State v. McCombs

No. 72                 February 7, 2024                     545

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                STATE OF OREGON,
                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                           v.
         JOSHUA TERRELL GREEN McCOMBS,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
             Klamath County Circuit Court
                 16CR01356; A175889


   Andrea M. Janney, Judge.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Stephanie J. Hortsch, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
   ORTEGA, P. J.
   Conviction on Count 3 reversed; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
546   State v. McCombs
Cite as 

 (2024)                                                547

           ORTEGA, P. J.
         Defendant appeals his conviction by a jury for first-degree rape, ORS 163.375(1)(b) (Count 1); first-degree sodomy, ORS 163.405(1)(b) (Count 2); and first-degree sexual
penetration, ORS 163.411(1)(b) (Count 3). He assigns six
errors, challenging the denial of his motion for a judgment
of acquittal (MJOA) on Counts 1 and 3, the denial of his
motion to suppress his statements confessing to the conduct
underlying those convictions, and the imposition of 300-
month prison sentences and 100-year post-prison supervision (PPS) terms on each of the three counts.1 We conclude
that the evidence supported the denial of his MJOA as to
Count 1, that his inculpatory statements were correctly
admitted, and that his sentence on Counts 1 and 2 were
not constitutionally disproportionate. However, we conclude
that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s MJOA
on Count 3, because the evidence was legally insufficient
to corroborate his inculpatory statements that supported
the sexual penetration conviction. Accordingly, we reverse
defendant’s conviction on Count 3; otherwise, we affirm the
court’s judgment.
         We begin by providing the principal facts on which
we base our decision and provide additional relevant facts
as we address each issue. Detective Ferns interviewed
defendant in connection to allegations that defendant had
sexually abused his four-year-old stepdaughter, H, after H
told her mother, “[D]addy hurt [my] butt with his wee-wee.”2
Defendant initially denied that he had touched H inappropriately. Ferns told defendant,”[I]f something did happen
between you and your daughter, I’m going downstairs and
you’re leaving this room”; “I will not arrest you”; “[T]he truth
always comes out”; and “If people lie to me …, I paint them
out to be liars in my report.” Defendant stated, “I did not
    1
      The trial court’s judgment indicates that each of defendant’s sentences
included a PPS term of “100 year(s).” The text of the applicable statute, ORS
144.103(2), however, indicates that the PPS term shall be “for the rest of the
person’s life.” Defendant points out that error, but he expressly concedes that the
error was harmless, and we agree. We, thus, review defendant’s challenge to his
PPS terms, as he presents it, as a challenge to the imposition of a lifetime PPS
term against him.
    2
      H was about two months old when defendant and H’s mother began their
relationship, and H referred to defendant as “daddy.”
548                                        State v. McCombs

touch her with my penis”; “I might have rubbed harshly
when I was cleaning, but the poop wouldn’t come off.” In
response to whether his finger “entered the cavity of [H]’s
anus,” defendant replied, “[M]y finger might have entered
[H] … once.” Defendant explained that he was helping H
with a bath, that “the soap was really slippery” and “it just
happened,” and that he made a mistake. Ferns replied, “I
can tell on your face it was intentional” and “If this is true,
… let’s … get you some help on it.” Defendant continued
to deny that he acted intentionally.
          As the interview proceeded, Ferns said, “I think
you stuck your finger in your daughter’s ass on purpose,”
and defendant relented, stating, “I did, sir.” He explained
that he put his “middle finger … [a]ll the way” up H’s anus
for “[m]aybe two [or] three minutes,” on purpose, more than
once, but no “more than five times.” Moreover, defendant
stated that he “put” his penis in H’s anus “[n]ot all the way.”
He explained, “I put it in, and then she started screaming
really bad. I pulled it out and instantly left the [bath]room.”
Defendant further explained that he used baby oil as a lubricant and that he did not use a condom. Ferns asked defendant to write an apology letter, describing “in detail what
[defendant] did” to H, and defendant did so. After defendant wrote the apology letter, Ferns told defendant (falsely),
“Your daughter had a tear on her vagina. What’s going on
about that?” Defendant replied, “I never tried to insert it
into there. … I pushed it there, but I couldn’t.” Defendant
also stated that he did not know how far his penis went into
H’s vagina and that “[m]aybe” it was “an inch, if that.” At the
end of the interview, defendant stated, “I’m not glad that I
did it”; “I’m glad that I told you the truth”; “There’s no help
for this”; and “Tell [H] I’m sorry.”
        The state indicted defendant with first-degree
rape, ORS 163.375(1)(b) (Count 1), alleging that defendant
“engage[d] in sexual intercourse” with H; first-degree sodomy, ORS 163.405(1)(b) (Count 2), alleging that defendant
“engage[d] in deviate sexual intercourse” with H; and first-degree sexual penetration, ORS 163.411(1)(b) (Count 3),
Cite as 

