Short v. State

FINAL COPY

                   S25A0048. SHORT v. THE STATE.


      LAGRUA, Justice.

      In November 2019, Appellant Angelo Short was convicted of

malice murder and related crimes arising from the stabbing death

of Peggy Gamble, along with other crimes committed within 48

hours of Gamble’s death.1 On appeal, Short challenges the trial


      1 The crimes occurred in Muscogee County on November 27-29, 2016. A

Muscogee County grand jury returned an indictment on October 16, 2018,
charging Short with malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault for
Gamble’s killing (Counts 1, 2, and 3, respectively), burglary in the first degree
and theft by taking for Short’s entry into Gamble’s home and taking of items
after the killing (Counts 4 and 5, respectively), robbery of a Piggly Wiggly after
the killing (Count 6), and obstruction of an officer arising from Short’s arrest
on November 29, 2016 (Count 7). Short was tried November 4-8, 2019, and the
jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. On November 19, 2019, Short was
sentenced to life in prison without parole plus 40 years in total, delineated as
follows: life without parole for Count 1 (malice murder), with which Count 2
(felony murder) and Count 3 (aggravated assault) were merged; 20 years
consecutive for Count 4 (burglary in the first degree); 20 years consecutive for
Count 6 (robbery); and 12 months concurrent with Count 1 for the
misdemeanors in Count 5 (theft by taking) and Count 7 (obstruction of an
officer). We note that the trial court erred at sentencing by merging Counts 2
and 3 into Count 1, rather than vacating Counts 2 and 3 by operation of law.
See Hulett v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2014) (“[W]hen a valid
guilty verdict is returned on both malice murder and felony murder of the same
victim, the defendant should be sentenced for the malice murder, and the
court’s admission of incriminating statements that he gave to

officers with the Columbus Police Department (“CPD”) during

custodial interviews conducted by Detective Stuart Carter and

Sergeant Lance Deaton.2 Specifically, Short argues that the trial

court erred in ruling that his statements, which amount to a

confession, were not induced by the slightest hope of benefit or

remotest fear of injury. OCGA § 24-8-824.3 We disagree and affirm.

      Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence

presented at trial showed that 83-year-old Gamble was stabbed to



alternative felony murder count stands vacated by operation of law as simply
surplusage.”) (cleaned up). However, this error in nomenclature does not affect
Short’s sentence and is otherwise harmless. Manner v. State, 

, 890-
891 (IV) (

) (2017).
      Short timely filed a motion for new trial on November 19, 2019, which
was twice amended. Following briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied Short’s amended motion for new trial by order dated December
30, 2022. Short timely filed a notice of appeal on January 24, 2023. His appeal
was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2024 and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
      2 Audio and video recorded interviews were conducted on November 29,

2016 (the “November 29 interview”), December 5, 2016 (the “December 5
interview”), December 14, 2016, and February 1, 2017. Short’s confession was
obtained during the December 5 interview.
      3 Under Georgia statutory law, “[t]o make a confession admissible, it

shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the
slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” OCGA § 24-8-824. Short
challenges the admission of his confession only as a matter of statutory law
and raises no constitutional due process argument.
                                      2
death in her home in Columbus during the overnight hours of

November 27-28, 2016.4 CPD officers discovered Gamble’s body

around noon on November 28, 2016, observed signs of forced entry

at her home, and learned that several items were missing, including

Gamble’s gold 1988 Toyota Corolla. Seeking leads and the public’s

assistance to locate Gamble’s car, CPD issued a BOLO5 for the

Corolla and a press release to the media. Late in the evening on

November 28, 2016, CPD officers received a tip connecting Short to

Gamble’s car.6 Officers responded to the tipster’s location and

discovered Gamble’s car, but Short was nowhere to be found.7


      4  A medical examiner testified that Gamble’s death was a homicide
caused by 13 stab and sharp force injuries at various lengths and depths. The
murder weapons – two kitchen knives taken from Gamble’s home – were
recovered by CPD officers during the investigation of the crimes, and a forensic
scientist who examined the knives testified that blood on one of them partially
matched Gamble’s DNA.
      5 BOLO stands for “[b]e on the lookout [for].” See BOLO, Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Police sometimes use this expression for people or
vehicles that they are trying to locate.”).
      6 Specifically, Angela Champion was at her home in Columbus when

Short, an attendee of Champion’s Thanksgiving get-together earlier in the
week, pulled up in Gamble’s car. Champion recognized the car from the news
and called the police, but Short had left the scene on foot by the time officers
arrived.
      7 Several other witnesses testified to seeing Short in or with Gamble’s

car on November 28, 2016 at various locations in Columbus. Some of them,

                                       3
     By daybreak on November 29, 2016, Short was a suspect in

Gamble’s killing, and CPD officers spent the day on the lookout for

him. Short robbed a Piggly Wiggly that morning, but CPD officers

were unable to locate him until around 6:00 p.m., in response to a

series of calls regarding Short’s location. CPD officers converged on

that area, and Short barricaded himself inside a vacant apartment

before being subdued and arrested. Short was then taken to CPD

headquarters, where the first custodial interview occurred.

