Volume 338 — Connecticut Reports

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-95 (a)), ''[n]o appeal may be taken from a judgment denying a petition for a new trial unless, within ten days after the judgment is rendered, the judge who heard the case . . . certifies that a question is involved in the decision which ought to be reviewed by the Supreme Court or by the Appellate Court.'' The petitioner, who had been convicted of numerous crimes, including attempt to commit murder, conspiracy to commit murder, kidnapping in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree, and assault in the first degree in connection with an incident in which the petitioner and a coconspirator sexually assaulted the victim at gunpoint and then shot her several times, filed a petition for a new trial based on a claim of newly discovered evidence. Specifically, the petitioner claimed that there was newly discovered evidence in the form of technologically enhanced security camera footage that had been shown to the jury, which made it clear that it was the coconspirator and not the petitioner who had exited the petitioner's car and approached the victim's body after she had been shot, as well as certain impeachment evidence relating to the posttrial arrest and conviction of H, the lead detective in the petitioner's criminal case, in connection with H's involvement in a forgery scheme. The petitioner also claimed that the prosecutor improperly withheld certain exculpatory evidence and introduced false testimony from the victim. The trial court denied the petition for a new trial, concluding, inter alia, that the evidence against the petitioner was overwhelming and that it was not probable that the new evidence regarding the security camera footage or H's conviction would produce a different result at a new trial. The petitioner then appealed to the Appellate Court but did so without first seeking certification to appeal pursuant to § 54-95 (a). After the appeal was pending for almost one year, the Appellate Court notified the petitioner that the requisite certification to appeal was lacking. Accordingly, the petitioner filed in the trial court a request for leave to file a late petition for certification to appeal, in which he explained that he had not been provided notice of the appeal procedures and the certification requirement specific to a petition for a new trial, as is the custom in habeas corpus cases. Before argument proceeded in the trial court on the request for leave, the Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal for his noncompliance with § 54-95a (a). In deny- ing the petitioner's request for leave, the trial court summarized the reasons why it had rejected the petitioner's enhanced security camera footage claim, indicated that the claim regarding H's posttrial arrest would not have affected the result of the petitioner's criminal trial, and concluded that the petitioner's claims were ''meritless and too late.'' The petitioner again appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying his request for leave to file a petition for certification to appeal because the trial court did not consider the reason for the delay or any other factors relevant to permitting a late filing and, instead, denied his request on the basis of the merits of his appeal. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that, although the trial court had referenced the merits of the petitioner's claims, it also had considered, and largely based its decision on, the length of the petitioner's delay in requesting leave to file a late petition for certification to appeal. On the granting of certifica- tion, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for leave to file a late petition for certification to appeal because, in deciding whether to excuse the untimely request, the trial court failed to give due consider- ation to the petitioner's reason for his late filing: although the trial court considered the length of the petitioner's delay by acknowledging the ten day limit in § 54-95 (a) and stating that the petitioner's claims were ''too late,'' the reason for the delay is a distinct, nontemporal factor that the court must consider separately in deciding whether to excuse an untimely filing, and nothing in the record indicated that the trial court considered the reason advanced by the petitioner, namely, that the custom of providing notice of the certification requirement in habeas cases shows that it is an important procedural hurdle that could be overlooked in the absence of special mention and that he was lulled into error by his prior experience in his habeas case; moreover, this court was not convinced that, if the trial court had considered that reason, it would have denied the petitioner's request, as the petitioner's attorney otherwise diligently pursued the appeal of the denial of his petition for a new trial and complied with the certification requirement in the petitioner's habeas case when he received noticed to do so, the trial court, the Appellate Court and the state all overlooked the petitioner's noncompliance with § 54-95 (a) during the year the appeal was pending, neither the state nor the trial court suggested that the delay resulted in any prejudice, and the petitioner would have no meaningful remedy for his attorney's failure to comply with § 54-95 (a), there being no right to the effective assistance of counsel in connection with a petition for a new trial. 2. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed on the alternative ground that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for leave to file a late petition for certification to appeal on the ground that the petition for a new trial did not raise any issue warranting appellate review: a. With respect to the technologically enhanced security camera footage, the petitioner had raised a similar claim in his habeas petition, and the Appellate Court upheld the habeas court's conclusion that the petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged failure to adequately investi- gate the security camera footage to prove that he did not exit the vehicle; moreover, the enhanced footage was not meaningfully exculpatory, as it showed the petitioner wilfully and actively participating in criminal activity, and it would not have had a significant impeachment effect at trial because, although the enhanced footage contradicted the testimony of the victim and another witness that it was the petitioner who exited the vehicle, it was improbable that the jury would have doubted the other aspects of their testimony merely because they confused the peti- tioner's and his coconspirator's identities, given that the victim was suffering from life-threatening gunshot wounds and the witness was viewing the incident from a distance. b. Evidence that, after the petitioner's criminal trial, H was arrested and convicted of forgery in the second degree would not have led to a different result at a new trial, as all of the material activities performed by H in connection with the petitioner's criminal case occurred in the presence of others, and the petitioner's coconspirator was convicted at a trial that occurred after H's crimes were made known and through the testimony of a different detective; moreover, evidence that H had been charged with, but not convicted of, fabricating evidence in other criminal cases, which the petitioner contended would support his theory that H had switched the victim's blood sample to produce a negative toxicology test and, thus, avoid revealing that the victim's perception of the events was impaired by drugs, would not probably yield a different result at a new trial in light of the other evidence establishing that the victim was alert and oriented and that she provided accurate information immedi- ately after the incident and after her subsequent surgery. c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that none of the evidence or newly discovered evidence on which the petitioner relied to demonstrate prosecutorial improprieties would be material at a new trial, and nothing in the record suggested that that conclusion was debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could have resolved the claim in a different manner, or that there were any questions that deserve further proceedings. Argued May 6, 2020—officially released February 26, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, home invasion, and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that he was deprived of his constitutional rights to present a closing argument and to a fair trial by virtue of the prosecutor's cursory review of the evidence during her initial closing summation followed by a more detailed discussion of the evidence during rebuttal argument. The defendant had entered the ten year old victim's home and sexually assaulted her. At trial, R, an analyst at the state forensics laboratory, testified that the defendant's DNA profile was included in the mixture found in the victim's vaginal swabs that had been taken after the sexual assault. R testified that the expected frequency of individuals who could be included as a contributor to that sample was approximately one in 52 million in the African-American population. In addition, two police detectives testified regarding efforts that the police had made to analyze fingerprints found on a window in the victim's home, and one of those detectives testified that he did not know how long the fingerprints that had been found were present. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the prosecutor's closing argument did not prevent the defense from responding to the state's theory of the case and that the prosecutor did not mischaracterize the DNA and fingerprint evidence during her rebuttal argument. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the structure of the prosecu- tor's closing argument did not deprive the defendant of his constitu- tional rights: a. The prosecutor did not deprive the defendant of his right to present a closing argument: the fact that defense counsel did not know the exact manner in which the prosecutor would marshal inculpatory evidence did not mean that the defendant was denied an opportunity to participate in the adversary process, as the evidence referenced in the prosecutor's rebuttal argument was presented during trial, the role that evidence played in the state's case was apparent, and the prosecutor's specific reliance on R's testimony during her rebuttal argument should have been no surprise because her initial summation made clear that DNA evidence was the cornerstone of the state's case; moreover, defense counsel attacked the reliability of the evidence forming the basis of the prosecu- tor's rebuttal argument during his closing argument, and, thus, he was aware of the evidence forming the basis of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument and had a fair opportunity to refute it; furthermore, defense counsel made a strategic decision to use his closing argument to question the testimony of the state's eyewitnesses and the reliability of the state's forensic evidence, and chose not to directly address R's testimony. b. The prosecutor did not deprive the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial: the defendant failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor's substantive discussion of the evidence during rebuttal interfered with the ability of defense counsel to respond to the state's theory of the case, as the prosecutor's rebuttal was predicated on evidence that the prosecutor had presented at trial and on a theory of the case that the prosecutor articulated during her initial closing summation; moreover, given the central role the eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence played in the prosecutor's theory of the defendant's guilt, defense counsel was on notice that the prosecutor would likely rely on that evidence throughout her closing argument. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his constitutional rights to present a closing argument and to a fair trial were violated by virtue of the prosecutor's alleged mischaracterization of the DNA and fingerprint evidence during her rebuttal argument: a. The prosecutor's rebuttal argument did not violate the defendant's right to present a closing argument: although defense counsel may have been prevented from directly responding to the prosecutor's contention during rebuttal that the defendant was the only person in Connecticut who could be a contributor to the DNA mixture found on the victim's vaginal swabs, he was not deprived of an opportunity to argue that R's statistical frequency testimony left room for reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt; moreover, defense counsel did not address during his closing argument R's testimony, and the fact that defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's characterization of R's testimony demonstrated that he did not believe the statements infringed on the defendant's consti- tutional rights. b. Even if the prosecutor's statements regarding the DNA and fingerprint evidence were improper, the cumulative effect of those statements was harmless and did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial: the prosecutor's statements relating to the DNA and fingerprint evidence were brief and made only once, any impropriety involving the prosecu- tor's characterization of the DNA evidence was not severe, and the negative impact of the prosecutor's statement explaining the lack of conclusive fingerprint evidence was minimal; moreover, any negative effect that the statements may have caused was likely mitigated by the trial court's general jury instructions, and the overall strength of the state's case against the defendant was strong. Argued September 16, 2020—officially released March 2, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-1o (b)), a ''written . . . statement of a person under investigation for or accused of'' certain crimes ''made as a result of a custodial interrogation at a place of detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the person in any criminal pro- ceeding unless . . . [a]n electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 54-1o (h)), the presumption of inadmissibility under § 54-1o (b) may be overcome when the state proves, by a prepon- derance of the evidence, that ''the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.'' Convicted of the crimes of strangulation in the second degree and assault in the third degree, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The defendant and the victim had a physical altercation in the early morning, and the police arrested the defendant. The arresting officer, C, read the defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), both at the time he was arrested and later that morning at the police station. Thereafter, less than six hours after the defendant's second Miranda warning, the defendant was questioned by a detective, M, but the interro- gation was not video recorded. M did not readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights but did confirm with the defendant that he had been previously advised of his rights and that he was willing to speak with M. M then wrote out a narrative of the incident, and the defendant, after making several changes, signed and initialed the statement. Before trial, the state filed a motion seeking permission to introduce the defendant's signed statement into evidence. Although the state acknowledged that, because the interrogation was not recorded, the defendant's statement was presumptively inadmissible pursuant to § 54-1o (b), it requested a hearing to establish that the defendant's statement was admissible pursuant to § 54-1o (h). After the hearing, the trial court determined that the state could introduce the defendant's statement, reasoning that the state had met its burden under § 54-1o (h) of proving that the defendant's statement was voluntarily given and reliable under the total- ity of the circumstances. At trial, the state offered the defendant's state- ment into evidence. The Appellate Court concluded, inter alia, that the defendant's statement was properly admitted and affirmed the judgment of conviction. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's decision to admit his unrecorded, written statement into evidence on the ground that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving, in accordance with § 54-1o (h), that the statement was voluntarily given and reliable under the totality of the circumstances: a. This court concluded that the defendant's claim regarding § 54-1o (h) was constitutional with respect to the voluntariness inquiry but eviden- tiary with respect to the reliability inquiry; it was significant that the legislature chose to use the word ''voluntar[y]'' in a statute dealing with the admission of statements made by criminal defendants subject to custodial interrogation in places of detention because ''voluntary'' was a constitutional term of art in this context, and voluntary in the constitu- tional sense was the meaning that the statute's intended audience of criminal lawyers, judges, and law enforcement personnel would assume. b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving that his unrecorded statement was voluntarily given, as the record supported the trial court's determination that there was no Miranda violation and that that defendant's statement was volun- tary under the totality of the circumstances: the defendant received a valid Miranda warning at the police station, and there was no merit to the defendant's claim that M should have readvised him of his rights before beginning the interrogation, as less than six hours had passed between the defendant's Miranda warning at the station and the interro- gation, M reminded the defendant of his rights by expressly confirming with him that he had been advised of those rights earlier that day, the interview concerned the same incident for which the defendant had been arrested and advised of his rights, and the trial court found that the defendant understood the warnings he received and that he was not intoxicated or otherwise mentally incapacitated; moreover, the defen- dant, having received and understood valid Miranda warnings and volun- tarily participated in the interrogation, implicitly gave a knowing, voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights; furthermore, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's interrogation supported the trial court's determination that the defendant voluntarily gave his state- ment to M, as the defendant was thirty-eight years old and was not intoxicated or impaired, the interrogation lasted only one hour, there was no evidence that M used any potentially coercive methods during the interrogation, and the defendant did not explain how the specific circumstances, including M's failure to record the interrogation, could have served to overbear his will and to elicit an involuntary confession. c. The defendant failed to establish that the trial court had incorrectly determined that his unrecorded statement was reliable because, even if this court were to require independent, corroborating evidence to prove the reliability of his statement, the totality of the circumstances in this case, including instances of corroboration, demonstrated that the trial court correctly concluded that the state had met its burden. 2. This court declined to exercise its supervisory authority over the adminis- tration of justice to require trial courts to give a special instruction in all cases in which the police fail to record a custodial interrogation, but it emphasized that it was well within the trial court's discretion to give a specific, cautionary instruction when the police fail to record a custodial interrogation in violation of § 54-1o (b); because an unrecorded statement obtained during a custodial interrogation already has a legisla- tively prescribed presumption of inadmissibility, a jury instruction in all cases was not necessary to guard against a threat to the integrity of a particular trial or the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole, and the statutes of other states that provide for a jury instruction requirement when the police fail to record certain custodial interroga- tions were distinguishable from § 54-1o because they did not provide for a presumption that such statements were inadmissible. (Two justices concurring separately in one opinion) Argued June 12, 2020—officially released March 10, 2021

