No. 714 October 9, 2024 407
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Svetlana Artunyan, Claimant.
Svetlana ARTUNYAN,
Petitioner,
v.
SAIF CORPORATION
and Salem Area Mass Transit District,
Respondents.
Workers’ Compensation Board
2201224
A181792
Argued and submitted August 14, 2024.
Jodie Anne Phillips Polich argued the cause for petitioner. Also on the briefs was Law Offices of Jodie Anne
Phillips Polich, P.C.
Daniel Walker argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondents.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Kamins,
Judge.
EGAN, J.
Affirmed.
408 Artunyan v. SAIF
EGAN, J.
Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers’
Compensation Board upholding employer Salem Area Mass
Transit District’s notice of closure, which did not award
claimant benefits for impairment caused by loss of range
of motion. We review the board’s order under ORS 183.482
(8)(a); ORS 656.298(7), conclude that the board did not err,
and therefore affirm.
Claimant injured her right shoulder when she fell
at work. SAIF, on behalf of employer, accepted a claim for
a right rotator cuff tear. Claimant underwent surgery to
repair the rotator cuff. When claimant was medically stationery, SAIF issued a notice of closure awarding temporary partial disability benefit and five percent whole person
impairment for the right shoulder, which was a value for the
right shoulder surgery. Claimant requested reconsideration.
A medical arbiter determined that claimant’s rotator cuff injury had fully healed without permanent impairment, but that claimant had a loss of range of motion caused
entirely by a prior shoulder injury. Relying on that report,
the appellate review unit upheld employer’s notice of closure, which had awarded claimant benefits for her surgery
but not for impairment due to the loss of range of motion.
Claimant requested a hearing.
The board adopted an order of an administrative law
judge (ALJ) upholding the notice of closure. In affirming the
ALJ, the board found, based on the medical evidence, that
claimant’s loss of range of motion impairment was not caused
in any part by claimant’s compensable injury. Additionally,
the board found that there was no evidence that the loss of
range of motion impairment was due to a combining of the
preexisting condition and the compensable injury or to a
worsening of claimant’s preexisting condition. The board’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Claimant contended that, because her total impairment is caused in material part by the compensable injury,
she is entitled to be compensated for the full measure of her
impairment, including the loss of range of motion. The board
rejected the contention, concluding, citing the Supreme
Nonprecedential Memo Op:
(2022), that each component of impairment must
be assessed to determine whether it is caused in material
part by the compensable injury. The board concluded based
on that analysis and that claimant was not entitled to compensation for the loss of range of motion.
We agree with the board’s conclusion. In Robinette,
the court said:
“To qualify as ‘impairment,’ such that a claimant is
entitled to a value for that loss as part of their permanent partial disability award, there are two requirements:
(1) that there is a loss of use or function of the body part
or system, and (2) that that loss is ‘due to the compensable injury.’ ORS 656.214. Under that definition, a result of
an injury may be a loss of use or function to an injured
worker’s body part, but that does not mean that all loss of
use or function of the body part will qualify as impairment
for purposes of calculating permanent partial disability
because ‘impairment’ only includes loss of use or function
that is ‘due to the compensable injury.’”
369 Or at 781-82
. In reaching its conclusion that the
claimant’s impairment was not compensable, the court in
Robinette considered each particular impairment in determining whether that particular impairment was caused in
material part by the compensable injury.
Id. at 782
(“Review
of the medical arbiter’s determination and the record makes
clear that claimant’s reduced range of motion and decreased
stability in her right knee was not caused in material part,
or in any part, by the compensable injury.”). We followed that
analysis in our recent opinion in Gramada v. SAIF,
(2023) (“Each
loss of use or function is to be considered separately, and a
loss is ‘due to the compensable injury’ when the accepted
condition is found to be a material cause of the loss.”). Here,
substantial evidence supports the board’s finding that claimant’s particular impairment due to loss of range of motion
is not caused in material part by her compensable injury.
For that reason, we conclude that the board did not err in
upholding the notice of closure.
Affirmed.
