Robinette v. SAIF

                                       767

  Argued and submitted June 24, 2021; decision of Court of Appeals reversed,
        order of Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed June 3, 2022


             In the Matter of the Compensation of
               Theresa M. Robinette, Claimant.
                  Theresa M. ROBINETTE,
                    Respondent on Review,
                               v.
                    SAIF CORPORATION
                      and HCW Clients -
                Oregon Homecare Commission,
                     Petitioners on Review.
          (SAIF 18-01420) (CA A170673) (SC S068207)
                                   

    Claimant injured her right knee at work and her workers’ compensation
claim was accepted for a right knee strain. Following a knee surgery, claimant’s
doctor closed the workers’ compensation claim and claimant was awarded whole
person impairment for the surgical value associated with the knee surgery. Upon
reconsideration of the notice of closure, a medical arbiter found additional loss
of use or function of claimant’s knee in the form of reduced range of motion and
decreased stability but attributed those findings entirely to non-work-related
causes. Claimant was awarded additional impairment value for chronic condition impairment but did not receive any value for the reduced range of motion and
decreased stability, based on the medical arbiter’s findings that those were not
related to the compensable injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board upheld that
award, but the Court of Appeals reversed. SAIF sought review of that decision.
Held: When calculating permanent partial disability awards, each distinct loss of
use or function of a body part is considered separately to determine if it qualifies
as “impairment”—that is, “loss of use or function of a body part or system due to
the compensable industrial injury”—under ORS 656.214.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The order of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.




    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
   Daniel Walker, Appellate Counsel, SAIF Corporation,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on
review.
______________
    * On judicial review from the Workers’ Compensation Board. 

,

 (2020).
768                                                       Robinette v. SAIF

   Jodie Phillips Polich, Law Offices of Jodie Anne Phillips
Polich, PC, Milwaukie, argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent on review.
   Rebecca A. Watkins, Sather Byerly & Holloway, LLP,
Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae Oregon Business &
Industry and Providence Health & Services.
  Sommer E. Tolleson, Tolleson Conratt Nielsen Maher
& Replogle LLP, Tigard, filed the brief for amicus curiae
Associated General Contractors - Oregon Columbia Chapter.
   Julene M. Quinn, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
  Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Flynn,
Duncan, Nelson, and Garrett, Justices, and Nakamoto,
Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore.…
    NELSON, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
order of the Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.




______________
   … DeHoog, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
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        NELSON, J.
         The dispute in this workers’ compensation case provides this court with another opportunity to address the
meaning of the word “impairment” within the context of
the workers’ compensation statutory structure. Under ORS
656.214, impairment is defined as “the loss of use or function
of a body part or system due to the compensable industrial
injury.” This case involves loss of use or function of claimant’s right knee—specifically, reduced range of motion and
decreased stability in that knee—that was determined to
be entirely related to causes other than claimant’s compensable workplace injury. In addition, claimant has loss of use
or function of that same knee—surgical value and chronic
condition loss—that is related to the workplace injury. In
claimant’s view, she was entitled to the full measure of
impairment for all new findings of loss—the reduced range
of motion, the decreased stability, the surgical value, and the
chronic condition. On judicial review, the Court of Appeals
agreed with claimant, holding that “claimant’s impairment
‘as a whole’ includes her whole-person impairment, of which
the work injury is a material contributing cause, as well as
her impairment due to loss of range of motion and stability.”
Robinette v. SAIF, 