 (2024)                                               549

alleging that defendant “penetrate[d]” H’s anus with defendant’s finger.3
         Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to Ferns, arguing that they were not voluntary and
were, rather, coerced. He explained that he suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and argued that
Ferns misled him during the interview as to injuries to H’s
genitals and by promising to help him and informing him
that he would not be arrested if he admitted the alleged conduct. Two expert witnesses—clinical psychologist Dr. Calvo
and neuropsychologist Dr. Stanulis—testified for defendant,
opining that defendant’s undisputed PTSD put him at risk
of making false and involuntary statements. Ferns testified
that, having interviewed “several hundred” people, he had
noticed nothing “out of the ordinary mentally going on with”
defendant, including no changes in defendant’s demeanor.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion in a detailed opinion letter that found, based on Ferns’s testimony during the
suppression hearing and the recording of Ferns’s interview
with defendant, that defendant made his statements during
the interview voluntarily. As the court explained,
       “[D]efendant has a valid PTSD diagnosis [and] there
    may be circumstances or instances when an otherwise
    benign interrogation or interview could become coercive
    due to an individual’s acute PTSD reaction.
         “[Here,] [h]owever, there is no evidence that … defendant was exhibiting any signs of severe anxiety or distress
    that would have been out of the ordinary for this situation.
    … Ferns testified that … defendant was behaving in
    ways that were consistent with many defendants he had
    interviewed before. [Ferns] did not notice any physiological
    responses in … defendant that alerted him to any significant issues.”
        The court further found that Calvo and Stanulis,
the two expert witnesses who testified to the opinion that

    3
      “A person who has sexual intercourse with another person [who is under 12
years of age] commits” first-degree rape. ORS 163.375. “A person who engages in
oral or anal sexual intercourse with another person [who is under 12 years of age]
commits” first-degree sodomy. ORS 163.405. “[A] person [who] penetrates the
vagina [or] anus” of another person who is under 12 years of age “with any object”
commits the crime of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration. ORS 163.411.
550                                           State v. McCombs

defendant suffered from PTSD and involuntarily confessed,
were neither credible nor persuasive. The court explained:
      “The court … acknowledges the very real phenomena of false confessions. … Dr. Calvo[ ] testified that he
  believed [defendant’s] confession to be false because …
  defendant suffers from guilt due to actions in combat.
  Specifically, Dr. Calvo testified that … defendant was
  likely confessing to this charged crime out of guilt for having shot a child during the war. There is absolutely no evidence on the record to suggest this is anything other than
  pure speculation. Dr. Calvo frequently contradicted himself
  and had to be routinely redirected by counsel. For example, Dr. Calvo testified that it is very common for veterans
  with PTSD to exhibit a mistrust and disdain for authority.
  [D]efendant … was respectful and compliant with authority. When carefully redirected by defense counsel, Dr. Calvo
  testified that … defendant’s deference to authority during
  the interview could certainly be a ‘result’ of PTSD. Overall,
  the court did not find Dr. Calvo’s testimony to be credible.
      “Further, Dr. Stanulis’[s] opinion is not persuasive.
  His report reads as little more than a cursory critique of
  the interview, while citing wholly unreliable sources. His
  testimony was also contradictory. When confronted with
  conflicting information or difficult questions, he became
  evasive and non-responsive. Neither expert could identify
  behaviors or actions by … defendant during the interview
  that could be identified as symptoms of PTSD. Dr. Calvo
  cited … defendant’s politeness as evidence of PTSD, while
  Dr. Stanulis mentioned that … defendant almost vomited
  and was compliant. When pushed, neither witness could
  articulate why … defendant’s PTSD made this confession involuntary. Dr. Stanulis relied heavily on his belief
  that the interview itself was coercive and that [defendant]
  would be especially vulnerable to that type of interview.
  Overall, the testimony of Dr. Stanulis was not particularly
  credible or compelling.”
        Moreover, the court found that defendant “willingly
went to the police station to be interviewed”; that he “was
advised of his Miranda rights and signed an acknowledgement that he understood those rights”; that “[t]here [wa]s
no evidence on the record that he did not understand his
Miranda rights, or that his PTSD rendered him unable to
understand his rights” and “no indication of confusion on
Cite as 

 (2024)                                               551

behalf of … defendant.” The court further found that the
interview was a “one-on-one interview that lasted less than
one hour,” that it “occurred in the middle of the day,” and
that “defendant was never threatened, restrained, or told he
could not leave.”
        Regarding Ferns’s statement, “I’ll go upstairs,4
and you’ll go home,” the court, based on State v. Vasquez-Santiago, 

