Young and Player

                               621

  This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
   pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
        except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
        Submitted November 3, 2022, affirmed January 5, 2023


                     In the Matter of
                    Mariah YOUNG,
                  Petitioner-Respondent,
                            and
                  Jamie Ray PLAYER,
                  Respondent-Appellant.
               Yamhill County Circuit Court
                  20DR19571; A178576


  Jennifer K. Chapman, Judge.
  Jamie Ray Player filed the brief pro se.
  No appearance by respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
  Affirmed.
622                                        Young and Player

        SHORR, P. J.
         Father appeals from a stipulated general judgment
that established custody, parenting time, and child support
with respect to the parties’ child, assigning error to the
trial court’s decision to enter and enforce the judgment. We
understand father’s pro se argument to assert that he did
not consent to the stipulated judgment because he signed it
under duress. As explained below, we reject that argument
and affirm.
         Although mother has waived appearance, we have
an independent duty to determine whether our court has
jurisdiction over an appeal. Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc.,

, 

 (1999). By statute, a party
to a stipulated judgment may take an appeal only if “[t]he
judgment specifically provides that the party has reserved
the right to appellate review of a ruling of the trial court in
the cause; and … [t]he appeal presents a justiciable controversy.” ORS 19.245(3). However, we have recognized two
other exceptions to that general rule prohibiting an appeal
from a stipulated judgment. First, a party may assert on
appeal that the terms of a stipulated judgment are inconsistent with the actual underlying stipulation. Varde v.
Run! Day Camp for Dogs, LLC, 

, 

 (2021). Second, a party may challenge the validity
of a stipulated judgment on appeal on the ground that they
did not actually consent to it. Id.; see also Brown and Shiban,

, 

 (1998), rev den, 

 (1999) (whether wife’s attorney’s threats of legal action
constituted duress that vitiated husband’s consent was issue
that could “properly be raised by husband on direct appeal
of the stipulated judgment”). Thus, because we understand
father to contend that his consent to the stipulation was vitiated by duress, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over
this particular appeal.
         Father does not seek de novo review, and we decline
to exercise such review here. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (Court
of Appeals has discretion to review de novo in equitable
actions); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (“The Court of Appeals will exercise its discretion to try the cause anew on the record or
to make one or more factual findings anew on the record
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2023)            623

only in exceptional cases.”). Accordingly, we view the facts
consistently with the trial court’s express and implied findings, if any, and as supplemented by uncontroverted information from the record. Haggerty and Haggerty, 

, 

 (2014). We review for legal error—
specifically, to consider whether the trial court erred as a
matter of law in entering and enforcing the judgment over
father’s claim that his consent to the settlement was vitiated
by duress. See Haggerty and Haggerty, 

,

, adh’d to as modified on recons, 

, 

 (2016), rev den, 

 (2017) (conducting legal-error review of similar argument).
         We conclude that the settlement was valid in this
case because father did not establish duress. Duress may
vitiate a party’s apparent assent to a settlement if that consent is the result of “any wrongful act or threat thereof” that
“actually compels” the party, “against his will,” to agree to
the settlement. Jones v. Jones, 

, 

 (1976). Here, father contends that he was pressured
into agreeing to a settlement by his attorney. Although his
arguments are not completely clear to us, he contends that
allegations against him in the custody proceeding were
false, and argued in the trial court that he had objected to
certain specific terms in the settlement agreement, that
his attorney had warned him that his legal situation would
be worse if he did not agree, and that he had “no option to
say no.” However, father also admitted to signing the settlement agreement near the end of a five-hour settlement
conference at mother’s attorney’s offices. Father was represented by counsel during that conference. Having reviewed
the record in full, we see no evidence that father was subject
to a wrongful act or threat that compelled him to assent
to the settlement agreement. Thus, the trial court did not
err in enforcing the settlement agreement and entering the
stipulated judgment.
        Affirmed.