     Detective Carter and Sergeant Deaton first interviewed Short

in the hours immediately after his arrest on November 29, 2016.

During this interview, Short confessed to the Piggly Wiggly robbery

after being advised of his Miranda8 rights and waiving the same.9

Short admitted during this interview that he knew Gamble and that

he recognized her car, but Short did not admit or deny his




including Taquawn Pollard and Madison Reese, even rode in the car with Short
on this date as he and others attempted to sell Gamble’s car for drug money,
committed thefts, and bought and used crack-cocaine.
      8 Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (

, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
      9 Short also signed an advice and waiver of rights form during the

November 29 interview.
                                     4
involvement in Gamble’s killing or the theft of her car. Throughout

this interview, the officers encouraged Short to tell the truth and

suggested that they already knew Short killed Gamble and stole her

car. The officers also suggested at various points that telling the

truth would be helpful to Short when it came to a potential plea deal

or sentencing recommendation. Of note, the officers pointed out that

“there is a difference between life in prison with no parole or if you

plead out to a sentence[,]” opined that the district attorney’s office

“might” offer Short a plea deal, suggested that “if” the district

attorney offered a plea deal, “it could be 25 years,” and told Short

that “anything [the district attorney’s office] could offer [him] is a lot

shorter than life without parole.” The officers also told Short that

they would “have an input” when it came time for the district

attorney to make a sentencing recommendation to the court. At the

end of the interview, Short was photographed, his clothing was

collected by the officers, and he was taken to the county jail.

     A week later, on December 5, 2016, Detective Carter

transported Short from the county jail to CPD headquarters for a

                                    5
second interview. At the start of this interview, Short told Detective

Carter and Sergeant Deaton that he wanted to talk with them about

his “housing situation,” and said that he tried to contact them from

the county jail but was unable to do so since he had been in solitary

confinement since his first day there. In so doing, Short recalled

telling someone that he did not feel safe in the county jail. Short

thought this person might have been Detective Carter, but Detective

Carter responded, “[t]hat must have been over at the jail if they

asked you if you felt safe.” Detective Carter and Sergeant Deaton

then proceeded to update Short on their investigation and told Short

that he was going to be charged with Gamble’s murder. They also

told Short that blood was found on the clothing collected from him

during the previous interview and informed Short that they were

expediting forensic testing on that blood. Detective Carter said “this

is a case that could get a death penalty case” in light of “the victim

and the circumstances that are involved[,]” and suggested that, if

“one drop” of Gamble’s blood was found on Short’s clothing, such a

discovery would “smoke” him since it “would not leave any doubt.”

                                  6
Detective Carter also opined that, “[i]f there’s physical evidence to

support what we got, then they could go for a death penalty case if

they elected to do that. I’m not saying they are going to. I’m just

saying it's a possibility.” A few minutes later, Detective Carter

theorized how he thought Short was “at the end of his rope[.]” Short

agreed that “this will probably be it” for him, to which Detective

Carter responded:

     I’m not sure what you mean by that. I can tell you this: if
     you take this to a jury trial, and our evidence comes back
     the way we anticipate it to come back and -- if the DA’s
     office, knowing they are going to a jury trial, they push for
     the death penalty, you’re right, it is the end for you. OK?

Short then told the officers that he wanted to talk to his mother, and

arrangements were made for Short’s mother to bring him lunch to

CPD headquarters later that day.

     Before his mother arrived, Short told the officers he was ready

to “tell the story now.” At this point, the officers advised Short of his

Miranda rights for a second time, and Short again waived them.10



     10 A second advice and waiver of rights form was signed prior to Short’s

confession during the December 5 interview.
                                     7
Short proceeded to tell the officers that he went to Gamble’s home

on November 28 so that he “could get a couple of dollars or

something like that[,]” that Gamble gave Short her car with

permission and an instruction to fill it up with gas for her, but that

Short “stayed gone with the car” instead. Short said that he ran into

Pollard shortly thereafter, and that Pollard suggested the two men

return to Gamble’s home, which they did. Short told the officers that,

when they arrived at Gamble’s home, Pollard went inside and killed

Gamble while Short stayed in the car. The officers told Short they

did not believe his story and implored him to “get it all out” and “be

honest.” Detective Carter said, “[i]f you lie to me, I can’t go to the

DA’s office and give you a good recommendation[,]” and told Short

the “worst thing” he could do for himself was lie.