, 

 (2020).
SAIF disagreed and sought review before this court, arguing that findings of loss due entirely to causes other than the
compensable injury do not satisfy the statutory definition of
“impairment” and, accordingly, should be excluded from an
injured worker’s permanent partial disability award.
         We agree with SAIF. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that claimant was not entitled to compensation for
the reduced range of motion and decreased stability findings
of loss. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and affirm the order of the Workers’ Compensation
Board.
        I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.   Overview of Key Terminology and Statutory Background
         To provide necessary context for the issues presented
in this case, we begin with a brief overview of key terminology and the workers’ compensation claims process. After a
770                                                    Robinette v. SAIF

workplace injury occurs, an injured worker is required to
provide written notice of the injury to the employer within
90 days of the injury occurring. See ORS 656.265(1)(a)
(“Notice of an accident resulting in an injury or death shall
be given immediately by the worker or a beneficiary of the
worker to the employer, but not later than 90 days after the
accident. The employer shall acknowledge forthwith receipt
of such notice.”). During its investigation and evaluation
of a submitted claim, the insurer or self-insured employer
must determine if the claim is compensable. ORS 656.262. A
“compensable injury” is “an accidental injury … arising out
of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death.” ORS 656.005(7)(a).
In most circumstances, the burden of proving that a particular injury is compensable, as well as proving the nature
and extent of any disability resulting from that injury, is on
the injured worker. ORS 656.266(1).
         Once the insurer or self-insured employer has determined whether the claim is compensable, it is required to
inform the claimant in writing of the claim’s acceptance or
denial. See ORS 656.262(6)(a) (“Written notice of acceptance
or denial of the claim shall be furnished to the claimant by
the insurer or self-insured employer within 60 days after the
employer has notice or knowledge of the claim.”). The workers’
compensation statutes set out specific requirements for
both a notice of acceptance and a notice of denial. See ORS
656.262(6)(b) (setting out the requirements for a notice of
acceptance); ORS 656.262(9) (setting out the requirements
for a notice of denial).
         A claim may be closed when the accepted, compensable condition becomes medically stationary, that is, when
“no further material improvement would reasonably be
expected from medical treatment or the passage of time.”
See ORS 656.005(17) (defining “medically stationary”). At
that time, permanent partial disability awards, if applicable, are calculated.1 Then, ORS 656.262(7)(c) sets out the
procedure for closing the claim:
     1
       Permanent partial disability is defined as either “[p]ermanent impairment
resulting from the compensable industrial injury or occupational disease” or
“[p]ermanent impairment and work disability resulting from the compensable industrial injury or occupational disease.” ORS 656.214(1)(c). As discussed
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         “When an insurer or self-insured employer determines
     that the claim qualifies for claim closure, the insurer or
     self-insured employer shall issue at claim closure an
     updated notice of acceptance that specifies which conditions are compensable. … Any objection to the updated
     notice or appeal of denied conditions shall not delay claim
     closure pursuant to ORS 656.268. If a condition is found
     compensable after claim closure, the insurer or self-insured
     employer shall reopen the claim for processing regarding
     that condition.”
The claimant may then accept the closure and the payment of benefits or, if the claimant objects to the terms of
the notice of closure or the scope of the award, the worker
may request reconsideration. See generally ORS 656.268
(5)(c) (describing requirements for notice of closure, including
a statement regarding a claimant’s right to request reconsideration). If the claimant’s physical impairment is in dispute
on reconsideration, then the Director of the Department of
Consumer and Business Services must appoint a medical
arbiter to consider the claim. See ORS 656.268(8)(a) (“If the
basis for objection to a notice of closure issued under this
section is disagreement with the impairment used in rating
of the worker’s disability, the director shall refer the claim
to a medical arbiter appointed by the director.”).
B.    Facts and Procedural History
        With that background in mind, we turn to the facts
of this case. In 2010, claimant, then a school custodian,
slipped on leaves at work and injured her right knee, thigh,
and hip. Claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim with
her employer and it was accepted for right hip, right knee,
and right thigh strains.
         In 2016, claimant was treated in the emergency
department at Legacy Mount Hood for right knee pain resulting from another fall that had occurred at her workplace when
she tripped over a piece of equipment, twisted her right knee,
and landed with all her weight on that knee. Claimant filed
a new workers’ compensation claim for that incident and that

in greater detail below, permanent partial disability benefits are calculated in
accordance with the rules and procedures set forth in ORS 656.214, and the
accompanying administrative rules.
772                                                      Robinette v. SAIF