Pursuant to a provision of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 (2)), the term ''meeting'' means ''any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember public agency, and any communication by or to a quorum of a multimember public agency . . . to discuss or act upon a matter over which the public agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power.'' The defendant Freedom of Information Commission appealed to this court from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing the administrative appeal of the plaintiffs, the city of Meriden and its city council. Four leaders of the twelve member city council had gathered at city hall with the mayor and the retiring city manager to discuss the upcoming search for a new city manager. The four member leadership group agreed to submit a resolu- tion to create a city manager search committee to the full city council for its consideration at an upcoming meeting and thereafter drafted a proposed resolution listing the names of people to be considered for appointment to the committee and detailing the committee's duties. Thereafter, a complaint was filed with the commission, alleging that the leadership group gathering was an unnoticed and private meeting, in violation of the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-225 (a)). The commission concluded that the gathering was a ''proceeding'' within the meaning of § 1-200 (2), such a proceeding constituted a ''meeting'' within the meaning of that subdivision, and the plaintiffs violated § 1-225 (a) by failing to properly notice the gathering and to conduct it in public view. Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed from the commission's decision to the trial court. In dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal, the trial court concluded that the commissioner's factual findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence and that the gathering constituted a meeting within the meaning of § 1- 200 (2). In reversing the trial court's judgment, the Appellate Court concluded that the gathering did not constitute a meeting under § 1-200 (2) and, thus, did not trigger the open meeting requirements of § 1-225 (a). Specifically, the Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of the phrase ''hearing or other proceeding'' in § 1-200 (2) as meaning a gathering among agency members that constituted a step in the process of agency-member activity. The Appellate Court explained that, consistent with the legal dictionary definitions of ''pro- ceeding'' and ''hearing,'' ''hearing or other proceeding'' in § 1-200 (2) refers to a process of adjudication, which falls outside the scope of activities conducted during the gathering at issue. On the granting of certification, the commission appealed to this court. Held that, because the gathering of the city council's four member leadership group with the mayor and the retiring city manager was not a ''hearing or other proceeding'' of a public agency under § 1-200 (2), it was not subject to the open meeting requirements of § 1-225 (a), and, accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed: the phrase ''hearing or other proceeding,'' as a whole, connoted a formal process by which official business was authorized to be conducted, and, when the phrase ''hearing or other proceeding'' in § 1-200 (2) was considered in the context of the entire statutory framework, it was apparent that a group comprising less than a quorum of a public agency, such as the four member leadership group, may conduct a hearing or other proceeding within the meaning of § 1-200 (2) only when it has express authority to take action; accordingly, because the mayor and the retiring city manager had no authority to create the city manager search committee, there was no evidence in the record that the leadership group was formed pursuant to any official resolution of the city council, and the leadership group had no independent, express authority to take any action regarding the formation of the search committee that could legally bind the city council, the gathering was not a hearing or other proceeding for purposes of § 1-200 (2); moreover, this court disagreed with the Appellate Court's restrictive reading of ''hearing or other proceeding,'' which would have circumscribed the applicability of the open meeting requirements to adjudicative activities, insofar as public agencies conduct hearings or proceedings that do not have adjudicative functions associated with them; furthermore, this court declined to adopt the commission's pro- posed definition of ''hearing or other proceeding'' as including all com- munications between government officials that constitute ''a step in the process of agency-member activity,'' regardless of whether such group has authority to act, because that interpretation would yield absurd results and render meaningless the quorum requirement in the second and third definitions of ''meeting'' under § 1-200 (2). Argued September 8, 2020—officially released March 12, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of robbery in the first degree and the commission of a class B felony with a firearm, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, O, had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately advise him during pretrial negotiations when he had purportedly expressed a misunderstanding of the law regarding his maximum sentencing exposure. The petitioner had rejected three plea offers, all of which called for him to plead guilty to robbery in the first degree in exchange for either a ten or fifteen year prison sentence, and proceeded to trial under the belief that the state could prove only that he was guilty of robbery in the third degree and that the maximum sentence he deserved for that offense was five years' imprisonment. The petitioner claimed that O's performance was defi- cient insofar as O had failed to advise him that, if he were convicted only of the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree, his maximum sentence would nonetheless be as severe as or exceed the sentences contained in the plea offers due to certain sentence enhance- ments with which the petitioner also had been charged. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of establishing that O did not advise him of the maximum sentencing exposure for robbery in the third degree with enhancements. The trial court thereafter denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the peti- tioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which dismissed the appeal. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner could not prevail on his ineffective assistance claim because he failed to establish that O had not advised him about his maximum sentencing exposure for a conviction of robbery in the third degree, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court properly dismissed the petitioner's appeal; although counsel has an obligation to address an expressed, material misunderstanding of law that appears to influence a defendant's decision whether to accept a plea offer or to proceed to trial, neither the petitioner nor O could recall whether O specifically advised him about his potential exposure for robbery in the third degree, and the habeas court expressly credited O's testimony that he was reasonably certain that he would have told the petitioner that, even if he were convicted of robbery in the third degree, he would face a sentence of more than ten years' imprisonment in light of the sen- tence enhancements. Argued September 11—officially released March 15, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-125g), ''any person who has six months or less to the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which such person was sentenced'' is eligible ''to go at large on parole . . . after having served ninety-five per cent of the definite sentence imposed.'' The plaintiff, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment in 1992, sought a judgment declaring, inter alia, that § 54-125g applies to prisoners, like himself, who have been convicted of murder and that the defendants, the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Commissioner of Correction, must consider his eligibility for early parole in calculating his estimated date of release from prison. The commissioner projected that, after applying certain statutory (§§ 18- 7a and 18-98a) credits that the plaintiff had earned toward the reduction of his sentence, the plaintiff's maximum release date would be in 2027. The defendants argued that the plaintiff's action was not ripe because the term ''definite sentence,'' as used in § 54-125g, refers to the full sentence imposed by the trial court, not the sentence an inmate will actually serve, and because, after applying the statutory credits that he has earned and will continue to earn, the plaintiff had not yet served, and almost certainly never would serve, 95 percent of his fifty year sentence. The defendants further argued that, even if the term ''definite sentence'' refers to an inmate's sentence as reduced by the credits he has earned, the plaintiff's action still was not ripe because he would not serve 95 percent of his sentence, as reduced by the credits he has earned, until 2024. The trial court assumed that § 54-125g applied to the plaintiff and that the term ''definite sentence'' means the sentence an inmate will actually serve. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded, in light of its assumptions, that the plaintiff's action was not ripe because he would not be eligible for parole until 2024, at the very earliest, and, thus, rendered judgment dismissing the action. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which dismissed the appeal. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed on the ground that, even if this court were to assume that § 54-125g applies to inmates, like the plaintiff, who have been convicted of murder, the plaintiff's claims were nonjusti- ciable for lack of standing: upon reviewing the statutory history of the determinate sentencing scheme, this court concluded that the legislature intended the term ''definite sentence,'' as used in § 54-125g, to mean the full sentence imposed by the sentencing court, and, because the plaintiff would not serve 95 percent of his fifty year definite sentence until 2039, which was well after his maximum release date in 2027, the plaintiff's claims were contingent on an event that would never occur; accordingly, because the plaintiff would, with virtual certainty, never serve 95 percent of his definite sentence, his interest in whether § 54-125g applies to inmates who have been convicted of murder was purely theoretical, and, accordingly, he lacked standing to bring the present action. Argued November 16, 2020—officially released March 16, 2021