     When Short’s mother arrived, the two ate lunch in the

interview room for approximately 90 minutes without the officers

present. The camera in the interview room continued to record.

Short did not confess to committing the crimes to his mother, but

they discussed the fact that Short was in solitary confinement

                                  8
because he was having “conflict” with other inmates. Short’s mother

expressed concern for her son’s safety, but Short assured her that

she did not need to worry. During their conversation, Short

mentioned that he requested to be placed in a protective custody cell

where he would “have no trouble” with other inmates, but did not

specify who he talked to and said he did not know “how that works

out.” Near the end of their lunch, Short’s mother told him to “do

what’s right.”

     When Short’s mother left, Detective Carter and Sergeant

Deaton resumed their interview, and Short confessed that he “did

everything.” Specifically, Short reiterated that he went to Gamble’s

home to ask for money, but now said that Gamble turned him away,

so Short kicked in her door, went inside, took money from Gamble’s

purse, two TVs, and Gamble’s car. Short said that Gamble promised

not to tell anyone about the incident, but he did not believe her, so

he “grabbed a knife” from her kitchen and “stabbed her.” Short later

clarified that he used two knives from Gamble’s kitchen in the

killing and said that he could take the officers to where he disposed

                                  9
of them.

     After Short confessed, he asked the officers to “help [him] try

to get the best deal [he] can in this situation.” Detective Carter

responded that, “once [his case] turns over to the DA’s office, they’re

in full control[,]” but added that he would “sit down” with the district

attorney’s office on Short’s behalf. Detective Carter also told Short

that, “in a confession-type thing, that normally kind of takes the

death penalty kind of off the table.” At the conclusion of the

interview, Short directed CPD officers to the murder weapons,

which were recovered and later admitted at trial. Detective Carter

testified at trial that he took Short back to the county jail afterward,

where he spoke with a jail employee “in [Short’s] presence” about

Short “having issues” with other inmates and Short’s request to be

placed in protective custody.

     A pre-trial Jackson-Denno11 hearing was held regarding the

admissibility of Short’s confession. After receiving testimony from

Detective Carter and admitting the recorded interviews and advice


     11 See Jackson v. Denno, 

 (

, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

                                     10
and waiver of rights forms into evidence, Short’s counsel said his

client would not be testifying and argued that Short’s confession

should be excluded from trial because it was induced in violation of

OCGA § 24-8-824 based on the “[t]otality of the circumstances, hope

or benefit, promise, threats of harm, any number of issues.” Counsel

for the State argued in rebuttal that Short “was not promised

anything” and that no “hope of benefit was held out.” After

arguments, the trial court said the hearing was “done” and went off

the record. However, the trial court went back on the record minutes

later because Short was “adamant” about testifying.

     Short then testified that, after the November 29 interview, he

was placed in general population at the county jail, where he was

“being threatened” by other inmates. Short said he was “in fear for

[his] life” at that time and reported his concerns to jail employees.

One of those employees, according to Short, gave him the option of

staying in general population or going to solitary confinement. Short

said that he chose the latter and that he remained in solitary

confinement until Detective Carter transported him to CPD on

                                 11
December 5. Short also said that, after being interviewed on

December 5, he was returned to solitary confinement and remained

there “until another interview[.]” Short testified that he “made

[Detective Carter] aware of what was going on at the jail” –

specifically, that he was concerned for his safety, had been placed in

solitary confinement, and wanted to be moved to protective custody.

Short said he made these facts known to Detective Carter “in the

car,” that Detective Carter responded by saying that “he would see .

. . what he could do for me depending on how I cooperated with

him[,]” that Detective Carter promised Short “protective custody for

[his] cooperation[,]” and affirmed that he confessed “based on those

promises” by Detective Carter.12

      After the Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court preliminarily

ruled that Short’s confession was admissible and formalized that




      12 Short did not clarify when he talked with Detective Carter “in the car,”

and Detective Carter was not recalled at the Jackson-Denno hearing to testify
in response to Short’s contentions. The record reflects that the hearing ended
abruptly when Short collapsed on the stand and required medical intervention.
Afterward, the trial court gave both parties an opportunity to add to the record,
but no further arguments were made.
                                       12
preliminary ruling at the start of trial. Short objected to the ruling,

and “reserve[d] the right to ask for those specific instructions during

the jury charge.”13 Key portions of the recorded interviews, including

Short’s confession, were admitted into evidence during the State’s

case-in-chief and played for the jury. At the conclusion of the trial,

the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and a sentence was

imposed by the trial court.

