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322 Or. App. 365

State v. Boyum

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided October 12, 2022

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Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2022-10-12

Applies OR 33 § 33.015

Affirmed · Decided 2022-10-12

                               365

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
           Submitted August 23, affirmed October 12, 2022


                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
                 JACOB TODD BOYUM,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
                Crook County Circuit Court
                   20CN01594; A175090


  Michael R. McLane, Judge.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Bruce A. Myers, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Eric Seepe, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  MOONEY, J.
  Affirmed.
366                                           State v. Boyum

          MOONEY, J.
         Defendant appeals from a general judgment of
contempt. The circuit court found that defendant “violated
the no-contact terms of the protective order in 20PO02632
by initiating contact with the protected individual, [T],
through a third party,” defendant’s mother. It imposed a
suspended jail sentence and placed defendant on bench probation. Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s finding of
contempt, arguing that the state failed to establish that he
willfully violated the restraining order. In particular, defendant disputes that the evidence was sufficient to support the
finding that his mother called T at his request to get information for him. We conclude that the trial court did not err,
and we affirm.
         ORS 33.015(2) defines “contempt of court” to include
“the following acts, done willfully”:
   “
   “(b) Disobedience of, resistance to or obstruction of the
   court’s authority, process, orders or judgments.”

To establish punitive contempt, the state must “prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that a valid court order exists, that the
defendant knew of the order, and that the defendant voluntarily failed to comply with it.” State v. Simmons, 
314 Or App 507, 511-12
, 
499 P3d 127
 (2021). “[W]illfully” in this context
means “intentionally and with knowledge that the act 
was forbidden conduct.” 
Id. at 512
. Defendant asserts that
the state failed to prove that he acted “willfully”.
         Because defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the court to find that he willfully violated the FAPA restraining order, we proceed as if we were
reviewing the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Id. at 511
. “We review the denial of a motion for judgment
of acquittal to determine whether, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the offense
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Trivitt, 
247 Or App 199, 203
, 
268 P3d 765
 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 
322 Or App 365
 (2022)           367

          The evidence adduced at trial focused on two phone
calls made by defendant’s mother to T. Reviewing the evidence in accordance with our standard of review, we conclude that the second call alone was sufficient to support the
court’s finding of contempt beyond reasonable doubt. That
second call was received by T while she was speaking with
Officer Hagen about the first call. Officer Hagen directed T
to put the call on speakerphone, at which point the officer
spoke directly with defendant’s mother. During that call,
defendant’s mother told Hagen that “it wasn’t [her] choice”
to call T, and that defendant had asked her to call T because
he wanted to know why T was blocking his calls. Although
the restraining order permitted defendant’s mother to contact T about defendant’s parenting time, a rational trier of
fact could infer from that evidence, describing the mechanics of how the call came to be placed and its purpose, that
defendant had directed his mother to make the call for an
impermissible purpose.
        Affirmed.

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