Volume 337 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiff sought to recover proceeds allegedly due under a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by the defendant insurer to its insured, B Co. The plaintiff contracted with B Co. to renovate the plain- tiff's damaged house, including site grading and foundation work, which involved, inter alia, the lifting of the house off of the foundation. The house collapsed after it was lifted by B Co.'s subcontractor. At the time of the collapse, the only work being performed on the house was related to the lifting. The plaintiff brought a separate action against B Co. for property damage arising from the collapse. B Co. tendered defense of the case to the defendant pursuant to the insurance policy, and the defendant declined to defend. The plaintiff subsequently brought the present action against the defendant, seeking recovery under a default judgment that the plaintiff had secured against B Co. in the separate action. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, concluding that the defendant had no duty to defend or to indemnify B Co. based on the applicability of two provisions in the insurance policy excluding coverage for property damage to ''that particular part of real property'' on which the insured or anyone working on the insured's behalf is ''performing operations if the property damage arises out of those operations'' and for property damage to ''that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because'' the insured's work ''was incorrectly per- formed on it.'' The plaintiff thereafter appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because, at the time B Co. tendered defense of the case to the defendant, there existed at least a possibility that the complaint alleged a liability covered under B Co.'s insurance policy that would have triggered the defendant's duty to defend. More specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had a duty to defend B Co. because the complaint alleged damage only to the house and interior renovation work, whereas the two relevant policy exclusions precluded coverage only for the defective work to the foundation itself and not for damage to the rest of the house. Held that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, that court having incorrectly determined that the two exclusions relieved the defendant of its duty to defend B Co. in the plaintiff's action against B Co., as there was a possibility that the damages the plaintiff alleged in that action were not excluded under the policy; numerous courts, including this court, have recognized that legal uncertainty can give rise to an insurer's duty to defend, there was legal uncertainty in the present case as to the meaning and applicability of the two exclusions, Connecticut law favors a narrow construction of exclusions and requires that ambiguous provisions be construed in favor of the insured, many other courts have interpreted exclusions with the ''that particular part'' language in a manner favoring coverage, and neither this court nor the Appellate Court has previously interpreted exclusions identical to those at issue in the present case. Argued January 14—officially released September 9, 2020

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants, S Co. and its general contractor, C Co., alleging, inter alia, that they had been negligently exposed to asbestos while working for subcontractors on a construction project at S Co.'s facility. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, the costs of medical monitoring for asbestos related diseases, and the establishment of a court monitored fund to pay those costs. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs had not suffered any actual injuries and, instead, were seeking medical monitoring for the risk of future injuries, which the defendants claimed is not cognizable under Connecti- cut law. The trial court determined that, because the plaintiffs conceded that they had not been diagnosed with an asbestos related disease, they had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a physical injury. Addressing an issue of first impression under Con- necticut law, the court then concluded that a claim for medical monitor- ing for an increased risk of future injury, in the absence of any present, physical harm, was not cognizable under Connecticut law. Thereafter, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendants. On the plaintiffs' appeal, held that the trial court's judgment was affirmed on the alternative ground that, even if this court were to recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring in the absence of the present manifestation of physical injury, the plaintiffs nevertheless failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to other elements of a medical monitoring claim, namely, whether medical monitoring was reasonably necessary for each individual plain- tiff. Argued December 18, 2019—officially released September 14, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of criminal trespass in the first degree, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury on the infraction of simple trespass as a lesser included offense. The defendant's conviction stemmed from his conduct in entering and panhandling on shopping mall property despite having been previously banned from the property by mall security officers and having been told by a private duty police officer, S, that he would be arrested for trespassing if he entered the property again. At trial, the defendant claimed that the first degree criminal trespass statute (§ 53a-107 (a) (1)) requires that an order not to enter the property be communicated ''by the owner of the premises or other authorized person'' and that the state failed to prove that S was authorized to communicate such an order to the defendant. Follow- ing the close of evidence, the defendant requested a jury instruction on simple trespass as a lesser included offense of first degree criminal trespass, which the trial court denied. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of conviction. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined, for purposes of State v. Whistnant (179 Conn. 576), that there was no evidence that could have permitted the jury to find him not guilty of first degree criminal trespass but also find him guilty of simple trespass. Specifically, the defendant claimed that the jury could have agreed with him that the state failed to prove that mall security personnel and S were authorized to ban him from mall property, and thus have found him not guilty of first degree criminal trespass, but nonetheless have found that the state proved that the defendant had been told multiple times that he was not allowed to enter the property to panhandle and thus have found him guilty of simple trespass. Held that the Appellate Court correctly con- cluded that the trial court properly declined the defendant's request to instruct the jury on simple trespass as a lesser included offense of first degree criminal trespass because the prerequisites set forth in Whistnant for obtaining a jury instruction on a lesser included offense were not satisfied; the jury could not consistently have found the defendant not guilty of first degree criminal trespass but guilty of simple trespass, as required by Whistnant, because the element of criminal and simple trespass requiring proof that the defendant knew he was not licensed or privileged to enter the property necessarily requires proof that he was not in fact licensed or privileged to enter, and, if the jury accepted the defendant's claim that the state had failed to prove that the security officers and S were authorized to ban him from entering the mall, there would have been no evidence permitting the jury to find that his entry at the time of his arrest was unlawful, an element of simple trespass. Argued February 20—officially released September 16, 2020

The plaintiffs, the town of Redding, the town water pollution control commis- sion, and a regional fire district, sought to foreclose municipal liens against the defendant R Co., a tax lien investment company and assignee of certain real estate tax liens originally levied on real property by a special taxing district authorized by the legislature. The town and the fire district filed motions for partial summary judgment with respect to priority, claiming that, under a 2007 public act (P.A. 07-196, § 4 (b) (3)) giving the special taxing district's liens priority ''over all other liens or encumbrances except a lien for taxes of the town of Redding,'' their tax liens had priority over the liens that R Co. had acquired from the special taxing district. R Co. also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that its liens were of equal priority, rather than subordinate, to those of the town and the fire district. The trial court determined that the liens of the town and the fire district were superior to the liens acquired by R Co., granted the motions for partial summary judgment filed by the town and the fire district, denied R Co.'s motion, and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the town and the fire district. R Co. appealed from the judgment of strict foreclosure, claiming that the trial court incorrectly had concluded that its liens were subordinate to those of the town and the fire district. Held that the trial court correctly determined that the liens acquired by R Co. from the special taxing district were subordinate to those of the town but incorrectly concluded that they also were subordinate to those of the fire district; Connecticut statutes addressing the subject of lien priority indicate that the legislature intended the phrase ''except a lien for taxes of the town'' in the priority clause of P.A. 07-196, § 4 (b) (3), to convey, not just the absence of priority of the special taxing district's liens over the town's liens, but subordination to them, and the priority clause also clearly and unambiguously provided the special taxing dis- trict's lines with priority over those of the fire district. Argued December 17, 2019—officially released September 21, 2020