The plaintiff general contractor sought to recover damages for breach of contract from the defendant subcontractor in connection with the defen- dant's abandonment of work it was purportedly obligated to perform in constructing an apartment complex. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages. The defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict, arguing that the parties' contract, as a matter of law, precluded an award of any relief to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that the jury reasonably could have based its award of damages on provisions of the contract permitting an award of damages against the defendant for costs associated with repairing defective work. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, and the defendant appealed. Held that the trial court properly declined to set aside the jury's verdict: to the extent that the defendant presented arguments relying on evidence or arguments that were presented to the jury, and to the extent that the defendant contended that the plaintiff never claimed at trial that the provisions of the contract obligating the defendant to cover the cost to the plaintiff of repairing defective work entitled the plaintiff to damages, this court was unable to assess such arguments or contention, as the defendant failed to provide this court with transcripts of the trial court proceedings; moreover, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that, even if the jury had based its award of damages on other provisions of the contract, those provisions did not entitle the plaintiff to recover repair damages as a matter of law, as the trial court properly relied on the provisions of the contract obligating the defendant to cover the cost of repairing defective work in declining to set aside the jury's verdict. Argued November 20, 2020—officially released March 16, 2021

Convicted of four counts of sexual assault in the first degree and three counts of risk of injury to a child in connection with the sexual abuse of his daughter, V, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly sentenced him to a period of probation on each sexual assault count and that certain improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal arguments violated his due process right to a fair trial and his right against self-incrimination. The charges stemmed from incidents that began when V was nine years old, in which the defendant engaged in sexual activity with V and showed her pornographic videos, but V did not disclose the abuse until she was eleven years old. The defendant was then interviewed by an investigator from the Department of Children and Families and, on two other occa- sions, by a detective, M, during which he denied sexually abusing V or showing her pornography. At trial, V testified, inter alia, that the defen- dant had sexually abused her when she was nine years old, and M testified about her two interviews with the defendant, but there was no physical evidence or eyewitness testimony, and the defendant did not testify. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of ten years' incarceration on each count of risk of injury to a child and, on each count of sexual assault in the first degree, to concurrent terms of twenty-five years' incarceration, execution suspended after twenty years, followed by ten years of proba- tion. On the defendant's appeal, held: 1. The trial court improperly imposed a sentence that included a period of probation in connection with the defendant's convictions of sexual assault in the first degree, and, accordingly, this court vacated the defen- dant's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing: case law and the plain language of the relevant statutes (§ 53a-29 (a) and (Rev to. 2013) § 53a-70 (b) (3)) established, and the state conceded, that special parole was the only form of supervised release a trial court could impose upon convicting the defendant of the class A felony of sexual assault in the first degree. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that certain remarks made by the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal arguments were improper: a. This court declined the defendant's invitation to overrule State v. Payne (303 Conn. 538), in which this court clarified that a defendant bears the burden of proving that a prosecutorial impropriety deprived him or her of the general due process right to a fair trial, whereas the state bears the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant alleges the violation of a specifically enumer- ated constitutional right, such as the right against self-incrimination. b. The prosecutor did not improperly comment on the defendant's failure to testify in violation of his right against self-incrimination: the prosecu- tor's various comments contrasting V's in court testimony with the defen- dant's out-of-court statements to M and the investigator were not improper because they did nothing to draw the jury's attention, either directly or indirectly, to the fact that the defendant did not testify at trial and, instead, merely asked the jury to compare the victim's and the defendant's versions of events and to decide which version was more credible; moreover, the prosecutor did not improperly comment on the defendant's failure to testify by asking the jurors whether there was any reasonable explanation why they should not find V credible, as that remark was a rhetorical device that the prosecutor used to ask the jurors to refer to their knowledge of human nature, and a reasonable jury would have understood that remark to be a commentary on V's veracity rather than the defendant's silence; furthermore, the context of the prosecutor's entire closing argument, and particularly his emphasis on the believability of V's testimony, her performance during cross-examination, and the consistency of her testimony with the evidence adduced at trial, made it clear that the jury would not have naturally and necessarily considered the prosecutor's isolated comment that the credibility of a party is best determined by how the party performs on cross-examination to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. c. The prosecutor's remarks did not constitute an improper expression of personal opinion regarding the evidence, V's credibility and the defen- dant's guilt but, rather, were legitimate commentary on the evidence adduced at trial; when viewed in the context of the prosecutor's entire closing argument, his remarks that ''the only conclusion'' to be drawn is that V testified credibly and that ''the only result'' is to find the defen- dant guilty underscored an inference, namely, that V was credible and that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged, that the jury could have drawn entirely on its own on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, including V's testimony regarding the sexual assaults, the lack of any reliable evidence indicating that she had a motive to lie, and the defendant's contradictory out-of-court statements. d. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly relied on facts not in evidence when he remarked that the defendant had failed to disclose to the police until his second interview with M that he spent time alone with V at home after school: the record reflected that the defendant made contradictory statements to the police regarding whether he spent time at home alone with V, M's testimony regarding her two interviews with the defendant was ambiguous with respect to whether it was at the first or second interview that the defendant dis- closed spending time alone with V, and the prosecutor's remarks regard- ing the timing of the defendant's disclosure were a permissible commen- tary that was predicated on M's testimony and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it; moreover, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's characterization of M's testimony. Argued October 20, 2020—officially released March 19, 2021

Convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. The defendant and a friend, T, had driven to a café, where the victim was fatally shot, and subsequently drove to a nightclub about twelve miles away. Another individual, G, saw T and a man who matched the defendant's description enter the nightclub about fifteen to twenty minutes after G received a phone call informing him that the victim had been shot. The defendant claimed that he was at the nightclub at the time of the shooting. After oral argument before the Appellate Court but before that court released its decision in the present case, the United States Supreme Court decided Carpenter v. United States (138 S. Ct. 2206), in which the court held that the fourth amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring historical cell site location information (CSLI), which reveals a cell phone user's past physical movements. The Appellate Court thereafter summarily denied the defen- dant's motion for permission to file a supplemental brief to raise a new claim, premised on Carpenter, challenging the admission of certain CSLI records, which the police had obtained prior to the defendant's arrest. The CSLI records of the defendant's cell phone and the two cell phones T had with him on the night of the shooting were admitted into evidence at trial without objection. Relying on the CSLI records of T's phones, the state's expert testified that T's and the defendant's cell phones were located near the café at about the time of the shooting and near the nightclub shortly thereafter. The Appellate Court upheld the defendant's conviction, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the Appellate Court improperly had denied his motion for permission to file a supplemental brief. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the Appellate Court improperly denied his motion for permission to file a supplemental brief after oral argument before that court so that he could raise an unpreserved claim premised on the new constitutional rule announced in Carpenter, as his claim failed under the fourth prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because the Appellate Court's failure to permit the defendant to file a supplemental brief was harmless beyond a reason- able doubt: generally, an appellate court should grant a request for supplemental briefing when a party asks it to entertain an unpreserved claim premised on a newly announced constitutional rule in all but the clearest of situations in which the claim would fail under one of Golding's four prongs, and principles of fairness and equity required the Appellate Court to exercise its discretion to grant the defendant's motion; neverthe- less, the state sustained its burden of demonstrating that any claimed error was harmless, there having been significant evidence presented at trial that placed the defendant at the crime scene at the time of the shooting, including the historical CSLI records from T's two cell phones, which placed T at the café around the time of the shooting, T's testimony that he had the two cell phones throughout the night, admissions by both T and the defendant, to the police and at trial, that they were together that night, and testimony from other witnesses that they had seen a man fitting the defendant's description flee the scene of the shooting and enter a car that matched the appearance of the car T was driving, and there having been significant evidence linking the defendant to the victim's murder, including DNA and ballistics evidence, and the defendant's statement to his girlfriend that he had shot someone on the night of the victim's murder; moreover, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that this court could not consider the CSLI records of T's cell phones in determining the strength of the state's case, as the defendant lacked standing to challenge the admission of T's CSLI records on the ground that such admission violated T's fourth amendment rights. 2. The trial court properly admitted G's testimony about a phone call that he had received from another individual informing him that the victim had been shot: the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the defendant had not adequately preserved his claim that G's testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay because, although defense counsel objected when the prosecutor asked G what was said to G during the phone call without clarifying that the ground for the objection was hearsay, the state and the trial court were aware of the basis of the objection, and, thus, any failure by defense counsel to clarify the ground for the objection did not deprive the state and the trial court of fair notice of the defendant's claim; moreover, G's testimony was properly admitted as nonhearsay, as the caller's statements were not offered for their truth but, rather, to show their effect on G, specifically, that the phone call caused G to take certain actions that were relevant to establish the state's time line of events; furthermore, even if G's testimony about the call constituted inadmissible hearsay, its admission was harmless because, even if G had not been permitted to testify about what the caller told him, G's other testimony, to which defense counsel did not object, would have led a jury reasonably to infer that the victim had been shot prior to the defendant's and T's arrival at the nightclub, and because there was other evidence establishing the defendant's guilt, including the CSLI records of T's phones, which, coupled with the defen- dant's admission that he was with T on the night of the shooting, demon- strated that the defendant was near the café at the time of the shooting. Argued October 20, 2020—officially released March 23, 2021

Convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had violated his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by denying his written motion to dismiss defense counsel without adequately inquiring into certain grounds for his motion and without conducting any inquiry into defense counsel's alleged con- flict of interest. During a pretrial hearing, the defendant informed the trial court that he no longer wanted to be represented by defense counsel. The court ruled that there was no basis to dismiss defense counsel but that the defendant could file a written motion to dismiss counsel and provide reasons why counsel should be dismissed. Thereafter, the defen- dant filed his written motion to dismiss counsel, in which he asserted four grounds for the dismissal, including that a conflict of interest had arisen. Following a hearing, the court denied the defendant's motion without inquiring into defense counsel's alleged conflict of interest. Two years later, at the defendant's sentencing hearing, the sentencing court asked the defendant if he wanted to address the court. In response, the defendant again raised the issue of defense counsel's alleged conflict of interest, stating that counsel was also representing the victim's son. The court proceeded to sentence the defendant without inquiring into the alleged conflict of interest. On appeal from the judgment of convic- tion, held: 1. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court adequately inquired into the grounds asserted by the defendant in support of his written motion to dismiss defense counsel, other than the alleged conflict of interest; the defendant's claims that defense counsel did not diligently provide him with copies of the state's discovery materials or investigate informa- tion he had provided to her, that she allowed her investigator to advise him to plead guilty, and that she violated unspecified professional and ethical standards were not substantial complaints, and, therefore, they did not warrant further inquiry by the court, much less the dismissal of defense counsel. 2. The defendant having clearly brought to the attention of both the court presiding over the pretrial hearing and the sentecning court the pos- siblilty of defense counsel's conflict of interest, both courts had an affirmative duty to conduct further inquiry into the alleged conflict of interest by investigating the surrounding facts and questioning the defendant and defense counsel to determine whether counsel had an actual conflict of interest and whether that conflict had adversly affected her representation of the defendant; moreover, because both courts failed to conduct such an inquiry, this court could not determine, on the basis of the record before it, whether the defendant's allegation of a conflict of interest had any merit, and, accordingly, this court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest that adversly affected her performance. Argued November 24, 2020—officially released March 26, 2021

Convicted of numerous crimes, including six counts of capital felony, in connection with the invasion of the P family home in the town of Cheshire that resulted in a triple murder, sexual assaults, kidnappings, and arson, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant, along with his accomplice, S, entered the home around 2 a.m. and proceeded to tie up the members of the P family, which consisted of J, her husband, W, and their daughters, H and M. Discovering that there was no money in the house, and concerned that his and the defendant's DNA would be found there, S drove J's car to a nearby gas station to buy gasoline and then, around 9 a.m., took J to a bank so she could withdraw a large sum of cash. While S was gone, the defendant sexually assaulted M and took sexually explicit photographs of her with his cell phone. After returning to the home, S sexually assaulted J and strangled her to death. Upon realizing that W was escaping and that the police, responding to a 911 call from the bank, were surrounding the house, S poured gasoline throughout the home, ignited it, and fled with the defendant in J's car. The defendant and S crashed the vehicle and were apprehended, while H and M perished in the ensuing fire. S was tried first and convicted. Prior to the defendant's trial, the defendant filed a motion to change the venue from the judicial district of New Haven, arguing that the pretrial publicity surrounding his case, exacerbated by coverage of S's trial, would prevent him from empaneling an impartial jury. The trial court denied the motion. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not violate the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury in denying his motion to change the venue from the judicial district of New Haven or in denying his challenges for cause to twelve prospective jurors: a. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the pretrial publicity surrounding his case created an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice that would have required moving the trial from New Haven, because, although certain factors relevant to determining whether prejudice should be presumed favored the defendant, namely, the nature of the media coverage and whether the passage of time had alleviated the impact of the prejudicial publicity, the extensive jury selection process employed by the trial court in this case, along with the characteristics of New Haven's population, strongly favored the state with respect to whether to presume prejudice: certain media coverage of the incident, particularly remarks from a state senator calling for the defendant to be hanged in the street by his genitalia and commentary from a bipartisan array of state politicians citing the home invasion in support of the death penalty, evoked the sort of community wide rush to judgment that can trigger a presumption of prejudice, and, because the defendant's case was tried only several months after S was convicted and sentenced, the passage of time between the home invasion and the defendant's trial did not mitigate the impact of that prejudicial publicity; nevertheless, when compared to other geographic regions that courts have considered sufficiently populous to permit the selection of an impartial jury, the size and diversity of New Haven, which had an urban and suburban population of 846,000 at the time of trial, greatly increased the feasibility of identifying an impartial jury, and the jury selection process in the present case, which allowed the attorneys for the state and the defendant to assess each prospective juror's familiarity with the case and ability to render an impartial verdict, which afforded each party forty peremptory challenges instead of the minimum thirty required in capital cases, and which left open the possibility of a change in venue in the event that individual voir dire did not result in the empaneling of an impartial jury in New Haven, outweighed the inflammatory nature of the publicity associated with the case such that the defendant failed to surmount the extremely high bar necessary to