     Short timely moved for a new trial, arguing in relevant part

that “[t]he trial court erred by allowing defendant’s pre-trial

statements to be introduced into evidence.” At a motion for new trial

hearing, Short argued his confession was “induced by a hope of

benefit” because the officers allowed Short to have lunch with his

mother during the December 5 interview and because of “the threats

that were involved” in procuring it — namely, the officers’ “death

penalty talk[,]” as well as threats from other inmates, which




     13 Short raised no objection to the proposed jury instructions at the
charge conference, and the jury was ultimately instructed that, “[a] statement
induced by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury is not
voluntary.”
                                     13
ultimately resulted in Short being placed in protective custody. In a

post-hearing brief, Short maintained that the trial court “should

have suppressed Short’s statement because of the hopes of benefit,

and actual benefits, and fears of injury offered and afforded prior to

his confession.” Short’s motion for new trial was denied by order

dated December 30, 2022. This appeal followed.

     1. Short argues that his confession was induced by both the

“slightest hope of benefit” and the “remotest fear of injury,” such that

the trial court erred by admitting his confession at trial. OCGA § 24-

8-824. We disagree.

     Under Georgia law, “[t]o make a confession admissible, it shall

have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by

the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” OCGA § 24-

8-824. We have held that the “slightest hope of benefit” referred to

by the statute “is not to be understood in the colloquial sense, and

that the phrase refers to promises related to reduced criminal

punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at

all.” State v. Leverette, 

 (2) (

) (2025)

                                  14
(cleaned up). The phrase “remotest fear of injury,” in turn, refers to

“physical or mental torture or coercion by threats.” State v. Lynch,

 (1) (

) (2009) (citation and punctuation

omitted) (decided under former code). When a defendant argues that

a custodial statement made to law enforcement was involuntary

under OCGA § 24-8-824 and seeks exclusion of that statement before

trial, the State bears the burden of establishing the admissibility of

the statement by a preponderance of the evidence. Henderson v.

State, 

 (2) (

) (2021). In evaluating such

arguments, the trial court “must consider the totality of the

circumstances in determining whether the defendant’s statement is

admissible under OCGA § 24-8-824.” Leverette, 

 (2)

(citing Henderson, 

 (2)). See also Leverette, 

 (1) n.15 (Peterson, P. J., dissenting) (discussing applicable

standard of review). Whether a statement offers a hope of benefit or

threatens harm “is not itself sufficient to render a defendant’s later

statements to law enforcement inadmissible[.]” See Budhani v.

State, 

 (2) (b) (

) (2019) (explaining that

                                 15
a violation of OCGA § 24-8-824 requires officers to have “actually

induce[d] the defendant’s statements”) (cleaned up); Pulley v. State,

 (2) (

) (2021) (observing “the key

inquiry is whether the alleged promise actually induced the

statement that Appellant seeks to suppress”) (cleaned up). We

review the trial court’s admissibility decision de novo where “the

controlling facts can be definitively ascertained, exclusively by

reference to evidence, such as a recording of a police interview, that

is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility.”

Leverette, 

 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Otherwise,   “the   reviewing   court   accepts   the   trial   court’s

determinations as to the credibility and weight of conflicting

evidence unless they are clearly erroneous and independently

reviews the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.”

Matthews v. State, 

 (3) (b) (

) (2021).

     Here, the trial court ruled that Short’s post-Miranda

confession was admissible because Short “knowingly was informed

of his rights” and “waived those rights . . . repeatedly” and allowed

                                 16
Short’s confession to be admitted into evidence at trial over Short’s

objection. These rulings expressly rejected Short’s argument that his

confession was induced in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824 based on the

“[t]otality of the circumstances, hope or benefit, promise, threats of

harm, any number of issues.” Thus, while the trial court’s rulings

did not reference any “hope of benefit,” “fear of injury,” or OCGA §

24-8-824 itself, the express rejection of Short’s contrary position and

decision to admit Short’s confession at trial is, by necessary

implication, a ruling that Short’s confession was obtained consistent

with the dictates of OCGA § 24-8-824 and not induced by an

impermissible hope of benefit or fear of injury.

