Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

329 F.2d 821

Docket No. 17637.

Moore v. United States

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided April 7, 1964.

Rehearing Denied April 28, 1964.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1964-04-07

1 counsel of record

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Hill v. United States · MacHibroda v. United States · United State v. Morgan

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1964-04-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently February 1990

5 federal appellate ·

401964197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*822Charles Clifford Moore, pro se.

¶2Before JOHNSEN, Chief Judge, and MATTHES, Circuit Judge.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Under our policy that collateral attacks upon convictions and sentences should, in the public interest, not be left standing open, the appeal pending from the filing of notice of appeal to the District Court’s denial of appellant’s motion to have a sentence against him vacated will be permitted to be docketed without payment of fee, and the appeal will then be dismissed as frivolous.

¶5The motion to vacate was in the nature of an application for a writ of error coram nobis, since it was an attempt to reach at a sentence which appellant had served. His reason for seeking to have the sentence vacated was that it had been used under the Kansas Habitual Criminal Act as a basis for increasing the punishment against him on a Kansas offense.

¶6The attack made was that the Court had not granted appellant allocution at the time of his sentencing. Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., contains the prescription that, “Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment”.

¶7The right to allocution is in the federal system regarded as a substantial right, and failure to accord it would perhaps entitle a defendant to have his sentencing proceedings reversed through an appeal. But failure to have complied with the provisions of Rule 32 (a) as to allocution in some individual case does not of itself make the sentence-imposed void so as to leave it open to collateral attack by a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473. Even less would there seem to be basis legally to allow reach to be made at such a sentence through error coram nobis where,, as here, no attack is made upon the conviction underlying the sentence but only upon the sentence, and the sentence itself has been served. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 has no application to the situation.

¶8Appeal docketed and dismissed.

/329/f2d/821 · .json · Public domain