The plaintiff sought to vacate, and the defendant sought to confirm, an arbitration award dividing the parties' equity in their marital home and allocating various child support expenses in connection with the parties' marital dissolution. The parties, who were married in France, had entered into a premarital agreement that ''designate[d], as the law to be applicable to their matrimonial regime, the French law . . . .'' That agreement also provided that, in the event of divorce, each party's separate property would remain the separate property of its owner, and that any property acquired in both parties' names was presumed to belong to them jointly, in the absence of proof to the contrary. While married, the parties purchased their marital home in Westport, Connecti- cut. The plaintiff provided most of the down payment using funds her father had given her, but the parties took title to the home jointly, and the defendant made all of the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments. The plaintiff thereafter commenced the present action to dissolve the marriage. Both parties sought to enforce the premarital agreement, and the trial court approved their agreement to submit the matter to arbitra- tion. The arbitration agreement contained a choice of law provision providing that substantive issues would be governed by Connecticut law but that the arbitrator shall apply the French Civil Code ''with regard to any claim by the parties that the [a]rbitrator either vacate [the] premarital agreement or effectuate [the] premarital agreement and if effectuated determine what property is included within the scope of the premarital agreement pursuant to [the] French Civil Code.'' The arbitrator issued a written award, finding that, pursuant to the premarital agreement, the marital home constituted joint property because it was acquired in both parties' names and neither party had presented evidence to rebut the presumption of joint ownership. The arbitrator also deter- mined that the choice of law provision in the premarital agreement designating French law as the law applicable to the parties' ''matrimonial regime'' did not govern the distribution of joint property in the event of divorce. Instead, the arbitrator determined that Connecticut law, under which joint assets may be divided equitably in the discretion of the tribunal, rather than French law, under which a party recovers his or her contribution to the joint asset, governed the distribution of the equity in the home. Explaining that the award reflected the parties' respective contributions to the home and protected the defendant from the vagaries of the real estate market, the arbitrator awarded the marital home to the plaintiff but ordered that she pay the defendant $212,000 for his share of the equity. The arbitrator also issued orders regarding the payment of child support, as well as other expenses related to the care of the parties' children. The trial court denied the defendant's application to confirm the arbitration award and granted the plaintiff's motion to vacate the award, concluding that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority under the arbitration agreement and manifestly disre- garded the law by ignoring the clear choice of law provisions in the premarital agreement and by dividing the equity in the marital home pursuant to Connecticut law rather than French law. The trial court also concluded that the arbitration award improperly included issues relating to child support. On the defendant's appeal, held: 1. There was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that this court lacked appellate jurisdiction on the ground that there was no final judgment from which to appeal insofar as the statute (§ 52-423) providing a right of appeal from an order vacating an arbitration award is inapplicable to arbitration awards that include issues related to child support; § 52-423 expressly confers on parties the right to appeal from orders related to the judicial enforcement of arbitration awards, the fact that the arbitration at issue involved a marital dissolution was of no consequence, and the statute (§ 46b-66 (c)) limiting the applicability of § 52-423 with respect to orders vacating or confirming an arbitration award that include issues related to child support did not place a categorical condition on a party's right to appeal from such orders but, rather, limited the enforceable scope of the arbitration agreement and award. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's motion to vacate on the ground that the plaintiff failed to identify a factual basis for that motion within the statutory (§ 52-420 (b)) limitation period; the defendant conceded that the plaintiff filed the motion within the limita- tion period specified in § 52-420 (b), and, although the plaintiff's motion did not articulate a specific factual basis for vacating the award, nothing in § 52-420 requires the movant to set forth the factual basis for his or her motion. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's arguments in her motion to vacate pertaining to child support on the grounds that the plaintiff was not aggrieved by that portion of the award and that the issue of child support had been rendered moot by the parties' pendente lite stipulations addressing that issue: the plain language of the statute (§ 52-418 (a)) authorizing the court to vacate an arbitration award expressly confers on any party to the litigation the right to move to vacate the award, regardless of whether the party is aggrieved by that award, and this court declined to import the requirement of aggrievement into the statute; moreover, the fact that the parties had entered into pendente lite stipulations regarding the issue of child support did not render that issue moot, as pendente lite orders are not permanent but terminate with the conclusion of litigation, and, accordingly, the court was still obligated to make a final child support determination. 4. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the arbitrator's award exceeded the scope of the parties' submission; the issue on appeal was not whether the arbitrator resolved the issues presented correctly but simply whether the issues had been submitted to the arbitrator to decide, which they clearly had been; moreover, in light of the arbitrator's having clearly fulfilled her obligation to interpret and to apply the arbitration agree- ment, this court would not substitute its own interpretation for that of the arbitrator. 5. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the arbitrator manifestly disre- garded the choice of law provision in the premarital agreement by distributing the equity in the marital home in accordance with Connecti- cut law; in light of the ambiguities in the premarital agreement, which declared that French law governed the parties' ''matrimonial regime'' without defining that term, and which provided for the distribution upon divorce of separate property and property for which ownership could not be established but not for the distribution of joint property, this court could not conclude that any error that the arbitrator may have made in distributing the equity in the marital home amounted to an egregious or patently irrational rejection of clearly controlling legal principles that would permit a court to vacate the arbitration award under the highly deferential standard governing the manifest disregard of law inquiry. 6. The trial court correctly determined that the arbitrator's award included issues related to child support in violation of § 46b-66 (c) and the statute (§ 52-408) generally governing agreements to arbitrate, but this court concluded that the portion of the award related to the health care, childcare, and extracurricular activity expenses of the parties' children was severable from the remainder of the award: in light of the well established purpose of the child support statutes to protect the rights of children who are not parties to the dissolution matter, this court concluded that a party cannot waive the statutory prohibition against the arbitration of issues related to child support, as that issue is reserved for the trial court, which must by law consider the child support guide- lines; accordingly, this court remanded the case with direction to render judgment granting the plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award insofar as it included orders related to child support but denying the motion to vacate the award in all other respects, and denying the applica- tion to confirm that portion of the arbitration award relating to child support but granting the application to confirm the award in all other respects. Argued January 21—officially released September 24, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree and criminal attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which two Hispanic men pulled a woman, who was walking on a street in New Britain, into the backseat of their car and sexually assaulted her. Approximately ten years after the incident, the defendant became a person of interest based on a match between the DNA sample that had been extracted from the victim's sexual assault evidence kit and a sample of the defendant's DNA that had been placed into a database at some point after the victim's assault. The police interviewed the defendant, and he denied that the incident in question occurred but consented to the taking of a buccal swab, which the police submitted to the state forensic laboratory for analysis. The laboratory subsequently reported a match between the DNA from the defendant's buccal swab and that taken from the victim's sexual assault evidence kit, and the police inter- viewed the defendant again. During the second interview, the defendant admitted that he did have a threesome after he picked up a man and a woman near an automobile parts store. At trial, three laboratory reports analyzing the DNA samples were introduced into evidence through the testimony of P, a forensic science examiner with the state forensic laboratory. The first of the three reports was produced in 2007 and described the results of the victim's sexual assault evidence kit. The second and third reports were produced in 2016 and were based on comparisons of the DNA samples from the sexual assault evidence kit and the defendant's buccal swab. P testified regarding the procedures used to test the DNA evidence and the results contained in the three reports. The third and final report analyzed the sperm-rich and epithelial- rich fractions of the vaginal, oral and genital swabs, including a 2016 reworking of the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs, and the defendant's buccal swab. That report concluded that the defendant was a potential contributor to the DNA profile from the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs and that the expected frequency of individuals who could be a contributor to that DNA profile was approximately 1 in 230,000 in the Hispanic population. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had violated his right to confrontation by allowing P to testify about the results of the DNA identification analysis without requiring testimony from the individual who generated the DNA profiles. Held: 1. The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his right to confrontation failed under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because it was unclear whether the 2016 retesting of the vaginal swab was performed by someone other than P, and, therefore, the record was inadequate to establish whether a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation occurred. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his due process right was violated by the introduction of DNA identification evidence that was unreliable: the defendant failed to establish a constitu- tional violation under Golding because the jury was presented with evidence that there was a genetic profile match and the statistical rarity of the match, P explained the statistical method she used to determine the rarity of the match, and defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine P, present his own statistical evidence, or request a jury instruction; moreover, this court declined the defendant's invitation to exercise its supervisory authority to require trial courts to instruct juries on the meaning of random match probability when DNA evidence is the only evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. 3. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that a random match probabil- ity of 1 in 230,000 in the Hispanic population, by itself, was insufficient to prove that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the evidence establishing the identity of the defendant was not based on DNA evidence alone, as the video recordings of the defendant's two interviews with the police, which were played for the jury and which included inconsistent statements that indicated the defendant's consciousness of guilt, pro- vided additional evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (One justice concurring separately) Argued December 19, 2019—officially released September 24, 2020

The plaintiff landlords sought to regain possession of certain real property from the defendant tenants on the ground of nonpayment of rent. The parties had executed a commercial lease for the property. The property previously had been used as an automobile sales and repair facility, but the defendants intended to operate a retail rug gallery and a restaurant on the premises. The defendants started making monthly rent payments but stopped approximately five months later. At that time, the defendants had not completed their planned renovations to the premises and had not obtained the certificates of occupancy required to open the businesses. Meanwhile, without informing the defendants, the plaintiffs had been remediating the property of certain environmental contamination in accordance with a stipulated judgment with the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection. After the defendants failed to pay rent for three consecutive months, the plaintiffs served them with a notice to quit, and, when the defendants failed to vacate the premises, the plaintiffs commenced this summary process action. The defendants asserted several special defenses, including equitable nonforfeiture. At trial, two of the defendants testified that the defendants had stopped paying rent because it was the only way they could stay in business and to draw the plaintiffs' attention to their difficulties. The trial court rendered judgment of possession for the plaintiffs, concluding, inter alia, that the equitable nonforfeiture defense did not apply because the defendants had intentionally breached the lease. Specifically, the court rejected the defendants' claims that they had a good faith intent to comply with, and a good faith dispute over the meaning of, the lease. The court found that the defendants' alleged concerns about environmental contamination, which the defendants claimed justified their withholding of rent, were pretextual, and that the defendants' nonpayment actually was motivated by the costs and difficulties arising from the delay in renovating and occupying the premises. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the defendants, on the granting of certifi- cation, appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the defendant's equitable nonforfeiture defense, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment; because the defendants intentionally withheld rent on pretextual grounds and in the absence of any good faith dispute over the terms of the lease, it was within the trial court's equitable discretion to determine that the defendants acted wilfully in not paying rent and to deny them equitable relief from forfeiture of the premises. Submitted on briefs May 8—officially released September 30, 2020