     Short advances two arguments on appeal as to why his

confession was inadmissible at trial: one is based on an alleged “hope

of benefit” and the second is based on an alleged “fear of injury.” We

address them in turn.

     (a) Short maintains that his confession was induced by the

slightest hope of benefit when officers “repeatedly reiterated that a

confession and guilty plea would allow him to obtain a 25-year

                                  17
sentence and avoid imprisonment for life without the possibility of

parole or the death penalty.” This contention fails because, when

viewed in context, none of the statements made by officers relating

to a plea deal or possible sentence amounted to “promises related to

reduced criminal punishment.” Leverette, 

 (2) (citation

and punctuation omitted). See Henderson, 

 (2)

(explaining that “exhortations or encouragement to tell the truth,

conveying the seriousness of the accused’s situation, or offering to

inform the district attorney about the accused’s cooperation while

making clear that only the district attorney can determine charges

and plea deals — do not amount to a hope of benefit”) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

     Throughout the recorded interviews, the officers suggested

that telling the truth or giving a confession might be helpful to Short

or play a beneficial role in plea negotiations or when it came to a

potential future sentence. However, the officers did not promise

Short that a plea offer would be made to him or tie a promise of a

plea offer to any particular sentence or punishment. While the

                                  18
officers pointed out that there could be a “difference” in his

punishment depending on “if [he] pled out to a sentence,” they made

clear that it was the district attorney’s office, rather than

themselves, who “might” offer him a plea. Insofar as a particular

punishment or sentence is concerned, the officers stated that “if” the

district attorney offered Short a plea, “it could be 25 years,” and

simply pointed out a fact when observing that “anything they could

offer you is a lot shorter than life without parole.” Moreover, while

the officers told Short they would “have an input” with the district

attorney and said they would make a “good recommendation” on

Short’s behalf if he told the truth, the officers made clear that the

district attorney, rather than themselves, would have the final word

on   any   plea   deal   or   sentencing   recommendation.     These

noncommittal statements by the officers did not amount to

“promises related to reduced criminal punishment.” Leverette, 

 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Perez v. State,

 (2) (

) (2020) (concluding that

officers’ statements to a defendant “that he could help himself by

                                 19
being honest and by telling [the officers] what had really happened”

was “not the equivalent of offering a hope of benefit”); Samuels v.

State, 

 (2) (

) (2010) (“Sheriff Marshall’s

suggestion that he may at some point be willing to talk to the district

attorney did not constitute a reward of a lighter sentence[.]”); Taylor

v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2001) (“It also does not

render a statement involuntary for the police to tell a suspect that

the trial judge may consider her truthful cooperation with the

police.”), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Chulpayev, 

 (3) (b) (

) (2015); Arline v. State, 

 (2) (

) (1995) (“Merely telling a defendant that his

or her cooperation will be made known to the prosecution does not

constitute a ‘hope of benefit’ sufficient to render a statement

inadmissible[.]”).

     The same is true to the extent that Short argues the officers

induced his confession with an improper hope of benefit by referring

to his case as a “death penalty case,” by insinuating that discovery

of Gamble’s blood on Short’s clothing would “smoke” him, and by

                                  20
suggesting — after Short had confessed — that his confession

“normally kind of takes the death penalty kind of off the table.” With

respect to these statements, “context matters.” Leverette, 

 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). These first two

statements were made in the context of Detective Carter discussing

the “possibility” that the district attorney’s office “could go for a

death penalty case if they elected to do that.” And Detective Carter

immediately followed up on that statement by clarifying: “I’m not

saying they are going to [pursue the death penalty], I’m just saying

it’s a possibility because this woman is 83 years old, OK?” In context,

these statements are no more than simply “an explanation of the

seriousness of [his] situation” as a suspect accused of murdering an

83-year-old woman and do not otherwise render his confession

inadmissible. See Sosniak v. State, 

 (1) (C) (

) (2010) (concluding that officer’s suggestion that

defendant was “already looking at a death penalty case” and “could

‘get a needle’” amounted to no more than an explanation of the

seriousness of the defendant’s situation).

                                  21
         Finally, the statement made by Detective Carter that Short’s

confession “normally kind of takes the death penalty kind of off the

table” is not only equivocal, but came after Short’s confession had

been obtained, and “any hope of benefit given by the police to a

defendant after the defendant has already confessed cannot be said

to have induced the confession and thus does not affect its voluntary

nature.” State v. Lee, 

 (2) (

) (2008)

(emphasis omitted); Chandler v. State, 

 (1)

(

) (2003). See Budhani, 

 (2) (b) (noting

requirement of actual inducement).