claim was accepted for a right knee strain. Claimant underwent arthroscopic partial medial meniscectomy surgery for a
right knee medial meniscus tear that year.
         In August 2018, claimant’s doctor—the same one
who had performed her 2016 knee surgery—conducted
a closing evaluation of claimant’s workers’ compensation
claim. That doctor released claimant back to her job, effective as of September 2017, and indicated that claimant did
not suffer significant limitations in the repetitive use of her
right knee or leg. The notice of closure that followed that
evaluation awarded two percent loss of the whole person for
impairment to claimant’s right knee, based on the surgical
value associated with claimant’s right knee surgery.
         Claimant requested reconsideration of the notice
of closure. An orthopedic surgeon, acting on SAIF’s behalf,
conducted a new evaluation of claimant’s injury. A medical arbiter examination also took place. Despite the earlier
findings from claimant’s doctor, the medical arbiter found
that claimant was significantly limited in the repetitive use
of her right leg for more than two-thirds of an eight-hour
work period and discovered that claimant suffered some
additional loss of the use of her right knee in the form of
reduced range of motion and decreased stability. The medical arbiter, however, attributed those findings entirely to
non-work-related causes.2 Accordingly, the order on recon-

    2
      SAIF frames the medical arbiter’s findings slightly differently than the
administrative law judge (ALJ) who reviewed claimant’s case. SAIF notes that,
in response to specific questions in a cover letter, the doctor who performed the
medical arbiter examination stated that the “[r]educed ranges of motion of the
right knee were attributed to body habitus and not to the accepted conditions,”
though he later concluded his report by stating that, “[t]he stability findings are
one hundred percent (100%) due to preexisting non-work-related degenerative
changes of the right knee as well as the range of motion findings being one hundred percent (100%) related to the preexisting condition of osteoarthritis of the
right knee.” The ALJ’s order on review states that the medical arbiter “attributed
reduced ranges of motion of the right knee to body habitus and not to the accepted
conditions” and that “there might also be contribution to restriction of ranges
of motion due to documented arthritis of the right knee,” but that the “stability
findings were one hundred percent due to non-work-related degenerative findings.” Both statements appear to accurately reflect the report that the medical
arbiter prepared after reviewing claimant’s case and the difference in framing
is not consequential to our opinion today. Although both parties agree that the
medical arbiter found that claimant’s right knee range of motion and stability
findings were not attributable to the accepted right knee condition, they frame
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sideration affirmed the previous notice of closure and the
award for two percent whole person impairment.
         Claimant then requested an administrative hearing
concerning the extent of her impairment award. Following
that hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) amended
the order on reconsideration to recognize additional impairment for a chronic condition of the right knee that had not
previously been calculated. The ALJ explained that the surgical value previously awarded should have been “combined
with the five percent chronic condition impairment for the leg
for a 10 percent impairment value for loss of the leg[,]” which
converts to an award for five percent loss of the whole person. In short, the amended order on reconsideration modified
the total permanent partial disability award to five percent
whole person impairment. Based on the medical arbiter’s
conclusion that the reduced range of motion and decreased
stability findings were unrelated to the compensable injury,
the ALJ did not modify the permanent partial disability
award to include any additional value for impairment related
to those findings.
        Claimant requested review of that decision by the
Workers’ Compensation Board (board). The board adopted
and affirmed the ALJ’s order.
         Claimant sought judicial review in the Court of
Appeals, arguing that, under this court’s decision in Caren
v. Providence Health System Oregon, 

, 

(2019), she was entitled to an award accounting for the full
measure of impairment in her right knee—including the
reduced range of motion and decreased stability findings, as
well as the surgical and chronic condition values—because
her compensable work injury was a material contributing
cause of her impairment as a whole. In response, SAIF
argued that Caren did not control because that case involved
apportionment and a combined condition, two attributes
that are not present on the facts in claimant’s case. Instead,
in SAIF’s view, claimant suffered from separate findings
of loss caused entirely by a noncompensable condition and

the non-work-related cause—degenerative changes, body habitus, or preexisting
osteoarthritis—differently. There is no need for us to address that difference.
774                                        Robinette v. SAIF

claimant was not entitled to compensation for those findings
of loss because they did not meet the statutory definition of
“impairment.”

