¶1concurring.
¶2I concur in the decision of the Court and write separately only to emphasize that, since the defendant’s trial commenced prior to 1 July 1984, this case has not been decided under the *451North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Therefore, questions concerning the admissibility of evidence of other offenses by the defendant are controlled in the present case by State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364 (1954) and cases decided thereunder, not by N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b).
¶3Under our new Rule 404(b), it is not the case — as we sometimes stated under McClain— that evidence of other offenses falls under a “general rule of exclusion” subject to certain “exceptions.” Cf. 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 91 (3d ed. 1988) (reviewing the erratic nature of our methods of stating the applicable rule under McClainin prior cases and, at times, in the same opinion). It is clear now that, “as a careful reading of Rule 404(b) clearly shows, evidence of other offenses is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the character of the accused.” State v. Weaver, 318 N.C. 400, 403, 348 S.E. 2d 791, 793 (1986) (quoting 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 91 (2d rev. ed. 1982)) (emphasis added). “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1988) (emphasis added).
Thus, even though evidence may tend to show other crimes, wrongs, or acts by the defendant and his propensity to commit them, it is admissible under Rule 404(b) so long as it also “is relevant for some purpose other than to show that defendant has the propensity for the type of conduct for which he is being tried.”
¶4State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 206, 362 S.E. 2d 244, 247 (1987) (quoting State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 637, 340 S.E. 2d 84, 91 (1986)).
¶5These recent cases decided under Rule 404(b) and others relying upon them state a clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged. I recognize that, in stating the rule under McClain, our “different methods of statement (at times appearing in the same opinion) produced no clear disparity in results.” 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence, *452§ 91 (3d ed. 1988). However, I think it will be helpful to the Bar and only proper for this Court to continue along one clear course in stating the general rule to be applied under our new Rule 404(b), rather than adopting an erratic course as was the case under McClain. I believe that our recent cases support such a clear course under Rule 404(b) in the form of the general rule of inclusion I have set forth, and I hope we will not deviate from that course in future cases.