, 

 (2019),5 explained:
         “Th[at] [statement] triggers an inquiry about whether
    inducement overborne the defendant’s free will. [However,]
    [h]ere, there were no promises that a confession could
    secure a benefit or avoid a harm. [Defendant] was encouraged to tell the truth. … Unlike Vasquez-Santiago, there
    were no direct or implied promises regarding the state’s
    action towards the defendant. … Ferns did not promise or threaten the defendant in any way …. Ferns did
    not promise or threaten any leniency or harsh treatment.
    [D]efendant specifically asked … Ferns what was going to
    happen, and … Ferns replied, ‘I don’t know.’ At one-point
    … Ferns did push defendant to tell the truth and told
    [defendant] he believed [defendant] was only being ‘partially truthful.’ … Ferns admitted to lying to [defendant]
    about an injury to [H]. Lying to a defendant is not prohibited. The deception in this case was not ‘beyond that pale’
    as defense counsel argues.”
           The court continued:
       “Further, the defendant did not confess to every act he
    was questioned about. [Defendant] confessed to only certain acts, even when pressed by [Ferns] regarding other
    victims, locations, and facts. [D]efendant corrected [Ferns]
    on more than one occasion about the nature of his conduct,
    of where the incident occurred. While alone, [defendant]
    wrote his confession which matched his verbal statement.

    4
      At the interview with defendant, Ferns used the word “downstairs” but,
when testifying, he used the word “upstairs.” The court appears to be referring to
Ferns’s testimony. That word variation does not affect our analysis as it is clear
in the record that Ferns was referring to the same place both times.
    5
      In Vasquez-Santiago, the defendant’s confession was held to be involuntary because the detectives secured that confession by making the defendant
“believe[ ] that his infant was separated from the child’s nursing mother and was
being detained by police,” by “repeatedly” telling him “that his family was suffering” and “that his confession to murder was the key to securing [his] family
members’ release and ending that suffering.” 

.
552                                           State v. McCombs

   [Defendant] repeatedly apologized for his behavior and
   expressed relief in telling the truth. … The court does
   take … defendant’s diagnosis and level of disability into
   consideration under the totality of the circumstances …
   [and] finds that [defendant] was not overcome by his disability to the point of involuntarily confessing. [Defendant]
   was not induced to confess through fear or promises, direct
   or implied.
         “The motion [to suppress] is denied.”
         At defendant’s trial, the state played the audio
recording of defendant’s interview with Ferns and introduced, among other evidence, defendant’s apology letter to
the jury. Ferns and several other witnesses testified for the
state, including H’s mother, H, and other individuals who
corroborated that H had asserted that “[defendant] hurt
[her] butt with his pee-pee.” In addition to testifying to H’s
statement, H’s mother confirmed that there was baby oil in
their house—in reference to defendant’s statement that he
used baby oil as a lubricant.
           Child Abuse Response and Evaluation Services
(CARES) medical director, Laneah Snyder, who evaluated
H, performed a head-to-toe examination of H, and participated in H’s forensic interview, testified that when she asked
H about her vaginal area, H replied that “Daddy made a
mark with his wee-wee,” when H was in “[m]ommy’s room.”
When asked about how many times “Daddy made a mark
with his wee-wee,” H replied, “Hours.” According to Snyder,
that response reflected the time concepts of a four-year-old
child. Snyder testified that H’s video colposcopy showed “a
little bit of redness” “in front of” H’s hymen, though she also
acknowledged that “a bit of redness” can be “very normal”
in a four-year-old. Snyder explained that “normal” is a common physical finding following child abuse.
         Snyder further testified that in reply to questions
about H’s anus area—including, “Has anybody ever made
you do anything to their butt that’s made you feel weird or
icky or not right?”—H replied, “Daddy did” and “He put his
wee-wee in my butt”; when asked, “Where is his wee-wee?”
H replied, “In his pants”; when asked about where that happened, H replied, “At the house,” in the “TV room and [in]
Cite as 