establish the existence of presump- tive prejudice. b. The extensive pretrial publicity surrounding the defendant's case did not result in actual prejudice that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, as the voir dire process by which the jury was selected was constitutionally adequate: the individual voir dire process did not consist of the blind acceptance of prospective jurors' assurances of impartiality but involved a lengthy and thorough probing of their responses to questions by the state, the defendant, and the trial court, the defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges until the voir dire of the backup alternate jurors, after the regular and alternate jurors had been selected, or chal- lenge for cause any juror who actually deliberated in his case, and the trial court implemented thorough measures to ensure the jury's continued impartiality through daily admonishments counseling the avoidance of any publicity; moreover, a detailed, juror by juror analysis of the jury selection record, which focused on the extent of each juror's exposure to pretrial publicity and its effect on his or her case knowledge and impartiality, revealed that each juror who deliberated at trial and sentenc- ing repeatedly expressed his or her ability to be fair and impartial, to apply the appropriate burden of proof and the presumption of innocence, and not to be swayed by sympathy or to be affected emotionally after viewing disturbing evidence; furthermore, the fact that some of the jurors expressed sympathy for W and the P family did not indicate that they were so impartial that they could not set aside their impressions to return a verdict on the basis of the evidence, none of the jurors was personally affected by the events at issue, and the fact that several prospective jurors lost their composure and made inappropriate out- bursts, including crying openly in court and making menacing comments about or toward the defendant, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial because the trial court questioned the prospective jurors who had witnessed the outbursts to ensure that the outbursts would not affect the jurors' impartiality; accordingly, in light of the deference appellate courts afford to a trial court's assessment of the impact of pretrial publicity on juror impartiality, this court concluded that the trial court had correctly determined that the pretrial publicity did not result in actual jury prejudice. c. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying his challenges for cause to twelve potential jurors because any error was harmless; an improper denial of a for cause challenge is not prejudicial unless the defendant shows that the ruling resulted in an identifiable, objectionable juror actually serving on the jury that decided the case, and none of the twelve jurors that the defendant challenged for cause actually deliberated on his case or decided his guilt. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motions for a continuance, to reopen the evidence, and for a mistrial, which were all based on his contention that the state had improperly failed to disclose until after the close of evidence approximately 130 pages of letters written by S while S was incarcerated, as there was no miscarriage of justice or prejudice resulting from the late disclosure of the letters: even if the letters, which, according to the defendant, con- tained S's admissions that he was the mastermind behind the home invasion and that he previously had raped, tortured, and murdered seven- teen other women and girls, were admissible, nothing contained therein was exculpatory or directly supported the defendant's theory that he did not intend for anyone to be killed, as the letters indicated that the home invasion was a joint venture and contradicted certain theories of defense proffered at trial, namely, that the defendant did not engage in anal intercourse with M and that it was S who had poured the gasoline throughout the house; moreover, the trial court properly found that the letters likely would have reinforced the basis for a guilty verdict and would have served to establish certain aggravating factors needed to secure a death sentence during the penalty phase. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state had violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) by failing to disclose recordings of certain communications made by various Cheshire police officers during and after the response to the home invasion: a. The trial court correctly determined that it was the defendant's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a police communications log, which J's sister, C, claimed to have received via e-mail several months after the home invasion and which purportedly established that police officers were present at the P home when S and J returned from the bank, the preponderance standard having been consistent with the one required by federal and sister state courts for a defendant to prove the existence of purported Brady evidence and with the standard used by Connecticut courts to make other preliminary determinations of fact involving a defendant's constitutional rights; more- over, the trial court did not commit clear error in finding that the defen- dant had failed to prove the existence of the e-mail or the communications log it contained by a preponderance of the evidence because, even though the trial court found that the testimony of C was credible and that she had no motive to help the defendant by fabricating evidence, C had deleted the e-mail and lost her only printout of it, making it impossible to determine its provenance, C did not know who sent the e-mail, a search of the Cheshire Police Department's records did not reveal a corresponding communication, despite C's belief that someone from the department had sent it, and the log had not been turned over to the defense; furthermore, any error on the part of the trial court in sustaining the state's objection, during an evidentiary hearing, to a question about whether the e-mail appeared to have been created by the police was harmless. b. Certain undisclosed communications regarding the Cheshire Police Department's response to the bank's 911 call, which the parties agreed constituted impeachment evidence insofar as it supported the defen- dant's theory that the testifying officers' embarrassment over the alleg- edly inadequate response colored their testimony, were not material, and, therefore, the state's failure to disclose them did not violate Brady; none of the communications would have impeached the veracity of the officers who testified with respect to the principal issues disputed during the guilt phase of the trial, namely, whether the defendant committed an anal sexual assault of M and his intent to kill J, H, and M, as DNA evidence recovered from M's body provided overwhelming support for the jury's verdict with respect to the defendant's sexual assault of M, any inadequacy in the police response bore no relation to the defendant's theory that the DNA had been contaminated by a laboratory technician, and none of the circumstantial evidence on which the state relied to prove the defendant's intent depended in any way on the observations or veracity of the officers who testified. c. Statements made by certain police officers describing the defendant as ''simple as they come'' and ''nobody home,'' and S as looking ''evil,'' were not material for Brady purposes: the officer who described the defendant's demeanor observed the defendant only fleetingly in a police station hallway and took no part in the response to the home invasion, the investigation, or any interviews with the defendant, and it was not reasonably likely that the officer's testimony would have influenced the jury on the issue of the defendant's demeanor in light of more probative evidence in the record, namely, a detective's testimony that the defendant was emotionless following his arrest and the recording of the defendant's statement to the police; moreover, the statement describing S as looking evil was a casual observation that, in the absence of anything further, did nothing to inform the jury's assessment of what actually happened in the P residence or to support the defendant's theory that S was the mastermind behind the home invasion and that the defendant wanted no part in killing J, H, or M. 4. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the state had violated his due process right to a fair trial by presenting evidence that it knew or should have known to be false or misleading, namely, the testimony of an expert witness, B, that an inflammatory photograph of female genitalia found on the defendant's cell phone depicted M, as that testi- mony was not material: even if B's testimony was false or substantially misleading, there was no reasonable probability that it would have affected the jury's verdict, it having been undisputed that the other five photographs in the exhibit containing the purportedly inflammatory photograph were in fact of M, which corroborated the defendant's state- ment to the police that he had taken photographs of M for his personal use, and the content of the image did not bear on the principally con- tested issues in the guilt phase, that is, whether the defendant had sexual assaulted M anally and whether he had the requisite intent to kill; moreover, if the person depicted in the photograph was not M, it necessarily had to have been H, which would have introduced an addi- tional sexual assault victim to the case. 5. The defendant's challenge to the statute (§ 18-10b) imposing certain restrictive conditions of confinement on inmates, like the defendant, who have been convicted of capital felony or murder with special circum- stances was not reviewable on direct appeal: the record was insufficient to resolve the defendant's claims that the conditions of confinement set forth in § 18-10b are unconstitutional on the grounds that they constitute an ex post facto law, violate equal protection, and are excessive and disproportionate, as there was no evidence beyond an averment of information and belief with respect to the claimed disparate treatment of defendants who had received life sentences after the abolition of the death penalty, as compared to capital defendants who previously had received life sentences, and there was no evidence as to the conditions of confinement actually imposed on the defendant, who was incarcerated in Pennsylvania; moreover, the proper vehicle by which the defendant may challenge his conditions of confinement is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the defendant can present evidence that is relevant to his claim before the habeas court, which is empowered to make factual findings on the basis of that evidence. Argued October 17, 2019—officially released April 12, 2021