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-60 [b]), the Commissioner of Labor shall adopt regulations that carry out the purposes of the minimum wage laws, and such regulations shall entitle employers, as part of the minimum fair wage, to a tip credit by including gratuities in an amount equal to a certain percentage of the minimum fair wage per hour for persons, other than bartenders, who are employed in the hotel and restaurant industry and who regularly and customarily receive gratuities. Pursuant further to a Department of Labor regulation (§ 31-62-E4), ''[i]f an employee performs both service and non-service duties, and the time spent on each is definitely segregated and so recorded, the allowance for gratuities as permitted as part of the minimum fair wage may be applied to the hours worked in the service category,'' but, ''[i]f an employee performs both service and non-service duties and the time spent on each cannot be definitely segregated and so recorded, or is not definitely segregated and so recorded, no allowances for gratuities may be applied as part of the minimum fair wage.'' The defendants, K Co. and its single member, C, appealed from the trial court's order certifying for class action status an action brought by the plaintiff, who was employed at one of the six restaurants in Connecticut operated by the defendants under the name Chip's Family Restaurants. In addition to waiting tables, servers at the restaurants were required to perform ''side work,'' such as cleaning tables and appliances, restocking, slicing lemons, and preparing food toppings. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the defendants violated Connecticut wage laws when they failed to pay their servers, during a certain time period, the minimum hourly wage mandated by § 31-60 (b) by unlawfully deducting a tip credit from the servers' wages for the time they spent on side work, which the plaintiff claimed was nonservice in nature under § 31-62-E4 of the regulations. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for class certifi- cation and certified a class consisting of all individuals employed as servers ''at any Connecticut Chip's Family Restaurant'' during a certain time period. In so doing, the court declined to define the terms ''service'' and ''nonservice,'' as used in § 31-62-E4 of the regulations, and, instead, found that, regardless of whether the side work constituted a service or nonservice duty, the class members' claims were all the same, namely, that each server performed side work during every shift and was entitled to the full minimum wage because the defendants failed to segregate and record the time servers spent performing services and nonservice duties. The court specifically noted that the proposed class included several hundred servers employed at six different restaurants and that they shared the same claim, irrespective of variations in the type, amount, or manner of side work tasks performed by individual servers at each restaurant. Accordingly, the court concluded that each require- ment for class certification—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—set forth in the applicable rule of practice (§ 9-7) had been satisfied and that the predominance and superiority considerations under the applicable rule of practice (§ 9-8 (3)) also had been met. Thereafter, the defendants appealed from the court's order granting class certification pursuant to the statute (§ 52-265a) permitting the Chief Justice to certify an interlocutory appeal involving a matter of substantial public interest. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improp- erly declined to inquire into the merits of the plaintiff's legal theory and to decide that the tasks assigned as side work constituted service duties under § 31-62-E4 of the regulations in determining whether the common- ality and predominance requirements for class certification had been met; the court should inquire into the merits of a case only to the extent necessary to ensure that a plaintiff has met the requirements of the class action rules, and, in the present case, the defendants failed to demonstrate how the trial court's determining the meanings of ''service'' and ''nonservice'' would affect whether common issues predominate. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the four class certification requirements of Practice Book § 9-7 had been satisfied: the defendants did not challenge the trial court's finding that the numero- sity requirement was satisfied by the proposed class of several hundred servers employed at the six restaurants; moreover, the commonality requirement was satisfied, as the defendants used a single, common side work policy that was applicable at all six restaurants, the evidence demonstrated an overarching policy of the servers' performing generally consistent side work tasks, and any factual variations in how servers at the different locations performed side work were likely to be insub- stantial; furthermore, the adequacy of representation and typicality requirements were satisfied because the plaintiff asserted a cognizable claim against the defendants, namely, violations of Connecticut wage laws and regulations, and her standing in this case allowed her to typi- cally and adequately represent class members with claims against the defendants. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the predomi- nance and superiority requirements of Practice Book § 9-8 had been satisfied: common issues of law or fact predominated over questions affecting only individual members, as much of the proof necessary to establish the contested element of the plaintiff's claim, namely, whether the servers performed both service and nonservice duties, was apparent from the defendants' own admissions, and the plaintiff was not required to prove the precise nature of the servers' side work duties because, under the minimum wage laws, it is the employer's burden to establish that the servers were service employees who were subject to the tip credit; moreover, the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs could use representative testimony, rather than individual testimony, to prove that the tasks assigned as side work were nonservice in nature, as the evidence indicated that all servers were trained in a similar manner, the tasks assigned to servers were relatively uniform, and a common side work policy was used at all six restaurants, despite minor variations in the manner and frequency that individual servers may have performed certain tasks; furthermore, in light of this court's conclusion that the use of representative testimony was proper, the trial court correctly determined that a class action was superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, espe- cially as it would promote judicial efficiency and provide many individu- als, who likely would not bring such a claim, an opportunity for relief. 4. There was no merit to the defendants' claim that the trial court improperly defined the class by referring to ''Connecticut Chip's Family Restaurant,'' which is not a legal entity, in its certification order; the court used a term that clearly encompassed all six restaurants operated by the defendants, allowing for individual servers to easily recognize whether they qualify as class members based on their employment at a Chip's restaurant and for their eligibility to be readily ascertained and defini- tively verified. Argued January 14—officially released October 6, 2020

The plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of the decedent, B, sought to recover damages from the defendants, the Department of Correction and the provider of health care for those in the department's custody, for B's allegedly wrongful death. In July, 2015, the Claims Commissioner authorized B to bring an action against the defendants for medical malpractice, but B died without having done so. In September, 2016, the plaintiff brought the present action against the defendants. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the action was time barred by the statute (§ 4-160 (d)) requiring a plaintiff who has been granted authorization to sue the state by the Claims Commissioner to bring an action within one year from the date that the authorization was granted. The plaintiff filed an objection, arguing that the one year time limitation contained in § 4-160 (d) was inoperative because the two year time limitation in the wrongful death statute (§ 52-555 (a)) controlled her wrongful death claim on behalf of B's estate. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, which affirmed. The Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff was required to comply with both the one year time limitation contained in § 4-160 (d) and the two year time limitation contained in § 52-555 (a). More specifically, the Appellate Court held that, because § 4-160 created a right of action against the state that did not exist at common law, that statute's one year time limitation constituted a strict limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity. The Appellate Court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the two year statute of limitations in § 52-555 (a) superseded or rendered inoperative the one year limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity, reasoning that nothing in the text of § 4-160 (d) excepts wrongful death actions from the strict, one year time limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity. The Appellate Court further held that, because the Claims Commissioner's authorization to sue had expired when the plaintiff brought the present action, sovereign immunity barred her action, and the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court's reasoning and analysis were sound, and, accordingly, that court properly upheld the trial court's granting of the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; moreover, this court's decision in Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Interna- tional, LLC (331 Conn. 53), which recognized that the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions contained in § 52-555 (a) does not supersede a time limitation in a statute that creates a right of action that did not exist at common law, provided additional support for the Appellate Court's holding because § 4-160 created the right to sue the state for medical negligence, subject to authorization by the Claims Commissioner, and the plaintiff was thus required to comply with both the two year statute of limitations of § 52-555 (a) and the one year limitation period set forth in § 4-160 (d). (One justice concurring separately) Argued May 4—officially released October 9, 2020