          Acknowledging that Caren did not directly answer
the question presented, but nonetheless relying on guidance
provided by this court in that case, the Court of Appeals
explained that claimant was entitled to an award accounting for the full measure of impairment in the entirety of her
right knee because her work injury was a material contributing cause of her impairment “as a whole.” Robinette, 

. The Court of Appeals considered this court’s reasoning in Caren to be relevant in claimant’s case, explaining
that “[i]f the employer intends to assert that a portion of the
claimant’s impairment is not related to the work injury, the
employer is required to issue a preclosure denial of the condition giving rise to the impairment” before “the employer is
entitled to a reduction in impairment benefits for the portion
of the impairment that is attributable to a cognizable preexisting condition.” 

 Because the condition that caused
the range of motion and stability impairment had not been
specifically denied, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that claimant was entitled to compensation for those findings. 

         SAIF petitioned for review of that decision, arguing
that the Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted the meaning of “impairment” in ORS 656.214. SAIF contended that
claimant should not receive an award for findings of loss
that are attributed entirely to conditions that are unrelated
to the accepted compensable injury. Specifically, SAIF reasoned that claimant should not receive an award of permanent partial disability for the reduced range of motion and
decreased stability findings in her right knee because those
were not related to the compensable injury. In SAIF’s view,
ORS 656.214 and the surrounding statutes that govern
awards for permanent partial disability clearly demonstrate
that findings of loss that are unrelated to the compensable injury do not qualify as impairment. We allowed review
to consider whether the definition of “impairment” within
ORS 656.214(1)(a) includes findings of loss that are not at all
related to, or caused by, the compensable injury.
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                       II. ANALYSIS
          As explained above, the workers’ compensation
statutes provide for a specific process that must be adhered
to following a workplace injury. When an accepted, compensable injury becomes medically stationary, then the insurer
or self-insured employer calculates the amount of disability
benefits due to the claimant. See generally ORS 656.262(7)(c)
(setting out process for closing a claim). Those disability
benefits include benefits for permanent partial disability,
if applicable in the case, based on the impairment to the
claimant. The primary disagreement between the parties in
this case centers around the word “impairment”—“the loss
of use or function of a body part or system due to the compensable injury,” ORS 656.214—and whether the calculation of
permanent partial disability is intended to encompass findings of loss that are entirely unrelated to the accepted, compensable injury.
          On review, SAIF contends that loss “due to the compensable injury” includes only findings of loss that stem
from the accepted conditions. In its view, any other findings
of loss that do not have a causal relationship to the accepted
conditions do not qualify as impairment under ORS 656.214
because those findings are not “due to the compensable
injury.” SAIF contends that neither the workers’ compensation statutes, nor the administrative rules interpreting
those statutes, support awards for permanent partial disability stemming from findings of loss that are completely
unrelated to the accepted conditions. Accordingly, SAIF
argues that the Court of Appeals’ decision awarding claimant compensation for all of the findings of loss—including
value for loss that was entirely caused by a noncompensable
condition—is a misinterpretation of this court’s decisions
and is inconsistent with the workers’ compensation statutory scheme.
          In response, claimant contends that the statutory
definition of “impairment” in ORS 656.214 makes clear that
an injured worker is entitled to the “full measure of impairment” for the loss of use or function of a body part or system due to the “compensable injury,” including all findings
of loss. Claimant argues that “[i]t is the insurer/self-insured
776                                         Robinette v. SAIF

employer’s burden of proof to identify what medical conditions, other than the medical conditions caused by the compensable injury, are contributing to impairment in the body
part or systems harmed as a result of the work accident.”
In claimant’s view, once she established that her claim was
compensable, she was entitled to the full measure of her
loss, including value for the reduced range of motion and
decreased stability findings. Claimant contends that the
Court of Appeals properly determined that claimant was
entitled to compensation for the full extent of loss of use or
function of her knee, including the reduced range of motion
and decreased stability findings.

