649
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Submitted December 8, 2022, affirmed October 11, 2023
In the Matter of A. M.,
a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
A. M.,
Appellant.
Coos County Circuit Court
21JU02357, 21JU02091;
A176293 (Control), A176296
Megan Jacquot, Judge.
Ginger Fitch and Youth, Rights & Justice filed the brief
for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
POWERS, J.
Affirmed.
650 State v. A. M.
POWERS, J.
In this consolidated juvenile delinquency proceeding, youth appeals from a pair of juvenile court judgments
that committed her to the legal custody of the Oregon
Youth Authority (OYA) with a recommendation for placement in a youth correctional facility. In 2018, the juvenile
court asserted jurisdiction over youth for committing an
act, which if done by an adult, would constitute one count
of harassment (ORS 166.065(3)). In 2021, youth waived her
right to a trial and admitted that she committed acts, which
if done by an adult, would constitute one count of giving false
information to a police officer (ORS 807.620) and one count
of giving false information to a police officer in connection
with a citation/warrant (ORS 162.385). The court asserted
jurisdiction based on her admissions and, after a hearing,
ordered her commitment to OYA. On appeal, she argues in a
single assignment of error that the juvenile court abused its
discretion when it found that it was in her best interests to
be committed to OYA custody for placement in a youth correctional facility. We have reviewed the record and conclude
that the juvenile court made a permissible determination
based on the evidence in the record that it was in youth’s
best interests to be placed in OYA’s custody. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Youth sets forth two primary arguments in support of her assignment of error. First, youth argues that the
construction of the juvenile code and the cases analyzing
the code establish a presumption that it is in a youth’s best
interests to be placed in the least restrictive placement and
for parental custody to be maintained, and that the state
did not rebut that presumption in this case. Second, youth
asserts that the juvenile court failed to identify a “firm factual basis” for concluding that placement in OYA custody
was in youth’s best interests under ORS 419C.478. Because
the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history, we do not set out those facts for this nonprecedential
memorandum opinion.
We review a juvenile court’s determination of
the best interests of the youth for an abuse of discretion.
Sjomeling v. C. L. L., 251 Or App 172, 187,
285 P3d 1116,
Nonprecedential Memo Op:
328 Or App 649 (2023) 651
rev den,
353 Or 103 (2012). Therefore, we reverse a juvenile
court’s discretionary determination only if it is not a legally
permissible one.
Id. A discretionary determination is legally
impermissible if it is “based on predicate legal conclusions
that are erroneous or predicate factual determinations that
lack sufficient evidentiary support.” Espinoza v. Evergreen
Helicopters, Inc.,
359 Or 63, 117,
376 P3d 960 (2016).
First, we conclude that we need not reach the issue of
whether the juvenile code and its case law create a presumption in favor of maintaining parental custody and placing
youths in the least restrictive placement. Even if such a presumption exists, we conclude, as explained below, that it has
been rebutted by evidence in the record demonstrating that
placement in OYA’s custody was in youth’s best interests.
Second, we reject youth’s contention that the record
does not establish a “firm factual basis” for the court’s conclusion that placement in OYA custody was in youth’s best
interests. Neither the juvenile code nor its case law requires
a “firm factual basis” for the juvenile court’s determination
to place a youth in OYA custody. As part of disposition proceedings, a juvenile court may place an adjudicated youth
in OYA’s custody as long as it provides “written findings
describing why it is in the best interests of the adjudicated
youth to be placed” with OYA. ORS 419C.478(1).1 Further, the
court must consider the following factors: the “gravity of the
loss, damage or injury caused”; whether the youth’s conduct
was “aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful”; “[w]hether the adjudicated youth was held in detention under ORS
419C.145”; the “immediate and future protection required by
the victim, the victim’s family and the community”; and the
youth’s “juvenile court record and response to the requirements and conditions imposed by previous juvenile court
orders.” ORS 419C.411(3)(a) - (e). The court may also consider
whether the youth “has made any efforts toward reform or
rehabilitation” and “[a]ny other relevant factors or circumstances raised by the parties.” ORS 419C.411(4)(a), (g).
1
ORS 419C.411 (2019) and ORS 418C.478 (2019) were in effect at the time of
the proceedings in this case, and both were subsequently amended. See Or Laws
2021, ch 489, §§ 67, 82. Because those amendments do not affect our analysis, we
cite the current versions in this opinion.
652 State v. A. M.
Here, the juvenile court made the required ORS
419C.478(1) written findings that it is in the best interests
of youth to be placed in the custody of OYA. Specifically,
the court found, “The youth has previously run from treatment facilities that were not secure, and the youth needs to
undergo treatment before she is released to a less restrictive
placement.”2 In making its determination, the court found
that youth suffered from a serious, polysubstance drug problem and that youth had run away from less secure placements in the past. The court further found that, because of
the “tenacity of [youth’s] drug problem,” she did not “have
the ability to resist leaving” an unsecure placement. The
court also expressed concern that youth has faced dangerous situations while she has been on the run. The court thus
reasoned that youth needed to be in a secure facility “until
she can be sober and have enough tools to be able to stay in
a non-secure treatment facility” when she is granted parole.
In short, the juvenile court considered the circumstances and evidence supported by the record to make its
discretionary determination, and thus the court’s decision
to commit youth to OYA custody for placement in a youth
correctional facility was legally permissible.
Affirmed.
2
We agree with youth’s argument that, contrary to the juvenile court’s
explicit finding, she did not run from “treatment facilities.” The record indicates
that youth ran away from a placement with her mother and from a shelter placement at River Rock. That misstatement, however, does not affect the import of
the juvenile court’s finding that youth has run away from less secure placements
and thus does not undercut the finding that youth was likely to run from future
unsecure placements.