Convicted of murder, attempt to commit murder, and assault in the first degree in connection with the shooting of his girlfriend's daughter, O, and O's roommate, J, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting into evidence four photographs depicting the bloody interior of the car in which O and J drove to the hospital after the shooting. On the day of the shooting, O and J arrived at the house where the defendant and his girlfriend lived and found them arguing inside a locked bedroom. O and J demanded that the defendant open the bedroom door. When he did, he shot O and J each once in the chest. O and J fled to O's car and drove to the hospital, where J died as a result of her injuries. At trial, the state introduced into evidence, over defense counsel's objection, the four photographs as full exhibits. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the trial court had improperly admitted the photographs because they were not relevant to the crimes with which he was charged and, alternatively, because they were unduly prejudicial insofar as their graphic nature had a tendency to arouse the jurors' passions. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the photographs depicting the bloody interior of the car that O and J used to flee the shooting: the photographs were relevant because the amount of blood loss that O and J suffered immediately after the shooting and the corres- ponding severity of their wounds were probative of certain elements of the charged offenses, namely, whether the wounds the defendant inflicted were grievous enough to cause J's death and serious physical injury to O, and the defendant's intent as to those offenses; moreover, the photographs were relevant because they corroborated O's testimony at trial about the events that transpired immediately following the shoot- ing; furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudi- cial effect. Argued February 21—officially released October 14, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, the city of New Haven and one of its police officers, C, in connection with injuries the plaintiff sustained when he crashed his dirt bike to avoid colliding with C's police cruiser. C was driving northbound on a New Haven street when she spotted a group of dirt bikes and all-terrain vehicles driving the other way down the street in violation of a city ordinance. Without giving any warning or operating her lights or sirens, C executed a roadblock maneuver by pulling her cruiser diagonally across the double yellow line into the southbound lane and directly in front of the group. To avoid a head-on collision, the plaintiff jumped the curb onto the sidewalk, where he lost control of his dirt bike and struck a tree. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that C was negligent in responding to the dirt bikes and all-terrain vehicles because she initiated a pursuit and engaged in a roadblock maneuver in violation of the city police depart- ment's pursuit policy and the uniform statewide pursuit policy set forth in the applicable state regulation (§ 14-283a-4 (d) (5)), both of which prohibit the use of roadblocks, except when necessary to save human life or when specifically authorized by a supervisor, respectively. Accord- ingly, the plaintiff claimed that C violated a ministerial duty and that the city was liable pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n (a) (1) (A)) for the negligent acts of its employee. The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that C was engaged in a discretionary act when responding to the dirt bikes and all-terrain vehicles, and that the defen- dants therefore were protected by governmental immunity pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (2) (B). In opposing the defendants' motion, the plaintiff also relied on the deposition testimony of M, a sergeant with the city's police department, that, at the time of the incident, it was the police department's policy not to pursue dirt bikes or all-terrain vehicles on public roads as a matter of public safety, and that C had breached the department's pursuit policy by, inter alia, executing a complete roadblock without providing an opening for oncoming vehicles. The trial court granted the defendants' motion and rendered judgment for the defendants, concluding that they were entitled to governmental immunity. Crediting C's deposition testimony, the court concluded that there was no evidence that C engaged in a pursuit, and, accordingly, neither the statewide nor the department pursuit policy was applicable to the present case. The court instead determined that C's response was discretionary rather than ministerial and that, even if C had initiated a pursuit, the language of the statewide and department pursuit policies nonetheless rendered her decision to do so discretionary. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held that the trial court improp- erly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that C was engaged in a discretionary act when responding to the dirt bikes and all-terrain vehicles, and, therefore, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings: the portions of the statewide and department pursuit policies relating to roadblocks and the pursuit of dirt bikes and all-terrain vehicles pre- sented the type of bright-line directives that created a ministerial duty regarding the manner of pursuit, and, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether a pursuit had occurred within the meaning of those policies, which was a predicate for establishing whether C had violated a ministerial duty; moreover, although M was not C's direct supervisor, his employment with the department gave him sufficient knowledge, training, and experience with respect to the department's policies and procedures such that his testimony was relevant to establishing the existence of a ministerial duty. Argued May 4—officially released October 15, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of the crime of unlawful sexual contact in the first degree, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to have his guilty plea withdrawn or vacated. A clerk of the court granted the self-represented petitioner's application for a waiver of fees but took no action on his request for the appointment of counsel. Subsequently, the habeas court, in connection with its prelim- inary consideration of the writ under the rules of practice (§ 23-24), dismissed, sua sponte, the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and ordered the petition returned to the petitioner. The court determined that, pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 23-29), it lacked jurisdiction because it was apparent, on the face of the petition, that the petitioner was not in custody for the conviction being challenged. The court denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the habeas court improperly dismissed the petition under § 23-29 without first appointing him counsel and providing him with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Held: 1. The habeas court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner was not in custody for the challenged conviction, but it should have declined to issue the writ pursuant to § 23-24 rather than dismissing the petition pursuant to § 23-29, consistent with this court's prior decision in Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correc- tion (334 Conn. 548); moreover, the mere administrative granting of the waiver of fees, without more, did not transform the petitioner's patently defective petition into one in which the procedures of § 23-29 applied, and, because the habeas court should have declined to issue the writ, the petitioner was not entitled to appointment of counsel, notice or an opportunity to be heard; furthermore, the petitioner's claim that this court should apply the doctrine of plain error and reverse the judgment of the habeas court was unavailing because the petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the habeas court's error was obvious. 2. There was no merit to the petitioner's claim that the habeas court improp- erly failed to construe his petition as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, the habeas court having lacked jurisdiction to entertain such a petition; even if this court assumed that the habeas court had a duty to construe the habeas petition as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, the petitioner still could not prevail on his claim, as his habeas petition was filed well beyond the three year limitation period allowed for petitions for a writ of error coram nobis. Argued April 29—officially released October 20, 2020

The plaintiff, who sustained injuries when he fell off a retaining wall con- structed by the defendant town, sought to recover damages from the town. He claimed that the town created a public nuisance by constructing the wall without a fence on top of it. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the town. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict, claiming that the jury's responses to certain interrogatories, in which it indicated that it had found that the wall was an inherently dangerous condition but was not an unreasonable or unlawful use of the land, were inconsistent. The trial court denied the motion and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court concluded that, as a matter of law, the jury could not have determined that the retaining wall without a fence was both inherently dangerous and not an unreasonable use of the land. The Appellate Court further concluded that the wall constituted an unreasonable use of the land because it was inherently dangerous and lacked any social utility. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. On the granting of certification, the town appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, as the jury's responses to the special interrogatories could be harmonized in light of this court's established public nuisance jurisprudence: the proper inquiry for determining the reasonableness of a defendant's use of the land is not whether the inherently dangerous condition alone is reasonable, but whether the defendant's use of the land constitutes a reasonable use in light of the surrounding circumstances, and the Appellate Court improp- erly focused its inquiry solely on the condition at issue and ignored the multiplicity of factors that the jury could have considered in determining that, despite the inherent dangerousness of the wall, the town's use of the land, when considered in context, was reasonable; moreover, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the town's use of the land was reasonable in light of the benefits of the wall, the steps the town took to mitigate the danger posed by the wall, such as the placement of a guardrail and dense vegetation between the adjacent parking lot and the wall, and the absence of any evidence that other individuals had fallen from the wall prior to the plaintiff's accident. Argued April 27—officially released November 9, 2020

Convicted of, among other crimes, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, home invasion, risk of injury to a child and assault in the second degree with a firearm, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that his convictions should be reversed because the trial court incorrectly determined that his jury trial waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgments of conviction, specifically rejecting the defendant's claims that his waiver was constitutionally infirm because he was suffering from an unspecified mental illness at the time of the waiver and that trial court's canvass was constitutionally infirm because the court failed to elicit from him additional information about his background, experi- ence, conduct, and mental and emotional state, and to explain, among other things, the mechanics of a jury trial. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, renewing his claim in the Appellate Court challenging the validity of his jury trial waiver. Held that the Appellate Court having fully addressed the issues raised by the defendant before this court concerning whether the trial court had correctly deter- mined that his jury trial waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, this court adopted the Appellate Court's thorough and well reasoned opinion as a proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. Argued September 18—officially released November 9, 2020

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of posses- sion of a controlled substance with intent to sell, the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence that was seized after the police detained him, without a warrant, in the parking lot of the apartment building in which his codefendant, E, lived. The police had obtained an arrest warrant for a suspected drug trafficker, R, and a search warrant for R's apartment, which was in the same building as E's apartment.. Prior to executing the warrants, the police were surveilling the parking lot when they observed an unknown male, later identified as the defendant, engage in a brief conversation with R. The defendant and R then got into their respective vehicles and departed. A short time later, R was arrested for selling narcotics to an undercover officer, and the police prepared to execute the search warrant for R's apartment. At that time, however, the defendant and E returned to the parking lot in the defendant's vehicle. Approximately four or five uniformed police officers, at least one of whom had his gun drawn, immediately approached the defen- dant's parked vehicle. Upon reaching the driver's door, one of the officers opened the door and detected the odor of marijuana. The officer also observed a marijuana cigarette and drug packaging inside the vehicle. Both the defendant and E were removed from the vehicle and placed into custody. The police subsequently obtained a search warrant for E's apartment, and that search yielded additional narcotics and other related evidence. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized by the police, claiming that the warrantless search and seizure of his person and vehicle violated his constitutional rights. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the warrantless seizure fell within the exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement that authorizes law enforcement officers executing a search warrant to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because he was not an occu- pant or in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched within the meaning of that exception. Held that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to suppress, the state having failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that the defendant was in the immediate vicinity of R's apartment when the defendant was detained by the police: the record was devoid of any evidence concerning the spatial factors used to ascertain whether the defendant was in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, including whether the defendant was detained within the lawful limits of R's apartment, whether he was detained within the line of sight of R's apartment, and whether his location made it easy for him to enter or reenter R's apartment; accord- ingly, the warrantless search and seizure of the defendant and his vehicle were not justified under the relevant exception to the warrant require- ment. Argued June 5—officially released November 13, 2020