          The dispute in this case presents a question of statutory interpretation. When we are faced with an issue of
statutory construction, as here, we resolve that issue following the established statutory interpretation framework laid
out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 

, 

 (1993), and State v. Gaines, 

, 

 (2009). In interpreting statutory
provisions, our primary goal is to determine the intent of
the legislature at the time that it enacted the relevant statutes. See Gaines, 

 (“This court remains responsible for fashioning rules of statutory interpretation that,
in the court’s judgment, best serve the paramount goal of
discerning the legislature’s intent.”). To determine whether
the legislature intended for injured workers to receive compensation for the full measure of all new loss of use or function of a body part, even loss of use or function that is wholly
unrelated to the compensable injury, we examine the workers’ compensation statutes as a whole and our prior judicial
interpretations of those statutes. See Caren, 

(citing Brown v. SAIF, 

, 

 (2017)).
With that in mind, we turn to our previous cases discussing
the meaning of “impairment” and the causes that contribute
to it.

        This court has construed “impairment” and the
causes that contribute to it on multiple occasions, including
in our recent opinion in Johnson v. SAIF, 

, 

 (2022), a case that was consolidated for oral argument with this one. In Johnson, we extensively reviewed
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this court’s prior judicial interpretations of the meaning
of the word “impairment,” the causes that contribute to it,
and the surrounding statutory framework in the workers’
compensation scheme. 

. Those cases do not
bear repeating here in such extensive detail, but they nonetheless lay out important background principles that will
aid in better understanding the parties’ arguments before
answering the question before us in this case.

          In one of the first cases addressing the meaning
of “impairment,” and the phrase “due to the compensable
injury,” as used in ORS 656.214, Barrett v. D & H Drywall,

, 

 (1985) (Barrett I), adh’d to on
recons, 

, 

 (1986) (Barrett II), this court
explained the statutorily prescribed standard for determining whether an award for permanent partial disability is
appropriate. When an accepted, compensable injury is the
material contributing cause of a claimant’s impairment,
then the claimant is entitled to the full measure of compensation for that entire impairment. Johnson, 

.
In other words, as we understood the workers’ compensation statutory scheme at the time the Barrett cases were
decided, an injured worker is entitled to compensation for
the full measure of new impairment caused by the compensable injury, whether the injured worker suffers greater
permanent partial disability because of a preexisting condition or not. See Barrett I, 300 Or at 328 (“The oft-expressed
maxim still applies: An employer takes the worker as he
finds him. Whether the worker suffers greater permanent
partial disability … because of a preexisting condition is
irrelevant in deciding the amount of loss of earning capacity
caused by a new injury superimposed on a preexisting condition.”). The general rule underlying all workers’ compensation claims is that a worker is entitled to compensation
for impairment that is caused in material part by the compensable injury, even if that impairment is heightened—or
different—because of a worker’s individual circumstances
prior to the injury.

        Then, in 1990, the legislature enacted a significant
overhaul of the workers’ compensation statutory scheme. See
Caren, 

 (discussing the 1990 overhaul of the
778                                        Robinette v. SAIF

workers’ compensation statutes in response to this court’s
decisions in the Barrett cases); see also Brown v. SAIF, 

, 

 (2017) (describing the 1990 special session and the overhaul of the workers’ compensation
statutes that resulted); Or Laws 1990, ch 2, § 3 (Spec Sess)
(detailing the changes made during the legislative session).
Those legislative changes included the creation of what is
now known as the “combined condition” framework. Caren,

. The 1990 legislation amended the definition of “compensable injury” to specify that, when an “otherwise compensable injury” combines with a preexisting condition to create a new condition or need for treatment, the
combined condition “is compensable only if … the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of
the disability of the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition.” See ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). That amendment altered
the material contributing cause standard discussed above
by creating a different standard—a major contributing
cause standard—for combined conditions.
          The intent of the legislature in creating the combined condition framework was to enact an exception to
the general rule that would allow insurers or self-insured
employers to reduce their liability for claims in a limited set
of circumstances. See Caren, 

