supported by the record, but that too fails. Trial
¶194counsel did not challenge the prosecutor’s representations at the
¶195hearing that the discovery in this case was voluminous; indeed, trial
¶196counsel stated that there was a “considerable amount” of it. Given
¶197that trial counsel’s request to withdraw came two months before the
¶198trial was scheduled to start, the trial court did not abuse its
¶199discretion in concluding that granting the request would delay the
¶200trial. See Rouse, 275 Ga. at 608-609 (9) (upholding the trial court’s
¶201decision to deny a motion to withdraw, in part, because it “was filed
¶202within two months of the scheduled trial date”).
¶203 3. Parker argues that the trial court erred in admitting into
¶204evidence the book entitled “The 48 Laws of Power.” Parker argues
¶205 12 that the evidence was not relevant to the issue of whether Parker
¶206murdered Stallings, and even if relevant, its low probative value was
¶207substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We
¶208conclude that even if the court abused its discretion in admitting the
¶209book into evidence, any such error was harmless.
¶210 A trial court’s non-constitutional evidentiary error requires
¶211reversal of a defendant’s conviction “unless it can be deemed
¶212harmless, meaning that it is highly probable that the error did not
¶213contribute to the verdict.” Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 90 (3) (g) (844
¶214SE2d 791) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In
¶215determining whether the error was harmless, we review the record
¶216de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable
¶217jurors to have done[.]” Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 (2) (c) (829
¶218SE2d 142) (2019) (citation omitted).
¶219 Here, the admission of the book likely made very little
¶220difference in the jury’s assessment of the evidence. As recounted
¶221above, the evidence of guilt was strong, if not overwhelming. Parker
¶222admitted to shooting Stallings, and his claim of self-defense was
¶223 13 very weak. Parker points to no portion of the book that was
¶224particularly prejudicial. Although the State argued to the court that
¶225the book was basically an instruction manual on how to deceive and
¶226manipulate people, and that Parker’s actions reflected an intent to
¶227deceive the police and the jury, there is nothing in the record
¶228indicating that the State made this argument to the jury or
¶229otherwise focused on the contents of the book at trial. The only
¶230mention of the book before the jury was the prosecutor identifying it
¶231as having been found in the backpack that also contained the
¶232murder weapon.3 Even if the book was relevant to Parker’s
¶233credibility, the book likely had very little impact compared to
¶234Parker’s inconsistent statements and contradictory testimony. The
¶235jury could assess Parker’s credibility and reject his self-defense
¶236claim independent of Parker’s possession of the book. Because the
¶237evidence of guilt was strong and the book had very little prejudicial
¶238force, any error in admitting the book is not a basis for reversal. See
¶239 3 Although the book did go out with the jury during its deliberations, the State did not mention the book during its closing argument. 14 Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 863-865 (2) (896 SE2d 516) (2023) (any
¶240error in admission of demonstrative photographs of model firearms
¶241was harmless given the compelling evidence of guilt and the limited
¶242prejudicial effect from the photographs); Puckett v. State, 303 Ga.
¶243719, 720-721 (2) (814 SE2d 726) (2018) (any error in admitting a
¶244photograph showing several crime books on the defendant’s
¶245bookshelf was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt);
¶246Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 155 (4) (805 SE2d 873) (2017) (any
¶247error in allowing the State to engage in a demonstration regarding
¶248the crime was harmless, as any effect that the demonstration may
¶249have had on the jury “would have been minimal compared to the
¶250effect of the properly-admitted evidence before it”).
¶251 4. Parker argues that trial counsel was ineffective for entering
¶252into several stipulations regarding the authenticity of evidence that
¶253showed Parker’s movements on the day of the crime and placed him
¶254in the Acura. Parker argues that counsel’s lack of investigation and
¶255his entering into stipulations resulted in the admission of
¶256overwhelming evidence of Parker’s travels to and from and presence
¶257 15 at the crime scene. Parker argues that the jury would have been
¶258more likely to acquit Parker without these stipulations. This claim
¶259has no merit.
¶260 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
¶261defendant must prove both that his counsel’s performance was
¶262deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See
¶263Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
¶264674) (1984). Deficient performance means that “no reasonable
¶265lawyer would have done” what trial counsel did, while prejudice
¶266means there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial
¶267would have been different but for the deficient performance. Wells
¶268v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 164 (2) (a) (758 SE2d 598) (2014). A defendant
¶269claiming that his counsel was underprepared must show that more
¶270preparation “might have produced [something] that would have
¶271made a difference in the outcome of his trial.” Roberts v. State, 305
¶272Ga. 257, 266 (5) (c) (824 SE2d 326) (2019) (citation omitted).
¶273 Parker makes no showing that any of the evidence in question
¶274— surveillance recordings, a GBI fingerprint report, and GPS data
¶275 16 from the Acura — was inadmissible. Trial counsel explained at the
¶276motion for new trial hearing that he had no reason to question the
¶277authenticity of the evidence, the stipulations were “partly a
¶278housekeeping matter,” and he had no reason to believe the relevant
¶279witnesses would fail to show up at trial to authenticate the evidence
¶280in question. Trial counsel stated that Parker understood the
¶281stipulations and consented to them. Trial counsel also explained
¶282that the stipulated evidence was consistent with Parker’s version of
¶283events and self-defense claim. By challenging these stipulations,
¶284Parker seems to suggest that counsel should have presented an
¶285alternative defense that he was not present for the shooting. But
¶286such a defense would not have been supported by the evidence and
¶287was contrary to his self-defense claim, a defense that Parker had
¶288discussed with counsel prior to trial as part of a review of his
¶289potential trial testimony. See Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 637 (2)
¶290(a) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[I]t is rarely an unreasonable strategy to
¶291not pursue defenses that logically conflict.”). Because Parker has not
¶292shown that any of the evidence would have been inadmissible had
¶293 17 counsel not stipulated to its authenticity, and the evidence in
¶294question was consistent with his self-defense claim, Parker cannot
¶295establish that no reasonable attorney would have stipulated to the
¶296evidence’s authenticity. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance claim
¶297fails.
¶298 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶299 18