State v. Chuol

No. 11                 January 2, 2025                       277

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
             BUOMKUOTH JOHN CHUOL,
         aka Chuol Buomkuoth, aka Buomkuouth,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
            Multnomah County Circuit Court
                  20CR56519; A179536

   Chanpone P. Sinlapasai, Judge.
   Submitted July 16, 2024.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Kate E. Morrow, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
   ORTEGA, P. J.
   Affirmed.
278                                            State v. Chuol

        ORTEGA, P. J.
         Defendant appeals his conviction, following a bench
trial, for one count of first-degree burglary under ORS
164.225. He assigns error to the court’s denial of his motion
for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on that count, maintaining that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
intended to commit theft for the purpose of ORS 164.225. We
conclude that the state offered sufficient evidence to support
the determination that defendant had entered the dwelling
with the intent to commit theft. Accordingly, we affirm.
         We review the denial of an MJOA for legal error.
State v. Newkirk, 

, 

, rev den,

 (2022). In doing so, we “view[ ] the evidence in
the light most favorable to the state to determine whether
a rational trier of fact, making reasonable inferences, could
have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Long, 

, 

 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
         Defendant’s first-degree burglary conviction arose
from the following facts. Defendant, carrying a backpack,
approached a fully enclosed and fenced house and repeatedly rang the front doorbell. He removed the doorbell and
placed it in his pocket before entering the backyard, where
he spent about 40 minutes. Defendant found a spare key and
let himself inside the house, while two children hid in their
bedrooms. For about 25 minutes, defendant looked around
the living room, checked windows and doors, examined the
contents of a coffee table, sat on the couch to read mail, and
inspected a television, a computer, and an Xbox.
         A person commits the crime of first-degree burglary
if the “person enters or remains unlawfully in a building
with intent to commit a crime therein,” ORS 164.215, and
the building is a dwelling, ORS 164.225. The crime that
defendant intends to commit is a material element of the burglary conviction. State v. Sanders, 

, 

 (1977). In this case, defendant was charged with first-degree burglary with the intent to commit theft. The requisite intent for the crime of theft requires “intent to deprive
another of property” or the intent “to appropriate property.”
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)             279

ORS 164.015. Both intents require evidence that the defendant acquired the “major portion” of the property’s “economic value.” ORS 164.005(1)(a); see ORS 164.005(2) (defining
“appropriate” and “deprive”). Intent to commit a crime does
not need to be proven with direct evidence. State v. Ross, 

, 

 (1991), cert den, 

 (2005)
(“Evidence of a defendant’s intent is rarely, if ever, proven by
direct evidence. Intent is an operation of the mind, and it is
seldom susceptible of direct proof. This subjective fact is usually established by a consideration of objective facts, and from
these objective facts an ultimate conclusion is drawn.”).
         On appeal, defendant assigns error to the denial of
his MJOA, arguing that the state did not present sufficient
evidence of defendant’s intent to commit theft inside the
home. We disagree. Viewed in the light most favorable to
the state, the evidence is sufficient for the factfinder to make
a reasonable—rather than a speculative—inference that
defendant intended to commit a theft. See State v. Bivins,

, 

 (2004) (reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence are permissible,
as long as they are not speculative).
          The proper inquiry to establish intent to commit a
crime for purposes of burglary is “whether defendant developed intent to commit an additional crime at any point during
the course of the trespass.” State v. Payton, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2021) (quoting State v.
Henderson, 

, 

 (2019)). Notably, before
entering the home, defendant removed the doorbell and placed
it in his pocket. That act, while minimal, considered with his
other conduct—checking out the exterior of the home, spending time inside examining mail and other items—permitted
a reasonable inference that he had developed the requisite
intent to commit additional theft inside the home.
        Accordingly, the evidence here was sufficient such
that a rational factfinder could conclude that defendant
intended to commit theft when he entered the home. The
trial court, therefore, did not err in denying defendant’s
MJOA.
        Affirmed.