 (“[T]he legislature
intended the combined condition process to create an exception to the general rule that employers pay compensation for
the full measure of the workers’ permanent impairment if
the impairment as a whole is caused in material part by the
compensable injury[.]”). In cases where a legally cognizable
preexisting condition—that is, “any injury, disease, congenital abnormality, personality disorder or similar condition
that contributes to disability or need for treatment, provided
that … the worker has been diagnosed with the condition,
or has obtained medical services for the symptoms of the
condition regardless of diagnosis,” ORS 656.005(24)(a)—
combines with a compensable injury, the legislature carved
out a process through which the insurer can apportion the
claimant’s permanent partial disability award according to
the percentage of the impairment that was caused by the
compensable injury. Caren, 

. That exception is
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limited to circumstances where the insurer or self-insured
employer avails itself of the statutory requirements. See
Schleiss v. SAIF, 

, 

 (2013) (“[T]o
qualify for the apportionment of impairment, a cause must
be legally cognizable.”). But, in circumstances where the
combined condition framework is not applicable, we have
continually confirmed that the general rule remains: Where
an accepted, compensable injury is a material contributing
cause of the claimant’s impairment, then the claimant is
entitled to the full measure of compensation for that impairment. Johnson, 

.
         With that background in mind, we turn to resolving the specific issue presented in this case—whether a
claimant who establishes that her compensable injury was
a material cause of some new findings of loss is entitled to
compensation for all new loss of use or function, even loss
findings that are wholly unrelated to the compensable
injury. We addressed a parallel, though ultimately different,
question in our recent decision in Johnson. Understanding
that decision, and the differences in the questions presented
in that case compared to this one, provides guidance for our
decision today.
        In Johnson, the claimant suffered a hand injury in a
work-related incident and SAIF accepted, in part, the workers’ compensation claim for her injuries. 

.
After receiving treatment for her initial injury, the claimant sought treatment for additional pain. 

. Later,
during the claim closure process, a medical arbiter determined that the claimant suffered a loss of grip strength that
was attributable 50 percent to the accepted compensable
conditions and 50 percent to the denied conditions. 

. Based on that information, the Workers’ Compensation
Board apportioned and reduced the claimant’s permanent
partial disability award according to the percentage of
impairment attributed to the denied condition. 

         We allowed review of that case to consider the extent
to which the workers’ compensation statutes, and specifically ORS 656.214, require an insurer to award benefits for
the full measure of an injured worker’s impairment when
that impairment is caused, at least in part, by a previously
780                                                     Robinette v. SAIF

denied noncompensable condition. We explained that an
injured worker is entitled to the full value of an impairment
that is due in material part to, and resulting in material
part from, the compensable injury, and that apportionment
is only appropriate where the employer or insurer follows
the statutory process laid out for identifying a combined or
consequential condition. 

. Ultimately, we held that
the claimant in Johnson was entitled to the full measure of
her loss of grip strength because that loss had been found to
be caused in material part by the compensable injury and
the claim did not qualify as a combined condition. 

.
         Here, claimant presents a similar argument to the
one presented in Johnson. In her view, once she established
that her workplace injury was compensable, she was entitled to the full measure of all new findings of loss in her
right knee—including compensation for the reduced range
of motion and decreased stability findings, as well as the
surgical and chronic condition values—because her compensable work injury was a material contributing cause to her
overall impairment. At first glance, our prior cases, including Johnson, appear to support that proposition. After all,
we do not understand either party in this case to be contending that the reduced range of motion and decreased stability findings represent a combining of claimant’s workplace
injury with any preexisting condition.3 Without a combined
condition, claimant is correct that she is entitled to the full
measure of her impairment that is due, in material part, to
the compensable injury. We have reaffirmed that principle