 (2024)                             553

mommy’s room one time.” Snyder testified that she found no
additional physical findings and that H’s “anal exam was
with the normal limits.” Asked whether she would “expect
… to see physical findings [from where] the defendant
used his finger, put his penis in her rectum using baby
oil one time,” Snyder replied, “never.” Specifically, Snyder
explained, “[You] are even less likely to see anal findings in
abuse than you are … in vaginal findings.”
         CARES forensic interviewer, Andrea Mitchell, who
interviewed H after Snyder’s examination and with Snyder,
testified that H told Mitchell, “Daddy’s wee-wee hurt my
butt.” Like Snyder, Mitchell testified that H said that the
incident occurred “[i]n mommy’s room” and that “daddy’s
wee-wee” was “[i]n his pants,” which H demonstrated that
by “point[ing] to [H’s] front private.” Mitchell also testified
that H said that “daddy” took H’s pants and underwear off
when they were in the bathroom; when asked whether “daddy’s wee-wee ever hurt [H] anywhere else,” H replied, “No.”
After a break in the interview, Mitchell asked H to draw a
picture of defendant’s “wee-wee” and H drew a picture of an
“awkward-shaped circle, kind of long with a point on it.” At
that point, the state introduced H’s drawing into evidence.
Mitchell also testified that, when asked to clarify where and
how defendant’s conduct happened, H said that “she was in
the room … [o]n the bed” and that H demonstrated defendant’s position by “l[ying] facedown with her knees tucked
under her stomach” and said, “Daddy was on my butt.” H
confirmed to Mitchell that she told “the doctor last night”
and told her “mommy” about “daddy’s wee-wee hurting her
butt.” Mitchell confirmed that in her interview with H, H
made no mention of whether defendant “put anything in
[H’s] vagina” or whether “a finger [had] be[en] put in her
butt.”
         Ferns, who observed Snyder’s evaluation and
Mitchell’s interview with H, testified that the next day,
he contacted defendant to request an interview, and that
he explained to defendant upon that contact that the
interview concerned H, and defendant agreed to go to the
Police Department to be interviewed. About seven minutes
later, defendant arrived at the Police Department, Ferns
554                                          State v. McCombs

took defendant to the interview room, read defendant his
Miranda rights, and interviewed him, as described above.
         At the close of the state’s case, defendant moved
for a judgment of acquittal on Count 1 (first-degree rape)
and Count 3 (first-degree sexual penetration). He argued
that there was “no corroboration of [his] statements,” that
“[H] made no statements about either sexual [penetration],
rape, or sodomy,” and that there was “no physical evidence”
and “no evidence independent of [defendant’s] statement to
support those things.” The state contended that there was
enough evidence to go to the jury, explaining that H “made
a number of statements about daddy hurting her butt” and
that “she did make specific statements about daddy hurting her butt with his wee-wee … as well.” The state further contended that defendant “was alone with [H], had an
opportunity to do this and then he confessed his crimes.”
The court denied defendant’s MJOA, and the jury ultimately
found defendant guilty on all three charges.
         At defendant’s sentencing proceeding, the state recommended that the court sentence defendant on each count
to a 300-month prison sentence pursuant to ORS 137.700 and
a lifetime of post-prison supervision term pursuant to ORS
144.103(2). The state further recommended that the sentence
in Count 2 run consecutively to the sentence in Count 1 and
the sentence in Count 3 run concurrently to the sentence in
Count 2. Defendant renewed his MJOA and contended in his
sentencing memorandum that, in light of his PTSD, those
sentences were cruel and unusual, disproportionate, and violated his rights under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon
Constitution, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. He argued that the applicable mandatory-minimum sentences under ORS 137.700
were unconstitutional on their face and as applied to him.
        The trial court again denied defendant’s MJOA and
sentenced him according to the state’s recommendation. In
doing that, the court explained:
      “[T]he [c]ourt does not find that Jessica’s Law [codified
   as ORS 137.700] is unconstitutional as applied to [defendant]. Certainly, under these facts, [an ORS 137.700] sentence is not disproportionate.
Cite as 

 (2024)                                              555

        “What shocks the moral compass or shook this [c]ourt
    and the public is the sodomy and rape of a four-year-old
    child. As put on in evidence in the trial, there may not have
    been physical injury, but as our witnesses testified to, that
    is rarely, if ever see[n], in these type[s] of cases, which I’m
    sure exist as the ongoing psychological trauma that is a life
    sentence for that child and her family.”
        On appeal, defendant assigns six errors, one to the
denial of his motion to suppress, two to the denial of his
MJOA on Counts 1 and 3, and the remaining three assignments to his sentences on each of the three counts of which
he was convicted.
          We begin with defendant’s motion to suppress. He
contends that his inculpatory statements were erroneously
admitted in violation of ORS 136.425(1) and Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,6 and that the error
was not harmless. Defendant argues that the state failed
to meet its burden to prove that his inculpatory statements
were voluntary, and that Ferns induced him to confess by
fear or promises. See State v. Powell, 

