State v. M. C. J.

                               516

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
          Submitted October 27, affirmed December 29, 2022


                In the Matter of M. C. J.,
         a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                       Respondent,
                            v.
                         M. C. J.,
                        Appellant.
              Marion County Circuit Court
                  21CC06018; A177406


  Matthew Tracey, Judge pro tempore.
    Alexander C. Cambier and Multnomah Defenders, Inc.
filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before James, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and
Joyce, Judge.
  AOYAGI, J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2022)            517

        AOYAGI, J.
         Appellant appeals a judgment committing him to
the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180
days, based on his being unable to provide for his basic needs
due to a mental disorder. See ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C) (providing for civil commitment of a “person with mental illness”);
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) (defining “person with mental illness”
to include a person who, because of a mental disorder, is
“[u]nable to provide for basic personal needs that are necessary to avoid serious physical harm in the near future”). In
his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a basic-needs commitment. He does not contest that he has a mental disorder,
but he argues that the state failed to establish that he was
unable to provide for his basic needs.
         We decline to exercise de novo review. See ORS
19.415(3)(b) (providing that, in an appeal in an equitable
proceeding, we have “sole discretion” whether to engage
in de novo review of one or more factual findings); ORAP
5.40(8)(c) (limiting de novo review to “exceptional cases”).
Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if
there is any evidence in the record to support them, and we
review the court’s legal conclusions for legal error. State v.
B. B., 

, 

 (2010).
         To qualify as a “person with mental illness” under
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B), a person must have a mental disorder
that causes the person to be “unable to provide for his or
her basic personal needs in a way that leaves the person
at nonspeculative risk of ‘serious physical harm’—meaning
that the person’s safe survival will be compromised—in the
near future, even though that risk is not imminent.” State v.
M. A. E., 

, 240, 

 (2019). In this
case, the trial court determined that, due to his mental disorder, appellant was living in extremely unsanitary conditions and was not eating enough.
         We agree with the state that the evidence was legally
sufficient to support a basic-needs commitment. Ultimately,
we are persuaded that appellant was at nonspeculative risk
of serious physical harm in the near future, albeit not imminently, from the combination of (1) the extremely unsanitary
518                                           State v. M. C. J.

conditions in his trailer, which included a dead dog covered
in maggots that appellant believed was still alive and continued to “pet,” multiple cats that were eating off the maggotinfested dog, and extensive animal urine and feces throughout the trailer; (2) appellant’s extreme lack of personal
hygiene; (3) appellant’s limited access to food; (4) appellant’s
thin and frail appearance, which was tied to his having
lost a significant amount of weight, even though he was
not yet medically underweight at the time of commitment;
(5) appellant’s lack of electricity or propane in his trailer;
and (6) appellant’s recent deterioration after the deaths
of his mother and his girlfriend. Although we agree with
appellant that the evidence was thin as far as quantifying
the risk of serious physical harm in the near future, we are
persuaded that the evidence as a whole was sufficient to
establish the necessary degree of risk. See State v. N. S., 

, 

 (2020) (“[A] determination of
whether the evidence was sufficient for commitment must be
made in light of the whole record.” (Emphasis in original.)).
        Affirmed.