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of posses- sion of a controlled substance with intent to sell, the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress certain evidence that was seized after the police detained her, without a warrant, in a vehicle in the parking lot of the apartment building in which she lived while executing an unrelated search warrant on an apartment in that building. More specifically, the defendant claimed that the trial court incorrectly had concluded that the warrantless seizure fell within the exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement that authorizes law enforcement officers executing a search warrant to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted because, inter alia, she was not in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched within the meaning of that exception. Held that the exception to the warrant requirement on which the trial court relied in denying the defendant's motion to suppress was inapplicable, as the defendant was not within the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched when she was detained by the police, and, accordingly, her fourth amendment rights were violated, and the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless seizure should have been suppressed; because the facts of this case and the issue presented on appeal were identical to those in the companion case of State v. Rolon, (337 Conn. ), this court's reasoning in Rolon controlled the present case. Argued June 5—officially released November 13, 2020

Convicted of risk of injury to a child, sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second degree, and sexual assault in the fourth degree in connection with his alleged sexual abuse of the victim, J, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court's admission of a video recording of a forensic interview of J and exclusion of screenshots depicting two text messages purportedly sent by J to the defendant's niece, V, constituted harmful error. The Appellate Court upheld the defendant's conviction, concluding that neither evidentiary ruling was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The Appellate Court specifically concluded that the statements that J made during the inter- view were admissible under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule and that V's testimony was insufficient to authenticate the text messages and that there was not sufficient additional corroboration of V's testimony. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court rejected the defendant's claim that it should overrule prior Appellate Court precedent and adopt a standard under which statements made by a minor child abuse victim during a forensic interview can be admitted under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule only if the victim's primary purpose in making those statements was to obtain a medical diagnosis or treatment. 2. The Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding, for lack of authentication, the screens- hots of the text messages purportedly sent by J to V: the defendant established a prima facie case of authentication through V's testimony, and any doubts as to V's credibility or as to the source of the messages went to the weight, rather than to the admissibility, of the text messages; moreover, the exclusion of the text messages was not harmless because the state's case was not particularly strong insofar as there was no physical evidence or contemporaneous observations of the alleged sex- ual abuse, the only evidence of the abuse came from J's delayed disclo- sure, and the testimony of J's younger sister called J's veracity and motives into question; furthermore, the text messages, if deemed authen- tic by the jury, could have been used to impeach one of J's statements during her interview and could have been viewed by jurors as evidence of J's motivation to fabricate her allegations against the defendant; accordingly, the case was remanded for a new trial. Argued June 3—officially released November 19, 2020

Convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. The defendant and the victim were in a relationship, which had deteriorated in the weeks preceding the victim's death. On the day of the shooting, the defendant drove to a motel at which the victim had been staying and, several hours later, shot the victim in his motel room. At trial, the defendant asserted a theory of self-defense, claiming that she and the victim had argued in the motel room, that the victim had a knife, and that she feared for her life and had no time to flee. The state called a witness, M, during its case on rebuttal in an attempt to show that the victim had been afraid of the defendant. Over defense counsel's objection, M testified that, a few weeks before the victim's death, he told M that he had crawled into the defendant's home through a window to retrieve some personal possessions, that the defendant put a gun to his head and threatened him, and that her threats frightened him. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding, inter alia, that, even if the trial court had improperly admitted M's testimony, its admission was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. Thereafter, the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court cor- rectly concluded that any error relating to the admission of M's testimony was harmless, as the defendant failed to satisfy her burden of demonstra- ting that M's testimony substantially affected the jury's verdict: the incident that M recounted to the jury in her testimony was not the primary, or even a significant, basis for the case against the defendant, as the state introduced physical evidence that was inconsistent with the defendant's account of the shooting, evidence undercutting the defendant's claim that the victim had been the aggressor in their relation- ship, evidence of the defendant's conduct before the shooting that dem- onstrated her intent to use her gun, and evidence of the defendant's conduct after the shooting that demonstrated her consciousness of guilt; moreover, there was testimony from other witnesses that the defendant had previously displayed aggression toward the victim and that he was fearful of the defendant, and certain aspects of M's testimony supported the defendant's primary theory of the case. Argued June 3—officially released November 23, 2020

In accordance with State v. Patterson (276 Conn. 452), a trial court in a criminal case must issue a special credibility instruction to the jury when a jailhouse informant testifies about inculpatory statements made by a fellow inmate to the informant while they were incarcerated together. Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his request for a special credibility instruction concerning the testimony of jailhouse informants as it related to one of the state's key witnesses, S. At trial, the state presented no physical evidence linking the defendant to the victim's murder or to the firearm used, instead relying on the testimony of S, among other witnesses. S had approached the police more than two years after the shooting while he was in pretrial detention on two felony charges, hoping for a favorable disposition on his pending charges in exchange for information about the victim's murder. S told the police that he had seen the defendant when he was visiting the housing complex where the victim was murdered on the night in question and that, shortly thereafter, had heard gunshots. S also told the police that he and the defendant were watching television together the day after the shooting when S, who was holding a handgun, confessed to shooting the victim. The defendant requested that the trial court give a special credibility instruction concerning S's testimony in accordance with this court's decision in Patterson. The trial court denied the defen- dant's request and, instead, issued a general credibility instruction. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, con- cluding, inter alia, that the defendant was not entitled to the special credibility instruction that he had sought because S did not testify about a confession the defendant made to him while they were fellow inmates but, rather, about events he had witnessed and a confession that had been made outside of the prison environment. On the granting of certifi- cation, the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court had properly denied the defendant's request for a jailhouse informant instruction: a defendant is entitled to a special credibility instruction regarding jailhouse infor- mants when the informant was incarcerated at the time he approached the police with information regarding a defendant's inculpatory state- ments and testifies at trial about those statements, regardless of where the statements were made, and, because S was incarcerated when he approached the police about the defendant's confession in exchange for leniency in his own pending criminal matters, he was a jailhouse informant for whom a special credibility instruction was required; more- over, the trial court's denial of the defendant's request to give such an instruction was not harmless, as the state presented no physical evidence linking the defendant to the victim's murder or the firearm used in the commission of that offense, the trial court's general credibility instruc- tion did not fully inform the jury of the factors it could consider in evaluating S's credibility, and the only evidence corroborating S's testi- mony regarding the defendant's confession was the testimony of another witness who suffered from credibility problems; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case for a new trial. (One justice concurring separately; three justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued December 17, 2019—officially released December 1, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. The defendant and the victim were members of rival street gangs in Hartford. On the day of the shooting, the defendant called R, another member of his gang, and told him that he wanted to test an assault rifle. R drove with the defendant through areas of Hartford frequented by members of the victim's gang, and, as R drove, the defendant shot at the victim and killed him. Thirteen months later, the police recovered an assault rifle in connection with an unrelated investigation, and the state's expert witness, S, a firearm and toolmark examiner, testified that several cas- ings recovered from the scene of the victim's murder and the scene of a subsequent, unrelated shooting were positively identified as having been fired from the same assault rifle the police recovered. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to exclude or limit the scope of S's testimony and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct related to the subsequent shooting. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a hearing, pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Porter (241 Conn. 57), on the reliability and accuracy of the methodology used by S in connection with his anticipated firearm and toolmark testimony: the trial court, having based its decision to deny the defendant's motion soley on earlier Appellate Court precedent con- cluding that the science of firearm and toolmark identication is well established, abused its discretion by failing to determine whether the criticisms of firearm and toolmark analysis contained in certain reports cited by the defendant in his motion cast enough doubt on whether the science in that field remained well established so as to warrant a Porter hearing; moreover, this court lacked a fair assurance that the admission of S's testimony did not substantially affect the verdict, and, thus, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a Porter hearing was not harmless; accordingly, the defendant was entitled to a new trial. (Three justices concurring separately in one opinion) 2. The Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's denial of the defen- dant's motion to limit the scope of S's conclusions regarding the ballistics evidence to a ''more likely than not'' standard; given that the trial court was asked to limit S's testimony in a highly proscribed manner, and in light of the scant information and lack of case law provided in support of the defendant's motion, the trial court's denial of that motion was not an abuse of discretion. 3. The Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's admission of uncharged misconduct evidence concerning a shooting in which the defendant allegedly was involved and that occurred subsequent to the shooting that formed the basis of the murder charge in the present case, as the prejudicial impact of that evidence unduly exceeded its probative value: the subsequent shooting was a less severe crime than the murder in the present case because neither of the victims of the subsequent shooting was struck by the shots fired, and both shootings shared com- mon characteristics, including individuals being shot at outside of their homes; moreover, evidence of the subsequent shooting was introduced through the testimony of one of the victims of that shooting and was not limited to the the fact that there was a shooting but consisted of details regarding the surrounding events that could have aroused the jurors' emotions; furthermore, the subsequent shooting occurred eight months after the murder at issue in the present case, and no evidence suggested that the subsequent shooting was motivated by or related to the murder. Argued February 21—officially released December 4, 2020