, 

 (2012) (placing that burden on the state); see also
State v. Jackson, 

, 

 (2018) (requiring the state to prove that a “defendant’s free will was not
overborne and his capacity for self-determination was not
critically impaired, and that he made his statements without inducement from fear or promises”). In his view, Ferns’s
statements during the interview communicated to him that
he would not be arrested if he admitted to abusing H, that
liars are the worst type of people, that Ferns would write
a report painting defendant to be a liar if he did not admit
abuse, and that Ferns would help defendant obtain psychological help if he did admit abuse. Particularly, he argues
that, in light of the undisputed fact that he suffered from
PTSD connected to his military service, which rendered
     6
       ORS 136.425(1) provides that “[a] confession or admission of a defendant
… cannot be given in evidence against the defendant when it was made under
the influence of fear produced by threats.” See also Vasquez-Santiago, 

 (under Article I, section 12, confessions made by a defendant in custody
that were induced by the influence of hope or fear, applied by law enforcement,
are inadmissible against the defendant); State v. Jackson, 

, 

 (2018) (stating that an out-of-court confession is presumed to be involuntary); Lego v. Twomey, 

, 

, 

 (1972) (holding that the state must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence).
556                                        State v. McCombs

him 100 percent disabled, the state failed to establish that
his confession was the product of his free will and that his
will was not overborne by the alleged inducements. We are
not persuaded.
         “[C]onfessions are initially deemed to be involuntary and … the state has the burden to overcome that
presumption by offering evidence affirmatively establishing that the confession was voluntary,” which the state can
prove by “a preponderance of the evidence.” Jackson, 

. In determining whether a confession was voluntary,
rather than coerced, “[c]ourts look to the totality of circumstances,” including but not limited to “the crucial element of
police coercion; the length of the interrogation; its location;
its continuity; the defendant’s … physical condition; and
mental health.” 

. In making that assessment, it is
“helpful to begin with the issue of whether the officers who
interrogated [the] defendant induced him to make admissions by the influence of hope or fear.” 

. “The ultimate question is whether the state has met its burden to
show that [a] defendant’s confession was a product of [the]
defendant’s free will.” State v. Chavez-Meza, 

, 

 (2019), rev den, 

 (2020); see also
Powell, 

 (explaining that a court must make
“an individualized inquiry into whether the alleged inducement was sufficiently compelling to influence [the] defendant’s decision to confess”).
         Reviewing defendant’s claim for legal error, we conclude that the trial court’s findings, which are supported
by the record, support its conclusion that defendant’s confession was voluntary. See Jackson, 

 (setting
forth the legal error standard and providing that we are
“bound by the trial court’s findings of fact if supported
by the record”). As an initial matter, the court looked at
the totality of the circumstances, as provided in Jackson,
and made the required individualized findings regarding
whether Ferns’s statements influenced defendant’s confession, as required in Chavez-Meza and Powell. As the court
found, before the interview, defendant understood his
rights, including the right to remain silent, Ferns properly
administered Miranda warnings, and defendant evinced no
Cite as 

 (2024)                                                 557

signs of confusion. See Jackson, 

 (explaining
that, although Miranda warnings are not determinative of
whether a defendant’s confession was voluntary, it constitutes an important factor in the analysis of the totality of
the circumstances). Moreover, defendant did not manifest
atypical physiological responses to stress during the interview and, as the trial court found, Ferns did not observe
anything out of the ordinary in defendant’s demeanor. In
fact, he continued to deny the allegations even after Ferns
made the statements that defendant claims were threats
or promises. Furthermore, as the court found, none of the
experts who testified for defendant and whom the court did
not find credible could identify how defendant’s PTSD rendered his confession involuntary.
         Under the totality of the circumstances, no threats
or promises by Ferns induced defendant to the point of overbearing his free will. See 

 (“[T]he voluntariness
of an admission or confession depends on whether or not,
in the totality of the circumstances, a defendant’s free will
was overborne and his or her capacity for self-determination
was critically impaired.”). The state, therefore, met its burden to show that defendant’s confession was a product of his
free will. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress.
          We turn to defendant’s MJOA. In a combined argument, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to corroborate his confession as to first-degree rape and
first-degree sexual penetration and, in turn, to prove that
he committed those crimes.7 See ORS 136.425(2) (establishing that a confession must be corroborated to be admitted at
trial); see also State v. Moreno, 

, 

, rev den, 

, cert den, 

 (2016)
(same). According to defendant, the lack of corroborating
evidence rendered the evidence insufficient to prove that he
committed those crimes and, as such, the court should have
acquitted him. See ORS 136.445 (providing that the court
should acquit a defendant where “the evidence introduced
theretofore is such as would not support a verdict against
the defendant”).
   7
       Defendant does not challenge his conviction for first-degree sodomy, Count 2.
558                                         State v. McCombs

         “We review a trial court’s denial of a[n] [MJOA]
to determine whether, after viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Moreno, 

. When a defendant’s challenge to the denial of an MJOA involves the sufficiency of evidence to corroborate his confession, we must
first determine whether the defendant’s confession was corroborated. 