         For the reasons stated above, Short’s hope of benefit argument

fails.

         (b) Short also maintains that his confession was induced by the

remotest fear of injury “because he was at risk of harm by other

inmates in the Muscogee County Jail and was induced to confession

so as to be placed in protective custody.” The facts of this case do not

involve allegations of physical or mental torture by law enforcement

officers, and to the extent Short makes a fear of injury argument, it

                                    22
is predicated upon coercion by threats and a theoretical risk of harm

at the hands of a third party. Short essentially argues that Detective

Carter knew Short was being threatened by other inmates and that

Detective Carter used that threat to induce Short’s confession.14 This

argument fails because the record does not show actual inducement.

See Pulley, 

 (2) (explaining the need for “a causal

connection between the police conduct and the confession”) (citation

and punctuation omitted); Leverette, 

 (1) n.15

(Peterson, P.J., dissenting) (discussing requirement that a

“statement actually induce[ ] the defendant’s confession”) (citations

omitted).

      Short testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing that Detective

Carter offered him “protective custody for [his] cooperation[,]” that


      14 While Short    presents his “fear of injury” argument on appeal in a
manner that is separate and distinct from his “hope of benefit” argument, he
blended those arguments below. Because Short testified to the facts underlying
his “fear of injury” argument during the Jackson-Denno hearing, and because
the trial court rejected his generalized arguments under OCGA § 24-8-824 that
were based, at least in part, on those predicate facts, we think that the distinct
“fear of injury” argument that Short pursues on appeal has been fairly
preserved for ordinary appellate review. The trial court’s construction of
Short’s argument poses no issue here since Short’s argument fails regardless
of its characterization under OCGA § 24-8-824.
                                       23
Detective Carter made this offer at an unspecified time “in the car[,]”

and that he gave his confession “based on those promises.” However,

the recorded interviews contain minimal discussion of any “fear of

injury” on Short’s part and no use of that fear on the officers’ part to

induce a confession. Nearly three hours prior to giving his confession

during the December 5 interview, Short raised with the officers the

issue of his “housing situation” and alluded to fearing for his safety

inside the county jail. This was the only mention of such matters to

the officers prior to Short’s confession, and Detective Carter

responded to Short in that moment that it “must have been over at

the jail if they asked you if you felt safe.” Short later briefly

discussed being in solitary confinement and having some “conflict”

with other inmates during lunch with his mother, but at no point do

the recorded interviews contain any discussion of what Short

testified to at the Jackson-Denno hearing.

     Therefore, in denying Short’s pre-trial motion, the trial court

rejected Short’s contention that his confession was induced by an

offer of “protective custody for [Short’s] cooperation[,]” relying

                                  24
instead on what could be gleaned from the recorded interviews

themselves. Under our deferential standard of review, the trial court

was free to do so, and Short has not shown that doing so constitutes

reversible error in this case. Absent Short’s discredited testimony,

there is nothing in the record to support his contention that the

officers used a fear of injury to coerce and actually induce his

confession.

     2. Because we conclude that Short’s confession was obtained

consistent with OCGA § 24-8-824 and that the trial court did not err

in concluding otherwise, we need not address Short’s derivative

argument that the trial court erred by admitting physical evidence

(here, the murder weapons) that were recovered as a result of that

confession. Such an argument is also foreclosed by our precedent.

See Chulpayev, 

 (3) (b) (concluding that “the fruit of

the poisonous tree doctrine does not, as a matter of law, apply to

violations of OCGA § 24-8-824”).

     3. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that Short’s

confession was not induced by either a hope of benefit or fear of

                                   25
injury in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824. Therefore, the trial court did

not err by admitting Short’s confession at trial. We affirm.

     Judgment affirmed. Peterson, C. J., Bethel, Ellington,
McMillian, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ., concur. Warren, P. J., concurs
specially in part.



     WARREN, Presiding Justice, concurring specially in part.

     Although I agree with the majority opinion’s ultimate

conclusion that Short’s convictions should be affirmed in this case, I

respectfully disagree with much of its reasoning in Division 1 and

therefore concur specially in that division. In particular, I believe

that this Court may review Short’s “fear of injury” contention on

appeal for plain error only.

     Short contends in his appellate brief in this Court that the trial

court should not have admitted his confession under OCGA § 24-8-

824 on the basis that it “was induced by remotest fear of injury

because he was at risk of harm by other inmates in the Muscogee

County Jail and was induced to confession so as to be placed in

protective custody.” But he did not clearly make that argument

                                  26
during the Jackson-Denno hearing or in the trial proceedings below.