     3
       Even if either party were to assert that the range of motion and stability findings represent a combining of the workplace injury and claimant’s preexisting body habitus, a claim that neither party appears to make here, the
alleged “combined condition” would still not qualify for apportionment because
it was never previously identified and considered following the statutory process laid out by the legislature. As we have explained before, we understand the
requirement that there be a preclosure denial of the preexisting condition as a
way of ensuring that the injured worker had notice and an opportunity to challenge a denied claim. See Caren, 

 (“The legislature created a process
that guarantees sufficient notice because the process requires a written denial of
a ‘combined condition’ before the employer reduces the impairment to account for
a preexisting condition, and we conclude that the legislature intended employers
to follow that process to obtain the benefit of that reduction.”). We do not need
to examine whether this situation would have qualified as a combined condition
claim, as we do not understand the parties to make that argument, but we note
that, as we understand the record here, there was no preclosure denial issued.
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many times before. See, e.g., Barrett II, 300 Or at 555-56;
Johnson, 

. But those cases do not implicate the
same question that is before this court here.
          Directly comparing this case to our recent decision in
Johnson reveals why this case necessitates a different result
under the workers’ compensation statutes. Unlike Johnson,
this case does not involve a situation where the loss of use
or function at issue was caused in material part by the compensable injury, but also had other contributing causes. As
explained above, the permanent partial disability award at
issue in Johnson was initially reduced according to the portion of the claimant’s impairment that the medical arbiter
determined to be related to a specifically denied condition.
On review, we reversed the apportionment of the claimant’s
award, holding that the claimant in that case was entitled
to compensation for the full measure of that impairment
because the compensable injury was a material contributing cause. Johnson, 

. Here, however, multiple
distinct losses of use or function are at issue, and, based on
the evidence in the record and the ALJ’s findings, no part
of the claimant’s reduced range of motion or decreased stability findings could be attributed to the accepted condition.
That is the key fact that differentiates this case from our
prior cases.
         ORS 656.214 makes clear that “impairment” is
“the loss of use or function of a body part or system due to
the compensable industrial injury or occupational disease.”
There is no dispute here that claimant suffered impairment
and that some of the loss of use or function of her right knee
was caused by the compensable injury. Claimant received
a permanent partial disability award of five percent whole
person impairment for the surgical value and the chronic
condition in her right knee because those were caused, in
material part (if not in whole), by the compensable injury.
Those impairment findings are not in dispute. But claimant’s reduced range of motion and decreased stability in the
same knee are separate and distinct forms of loss of use or
function. To qualify as “impairment,” such that a claimant
is entitled to a value for that loss as part of their permanent partial disability award, there are two requirements:
(1) that there is a loss of use or function of the body part or
782                                                       Robinette v. SAIF

system, and (2) that that loss is “due to the compensable
injury.” ORS 656.214. Under that definition, a result of an
injury may be a loss of use or function to an injured worker’s
body part, but that does not mean that all loss of use or function of the body part will qualify as impairment for purposes
of calculating permanent partial disability because “impairment” only includes loss of use or function that is “due to the
compensable injury.”
         Claimant’s reduced range of motion and decreased
stability findings are a loss of use or function of her right
knee. But those losses fail to qualify as “impairment.” Review
of the medical arbiter’s determination and the record makes
clear that claimant’s reduced range of motion and decreased
stability in her right knee was not caused in material part,
or in any part, by the compensable injury.4 Accordingly,
those separate and distinct findings of loss of use or function
of claimant’s right knee are not “impairment” under ORS
656.214 and are not part of the calculation of claimant’s permanent partial disability award.
         The workers’ compensation statutory structure is
designed in such a way that the injured worker has the burden of proving the nature and extent of any disability resulting from the workplace injury. ORS 656.266(1). Claimant
did not meet that burden here with regard to the loss of use
or function of her right knee exhibited through the reduced
range of motion and decreased stability. Claimant did not
establish a connection between those findings of loss and
the work-related injury. Although claimant was awarded
     4
       As a conceptual matter, we acknowledge that it is difficult to understand
how claimant suffered new loss of use or function—the reduced range of motion
and decreased stability—in her right knee following a workplace injury but that
the workplace injury did not contribute to that loss in any way at all. Nonetheless,
those are the findings of the medical arbiter, and those findings were adopted by
the Workers’ Compensation Board in its final order. The administrative rules
governing workers’ compensation in Oregon make clear that, “when a medical
arbiter is used, impairment is established based on objective findings of the medical arbiter, except where a preponderance of the medical evidence demonstrates
that different findings by the attending physician are more accurate and should
be used.” OAR 436-035-0007(5). It is not our place to set aside the factual finding
that claimant’s reduced range of motion and decreased stability were not caused
at all by the compensable industrial injury, particularly so because those findings were made by a qualified medical professional, following the procedures in
the workers’ compensation statutes and the accompanying administrative rules
interpreting those statutes, and were adopted by the board in its final order.
Cite as 