 “Only if [the] defendant’s confession is supported by legally sufficient corroborating evidence may both
the confession and the independent corroborating evidence
be considered in determining whether th[e] [MJOA] standard has been met.” 

        We proceed with the corroboration issue. The state
contends that defendant’s confessions of rape and unlawful
sexual penetration were corroborated. Regarding rape, the
state argues that evidence that H told Snyder that defendant had left a mark with his “wee-wee” on H’s vaginal area
and Snyder’s observation of redness on H’s hymen corroborated defendant’s confession that he put his penis into H’s
vagina. We agree.
         The corpus delicti of first-degree rape includes conduct where a person “ha[d] sexual intercourse with another
person” who is “under 12 years of age.” ORS 163.375(1)(b).
Here, defendant confessed to conduct that meets the elements of first-degree rape. He told Ferns that he had initially attempted to push his penis into H’s vagina but was
unable to insert it and stopped after inserting it no more
than “an inch, if that.” While defendant’s confession alone
would be legally insufficient under ORS 136.425(2) to prove
that defendant committed first-degree rape, the state introduced other evidence “from which the jury [could] draw an
inference that tend[ed] to establish” that defendant pushed
his penis into H’s vagina. State v. Hernandez, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2013). That evidence included evidence that H indicated that defendant
had “made a mark with his wee-wee”—which H said was in
his pants and identified in a drawing—on her vaginal area
while they were in “mommy’s room,” along with signs of redness on H’s hymen.
Cite as 

 (2024)                             559

         Even if the redness observed was potentially normal, the evidence that the state introduced, viewed in the
context of all the evidence, was sufficient to corroborate
defendant’s confession that he pushed his penis into H’s
vagina. See State v. Fry, 

, 

(2002) (holding that a child’s statements that the “defendant
touched her genitalia with his ‘thinger’ or his ‘pee-pee’ and
that it hurt when he did so,” along with a physician’s testimony that the pain that the child related “could have been
the result” of the defendant touching the child’s hymen or of
the defendant using force was sufficient to corroborate the
defendant’s confession that he penetrated the child with his
penis; although that evidence was “not conclusive evidence,”
and permitted “more than one inference,” it was admissible
under ORS 136.425 as “some other proof” that one instance
of rape occurred (emphasis added)). Defendant’s confession
was, thus, admissible to prove his guilt as to the rape charge,
and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s MJOA
as to Count 1.
         Regarding sexual penetration, the state admits that
there is no specific evidence that defendant had put his finger
in H’s anus but contends in two alternative arguments that
there was nevertheless sufficient evidence to corroborate
defendant’s confession. First, the state argues that evidence
that defendant had taken H’s clothes off, that H was “la[y-
ing] facedown with her knees tucked under her stomach,”
and that there was baby oil in the house, was “arguably” sufficient corroborating evidence, likening this case to State v.
Johnson, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2021) (holding that a child’s statement that she “had
to put [her] mouth on daddy’s pee-pee” and that it had happened “before school” was sufficient to corroborate multiple
counts of sodomy and sexual abuse because that statement
permitted “a reasonable inference that it could refer to multiple instances” of both sodomy and sexual abuse (emphasis
in original)). The evidence here, the state argues, considered
collectively and in the light most favorable to the state, and
given the particular nature and timing of the offenses and
the specific circumstances described, was sufficient, given
that H would not have been able to differentiate between
560                                         State v. McCombs

defendant penetrating her with his finger and penetrating
her with his penis.
          Second, the state argues that, even if its first argument fails, defendant’s own statement early in his interview
with Ferns—that defendant’s finger “might have entered” H
“once” when he was helping H with a bath as the “soap was
really slippery”—was sufficient to corroborate defendant’s
confession. In the state’s view, that statement constituted an
admission made separate from his later and clearer inculpatory admissions. As in State v. Manzella, the state argues,
defendant’s prior statement corroborated his subsequent
confession. 

, 

 (1988) (holding
that a defendant’s “assertion that he was rear-ended by
another car while waiting to turn left,” which was made “to
further [the police’s] investigation of an automobile accident”
and before the defendant’s disputed confession, was admissible to corroborate his confession that he had been “driving
in violation of his license restrictions”).
         We are not persuaded. The corpus delicti of first-degree sexual penetration includes conduct where a “person
penetrate[d] the … anus … of another with any object”
and that the other person is “under 12 years of age.” ORS
163.411(1)(b). Here, defendant confessed that he intentionally put his “middle finger” “[a]ll the way” up H’s anus for
“[m]aybe two [or] three minutes,” and the indictment alleged
that defendant penetrated H’s anus with “his finger.”
However, no other evidence corroborates defendant’s confession as to that conduct.
         Regarding the state’s first argument, this case is
different from Johnson. There, we assessed whether statements made by the alleged child victim, B—including that
B had to put her mouth on the defendant’s “pee-pee,” that it
happened “before school,” and that the defendant told her
that “mommy does it”—which undisputedly corroborated
one count of sodomy, also tended to prove that the defendant committed additional counts of sodomy against B, to
which he had confessed. See 