Indeed, Short filed no written motion to exclude his statements

under OCGA § 24-8-824, and at the Jackson-Denno hearing, Short’s

counsel cited the statute, offered only a glancing reference to “fear

of injury,” and then focused almost exclusively on claims pertaining

to an impermissible “hope of benefit.”15

      I also am not convinced that the trial court ruled on the “fear

of injury” argument under OCGA § 24-8-824 that Short now raises




      15  In this respect, counsel began his argument by saying that “there
[were] several issues. Totality of the circumstances, hope of benefit, promise,
threats of harm, any number of issues.” He then focused on law enforcement
officers’ alleged offers of a “hope of benefit,” asserting that they offered Short
“a plea to a 25-year sentence” and promised to take the death penalty “off the
table”—without mentioning the “remotest fear of injury” claim that Short now
raises on appeal. To be sure, Short later testified that other inmates at the jail
had “threatened” him; he told Detective Carter that he was concerned for his
safety; Detective Carter promised Short “protective custody for [his]
cooperation”; and Short confessed “based on these promises.” But Short did not
make clear whether his testimony pertained to a claim of fear of injury or to a
claim of hope of benefit (or to both), and trial counsel did not clarify whether
Short sought to exclude his confession on the basis of fear of injury. (On this
point: after Short testified, the trial court asked if trial counsel wanted to add
anything to the record, and counsel said, “No.”)
       Given all this, it is difficult for me to conclude that the trial court’s
“express rejection of Short’s contrary position and decision to admit Short’s
confession at trial is, by necessary implication,” a ruling that Short’s confession
was not induced by a fear of injury in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824. Maj. Op.
at 620.
                                        27
on appeal. In an e-mail to counsel following the hearing, the trial

court preliminarily ruled that Short’s “custodial statements” “after

his advice of rights” were admissible, noting that the statements he

made “prior to his advice of rights” would not be admitted.

       Then at the beginning of the trial, the trial court admitted

Short’s confession in an oral ruling, saying that Short “knowingly

was informed of his rights, waived those rights, and that was done

repeatedly, multiple times throughout the interviews,” with no

mention of OCGA § 24-8-824, “hope of benefit,”16 or “fear of injury.”

      Given our admonition that the tests for determining the

voluntariness of a confession under OCGA § 24-8-824 and under the

Constitution are not the same (and that language about “knowing



      16 Because Short’s trial counsel more clearly raised a hope of benefit

argument at the Jackson-Denno hearing and sought to exclude Short’s
confession on that basis, it is possible that the trial court’s admission of Short’s
confession was an implicit ruling on that issue and was thus preserved for
ordinary appellate review—although I have my doubts, given that the court’s
preliminary and oral rulings focused on only Short’s waiver of rights and the
constitutional voluntariness of his statements (rather than statutory
voluntariness under OCGA § 24-8-824). In any event, because Short’s hope of
benefit claim fails even under ordinary appellate review (as the majority
opinion concludes), it would also fail under the more stringent plain-error test.
See, e.g., Sconyers v. State, 

 (

) (2024).
                                        28
waiver of rights” typically is responsive to claims about

constitutional voluntariness), I have trouble concluding that the

trial court implicitly ruled on a fear of injury claim. See, e.g., State

v. Chulpayev, 

 (

) (2015) (explaining

the difference between statutory claims based on OCGA § 24-8-824

and claims of constitutional voluntariness under the United States

Constitution and noting that our decisions have sometimes

conflated the analysis of whether a confession is voluntary under the

separate standards). As discussed above, trial counsel made no

specific argument that Short’s confession was induced by a fear of

injury, and the context of Short’s testimony at the Jackson-Denno

hearing did not make such a claim “apparent.” OCGA § 24-1-103 (a)

(1).17 As I see it, plain-error review applies to Short’s fear of injury

claim, and Short’s claim fails under the second prong of the plain-




      17 Nor can I conclude, as the majority opinion does, that the fear of injury

claim Short now raises easily fails under ordinary appellate review because
the trial court—in purportedly implicitly ruling on a fear of injury argument
that was not clearly presented to it—also implicitly rejected Short’s testimony
and relied instead on video recordings of law enforcement interviews that
“contain minimal discussion of any ‘fear of injury.’” Maj. Op. at 623.
                                       29
error test. See Hassan v. State, 

 (

)

(2024) (explaining that under OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (1), “[a] trial

court’s ruling that admits evidence is ordinarily reviewable only

where ‘a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record,

stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not

apparent from the context’” and that “[w]ithout preservation of error

as provided in OCGA § 24-1-103, an appellate court reviews an

evidentiary ruling only for plain error pursuant to OCGA § 24-1-103

(d)”). See also Mitchell v. State, 

 (

)

(2022) (noting that an unpreserved claim that a defendant’s

confession was induced by a fear of injury, in violation of OCGA §

24-8-824, is reviewable only for plain error).

