State v. C. M.

520                   March 13, 2024                No. 177

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 In the Matter of C. M.,
         a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                       Respondent,
                            v.
                          C. M.,
                        Appellant.
            Multnomah County Circuit Court
                  22CC06668; A180060

  Michael J. Riedel, Judge.
  Submitted November 15, 2023.
   Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erica L. Herb, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot,
Judge.
  PER CURIAM
  Reversed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2024)             521

        PER CURIAM
         Appellant appeals a judgment of involuntary civil
commitment entered on November 3, 2022. Appellant was
committed to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for
a period not to exceed 180 days, based on his being a “person with mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C). Specifically,
the trial court found that, as a result of a mental disorder,
appellant was dangerous to others, ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A),
and was unable to provide for his basic personal needs necessary to avoid serious physical harm in the near future,
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B). Appellant does not contest that he has
a mental disorder (schizophrenia), but he argues that the
evidence was insufficient to meet the legal standard for civil
commitment. As described below, we agree and, accordingly,
reverse. We consequently do not reach appellant’s other
assignment of error.
         Appellant has not requested de novo review, nor do
we provide it. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (allowing discretionary
de novo review in equitable proceedings); ORAP 5.40(8)(c)
(we exercise such discretion “only in exceptional cases”). We
are therefore “bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact that are supported by any evidence in the record,”
and we “review the court’s dispositional conclusions, predicated on those findings, for errors of law.” State v. B. B., 

, 

 (2010).
         Having reviewed the record, we agree with appellant that the evidence was legally insufficient for civil commitment. Appellant damaged property in his apartment
complex on two occasions prior to his hospitalization—a
window on one occasion, and a coffee pot on another—and
at times demonstrated some aggressive mannerisms (yelling, briefly “posturing,” giving the middle finger, a menacing stare). However, there is no evidence that he had verbally threatened anyone, injured anyone, or attempted to
injure anyone. “[T]he type of ‘danger’ necessary to justify an
involuntary civil commitment is a narrow range of serious
and highly probable threats of harm.” State v. S. R. J., 

, 

 (2016); see also, e.g., State v.
K. M., 

, 

 (2021) (“[A]ctual
future violence” must be “highly likely.” (Internal quotation
522                                           State v. C. M.

marks omitted.)). The legal standard is not met on this
record.
          As for basic needs, for a civil commitment under
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B), a person’s mental disorder must cause
them to be “unable to provide for his or her basic personal
needs in a way that leaves the person at nonspeculative
risk of ‘serious physical harm’—meaning that the person’s
safe survival will be compromised—in the near future, even
though that risk is not imminent.” State v. M. A. E., 

, 240, 

 (2019). Here, there is evidence
of unsanitary living conditions, poor personal hygiene, and
noncompliance with psychiatric medications, but that evidence does not meet the standard for civil commitment. As
for food, appellant’s treatment provider expressed concern
about appellant’s ability to obtain food on his own, given
his mental disorganization, but there is no evidence that
appellant was malnourished or underweight upon arrival at
the hospital, his lab tests were “unremarkable,” he ate frequently in the hospital, and his housing provider “does food
boxes for people who need extra help with food.” A person’s
ability to provide for their basic needs must be assessed
based on “existing, as opposed to future or potential, conditions.” State v. Headings, 

, 

(1996). Appellant’s circumstances are unfortunate, but this
case is in line with others in which we have held that the
legal standard for a basic-needs commitment was not met.
See, e.g., State v. M. B., 

, 

(2019).
        Reversed.