¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: January 28, 2025
¶4 S24A1313. REDDICK v. THE STATE.
¶5 ELLINGTON, Justice.
¶6 A Grady County jury found Pascal Lorenzo Reddick guilty of
¶7felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of
¶8a felony in connection with the shooting death of Antavius
¶9Robinson. 1 Reddick contends that the evidence is insufficient to
¶10 1 A Grady County grand jury returned an indictment on December 9,
¶112021, charging Reddick with having committed, on November 14, 2020, malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During a jury trial that began on June 13, 2022, the jury found Reddick guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury found Reddick not guilty of malice murder, and the State entered an order of nolle prosequi on the count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court initially sentenced Reddick on June 15, 2022, but later entered a revised final disposition on July 7, 2022, to correct an error. The trial court sentenced Reddick to life in prison for felony murder and to a consecutive five-year prison sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court merged the aggravated assault count into the felony murder conviction at sentencing. On July 26, 2022, Reddick timely filed a motion for a new trial. New counsel entered an appearance on Reddick’s behalf on November 28, 2022, and, thereafter, twice amended Reddick’s motion for a new trial. After a hearing held on August 10, 2023, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial on March 11, 2024. support his convictions because the State did not prove beyond a
¶12reasonable doubt that Reddick was unjustified in using deadly force
¶13in self-defense or in defense of habitation, that the trial court abused
¶14its discretion in denying his immunity motion, and that trial counsel
¶15provided ineffective assistance. As explained below, Reddick’s
¶16arguments lack merit; therefore, we affirm his convictions.
¶17 1. Reddick contends that the evidence was insufficient to
¶18support his conviction for felony murder, arguing that the State
¶19failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not justified
¶20in using deadly force against the victim. For the reasons that follow,
¶21we disagree.
¶22 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
¶23views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict and
¶24evaluate[s] whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
¶25defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
¶26he was convicted.” Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (846
¶27Reddick timely filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 2024. Reddick’s appeal was docketed to the August 2024 term, and the case was thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 SE2d 83) (2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)
¶28(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). At trial, Reddick contended
¶29that he acted to defend himself and his home, and the trial court
¶30instructed the jury to consider self-defense and defense of habitation
¶31as affirmative defenses. Under Georgia law,
¶32 a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
¶33OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). Defense of habitation is governed by OCGA §
¶3416-3-23, which sets forth when a person is authorized to use force in
¶35the defense of habitation and also sets forth three specific contexts
¶36in which deadly force is authorized. 2 See Clark v. State, 307 Ga. 537,
¶37 2 OCGA § 16-3-23 provides:
¶38 A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation; however, such person is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if: (1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner and he or she reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering
¶39 3 540 (837 SE2d 265) (2019). “[Deadly force] is not justified if the
¶40degree of force used by the defendant exceeds that which a
¶41reasonable person would believe necessary to defend against the
¶42victim’s unlawful actions.” Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 423 (1) (554
¶43SE2d 458) (2001). See also Clark v. State, 271 Ga. at 29 (2) (“The
¶44use of excessive force or unlawful force while acting in self-defense
¶45is not justifiable.”). “When a defendant presents evidence that he
¶46was justified in using deadly force, the State bears the burden of
¶47disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Birdow v. State,
¶48305 Ga. 48, 50 (1) (823 SE2d 736) (2019).
¶49 Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
¶50evidence shows the following. During the early morning hours of
¶51 personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence; (2) That force is used against another person who is not a member of the family or household and who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using such force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred; or (3) The person using such force reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 4 November 14, 2020, Lakeisha Robinson (“Lakeisha”), the victim’s
¶52wife, went to Reddick’s Grady County home. Reddick and Lakeisha
¶53had sex on an air mattress on the living room floor. Robinson
¶54repeatedly called his wife, but she did not answer the phone.
¶55 Robinson drove to Reddick’s home in search of his wife. When
¶56he arrived, he used his cell phone’s camera to record his actions. The
¶57video recording showed Robinson exit his car, approach his wife’s car
¶58(which was parked in Reddick’s driveway), and look inside it. He
¶59lowered his phone to his side and walked to Reddick’s home, a mobile
¶60home with metal walls and a small porch off the front door. As he
¶61walked up the short flight of steps to the front door, the sound of a
¶62woman moaning can be heard on the recording. At that point,
¶63Robinson yells: “Hey, b***h, get out of there! Mother f****r! I’mma
¶64kill your motherf***ing ass, ho! Get your ass out of th—.” Robinson
¶65abruptly stopped speaking at the sound of a gunshot, and the video
¶66recording ends.