      “To establish plain error, the appellant must point to an error

that was not affirmatively waived, and that error must have been

clear and not open to reasonable dispute, must have affected the

appellant’s substantial rights, and must have seriously affected the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Hassan, 

 (cleaned up). “If the appellant fails to meet

                                  30
one element of the plain error test, his claim fails.” 

     Here, Short has not established that the trial court—in failing

to determine on its own accord that Short’s confession was induced

by the “remotest fear of injury” in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824—

committed a clear error beyond reasonable dispute. Under our cases

interpreting OCGA § 24-8-824, “[t]he ‘remotest fear of injury’ that

renders an incriminating statement involuntary and inadmissible is

‘physical or mental torture’ or coercion by threats.” State v. Lynch,

 (

) (2009) (interpreting a former version

of OCGA § 24-8-824) (citation omitted). See also Mitchell, 

 (“‘Physical or mental torture is the type of fear of injury that

prevents a confession from being admissible’ under OCGA § 24-8-

824.”) (citation omitted). At the Jackson-Denno hearing, Short

testified, among other things, that he had been threatened by other

inmates; he told Detective Carter that he was concerned for his

safety in the jail; Detective Carter promised Short “protective

custody for [his] cooperation”; and Short confessed “based on these

promises.” But Short has cited no authority, and I have found none,

                                   31
showing that these particular circumstances obviously “constituted

physical or mental torture” or coercive threats “of the type to render

an in-custody statement involuntary and inadmissible”—the

standard we have said applies to claims of “fear of injury” under

OCGA § 24-8-824. Browner v. State, 

 (

)

(2014). See also Lynch, 

 (affirming the trial court’s

suppression of the defendant’s statement to detectives because the

evidence presented at the suppression hearing supported the trial

court’s express findings that the detectives beat the defendant, used

“a taser,” removed his clothes, and withheld medical attention, such

that the defendant’s statement was induced by the remotest fear of

injury under a former version of OCGA § 24-8-824); Cheddersingh v.

State, 

 (

) (2012) (explaining that

under the plain-error test, the error must be so obvious that “‘the

trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even

absent the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it’”) (quoting

United States v. Frady, 

 (

, 71 LE2d

816) (1982)). And because under the particular circumstances

                                 32
presented in this case, Short has not met his burden of establishing

that the trial court clearly erred by failing to exclude his confession

on the ground that it was induced by the “remotest fear of injury” in

violation of OCGA § 24-8-824, Short has failed to establish that the

trial court plainly erred in this regard.18




      18 To be clear, I do not intend to suggest that a criminal defendant could

never establish a fear of injury claim under OCGA § 24-8-824 by alleging that
his fear was caused by an act of a third party (such as an inmate). Indeed, the
plain text of the statute does not appear to require that the defendant’s
confession be induced by a State actor. See OCGA § 24-8-824 (“To make a
confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being
induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”)
(emphasis added). I merely conclude that Short’s testimony, by itself and as
presented to the trial court here, did not clearly and obviously establish a fear
of injury under our current case law, so the trial court did not plainly err by
failing to exclude Short’s confession under OCGA § 24-8-824 on that basis.
        I also note that Short does not contend that Detective Carter’s alleged
offer to place Short in protective custody in exchange for cooperation in the
murder investigation constituted a hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824. In
any event, under our current case law, such an offer would not constitute a
hope of benefit. See, e.g., State v. Leverette, 

 (

)
(2025) (explaining that a hope of benefit is a “‘promise[ ] related to reduced
criminal punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at
all’”) (citation omitted). But see 

 at 824 n.17 (Peterson, P. J., dissenting)
(asserting that our case law has “repeatedly parrot[ed]” the “unsupported
assertion” that a hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824 must relate to the
charge or sentence facing the suspect).
                                       33
                      Decided May 28, 2025.

     Murder. Muscogee Superior Court. Before Judge Mullins.

     Ryan C. Malone, Frances C. Kuo, David J. Walker, for

appellant.

     W. Donald Kelly, District Attorney, Frederick Lewis, Assistant

District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney General,

for appellee.




                                34