The plaintiff, a collective bargaining unit that represented employees of the Waterbury Police Department, appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the plaintiff's applica- tion to confirm an interest arbitration award that had been issued pursu- ant to statute (§ 7-473c). The plaintiff and the defendant city, which were parties to an expired collective bargaining agreement, entered into mandatory, binding arbitration after they failed to negotiate a successor agreement. The resulting arbitration award determined the terms and conditions of the successor agreement. The city filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's application to confirm, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it. In granting the city's motion, the trial court concluded, inter alia, that § 7-473c did not, by its terms, authorize judicial review of an interest arbitration award by way of an application to confirm filed pursuant to statute (§ 52-417). On appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiff's application to confirm, held that the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction under § 52-417 to confirm an interest arbitration award issued pursuant to § 7-473c and, accordingly, properly granted the city's motion to dis- miss: the provisions of chapter 909 of the General Statutes, including § 52-417, which generally govern agreements to arbitrate and arbitration proceedings, apply solely to arbitral awards resulting from written agree- ments to arbitrate, and it was undisputed that the parties' arbitration was not conducted pursuant to such an agreement but, rather, in accor- dance with the mandatory arbitration provisions of § 7-473c; moreover, although § 7-473c explicitly provides that parties may seek to vacate or modify an interest arbitration award under the statutes (§§ 52-418 and 52- 419) governing applications to vacate and to modify arbitration awards, respectively, § 7-473c does not provide that parties may seek to confirm an interest arbitration award under § 52-417, and the failure of the legisla- ture to authorize confirmation of an interest arbitration award issued pursuant to § 7-473c was intentional and not an oversight. Argued November 19, 2019—officially released December 9, 2020

Pursuant to statute (§ 42-110g (d)), ''[i]n any action brought by a person'' under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.), ''the court may award . . . reasonable attorneys' fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery.'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages and attorney's fees from the defen- dant, a motor vehicle repair shop, for violation of CUTPA in connection with the installation of a modified engine in a car owned by K, the plaintiff's son-in-law, and financed through W Co., a third-party automo- bile finance company. The plaintiff had loaned K the money to pay the defendant for the requested work, but the engine was never installed because K did not want to pay for certain additional costs that the defendant indicated were necessary for installation. K subsequently failed to repay the loan, and the plaintiff obtained a judgment against K and secured a lien on the car that was subsequent in right only to that of W Co. The plaintiff informed the defendant of his status as a second position lienholder on the car's title. Subsequently, the defendant, which had retained the car, sold it at an auction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated CUTPA by refusing to perform the work that had been paid for and by failing to provide the plaintiff, a lienholder, with statutory notice of the auction. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had proven a CUTPA violation and awarded him damages. The court also concluded, however, that the plaintiff had not proven the evil motive or malice necessary to award punitive damages, and it exer- cised its discretion by finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had declined to award him attorney's fees. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that this court should adopt a presumption pursuant to which a plaintiff prevailing in a CUTPA action should ordinarily recover attorney's fees under § 42-110g (d) unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust: there was no language in § 42-110g (d) or legislative history indicating that the legislature intended a presumption in favor of attorney's fees, this court has previously held that an award of attorney's fees under CUTPA is discretionary, and this court declined to import such a presumption into CUTPA when the legislature did not choose to include one; moreover, the legislature has directed that the courts of this state, in interpreting the provisions of CUTPA, shall be guided by interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission in interpreting the federal analogue to CUTPA, and that commission has not adopted a presumption in favor of awarding attorney's fees for violations of the federal analogue. 2. The Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it declined to award the plaintiff attorney's fees under the test applicable to awarding punitive damages under CUTPA: the trial court failed to recognize the different purposes that attorney's fees and punitive damages serve under CUTPA, and, by identi- fying the more demanding test for awarding punitive damages, namely, intentional, wanton, malicious, or evil conduct, as its rationale for not awarding attorney's fees under § 42-110g (d), the trial court improperly required a more demanding showing from the plaintiff, which was at odds with the purpose of the attorney's fees provision in CUTPA, that is, to foster the use of private attorneys in vindicating the public goal of ferreting out unfair trade practices by commercial actors in connec- tion with consumer transactions; accordingly, the case was remanded for reconsideration of the plaintiff's request for an award of attorney's fees. Argued June 1—officially released December 11, 2020

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judg- ment revoking his probation following an incident in which he allegedly robbed and threatened W, a customer at a donut shop. A police officer had been dispatched to the donut shop after a report that a customer had been robbed there. The officer was informed that the customer, W, had described the suspect as a Hispanic male with a tattoo under his eye and had indicated that the suspect was wearing dark clothing. Upon the officer's arrival at the donut shop, he saw someone causing a disturbance. That person retreated to the bathroom, where the officer found him. The officer immediately noticed that that person, the defen- dant, was a Hispanic male, had a tattoo under his eye, and was dressed in dark clothing. The defendant was then detained in a police cruiser in the donut shop's parking lot. The officer then went to W's house and took his statement. W told the officer that someone attempted to rob him at the donut shop by indicating that he had a gun. W also stated that he would be able to identify his assailant if he saw him again. The officer and W then went back to the donut shop. When they arrived, the officer asked another officer to remove the defendant from the cruiser and have him stand next to it. The officer aimed a spotlight on the cruiser and the defendant, and W stated, ''without a doubt,'' that was the person who robbed him. That identification occurred within twenty minutes of the officer's initial arrival at the donut shop and within forty-five minutes after W first reported the incident. After the defendant was charged with violating his probation, he filed a motion to suppress W's identification of him, claiming that the one-on-one show up procedure the police used in connection with the identification vio- lated his due process rights. The trial court denied the motion, conclud- ing that the procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive. On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded, inter alia, that the procedure the police had used, although suggestive, was not unnecessarily suggestive due to the exigencies of the ongoing investigation and affirmed the trial court's judgment. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the identification procedure the police used was unnecessarily suggestive and rendered the identification unreliable. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had improperly declined to suppress the identification because, even if the identification procedure the police used was unnecessarily suggestive, W's identification of the defendant, in light of the totality of the circumstances, was reliable; W had a good opportunity to view the defendant at close range while they were in the donut shop before the defendant threated him and again when the defendant confronted him face-to-face, W was attentive because of the defendant's strange and disturbing focus on him, W gave an accurate description of the defendant within moments of the incident, W had a high level of certainty with respect to his identification, and the identification was made less than one hour after W's initial encounter with the defendant. Argued May 8—officially released December 11, 2020

The seven plaintiffs filed six separate actions in 2014 or 2015, seeking to recover damages from the defendant pediatrician for personal injuries they sustained as a result of the defendant's alleged sexual abuse when they were his minor patients in the 1970s and 1980s. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's practice of digitally penetrating their anuses during their annual physical examinations constituted both intentional sexual assault and medical negligence, and certain plaintiffs also alleged intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant moved for summary judgment as to the counts of the complaints sound- ing in negligence on the ground that those claims were barred by the two to three year limitation period contained in the statute (§ 52-584) pertaining to negligence and malpractice actions. The trial court granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment as to the negligence counts, concluding that, because they alleged causes of action arising out of medical conduct, § 52-584 applied rather than the extended statute of limitations (§ 52-577d) applicable to actions for damages to minors caused by sexual assault, abuse or exploitation, which permits such actions to be brought within thirty years from the date the person attains the age of twenty-one. After withdrawing the remaining counts alleging sexual assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plain- tiffs appealed. Held that the extended limitation period set forth in § 52- 577d did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims for injuries arising from medical negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, unac- companied by an originating act of intentional misconduct, and, there- fore, the plaintiffs' negligence claims were governed by the limitation period set forth in § 52-584; in light of the language and legislative history of § 52-577d, this court concluded that the limitation period set forth in § 52-577d, which was part of a legislative initiative to address the rights of crime victims, does not apply to negligence claims that do not arise out of harm caused by the intentional sexual abuse, exploitation, or assault of a minor. Argued February 20—officially released December 15, 2020