. We concluded that the evidence corroborated the defendant’s confession because B did not limit the number of times that
the conduct occurred, and because each of B’s disclosures
Cite as 

 (2024)                              561

appeared to correspond to separate occasions described in
the defendant’s confession. Id. at 120-21 (“While B’s disclosure may, in the abstract, be viewed as referring to only a
single act, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
state, B’s statement permits a reasonable inference that it
could refer to multiple instances.”).
         In contrast to Johnson, here the issue is whether
the evidence is legally sufficient to corroborate defendant’s
statements admitting conduct distinct from other conduct to
which he confessed, rather than to corroborate statements
admitting to other occasions of the same conduct. The evidence urged by the state—H’s assertions that she was lying
“facedown with her knees tucked under her stomach” when
defendant put his “wee-wee” in her butt, and that there was
baby oil in the house—does not permit, under the circumstances, an inference that defendant penetrated H with his
finger. Despite the possibility that H may not have been able
to differentiate between whether defendant used his finger
or his penis, an inference that defendant used his finger
would have required the jury to speculate that H’s perception was not accurate. Accordingly, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the state, that evidence did not permit a non-speculative inference that tends to establish that
defendant penetrated H with his finger and, hence, did not
meet the ORS 136.425 corroboration standard. See Moreno,

 (to corroborate a confession, “[r]easonable
inferences are permissible; speculation and guesswork are
not”).
           Regarding the state’s alternative argument that
defendant’s earlier statement—that his finger “might have
entered” H “once” accidentally—corroborated his confession,
we are likewise unpersuaded. A defendant’s statement can
only be used to corroborate the defendant’s confession if it is
made for some purpose other than to acknowledge guilt, and
if it is not so closely related to the confession as to become a
part of it. Manzella, 

, 316 n 13 (emphasizing
that “all statements made during the course of a confession
are protected by ORS 136.425(1)” and that “[t]he state may
not dissect a confession and use isolated statements to corroborate the ‘core’ of the confession” (emphasis in original)).
562                                        State v. McCombs

In Manzella, the defendant told a police officer arriving at
the scene of an accident that he had been rear-ended while
waiting in a traffic lane to make a left turn. 

.
Afterwards, the defendant was confronted with information
that the officer received from checking the defendant’s driver’s license, and he confessed to driving with a suspended
license (DWS). 

 The defendant’s initial statement—that
he had been rear-ended—could be used to corroborate the
driving element of his later confession to DWS, because
he made the statement for the purpose of furthering an
investigation of an automobile accident, and it was not so
closely related to his confession that it became part of it.

 Moreover, that conclusion was bolstered by the fact that
the defendant made the statement before being confronted
with evidence that his license had been suspended and that
a break occurred between that statement and his confession
to DWS. 

         By contrast, in State v. Simons, the defendant, who
worked as a senior nursing assistant, prompted by police
questioning about potential patient abuse allegations
against him by R and S, told the police that he “noticed R’s
sexual reaction in the shower, that S grabbed his penis more
than once, and that she put her mouth on it at least once.” 

, 

 (2007), rev den, 

 (2008). Later, during the same interview, the defendant
confessed to allegations related to offenses against R, S, and
another victim, all of whom were under his care. 

.
Because the trial court found that the defendant’s earlier
statements were made to acknowledge guilt and because
those statements “were so intertwined with his confession
as to be part of it” given that there was no temporal break
between those statements and his confession, the statements could not corroborate his confession. 

.
         This case is more like Simons than Manzella. In
Manzella, the subject of the alleged offense had not come up
at the time that the defendant made the disputed statement.
Here, when defendant told Ferns that his finger “might have
entered [H] … once” while he was bathing her, defendant
had already been confronted with the allegations that he had
sexually abused H. Like in Simons, defendant’s statement
Cite as 

 (2024)                               563

was prompted by questioning about the allegations at issue
and there was no temporal break between defendant’s statement and the confession, which occurred just a few minutes
later. As in Simons, we conclude that defendant’s statements “were so intertwined with his [subsequent] confession as to be part of it.” 