¶67 A silent, video-only recording from Reddick’s neighbor’s
¶68security camera also shows Robinson walking up to Reddick’s mobile
¶69 5 home. In the video, Robinson leaves the frame for about 20 seconds
¶70and then can be seen quickly retreating toward his car. Moments
¶71later, he collapses to the ground near his car.
¶72 After the shooting, Reddick placed a call to his cousin,
¶73Lieutenant Nixon of the Grady County Sheriff’s Office. When
¶74Lieutenant Nixon did not answer, Reddick sent him a text message
¶75stating: “Cuz answer man I shot at a n***a thru my door[.] I’m in
¶76Cairo.” When Lieutenant Nixon called Reddick, Reddick told him
¶77that he shot a person trying to break into his house. At the request
¶78of a GBI agent, Lieutenant Nixon picked Reddick up and drove him
¶79to speak with the agent.
¶80 GBI Special Agent Charlie Johnston investigated the shooting.
¶81When he arrived at Reddick’s home, he found Robinson’s body lying
¶82face-up about 50 feet from Reddick’s front porch. Agent Johnston
¶83learned that Lakeisha had turned Robinson onto his back and
¶84attempted to perform life-saving measures. Given that Robinson’s
¶85body was found about 50 feet from Reddick’s porch, Agent Johnston
¶86testified that Robinson had moved away from Reddick’s porch when
¶87 6 he was shot. Outside, on Reddick’s front porch, Agent Johnston
¶88recovered a 9mm shell casing. The shell casing was wedged between
¶89the porch flooring and the exterior siding of Reddick’s mobile home.
¶90A second 9mm shell casing was recovered from inside the home on
¶91the living room floor. Agent Johnston also discovered a single hole
¶92in the wall of the mobile home near the front door that appeared to
¶93be from a bullet being fired from inside the home. He also noted some
¶94minor damage to the exterior of the front door but could not tell how
¶95old the damage was.
¶96 No blood was found on Reddick’s porch, nor was there a trail of
¶97blood leading to the body. Based on his training and experience,
¶98Agent Johnston opined that the first shot was fired inside the home
¶99in reaction to the victim striking the front door, and the second shot
¶100happened after Reddick opened the door and fired the gun outside,
¶101as there was no way for the second shell casing to have landed where
¶102it did if Reddick had fired from inside his home with the door closed.
¶103 GBI Special Agent Montana Walker separately interviewed
¶104 7 Lakeisha and Reddick. 3 Reddick waived his Miranda rights. During
¶105the course of those interviews and based on evidence recovered from
¶106the crime scene, the agent concluded that Robinson went to
¶107Reddick’s home to find his wife. Once there, he heard Reddick and
¶108his wife having sex. He banged on the door, demanding that his wife
¶109come outside. After the first gunshot through the trailer wall,
¶110Robinson ran from the porch toward his car. As Robinson fled,
¶111Reddick shot at him a second time through the open door, and that
¶112shot hit Robinson.
¶113 During his interview with Agent Walker, Reddick said that he
¶114fired his gun twice from inside his home. When Agent Walker
¶115confronted Reddick with the evidence of the shell casing discovered
¶116wedged between his front porch and the side of his mobile home, he
¶117conceded that he may have fired a second time “during the heat of
¶118 3 Trial counsel was unable to locate Lakeisha and to subpoena her for
¶119trial. Lakeisha’s statement to the GBI was not tendered into evidence. Although Lakeisha testified at Reddick’s pretrial immunity hearing, defense counsel did not offer the transcript of her hearing testimony in evidence at trial. We also note that Reddick does not argue on appeal that any part of Agent Walker’s testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. 8 the moment” while outside on the porch. Reddick said he thought
¶120that someone was trying to break into his home. However, he
¶121claimed that, when he opened his door, he did not see anyone. He
¶122told Agent Walker that he was “scared sh**less,” and was not trying
¶123to kill anyone.