The defendant, who had been on probation after his conviction of possession of child pornography in the second degree, appealed from the trial court's judgment revoking his probation. In connection with the defen- dant's child pornography conviction, the sentencing court had imposed a term of imprisonment followed by a period of probation with conditions, including sex offender treatment. After being released from prison, the defendant entered an inpatient sex offender treatment facility for treat- ment. Before completing his course of treatment there, however, he was discharged on the basis of his failure to adhere to various conditions established by the facility for continued placement there. The defendant subsequently was charged with violating his probation as a result of his failure to complete sex offender treatment. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the violation of probation charge, contending, inter alia, that the probationary condition requiring him to successfully complete the sex offender treatment program violated his due process rights. The trial court denied the motion and found the defendant to be in violation of his probation. On appeal from the trial court's judgment revoking the defendant's probation, held that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the violation of probation charge: the defendant's claim that his placement at the treatment facility violated his right to due process on the ground that it was the functional equivalent of incarceration was unavailing, as the restrictions imposed on persons receiving treatment at the facility were appreciably less onerous than those placed on prison inmates, and, thus, residency at the facility was materially different from confinement in a prison; moreover, the defendant's placement at the facility furthered the rehabilitative and public safety purposes of probation, and, because the defendant's proba- tion officer reasonably concluded that the defendant's placement at the facility was the best, most appropriate option under the circumstances, that probationary condition did not offend principles of due process; furthermore, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that subjecting him to the highly restrictive conditions at the facility violated his right to equal protection on the ground that he was placed there due to his status as a homeless person upon his release from prison, as that claim foundered on the trial court's factual finding that he was not referred to the facility because he was homeless, and the defendant's claim that requiring him to attend the sex offender treatment program at the facility as a condition of probation violated his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment also failed when, as in the present case, the condition of probation was reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate goals of probation. Argued January 23, 2020—officially released January 7, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain improper remarks by the prose- cutor during closing argument. Specifically, the prosecutor stated in her closing argument that the state's firearms expert, S, had testified that a purposeful trigger pull was required to fire the petitioner's gun, even though S did not make that statement and was prevented from answering the prosecutor's leading question to that effect when the petitioner's trial counsel successfully objected to it. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition, concluding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. On the granting of certifica- tion, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment. The Appellate Court concluded that, although at least one of the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument was improper, the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the petitioner from litigating the issue of prejudice because, in the petitioner's direct appeal from his conviction, the Appellate Court already had determined, in the context of resolving his claim of prosecutorial impropriety, that the same improper remarks did not prejudice him. Thereafter, the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the petitioner was collater- ally estopped from litigating the issue of whether he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's improper remarks during closing argument, as the issue in the present case was not identi- cal to that presented in the petitioner's direct appeal of his conviction: the petitioner's claim of prosecutorial impropriety in his direct appeal required the Appellate Court to apply the factors set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 540), and, consistent with Williams and its progeny, the Appellate Court properly considered trial counsel's failure to object as evidence that the petitioner was not prejudiced, and it was this aspect of the Williams analysis that made it impossible to conclude that collateral estoppel barred the petitioner from litigating the issue of prejudice in his habeas action; moreover, the application of the doc- trine of collateral estoppel would preclude the petitioner from seeking a remedy for conduct that he claims affected not only his criminal trial but also his likelihood of success on appeal, and, thus, the application of that doctrine would be fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with due process and the principles underlying the writ of habeas corpus. 2. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's improper remarks and, therefore, could not prevail on the merits of his ineffective assistance claim: the failure of trial counsel to object to the remarks did not undermine this court's confidence in the verdict, as the impropriety was confined to the prosecutor's closing argument, and the trial court instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel did not constitute evidence; moreover, although the prosecutor mischaracterized S's testi- mony, S's actual testimony constituted strong evidence that the gun that the defendant used to commit the murder of which he had been convicted did not fire accidentally, as the petitioner had claimed; furthermore, the petitioner's own statements and actions before and after the shooting provided strong evidence that he acted intentionally, including evidence that the petitioner believed that the victim had arranged for two of her male friends to assault him, that he purchased a gun thereafter for the purpose of killing the men, and that he did not call for help after he shot the victim. Argued June 1, 2020—officially released January 11, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-194), ''[t]he repeal of any statute defining or pre- scribing the punishment for any crime shall not affect any pending prosecutions or any existing liability to prosecution and punishment therefor, unless expressly provided in the repealing statute that such repeal shall have that effect.'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 1-1 (t)), ''[t]he repeal of an act shall not affect the punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect . . . .'' The defendant was convicted of and sentenced to an effective term of incarceration of five years for possession of narcotics, among other crimes, in connection with events that occurred in 2014. After the defen- dant's arrest but prior to his conviction in 2016, the legislature amended the statute (§ 21a-279) under which the defendant was convicted, effec- tive October 1, 2015, by changing possession of narcotics from a class D felony with a maximum sentence of seven years of imprisonment to a class A misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of one year of imprisonment. After the defendant unsuccessfully appealed from the judgment of conviction, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing, inter alia, that the legislature had intended its 2015 amendment to § 21a-279 to apply retroactively. The trial court dismissed the motion to correct, and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which directed the trial court to deny rather than to dismiss the defendant's motion, concluding, inter alia, that the 2015 amendment did not apply retroactively. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly determined that the defendant was properly sentenced in accordance with the version of § 21a-279 that was in effect when he committed the crimes of which he was convicted: this court has interpreted §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t) to embody a presumption that changes to criminal statutes prescribing or defining punishment apply prospectively only, unless the statute expressly states otherwise, the plain language of the 2015 amendment did not indicate that it was to apply retroactively, and, contrary to the defendant's claim, the legislature did not intend to exclude ameliorative changes to sentencing schemes from the presumption against retroactivity derived from §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t); moreover, because the legislature was aware that this court has interpreted §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t) as requiring an explicit expression of intent regarding retroactivity to overcome this presumption, the legisla- ture's silence regarding retroactivity in the 2015 amendment was evi- dence of an intent that it have prospective application only; furthermore, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that prospective only appli- cation of the 2015 amendment would lead to an absurd and unworkable result on the basis that the 2015 amendment was meant to implement a 2015 budget bill that the legislature anticipated would result in fiscal savings for the Department of Correction, as nothing in the language of the budget bill or its legislative history referenced the 2015 amendment or the fiscal savings that would be realized from the 2015 amendment. 2. This court declined the defendant's invitation to adopt the amelioration doctrine, which provides that amendments to statutes that lessen their penalties are applied retroactively, and to overrule State v. Kalil (314 Conn. 529), which recently rejected the applicability of that doctrine: Kalil thoroughly considered whether to adopt the amelioration doctrine only six years ago and was based on approximately 100 years of prece- dent during which time the legislature took no action to suggest any disagreement with this court's interpretation and application of §§ 54- 194 and 1-1 (t); moreover, this court's analysis in Kalil was consistent with this court's analysis of the defendant's claim regarding the retroac- tivity of the 2015 amendment to § 21a-279, demonstrating that there were no conflicts or difficulties in applying the holding of Kalil. (One justice concurring separately) Argued September 11, 2020—officially released January 15, 2021