. Accordingly, regardless of
whether defendant’s statements were made for the purpose
of acknowledging guilt, those statements could not be used
to corroborate defendant’s confession to sexual penetration.
See Manzella, 

 & n 13 (explaining that no
statements made during a confession can be used “isolated[ly] … to corroborate the ‘core’ of the confession”). The
trial court therefore erred in denying defendant’s MJOA as
to Count 3, first-degree sexual penetration.
         We next address defendant’s challenges to his sentences. Because we have concluded that the trial court erred
in denying defendant’s MJOA as to first-degree sexual penetration, we address only the sentences for first-degree sodomy and first-degree rape. Defendant asserts that the trial
court erred in sentencing him pursuant to ORS 137.700(2)
and ORS 144.103(2) to 300-month prison sentences and a
lifetime PPS term for each of those offenses. In two separate arguments, he maintains that those sentences are constitutionally disproportionate, both facially and as applied,
under Article I, section 16, and the Eighth Amendment.
Defendant recognizes that we have previously held that 300-
month prison sentences under ORS 137.700 are not constitutionally disproportionate under Article I, section 16, but he
asserts that those cases were wrongly decided. For the same
reasons stated in his argument under Article I, section 16,
defendant claims that his sentences are cruel and unusual,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We are unpersuaded.
         “A sentence is disproportionate to the offense [under
Article I, section 16,] only if it ‘shock[s] the moral sense of
all reasonable [persons] as to what is right and proper under
the circumstances.’ ” State v. Wiese, 

, 

 (2010), rev den, 

 (2011) (quoting State v.
Rodriguez/Buck, 

, 

 (2009) (brackets in Wiese)). We address proportionality challenges under
Article I, section 16, using the factors set out in Rodriguez/
564                                          State v. McCombs

Buck, which include “(1) a comparison of the severity of the
penalty and the gravity of the crime; (2) a comparison of the
penalties imposed for other, related crimes; and (3) the criminal history of the defendant.” 

.
          As defendant acknowledges, we have previously
concluded that a 300-month prison sentence required by
ORS 137.700 (known as Jessica’s Law) is not facially disproportionate after applying the Rodriguez/Buck factors. See,
e.g., State v. Hoover, 

, 

, rev den,

 (2012); State v. Alwinger, 

, 

 (2010). Defendant’s arguments do not convince us
that those cases were wrongly decided or that the facts of
this case require a different result. As to the first factor,
the severity of the penalty is congruent with the gravity of
the crimes—rape and sodomy involving defendant’s four-year-old stepdaughter, which occurred on more than one
occasion—and defendant’s conduct underlying his convictions falls squarely within the type of conduct covered by
those offenses. See State v. Pardee, 

,

, rev den, 

 (2009) (upholding terms of
300 months for each count of sodomy and rape); see also, e.g.,
Alwinger, 

 (upholding a 300-month prison
sentence and a lifetime PPS term for a single occurrence of
first-degree unlawful sexual penetration of a child).
          As to the second factor, we are not persuaded that
defendant’s sentences are disproportionate as compared to
other more serious and related crimes. See 

 (recognizing
that “it is within the legislature’s role to decide that [crimes]
justify the same penalty”); see also Pardee, 

(disagreeing that “because the penalty for intentional murder—300 months’ incarceration without mandatory lifetime
PPS—is less severe than the penalty that [the defendant]
received” for each of several rape and sodomy convictions,
“the latter penalties [we]re disproportionate” (emphasis in
original)).
        Finally, the third Rodriguez/Buck factor does not
assist defendant either. Although defendant has no prior
criminal history, in light of his conduct—which involved
a four-year-old child to whom he was a father figure and
whom he was supposed to protect—his lack of criminal
Cite as 

 (2024)                           565

history has little weight in balancing the proportionality of
his sentences and is insufficient to render those sentences
unconstitutional. As such, none of defendant’s arguments
support his challenge. Because defendant has not convinced
us that ORS 137.700, on its face or as applied here, was disproportionate under the Rodriguez/Buck factors, we decline
to revisit our prior decisions, as he urges us to do.
         Regarding his challenge under the Eighth
Amendment, defendant was unable to demonstrate that his
sentences were cruel and unusual. Because here he relied on
the same argument that he presented under Article I, section
16, with which we disagreed when applying the Rodriguez/
Buck factors, we reject defendant’s Eighth Amendment
argument. See Wiese, 

 (“[A]nalysis of
the three [Rodriguez/Buck] factors under Article I, section
16, provide a sufficient basis to decide whether [a] defendant’s sentence was … cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment.”).
         In sum, the trial court did not err in sentencing
defendant pursuant to ORS 137.700 and ORS 144.103, nor
did it err in denying his motion to suppress or his MJOA
as to first-degree rape. The court, however, erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to first-degree sexual penetration (Count 3).
        Conviction on Count 3 reversed; remanded for
resentencing; otherwise affirmed.