¶124 During his trial testimony, Reddick claimed that, while he was
¶125having sex with Lakeisha, he heard a loud “thump” or “boom” at his
¶126front door. He testified that he heard Robinson yelling “I’m going to
¶127kill you,” as he banged on the front door. Reddick also said he heard
¶128a noise that sounded like someone trying to pry open his door. He
¶129said that he was scared and did not know how many people were on
¶130the other side of the door. He testified that he got out of bed, grabbed
¶131his gun off a nearby table, and “shot twice[.]” He said he shot “at a
¶132downward angle” through his home toward the front porch. He said
¶133he had no intention of killing anyone and intended only to scare the
¶134person away. He testified that, after he fired the gun, he heard
¶135Robinson say, “Oh, s**t,” and then he heard Lakeisha say that the
¶136voice was her husband’s.
¶137 9 Reddick also testified that, although he was still afraid, he
¶138walked to the door and stuck his head out just enough to yell for
¶139Robinson to get out of his yard. He claimed that he did not step out
¶140onto the porch at all or leave through the front door of his home.
¶141Instead, he went out his back door toward his neighbor’s house, at
¶142which point he looked back and saw a car with the lights on and the
¶143driver’s door open. He claimed that he did not know what happened
¶144to Robinson. Reddick testified that he called a friend of his and told
¶145him that someone was beating on his door and trying to break into
¶146his house, and that he shot through his door and did not know if the
¶147person was dead or had fled. He also testified that he tried to call
¶148his cousin, Lieutenant Nixon. Reddick did not, however, call 911 to
¶149report the shooting.
¶150 In late November or early December 2020, a friend of Reddick’s
¶151went to the Thomas County Sheriff’s Office and turned in Reddick’s
¶1529mm pistol. The Sheriff’s Office sent the pistol to the GBI, and
¶153subsequent ballistics testing showed that the two 9mm shell casings
¶154recovered from the crime scene were fired from Reddick’s 9mm
¶155 10 pistol.
¶156 A GBI forensic pathologist autopsied Robinson’s body. The
¶157pathologist determined that the body had an entrance wound to the
¶158front, upper-left chest near the armpit. The corresponding exit
¶159wound was in the mid- to lower-right side of the back and was four
¶160inches lower than the entrance wound. The bullet damaged
¶161Robinson’s lungs and heart, causing massive internal bleeding
¶162which resulted in his death. The pathologist determined that, if
¶163Robinson had been standing facing the front door when he was shot,
¶164the bullet would have gone through his chest and exited straight
¶165through his upper back and not at the left to right and downward
¶166angle he observed. The pathologist opined that Robinson’s height
¶167was not a factor that would have influenced the bullet’s trajectory
¶168through his body.
¶169 GBI Special Agent Amy Braswell conducted a trajectory
¶170analysis of the bullet hole in the wall of Reddick’s mobile home. She
¶171used the autopsy report to aid her in formulating an opinion
¶172regarding the trajectory of the bullet. She opined that, based on the
¶173 11 trajectory of the bullet, the victim was not standing on the porch
¶174when he was shot. Based on her review of all the evidence and given
¶175the four-inch downward angle between the victim’s entrance and
¶176exit wounds, it was more consistent with the shooter being on the
¶177porch and shooting down at Robinson while he was standing on the
¶178ground. Agent Braswell further opined that the one-inch difference
¶179in height between the porch and Reddick’s front door would not
¶180account for the bullet’s four-inch downward trajectory through the
¶181victim’s chest.
¶182 When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
¶183evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process for
¶184a reasonable jury to infer that, while the victim did approach
¶185Reddick’s home, beat on the door, and yell at his wife, he did not
¶186intend to enter Reddick’s home; rather, he wanted his wife to come
¶187outside. Further, mere “[v]erbal threats and fisticuffs do not justify
¶188the use of deadly force.” Collier v. State, 288 Ga. 756, 757 (2) (707
¶189SE2d 102) (2011). The evidence showed that Robinson died from a
¶190bullet that caused massive injury to his heart and lungs, yet he was
¶191 12 able to exclaim “Oh, s**t” after the first shot. Moreover, no blood was
¶192found on the porch or on the ground leading to Robinson’s body.
¶193From this evidence, the jury could infer that the first shot Reddick
¶194fired from inside his home missed Robinson. The jury could also infer
¶195that, after Reddick fired the first shot, Robinson stopped beating on
¶196the door and making threats and moved off the porch and away from
¶197Reddick’s home. The ballistic and trajectory evidence supported the
¶198State’s theory of the case that Reddick went out onto his porch and
¶199shot at Robinson, who had turned slightly to glance behind him as
¶200he retreated to his car. Robinson’s body was found in front of the
¶201parked cars about 50 feet away from the front porch. The evidence
¶202also showed that Robinson was unarmed.