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impairment for the surgical value and the chronic condition,
both of which were found to have been materially caused by
the workplace injury, the medical arbiter determined that
the reduced range of motion and decreased stability were
not related. Establishing that an injured worker has suffered impairment does not automatically establish that the
injured worker is entitled to compensation for all new findings of loss. Each distinct loss of use or function is still subject to the material cause standard and, ultimately, claimant bears the burden of establishing the causal connection
between the loss findings and the compensable workplace
injury in order to qualify that loss as “impairment” for purposes of calculating permanent partial disability. To hold
otherwise would lead to results that do not comport with the
“due to the compensable injury” wording in the definition of
“impairment” in ORS 656.214 and could lead to arbitrary
outcomes.
         An example provided in the briefing of amici curiae
Oregon Business & Industry (OBI) and Providence Health &
Services writing in support of SAIF and the employer in this
case, is illustrative on this point. As OBI and Providence
point out, the knee is a part of a larger bodily system—the
leg. There are various different types of loss of use or function of the leg, or parts of the leg, that could give rise to
permanent partial disability awards following injury to a
knee. Consider, for instance, reduced range of motion and
leg length discrepancies. Those are separate and distinct
conditions that could give rise to different loss of use or
function of the leg. The process for rating permanent partial
disability awards for findings of loss related to those conditions are laid out separately in the administrative rules.
See OAR 436-035-0220(1) (prescribing how to calculate ratings of loss for reduced range of motion in the knee); OAR
436-035-0230(2) (prescribing how to calculate ratings of loss
for leg length discrepancies and specifically excluding loss
due to reduced range of motion). It is entirely possible that
a worker may have reduced range of motion due to a knee
injury, and also have a previously untreated leg length discrepancy caused by a congenital defect. We see no reason in
the statutory language or the legislative history to suggest
that those two entirely distinct conditions—separate “loss
784                                        Robinette v. SAIF

of use or function”—should be considered a single “impairment” for the purposes of calculating an award of permanent
partial disability. Doing so would be at odds with the legislature’s goal of creating a workers’ compensation system that
provides compensation to injured workers for “those injuries
that bear a sufficient relationship to employment to merit
incorporation of their costs into the stream of commerce.”
See ORS 656.012 (announcing specific legislative findings
and policy objectives related to the workers’ compensation
statutory structure). Instead, focusing on each distinct “loss
of use or function”—and separately applying the material
cause standard to determine whether that “loss of use or
function” is “due to the compensable injury”—will properly
provide compensation to claimants who meet the burden of
establishing the connection between each loss of use or function and the workplace injury, and will protect insurers and
self-insured employers from paying for wholly unrelated
conditions.
                    III.   CONCLUSION
         Here, claimant suffered from reduced range of
motion and decreased stability in her right knee following
a workplace incident. A medical arbiter, however, attributed
those findings entirely to either body habitus or preexisting
osteoarthritis, but not at all to the workplace injury. Because
each finding of loss of use or function is to be considered
separately, and because the workplace injury was not a
material contributing cause of either of those loss findings,
claimant was not entitled to a value for those findings in her
award for permanent partial disability.
        The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The order of the Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.