The plaintiff, an automobile dealership, sought to vacate an arbitration award that was issued in favor of the defendants in connection with their purchase of a vehicle from the plaintiff. The parties had entered into a financing agreement that contained an arbitration clause providing, inter alia, that any arbitration between the parties would be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration. After the arbitrator ruled in favor of the defen- dants, the plaintiff filed an application to vacate the arbitration award in the trial court. The defendants opposed the plaintiff's application to vacate, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's application was untimely under the state statute (§ 52-420 (b)) that imposed a thirty day limitation period for applications to vacate an arbitration award. The court agreed and rendered judgment dismiss- ing the plaintiff's application to vacate as untimely. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment, contending that its application to vacate was not untimely because the arbitration agree- ment specified that the Federal Arbitration Act would govern any arbitra- tion between the parties and the limitation period for a motion to vacate an arbitration award under the applicable provision of that act (9 U.S.C. § 12) was three months. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's application to vacate an arbitration award as untimely under § 52-420 (b), and, accordingly, the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment: this court had repeatedly held that § 52-420 (b) unambiguously implicates a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, and, therefore, the expiration of the limitation period in § 52-420 (b) deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over an application to vacate an arbitration award filed pursuant to that statute; moreover, the plaintiff's reliance on federal cases for the proposition that § 52-420 (b) is not necessarily jurisdictional was misplaced because those cases concerned the subject matter juris- diction of federal courts with respect to certain federal statutes, not Connecticut courts with respect to § 52-420 (b); furthermore, because § 52-420 (b) implicates a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, the private agreement between the parties could neither confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court nor cure the jurisdictional defect arising from the plaintiff's late filing. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claims that § 52-420 (b) was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act and that the trial court's dismissal of its application to vacate an arbitration award conflicted with the obligation imposed on state courts by a provision of that act (9 U.S.C. § 2) to enforce arbitration agreements: § 52-420 (b) did not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal policy to enforce arbitration agree- ments, as both parties had postarbitration rights to seek judicial enforce- ment of the agreement to arbitrate under the Connecticut statutory scheme, and the plaintiff did not argue that the thirty day limitation period in § 52-420 (b) was prohibitively short such that a challenging party lacks a meaningful opportunity to seek to vacate an arbitration award; moreover, the application of § 52-420 (b) to the plaintiff's applica- tion to vacate did not treat an arbitration agreement differently from any other contract, which was consistent with the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act; furthermore, this court found persuasive a federal case that examined the relationship between § 52-420 (b) and the Federal Arbitration Act and found no conflict preemption, and the plaintiff's reliance on Haywood v. Drown (556 U.S. 729), a case in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a New York law that divested state courts of jurisdiction over actions brought against correction offi- cers pursuant to federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983), was unavailing, as the relevant policy concern underlying the Federal Arbitration Act was significantly different from the policy concerns underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the challenged state law in Haywood also was distinguishable from § 52-420 (b). Argued October 15, 2020—officially released April 15, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of murder, appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Prior to sentencing, the sentencing court was provided with a criminal history report and a presentence investigation report, which included a summary of the defendant's prior convictions of assault and drug offenses. In his motion to correct, the defendant claimed that the sentencing court relied on materially inaccurate information concerning his criminal history and the circumstances of the underlying offense. Specifically, the defendant claimed that the presentence investigation report incorrectly indicated that he had been convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine, rather than conspiracy to possess cocaine, and that he was convicted of assault in the second degree of an elderly person, rather than assault in the third degree. The defendant also claimed that the sentencing court mistakenly believed that he ''grazed'' the victim before stabbing him. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that there was no evidence that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information, that the court's statement that the defendant ''grazed'' the victim was supported by the record, and that, even if that statement was inaccurate, the court did not rely on the inaccuracy. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to correct, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the sentencing court had substantially relied on inaccurate information when imposing his sentence: the defendant's claim was belied by the record because, prior to sentencing, the prosecutor informed the sentencing court of the error in the presentence investigation report, the court correctly noted that the defendant's assault conviction was for assault in the third degree, and nothing in the record suggested that the court gave explicit attention to the inaccurate characterization of the defendant's assault conviction or that it considered the notation in the criminal history report incor- rectly identifying the assault victim as elderly; moreover, although the sentencing court incorrectly referred to the defendant's conspiracy con- viction as a conviction for conspiracy to sell cocaine, the court did not substantially rely on the precise nature of the conspiracy charge when imposing the defendant's sentence, as the court's recitation of the defen- dant's criminal history was used only to support the observation that the defendant had been convicted of three felony offenses before he had reached the age of nineteen. 2. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the sentencing court substantially relied on a false recollection of how the victim died when imposing the defendant's sentence: the court's statement that the defen- dant had ''grazed'' the victim was not materially inaccurate because, although a medical examiner testified that he observed a single stab wound on the victim's chest, eyewitnesses testified that the defendant had made several stabbing motions toward the victim before inflicting the fatal blow; moreover, the court's primary focus was on the severity and location of the fatal wound rather than the exact number of times the defendant stabbed the victim. Argued October 15, 2020—officially released April 16, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 12-161a), ''[i]n the institution of proceedings by any municipality to enforce collection of any delinquent tax on personal property from the owner of such property, through . . . any other pro- ceeding in law in the name of the municipality for purposes of enforcing such collection, such person shall be required to pay any . . . reason- able attorney's fees incurred by such municipality as a result of and directly related to such . . . collection proceedings.'' The plaintiff town sought to collect unpaid personal property taxes that it had imposed on slot machines that the defendant, W Co., owned and leased to an Indian tribe for use at the tribe's casino. After the plaintiff filed its collection action in state court, the tribe filed an action in federal court, challenging the plaintiff's authority to impose property taxes on the slot machines. A federal court of appeals ultimately held that the plaintiff's authority to impose property taxes on the slot machines was not preempted by federal law. The plaintiff and W Co. then executed a stipulation regarding the outstanding taxes, interest, penalties, and the attorney's fees incurred in the state collection action, but they disagreed as to whether the trial court could also find W Co. liable for attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff in defense of the federal action commenced by the tribe, to which W Co. was not a party. The plaintiff and W Co. filed separate motions for summary judgment on that issue, and the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and denied W Co.'s motion, concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to the attorney's fees that it had incurred in defending the federal action pursuant to § 12-161a. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff only as to liability with respect to the attorney's fees incurred in the federal action, and W Co. appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the phrase ''as a result of and directly related to,'' as used in § 12-161a, required a closer proximal nexus between the collection proceeding and the requested attorney's fees than the expansive interpretation applied by the trial court and that the claims advanced in the federal action, although significant to the ultimate resolution of the tax collection issue in the state proceeding, did not directly result in a final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties relative to the claimed delinquent taxes. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial court's decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because the Appellate Court incorrectly construed § 12-161a narrowly to limit the scope of the plaintiff's entitle- ment to attorney's fees to only those fees incurred in the state collection action: because § 12-161a was ambiguous with respect to the scope of the attorney's fees that are considered ''as a result of and directly related to'' a state collection proceeding, this court considered extratextual evidence, including legislative history, statutes containing similar lan- guage, and the treatment of the phrase ''as a result of and directly related to'' in Connecticut case law, and concluded that the ambit of § 12- 161a includes a directly related federal action that is determinative of a municipality's authority to pursue the underlying state collection pro- ceeding; in the present case, the attorney's fees attributable to the federal action were a result of and directly related to the state collection action within the meaning of § 12-161a, as the federal action was filed after the commencement of the state collection action for the purpose of staying the state collection action and was determinative of the state action; moreover, the restrictive construction of § 12-161a adopted by the Appellate Court and advanced by W Co. would lead to the absurd result of frustrating government administration insofar as the plaintiff, after successfully litigating its authority to pursue a specific collection action, could incur an actual loss of revenue as a result of its inability to recover attorney's fees in defending the federal action. Argued November 19, 2020—officially released April 21, 2021

Convicted of two counts of the crime of interfering with an officer, the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence obtained after a police officer, L, positioned his cruiser behind the defendant's car and blocked the defendant's egress from the parking lot in which he was parked. L had reported to the parking lot in response to a dispatch concerning a possibly unconscious man in a parked car. L eventually aroused the defendant by tapping on the driver's side window, and, when the defen- dant lowered the window, L smelled alcohol. The defendant was uncoop- erative and slurring his words, and subsequently was arrested. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence of his statements and actions in the parking lot, claiming that he had been seized in violation of the fourth amendment as soon as L positioned his cruiser behind the defendant's car and prevented him from leaving. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the defendant's encounter with L did not become a seizure until after the defendant awoke and lowered the window, as, up until that point, L was checking on the defendant's well-being pursuant to his community caretaking function rather than engaging in an investigatory stop. The court further concluded that, once the defendant awoke and began to interact with L, L had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant had been operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. On the defen- dant appeal, held that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that L was acting in his community caretaking capacity when he positioned his cruiser behind the defen- dant's car, as the limited intrusion on the defendant's liberty was reason- able and justified under the fourth amendment: L's arrival in the parking lot was in response to information, which made no mention of erratic driving or possible drunkenness, from a concerned citizen about an unconscious man in a parked car at nearly 2 a.m., L did not activate his lights, and, consistent with his purpose of determining whether the defendant required medical attention, L's first question upon arousing the defendant was whether he was okay; moreover, L testified that he positioned his cruiser where he did to ensure that the defendant's car did not roll backward or backup while he was ascertaining the situation, and there was no evidence that L was engaging in a general exploratory or pretextual stop when he parked his cruiser behind the defendant's car. Argued January 11—officially released April 26, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had been dissolved, appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court. The trial court had awarded the plaintiff $18,000 per month in alimony that was not modifiable in duration or amount. The trial court found that the defendant's gross annual income of $550,000 was derived from two closely held businesses that he owned, which were valued at $904,000. As part of its financial orders, the court awarded 50 percent of the fair market value of the two businesses to each party and ordered that the defendant retain 100 percent ownership of both businesses. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court impermissibly double counted his income by considering it both for the purpose of valuing his businesses and in making its alimony award. The Appellate Court reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new hearing on all financial issues. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to issue equitable orders and to consider, with respect to its alimony award, the possibility that the defendant, who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the dissolution and had a history of alcohol abuse, could become ill or might want to retire, or that his businesses could fail to thrive through no fault of his own. The Appellate Court further determined that the trial court had engaged in double counting. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff $18,000 per month in alimony that was not modifiable in duration or amount, as there was insufficient evidence that the award accounted for a substantial change in the defen- dant's circumstances: the trial court failed to consider or afford any significant weight to the defendant's age, health and future earning capacity, and, to the extent that it did consider these factors, the court could not reasonably have concluded that the defendant would continue to earn the same income for the rest of his life; moreover, although the evidence certainly supported the conclusion that the defendant's businesses would likely thrive for some time, the evidence did not support a finding that the growth of those businesses would necessarily be perpetual, and it was unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that the defendant would have the ability to comply with his alimony obligation for the rest of his life without some provision for modification should health or economics prevent compliance; accordingly, this court upheld the Appellate Court's reversal of the trial court's financial orders and its remand for a new hearing on all financial issues. 2. The trial court did not improperly engage in double counting, as the rule against double counting does not apply when the distributed asset is the value of a business and alimony is based on income earned from that business: this court relied on the decisions of courts in other jurisdic- tions in concluding that it is not double counting to award a spouse a lump sum representing a portion of the value of a business as well as alimony that is based on the paying spouse's actual income from that business; nevertheless, trial courts should consider all statutorily required factors and ensure that the awards as a whole are fair and equitable, and such consideration might include ensuring that the prop- erty distribution of a portion of a business' value to the nonowing spouse does not unfairly reduce the owning spouse's ability to earn income from that business. Argued June 10, 2020—officially released April 27, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-192a (c)), if ''[a] plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on said amount . . . .'' The plaintiff, an employment staffing agency, sought to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract from the defendant in connection with the defendant's failure to pay for certain services. Prior to trial, the plaintiff filed an offer of compromise, which the defendant did not accept, even though it previously had agreed to pay an invoice in the amount of the offer. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the defendant liable and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages in the exact amount of the offer of compromise. The trial court determined that the defendant had wrongfully withheld payment and that it was equitable to award the plaintiff double interest in light of the defendant's prior agreement and failure to pay. Accordingly, the court awarded the plaintiff both prejudgment interest and postjudgment interest at the annual rate of 8 percent pursuant to the statute (§ 37-3a) governing interest in civil actions generally, as well as both prejudgment and postjudgment offer of compromise interest pursuant to § 52-192a (c), at an annual rate of an additional 8 percent. The defendant moved for reargument, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court's award of postjudg- ment interest under § 52-192a was improper under Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (192 Conn. 301), in which this court concluded that offer of compromise interest under § 52-192a runs only from the date the offer was filed to the date of judgment. The trial court denied the motion for reargument without explanation, and the defendant appealed. Held that the trial court improperly ordered that the offer of compromise interest continue to accrue until the date the judgment is satisfied, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment only as to the award of postjudgment interest under § 52-192a and remanded the case with direction to vacate that award; the trial court's award of postjudgment interest under § 52-192a was improper, as this court's conclusion in Gionfriddo that offer of compromise interest terminates as of the date of judgment and may not be awarded postjudgment under § 52-192a controlled, that conclusion was not, contrary to the plaintiff's argument, dictum, and the plaintiff did not argue that Gionfriddo should be overruled or limited. Argued February 26—officially released May 4, 2021