¶203 Based on this evidence, the jury was authorized to find that
¶204Reddick fired the fatal shot when Robinson was unarmed and far
¶205enough away that he posed no threat to Reddick or Reddick’s home.
¶206The State’s evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that, at
¶207the time of the shooting, Reddick did not reasonably believe it was
¶208necessary to shoot the victim to defend himself or his home. See, e.g.,
¶209 13 Corley v. State, 308 Ga. 321, 322 (1)(a) (840 SE2d 391) (2020) (“The
¶210jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense
¶211and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-
¶212defense.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Clark v. State, 307 Ga.
¶213537, 541 (1) (837 SE2d 265) (2019) (To support a theory of defense of
¶214habitation, “the evidence must establish that the defendant had an
¶215objective reasonable belief that the assailant is entering to assault,
¶216to offer personal violence, or to commit a felony and that deadly force
¶217is necessary to prevent one of those acts[.]” (citation, punctuation,
¶218and emphasis omitted)); Collier, 288 Ga. at 757 (2) (“Justification
¶219cannot be based on a deadly assault which has been completely
¶220ended, unless the assailant has some further apparent ability to
¶221continue it[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted)). Instead, the jury
¶222could infer that Reddick fired a deadly weapon at Robinson as he
¶223was retreating from the mobile home, killing Robinson during the
¶224course of an aggravated assault on Robinson, which constitutes
¶225felony murder. OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) (“A person commits the offense of
¶226murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the
¶227 14 death of another human being irrespective of malice.”).
¶228 We conclude, therefore, that the evidence presented at trial
¶229was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to disprove
¶230Reddick’s justification defenses beyond a reasonable doubt and to
¶231authorize a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
¶232doubt of the crimes of felony murder and possession of a firearm
¶233during the commission of that felony. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443
¶234U.S. at 319 (III); Corley, 308 Ga. at 322 (1) (a); Clark, 307 Ga. at 541
¶235(1); Collier, 288 Ga. at 757 (2).
¶236 2. Reddick contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
¶237denying his pretrial motion seeking immunity from prosecution
¶238pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2.4 He contends that the trial court
¶239failed to consider and rule on his claim that he was acting in defense
¶240of habitation. The record does not support this claim of error.
¶241 4 OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides:
¶242 A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-20, 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, 16-3-24, or 17-4-20 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is unlawful by such person under Part 2 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of this title. 15 Code Section 16-3-24.2 bars criminal proceedings against a
¶243defendant if the defendant presents sufficient evidence at a pretrial
¶244hearing to persuade the trial court by a preponderance of the
¶245evidence that the defendant was justified in using deadly force. See
¶246Ellison v. State, 313 Ga. 107, 110 (868 SE2d 189) (2022) (“To prevail
¶247on a motion for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, a defendant
¶248must establish his justification defense by a preponderance of the
¶249evidence.”). “In reviewing the denial of a motion for pretrial
¶250immunity, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
¶251the trial court’s ruling and accept the trial court’s findings of fact
¶252and credibility determinations if there is any evidence to support
¶253them.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶254 In this case, although the trial court found that Reddick’s
¶255“fatal actions were motivated by other motives rather than self-
¶256defense” and that he “could not reasonably believe under the
¶257presented evidence that there was a danger of imminent death or
¶258great bodily injury to himself[,]” the trial court made no express
¶259finding addressing Reddick’s defense of habitation claim, which he
¶260 16 raised both in his initial immunity motion, and his post-hearing
¶261brief in support of the immunity motion. However, we conclude that
¶262such a ruling is implicit in the trial court’s ruling and final order for
¶263the following reasons.
¶264 In both its order denying Reddick’s pretrial motion for
¶265immunity as well as its order denying Reddick’s motion for a new
¶266trial on the immunity claim, the trial court referenced both the law
¶267of self-defense as well as defense of habitation. After considering all
¶268of the evidence submitted during the pretrial hearing, the trial court
¶269found:
¶270 From the credible evidence presented to this Court, it appeared that after the shot through the doorway, the decedent fled the porch area and was moving towards the area of the decedent’s vehicle, some approximately fifteen feet away; however, the Defendant stood in the trailer doorway or on the porch area and shot directly at the decedent, who was in the yard area at the time of the second shot. No evidence was presented that the decedent was armed with any type of weapon at any point.
