Volume 324 — North Carolina Reports

1. Garnishment 2.1 — service of attachment upon loan officer trainee — sufficient A bank was properly served with attachment papers in a garnishment action in accordance with N.C.G.S. <cross_reference>1-440.26</cross_reference> where the papers were delivered to a loan officer trainee and where the trial court found that the trainee's duties included the collecting of loan payments on the bank's behalf, that finding was supported by testimony, and N.C.G.S. <cross_reference>1-440.26</cross_reference>(C) plainly states that one who collects money on behalf of a corporation is deemed to be a local agent of the corporation. 2. Garnishment 1 — garnishment of account containing workers' compensation — permissible The Supreme Court rejected a garnishee bank's contention that N.C.G.S. <cross_reference>97-21</cross_reference> prohibits the court from allowing garnishment of an account into which the proceeds of a workers' compensation claim have been deposited because the bank failed to present this issue to the trial court; the garnishee bank has no standing to enforce the right of its depositor under the Workers' Compensation Act; and plaintiff sought to attach compensation proceeds that had been deposited into a general account with the garnishee bank rather than a claim for compensation.

1. Constitutional Law 53 — delay caused by defendant — no denial of speedy trial Defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial by a delay of two years and two months between the issuance of a warrant for defendant's arrest for the murder of the victim and his trial on a first degree murder charge where most of the delay was caused by the granting of thirteen motions for continuances made by defendant, motions for discovery and other motions made by defendant, and problems in securing counsel for defendant; defendant failed to assert his right to a speedy trial until three days before the trial was scheduled to begin, and defendant's actions were inconsistent with a desire for a speedy trial; and defendant made only nonspecific assertions that he was prejudiced by the delay. 2. Criminal Law 34.7 — threat to kill victim — admissibility Evidence that defendant threatened to kill the victim, or to kill a group of which he was a member, approximately two weeks before he killed the victim was relevant and admissible as evidence tending to show premeditation and deliberation and to negate self-defense. N.C.G.S. <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 404 (b). 3. Criminal Law 34.2 — other crimes and wrongs — admission as harmless error Assuming arguendo that the admission of evidence that defendant set a fire, possessed a knife and made threats to others while in jail awaiting trial for first degree murder violated N.C.G.S. <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 404 (b), defendant failed to carry his burden under N.C.G.S. <cross_reference>15A-1443</cross_reference> (a) to establish any resulting prejudice by showing a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at trial had the error not been committed. 4. Homicide 18.1 — first degree murder — premeditation and deliberation — sufficiency of evidence Evidence that defendant threatened to kill the victim approximately two weeks before actually killing him, taken together with evidence of the number and nature of wounds the defendant inflicted and the defendant's own statement that he had killed the victim because the victim had stolen marijuana, was substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation which supported defendant's conviction of first degree murder.

Homicide 19 — whether defendant felt his life was threatened — question excluded — error The trial court erred in a prosecution for first degree murder by sustaining the district attorney's objection to a question as to whether defendant believed that his life was threatened because that evidence was highly relevant to the crucial question of defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting, his knowledge and belief of danger, and his knowledge and belief of the necessity of action in relation to his plea of self-defense.

1. Jury 6.3 — voir dire — disallowance of question staking out jurors The trial court in a murder prosecution did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether any of them felt that defendant must be guilty of something, no matter what the circumstances, if defendant had a gun in his hand, pulled the trigger. and the death of another resulted therefrom, since counsel may not ask questions that tend to stake out a juror as to what his decision would be under a given state of facts. 2. Jury 6.3 — voir dire — understanding of reasonable doubt — disallowance of question to one juror — no abuse of discretion The trial court in a murder prosecution did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit defense counsel to ask one prospective juror whether she felt that she would uphold her service as a juror equally well by returning a verdict of not guilty if she had a reasonable doubt as she would by returning a verdict of guilty if she were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, since the question was designed to enable defense counsel to evaluate whether the juror completely understood the principles of reasonable doubt and the State's burden of proof, and defense counsel had previously questioned this juror on these principles of law and fully explored both areas with other potential jurors as the jury voir dire progressed.<page_number>Page 421</page_number>

Subrogation 1; Master and Servant 99.4 — injury to highway patrolman — settlement with third party — no notice to Department of Crime Control and Public Safety — settlement void A settlement between a highway patrolman injured in an automobile accident and the estate of the other party involved in the collision was void where the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety had paid workers' compensation benefits to the patrolman and did not give its written consent to the settlement. N.C.G.S. <cross_reference>97-10.2</cross_reference> (j) must be read in part materia with the rest of the section, which requires that the Department give a written consent before a settlement may be made.

Abatement and Revival 8.2 — failure to defend — prior pending action — summary judgment for defendant — proper The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Lumbermens in an action in which the Browns alleged that Lumbermens breached its contractual duty by failing to defend them because that identical issue was already pending in a prior action between the same parties in another county. The pending of a prior action between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction works an abatement of a subsequent action either in the same court or another court of the same state having jurisdiction.

Insurance 69 — business auto insurance — underinsured motorist coverage reduction for workers' compensation payments N.C.G.S. <cross_reference>20-279.21</cross_reference> (e) permits an insurance carrier to reduce the underinsured motorist coverage liability in a business auto insurance policy by amounts paid to the insured as workers' compensation benefits.