The plaintiff brought an action under the Connecticut Environmental Protec- tion Act of 1971 (CEPA) (§ 22a-14 et seq.) against the Commissioner of Environmental Protection and D Co., the owner and operator of a nuclear power plant in Waterford, seeking, inter alia, an injunction requiring the power plant to convert to a closed-cycle cooling system. The plaintiff previously had intervened in a proceeding before the Department of Environmental Protection to challenge the department's tentative deter- mination to renew a permit authorizing D Co. to withdraw water from Niantic Bay, cycle it through the power plant, and then discharge it into the Long Island Sound. In her CEPA action, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the permit renewal proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by CEPA and that the current operation of the power plant would result in unreasonable pollution. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's CEPA action for lack of standing. The plaintiff appealed, and this court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did have standing. Thereafter, the permit renewal proceeding continued, and, in 2010, after the department con- ducted an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer issued a proposed final decision, in which the hearing officer recommended that the department issue a permit. The department subsequently issued the permit, and the plaintiff filed an administrative appeal against the department and D Co., claiming, inter alia, that the department failed to make a legally valid best technology available determination. The administrative appeal was then consolidated with the plaintiff's CEPA action. Thereafter, the commissioner and D Co. filed motions to dismiss the CEPA action on the ground that it was moot, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal, and this court reversed that judgment. On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing on the merits of the consolidated actions and rendered judgments in favor of the commissioner, the department and D Co. The plaintiff appealed, claim- ing, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly concluded that she had failed to prove that the administrative proceeding was inadequate and that the operation of the power plant would result in unreasonable pollution. Held: 1. The plaintiff's claim that the administrative proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by CEPA was unavailing: a. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the administrative proceeding was inadequate insofar as the hearing officer precluded cer- tain claims on which the plaintiff sought to intervene: the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion by precluding the plaintiff's claim challenging the permit renewal application on the ground that it failed to implement the best technology available, as that claim was duplicative of several other claims, and the hearing officer fully considered the plaintiff's argu- ments on this issue; moreover, the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion by precluding three additional claims of the plaintiff on the ground that they raised issues that were outside the department's jurisdic- tion, as these claims involved matters that were regulated exclusively by the federal government, and two of those claims, which raised issues concerning federal criminal law and employment practices, were not related to environmental issues. b. The plaintiff's claim that the administrative proceeding was inadequate because the hearing officer had excluded a 2007 document containing a draft best technology available determination was unavailing: contrary to the plaintiff's claim, the department was previously directed by this court in Fish Unlimited v. Northeast Utilities Service Co. (254 Conn. 1) to review all of its prior determinations regarding the cooling system, and the plaintiff mischaracterized this court's language in Fish Unlim- ited, which was not an order but, rather, an explanation of what the department would be required to do to renew the permit pursuant to the applicable statutory scheme; moreover, the hearing officer's decision to exclude this document was not improper because there was nothing in the document or testimony to support its credibility, unlike other drafts of the permit, which were formally circulated by the department, authenticated, signed by their drafters, and admitted at the hearing. c. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim challenging the neutrality of the administrative proceeding on the ground that the hearing officer was biased, colluded with D Co. to issue the permit without any consider- ation of the closed-cycle cooling system, and prejudged the plaintiff's challenge to the permit's best technology available determination; the plaintiff's claim was inadequately briefed, as her allegations regarding bias were speculative and lacked citations to the administrative record, and the plaintiff's arguments concerning the allegations contained no relevant legal authority and were cursorily scattered across different headings and sections of her brief. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that she established that unreasonable pollution would result from the power plant's operation as permitted and claim that the permit's best technology available deter- mination violated the Clean Water Act, as they were inadequately briefed: the plaintiff provided only minimal citation to the trial or administrative record in support of these claims, and she provided no citation to any legal authority to define ''unreasonable pollution'' under CEPA, to define ''best technology available'' under the Clean Water Act, or to support either claim; moreover, this court declined to address the plaintiff's claim that the trial court failed to follow this court's prior remand order when it conducted a single hearing because the claim was inadequately briefed, as the plaintiff's briefing of this claim was inconsistent and nearly incomprehensible. Argued September 10, 2020—officially released January 21, 2021

Pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2003) § 14-55), no certificate of approval for a license to deal in or to repair motor vehicles ''shall be issued until the application has been approved and such location has been found suitable for the business intended . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 2-30b (a)), when two or more legislative acts passed during the same legilsative session ''amend the same section of the general statutes . . . and reference to the earlier adopted act is not made in the act passed later, each amendment shall be effective except in the case of irreconcilable conflict, in which case the act which was passed last . . . shall be deemed to have repealed the irreconcilable provision contained in the earlier act . . . .'' The defendants P Co. and A filed an application with the Department of Motor Vehicles seeking a license to operate a used car dealership in the city of Stamford, and A filed an application with the defendant zoning board of appeals seeking a certificate of approval for the proposed location of the dealership. The board held a public hearing and approved the application subject to various conditions. The plaintiff filed an admin- istrative appeal from the board's decision, claiming that the board improperly failed to conduct the suitability analysis mandated by § 14- 55. The trial court rendered judgment denying the administrative appeal, concluding that the board was required to and did consider the suitability of the propsed location in accordance with § 14-55. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the board failed to conduct the suitability analysis mandated by § 14-55 and that the trial court had improperly searched beyond the board's stated findings to cure that deficiency. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that, pursuant to § 2-30b (a), two 2003 amendments to § 14- 55, Nos. 03-184 and 03-265 of the 2003 Public Acts, the former of which expressly repealed § 14-55 without providing a replacment, the latter of which purported to amend § 14-55 by adding two new sentences, and neither of which referenced each other, constituted irreconcilable amendments and that P.A. 03-265 should be given effect because it was passed by the General Assembly two days after P.A. 03-184 was passed. On the granting of certification, P Co. and A appealed to this court, claiming that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that § 14-55 was not repealed in 2003. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that § 14-55 had not been repealed: the biennial codifications compiled by the Legislative Commissioners' Office, and thereafter ratified by the General Assembly, constituted an authoritative source for the statutory law of this state at the time those codifications went into effect, it was undisputed that the General Assembly adopted, ratified, confirmed and enacted the 2005 revision of the General Statutes and that § 14-55 was listed therein as having been repealed by P.A. 03-184, this same language was presented to the General Assembly and was ratified in seven succes- sive statutory revisions, and, accordingly, this court was unable to con- clude that the plaintiff satisfied its burden of proving that these entries were the result of a mere editorial error and should simply be ignored; moreover, other jurisdictions and secondary authorities provide support for the position that an attempt to amend a previously repealed statute is generally ineffective, and the Appellate Court improperly applied § 2- 30b (a) to resolve the conflict between the two amendments, as that statute applies only when two or more acts amend the same statute, and P.A. 03-184 did not amend § 14-55, as that term is ordinarily defined, but, rather, eliminated it in its entirey. Argued October 21, 2020—officially released January 25, 2021

Convicted of the crime of assault in the second degree, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court had deprived him of his right to present a defense of investigative inadequacy by omitting from its jury instructions certain language in his written request to charge stating that the jury could consider evidence of the police investigation as it might relate to any weaknesses in the state's case. At trial, the defendant contended that the victim had either mistak- enly or intentionally misidentified him as the person who assaulted her and that, if the police had conducted even a minimally adequate investigation of the incident, they would have discovered this to be the case. In support of his contention, the defendant adduced testimony from a number of witness regarding the inadequacy of the police investi- gation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, conclud- ing that the investigative inadequacy instruction that the trial court had given did not mislead the jury or otherwise deprive the defendant of his right to present an investigative inadequacy defense. In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Court noted that the trial court's instruction was identical to the model jury instruction provided on the Judicial Branch website and consistent with investigative inadequacy instruc- tions approved by this court in State v. Collins (299 Conn. 567) and State v. Williams (169 Conn. 322). The Appellate Court also rejected the defendant's contention that, in light of recent developments in the law, as indicated in this court's recent decision in State v. Wright (322 Conn. 270), the model instruction no longer reflected the correct state- ment of the law. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, renewing his claim in the Appellate Court challenging the propriety of the trial court's investigative inadequacy instruction. While this appeal was pending, the defendant was deported, and the record did not disclose the basis for his deportation. Held: 1. The defendant's appeal was not rendered moot because of his deportation, as this court's mootness doctrine recognizes reputational damage as a cognizable, collateral consequence of a criminal conviction, and, if the defendant should prevail on the merits, it will remove the stain of the underlying conviction from his record. 2. The Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court's investiga- tive inadequacy instruction did not mislead the jury or otherwise deprive the defendant of his right to present an investigative inadequacy defense, there having been a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled by the trial court's instruction: in light of Williams, Collins and Wright, this court concluded that the model jury instruction utilized by the trial court failed to inform the jury of a defendant's right to rely on relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of a reasonable doubt and the jury's concomitant right to consider any such deficiencies in evaluating whether the state has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the language that the defendant requested to be added to the model instruction would have properly apprised the jury of the defendant's right to present an investigative inadequacy defense and its right to consider it in evaluating the strength of the state's case; moreover, there was a significant risk that the instruc- tion given by the trial court improperly led the jury to believe that it could not consider the defendant's arguments concerning the adequacy of the police investigation, because, instead of apprising the jury that reasonable doubt could be found to exist if it concluded that the investi- gation was careless, incomplete or so focused on the defendant that it ignored leads that may have suggested other culprits, there was a reasonable possibility that the instruction had the opposite effect and caused the jury to believe that it was precluded from considering any such evidence; furthermore, given the weakness of the state's case, the instructional error was harmful, as the state's case against the defendant rested almost entirely on the believabilty of the victim's testimony identi- fying the defendant as the perpetrator, which the defendant sought to refute by directing the jury's attention to the alleged inadequacies in the police investigation. State v. Aquino (279 Conn. 293), to the extent that it held that a defendant's deportation during the pendency of his or her appeal renders the appeal moot when the record does not disclose whether the defendant's guilty plea was the sole reason for his deportation, overruled. Argued September 15, 2020—officially released January 26, 2021