¶271Thus, the evidence presented at the immunity hearing supported
¶272the trial court’s ruling that, at the time Reddick shot the victim, the
¶273victim was not attempting to enter Reddick’s home. Rather he was
¶274 17 unarmed and retreating toward his car. Given these findings, the
¶275trial court implicitly rejected Reddick’s defense-of-habitation claim
¶276when it concluded: “The presented evidence at the two immunity
¶277motion hearings [is] insufficient for this Court to determine that
¶278[Reddick] met [his] burden of proving that [he] is entitled to
¶279immunity from prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2,” a
¶280statute that expressly includes defense of habitation pursuant to
¶281OCGA § 16-3-23 as a rationale for immunity from prosecution.5
¶282Consequently, Reddick has not shown that the trial court’s ruling
¶283was an abuse of discretion.
¶284 3. Reddick contends that the trial court erred in denying his
¶285motion for a new trial on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.
¶286He argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
¶287three respects: (1) he failed to tender into evidence Lekiesha
¶288Robinson’s testimony from the immunity hearing; (2) he failed to
¶289adequately challenge the qualifications and testimony of Agent
¶290Braswell, and (3) he failed to object to the allegedly unfairly
¶291 5 See footnote 3, supra.
¶292 18 prejudicial testimony of Agent Walker. For the reasons set forth
¶293below, we discern no error in the trial court’s ruling that Reddick
¶294failed to carry his burden of showing that trial counsel was
¶295ineffective.
¶296 To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
¶297Reddick must demonstrate both that his trial counsel’s performance
¶298was professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced by this
¶299deficient performance. See Bates v. State, 313 Ga. 57, 62 (2) (867
¶300SE2d 140) (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668,
¶301687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To establish deficient
¶302performance, Reddick must show that trial counsel performed her
¶303duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the
¶304circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. See
¶305id. Establishing deficient performance
¶306 is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [the appellant] bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. To carry this burden, he must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy
¶307 19 may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.
¶308Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 740-741 (2) (879 SE2d 400) (2022)
¶309(citation and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Reddick
¶310“must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his
¶311trial counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been
¶312different.” Bates, 313 Ga. at 62 (2). “A reasonable probability is a
¶313probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
¶314(citation and punctuation omitted). “And, this burden is a heavy
¶315one.” Id. at 62-63 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If an
¶316appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of
¶317the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine
¶318the other prong.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d
¶319346) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶320 (a) Lakeisha Robinson’s testimony. Reddick contends that his
¶321trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to admit Lakeisha’s
¶322immunity hearing testimony at trial under an exception to the
¶323hearsay rule. Had counsel done so, he argues, the testimony would
¶324 20 have been admitted, and it would have corroborated Reddick’s
¶325testimony at trial that Robinson violently attempted to enter his
¶326home while threatening to kill those inside. For the reasons that
¶327follow, Reddick has not carried his burden of showing that trial
¶328counsel’s actions, even if deficient, were prejudicial.
¶329 The record shows that, although Lakeisha testified at the
¶330immunity hearing, she was unavailable at trial, despite counsel’s
¶331repeated attempts to find her and subpoena her. At the hearing on
¶332Reddick’s motion for a new trial, defense counsel testified that she
¶333thought Lakeisha’s testimony at the immunity hearing was
¶334favorable to Reddick’s justification defense. Nevertheless, counsel
¶335did not seek to admit Lakeisha’s immunity hearing testimony at
¶336trial under an exception to the hearsay rule.
¶337 Although Lekeisha’s hearing testimony would have
¶338corroborated Reddick’s trial testimony that Robinson banged on the
¶339door and shouted threats, ample other evidence already existed to
¶340show this, including Robinson’s own cell phone recording. Thus, her
¶341testimony, while arguably helpful on this point, was not required.
¶342 21 More significantly, however, had counsel persuaded the trial court
¶343to admit Lakeisha’s testimony from the motion hearing, that
¶344testimony, on the whole, would not have been favorable to Reddick
¶345and, in fact, would have undermined his claim of self-defense
¶346because it contradicted Reddick’s trial testimony that he fired both
¶347shots from inside his home while the door was closed.
¶348 During the immunity hearing, Lakeisha testified that, as she
¶349and Reddick were having sex, she heard loud banging on the door of
¶350the mobile home as well as her husband’s angry threats and
¶351demands that she come outside. Moments later, she heard what she
¶352believed was the sound of a gunshot. Because it was dark in the
¶353room, she did not see Reddick grab or fire his gun. But she saw
¶354Reddick open his front door, and then she heard another gunshot.
¶355She did not see Reddick actually fire his pistol because she ran out
¶356of the living room and toward the back of the home. Once outside,
¶357she found her husband’s body where their cars were parked. As
¶358Reddick fled, she called 911. She saw no weapons around her
¶359husband’s body, and, when she returned home, she found her
¶360 22 husband’s shotguns locked away.
¶361 Lakeisha’s testimony not only contradicts Reddick’s testimony
¶362that he fired his weapon twice from inside the home while the door
¶363was closed, but it also corroborates the State’s opinion and forensic
¶364evidence that Reddick fired the second shot at Robinson, who was
¶365unarmed, through the open door as Robinson retreated. Thus,
¶366assuming without deciding that trial counsel’s performance was
¶367professionally deficient for failing to seek to introduce Lakeisha’s
¶368immunity hearing testimony at trial, trial counsel’s allegedly
¶369deficient performance nevertheless cannot be deemed prejudicial
¶370because Reddick has not shown that Lakeisha’s testimony would
¶371have been sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
¶372trial. See Hill v. State, 291 Ga. 160, 164 (4) (728 SE2d 225) (2012)
¶373(Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
¶374despite any deficient performance in counsel’s lack of diligence in
¶375obtaining a particular witness’s testimony at trial, as the outcome of
¶376the trial would not have been different if the witness’s pretrial
¶377testimony had been admitted.).
¶378 23 (b) Agent Braswell’s qualifications and testimony. Reddick
¶379contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to
¶380object to the qualifications of Agent Braswell as an expert in bullet-
¶381trajectory analysis and failed to adequately cross-examine Agent
¶382Braswell’s opinions and the basis for them. Reddick also contends
¶383that Agent Braswell’s opinion was conclusory and unsupported by
¶384any data or measurements. For the reasons set forth below, we
¶385conclude that Reddick has failed to establish that his counsel’s
¶386performance was deficient with regard to Agent Braswell’s
¶387testimony.
¶388 The record shows that Agent Braswell was deemed an expert
¶389in crime scene investigation by the trial court during the immunity
¶390motion hearing. The State laid a foundation for the agent’s
¶391testimony in the field of bullet-trajectory analysis, and defense
¶392counsel cross-examined the agents’ qualifications. The record shows
¶393that Agent Braswell has a master’s degree in criminal justice as well
¶394as general training in forensic science through the police academy,
¶395the GBI, and the National Forensic Academy. She completed a
¶396 24 bullet-trajectory analysis course through the National Forensic
¶397Academy and thereafter engaged in yearly continuing education and
¶398advanced training on the subject. Also, during her 22 years as an
¶399agent with the GBI, she performed over 50 trajectory analyses and
¶400testified numerous times as an expert in the subject. After cross-
¶401examining the agent on her qualifications, defense counsel objected
¶402to the agent being tendered as an expert in bullet-trajectory analysis
¶403on the ground that she was biased in favor of the prosecution, but
¶404the trial court overruled that objection. At trial, the prosecutor also
¶405laid the foundation for Agent Braswell’s admission as an expert
¶406witness, defense counsel cross-examined the agent’s qualifications,
¶407and the trial court admitted the agent as an expert in bullet-
¶408trajectory analysis – this time without objection.
¶409 The record shows that counsel thoroughly cross-examined
¶410Agent Braswell’s qualifications and the facts and assumptions upon
¶411which the agent based her opinions. Counsel asked the agent why
¶412she took no measurements relating to the bullet’s trajectory from the
¶413bullet hole near Reddick’s front door through Robinson’s body,
¶414 25 arguing that her testimony failed to acknowledge that the height
¶415and directionality of the bullet hole on the exterior of the mobile
¶416home was the same height and directionality as the entry wound in
¶417Robinson’s body. But as the agent had explained, “[y]ou have to have
¶418two fixed points to do trajectory” analysis, and in this case, she could
¶419not perform that particular analysis “because the body [was] gone.”
¶420Instead, the agent based her opinion on the angle of the bullet’s path
¶421through Robinson’s body, as shown on the autopsy report, at the
¶422time Reddick fired the first shot through the door of his home. The
¶423agent explained that, given the location of the bullet hole and
¶424Robinson’s height, if Robinson had been shot while standing on the
¶425porch, the bullet would travel “in a straight path. It’s not going to
¶426veer downward.” The expert opined that the evidence was
¶427consistent with the prosecution’s theory that Robinson was “looking
¶428back at someone [who] was above him, say, up here on the porch,
¶429when he was shot in the left chest and then where the bullet wound
¶430exited his right lower back.”
¶431 The transcript also shows that defense counsel elicited
¶432 26 testimony from the agent acknowledging that she did not know how
¶433Reddick was standing or how he was holding his pistol when he fired
¶434it through the wall, and that his “arm could be angled at any
¶435direction.” Counsel thus demonstrated that the agent’s opinions
¶436assumed that Reddick was holding the pistol level when he fired it
¶437from inside his home. Moreover, the agent acknowledged on cross-
¶438examination that Reddick could have been standing at a slightly
¶439higher elevation than Robinson when the first shot was fired.
¶440During closing argument, defense counsel argued that Robinson’s
¶441fatal chest wound was more likely caused by the first shot, when he
¶442was facing the door instead of when he was retreating. That shot,
¶443counsel argued, was fired at a downward angle by Reddick, who was
¶444taller than Robinson and was standing inside the house, which was
¶445at a higher elevation than the porch. Thus, the record plainly shows
¶446that defense counsel used the agent’s testimony to support Reddick’s
¶447theory of defense.
¶448 Based on the record before us, Reddick has not shown a sound
¶449basis for the trial court to reject Agent Braswell as an expert witness
¶450 27 under the law then in effect.6 Although bullet-trajectory analysis has
¶451“been recognized as [an] area[] of expertise . . ., formal education in
¶452the particular subject is not a prerequisite for status as an expert; a
¶453person may be qualified as an expert when the person’s knowledge
¶454is derived from experience as well as study.” Rowe v. State, 276 Ga.
¶455800, 806-807 (6) (582 SE2d 119) (2003) (citations omitted). See also
¶456former OCGA § 24-7-707 (2022) 7; Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798,
¶457 6 This case was tried in June 2022, prior to the 2022 legislative amendment to OCGA § 24-7-702, which became effective on July 1, 2022. With that amendment, the General Assembly extended “to criminal cases the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993), and its progeny. See Ga. L. 2022, p. 201, § 1 (amending OCGA § 24-7-702).” Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 287, 300 (2) (b) n.6 (882 SE2d 300) (2022); see also Ga. L. 2022, p. 201, § 3 (noting effective date). Because this case was tried before the amendment became effective, the Harper standard applies in this case. See Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 15 (5) (b) n.5 (885 SE2d 790) (2023); see also Smith, 315 Ga. at 300 (2) (b) n.6. Under Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525 (1) (292 SE2d 389) (1982), generally, once a scientific procedure has been recognized in a substantial number of courts, a trial judge may judicially notice, without receiving evidence, that the procedure has been established with verifiable certainty. 7 When the current Evidence Code became effective in 2013, OCGA § 24-
¶4589-67 was replaced with the nearly identical OCGA § 24-7-707, which provided: “In criminal proceedings, the opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses.” But effective July 1, 2022, the General Assembly repealed OCGA § 24-7-707 and amended OCGA § 24-7-702 such that the latter statute now governs the admissibility of expert
¶459 28 801-803 (43) (c) (493 SE2d 136) (1997) (The court had sufficient
¶460information to find the witness qualified to testify on the location of
¶461the gun and trajectory of the bullet based on witness’s training and
¶462experience. (decided under former OCGA § 24-9-678)). Given the
¶463evidence of the agent’s training, education, and considerable
¶464testimony in criminal as well as civil cases. That amended version of OCGA § 24-7-702 (b) provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if: (1) The expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (4) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 8 Given that former OCGA § 24-9-67 and former OCGA § 24-7-707 are
¶465nearly identical and given that there was no materially identical federal rule when this case was tried, it is appropriate to rely on cases decided under former OCGA § 24-9-67. See, e.g., State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556 (2) (820 SE2d 1) (2018) (“[I]f a rule in the new Evidence Code is materially identical to a Federal Rule of Evidence, we look to federal case law[.]” However, “[i]f there is no materially identical Federal Rule of Evidence and a provision of the old Evidence Code was retained in the new Code, our case law interpreting that former provision applies.”); Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 453 (2) n.2 (796 SE2d 277) (2017) (“Although Georgia’s new Evidence Code is applicable to the trial of this case, the evidentiary requirements relating to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony in a criminal case under the new Evidence Code (OCGA § 24-7-707) are nearly identical to those that applied under the former Evidence Code (OCGA § 24-9-67). Accordingly, it is appropriate to rely, as we do in this case, on decisions under the old Code.”). 29 experience, no objection to her as an expert in bullet-trajectory
¶466analysis would have been successful, and counsel cannot be deemed
¶467deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. See Carter v.
¶468State, 310 Ga. 559, 564 (2) (a) (852 SE2d 542) (2020) (Counsel did
¶469not perform deficiently by failing to make an objection to a qualified
¶470shoe-print expert.).
¶471 Additionally, we cannot say that counsel was deficient for
¶472failing to thoroughly cross-examine Agent Braswell concerning the
¶473basis for her opinions and to challenge them where possible. The
¶474evidence adduced at trial supports the trial court’s conclusion that
¶475defense counsel’s performance was not deficient in this respect. See
¶476Morrison v. State, 303 Ga. 120, 126 (5) (b) (810 SE2d 508) (2018)
¶477(“Decisions about what questions to ask on cross-examination are
¶478quintessential trial strategy and will rarely constitute ineffective
¶479assistance of counsel.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶480 (c) Agent Walker’s testimony. Reddick argues that his trial
¶481counsel was professionally deficient for failing to object to Agent
¶482Walker’s testimony describing her assumptions about how the
¶483 30 shooting occurred, specifically that, after Reddick had fired his pistol
¶484through the wall of his home, “[Robinson] fled away from the scene
¶485back towards his vehicle, and once he fled from the front porch back
¶486to his vehicle, while he was running away, he was shot a second time
¶487– or he was shot at a second time and that bullet actually hit him.”
¶488Reddick also contends that counsel should have objected when
¶489Agent Walker testified that suspects sometimes lie and attempt to
¶490mitigate their culpability.
¶491 With respect to Agent Walker’s testimony concerning her
¶492theory of how the shooting occurred, that theory was based on the
¶493agent’s personal knowledge of the evidence gathered in the case in
¶494her capacity as lead investigator. Moreover, her testimony was
¶495cumulative of other admissible evidence that had already been
¶496admitted at trial, including video recordings, the location of the
¶497body, evidence gathered at the scene, the pathologist’s report, bullet-
¶498trajectory analysis, and the nearly identical testimony given by
¶499another agent. When Agent Walker gave this testimony, she was
¶500explaining her assumptions concerning the evidence at the time she
¶501 31 conducted her interview with Reddick. Reddick did not ask trial
¶502counsel at the hearing on his motion for a new trial why she did not
¶503to object to this testimony. “In the absence of testimony to the
¶504contrary, counsel’s actions are presumed strategic. And decisions
¶505regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an
¶506ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that
¶507no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Pierce v.
¶508State, 319 Ga. 846, 866 (11) (a) (907 SE2d 281) (2024) (citations and
¶509punctuation omitted). Given that Agent Walker’s testimony was
¶510based on her personal knowledge of the investigation and was
¶511cumulative of other evidence that had already been introduced
¶512during trial, we cannot say that trial counsel’s decision not to object
¶513was patently unreasonable. See Sawyer v. State, 308 Ga. 375, 384
¶514(2) (b) (839 SE2d 582) (2020) (trial counsel not deficient in failing to
¶515object to cumulative testimony).
¶516 With respect to Agent Walker’s testimony that suspects
¶517sometimes lie and attempt to mitigate their culpability, the
¶518transcript shows that the agent was discussing suspects generally,
¶519 32 and not Reddick specifically. Reddick’s trial counsel explained that,
¶520given this context, she did not believe it was necessary to object.9
¶521Under these circumstances, we cannot say that trial counsel’s
¶522decision not to object was patently unreasonable. See Gaston v.
¶523State, 307 Ga. 634, 642 (2) (c) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (Declining to
¶524object to something that is not a significant issue at trial is not
¶525patently unreasonable.).
¶526 For these reasons, we cannot say that trial counsel’s decision
¶527to forgo objections to Agent Walker’s testimony “was so patently
¶528unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have made the same
¶529decision.” Snipes v. State, 309 Ga. 785, 792 (3) (b) (i) (848 SE2d 417)
¶530(2020). Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Reddick’s
¶531motion for a new trial on these claims of ineffective assistance of
¶532trial counsel.
¶533 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶534 9 We note that, although the “credibility of a witness shall be a matter to
¶535be determined by the trier of fact,” OCGA 24-6-620, a witness’s statement that does not directly address the credibility of another witness is not improper. See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454 (2017) (“When a witness’s statement does not directly address the credibility of another witness, however, there is no improper bolstering.”). 33