No. 26 January 8, 2025 343
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
Nathan WINTLE,
aka Nathan Paul Wintle,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Meghan MARTIN,
aka Meghan Sue Martin,
Respondent-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
19DR12331; A180495
Francis G. Troy, II, Judge.
Argued and submitted December 13, 2024.
Alyson Sneider argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the briefs were Erica Tatoian and Harrang Long P.C.
Robert T. Scherzer argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Nakamoto, Senior Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Affirmed.
344 Wintle v. Martin
TOOKEY, P. J.
Mother appeals from a judgment dissolving the
parties’ 10-year marriage and awarding her custody of the
parties’ 12-year-old child. She assigns error to the property
division and to the trial court’s requirement that both parties must approve of the child’s travel out of the country. We
conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining a just and proper division of the marital
property and did not err in requiring both parties’ consent
for the child’s international travel. We therefore affirm.
The parties both have advanced degrees and considerable student loan debt, with husband owing $82,552,
and wife owing $122,025. The trial court found that each
party had used student loans to pay household expenses. In
the dissolution judgment, the court assigned to each party
their respective student loan debt.
Mother and the child are living in the family home,
which the trial court found had a value of $519,000, based
on the valuation of husband’s expert as of the date of trial.
Mother made some improvements to the home after the parties separated, spending between $25,000 and $30,000. The
house has increased in value since the parties separated,
but the trial court found that the increase was due to market factors rather than to mother’s improvements.
The parties stipulated that mother would be
awarded full custody of the child, with parenting time by
father. The parenting plan adopted by the court included the
following provision:
“Neither parent may take the child outside the United
States without prior approval in writing from the other
parent or subsequent court order. Neither party shall
unreasonably withhold his/her approval. For purposes of
providing approval for travel in writing, a hand-written
signature is required.”
On appeal, mother assigns error to the travel provision and also raises three assignments of error relating to
the property division. We address first her contention relating to the travel provision, which she raises in her third
assignment of error. The court explained the decision:
Cite as 337 Or App 343 (2025) 345
“I have the ability to limit the noncustodial parent in certain ways, so I don’t know why I don’t have the ability …
to limit the custodial parent’s decision without consulting
the other side and then getting their—I guess many people
do ‘consulting the other side’ but they leave it at that. They
don’t then say you’ve got to get an agreement. I’m going
further. I’m saying there has to be an agreement and that’s
my decision on that.”
Mother contends that the provision gives father “veto” power
over her decision to travel abroad with the child, and that
such orders “impermissibly infringe on the custodial parent’s right and responsibility to make decisions regarding
the child.” Father responds that the clause
“provides a commonsense approach to the cooperation and
involvement the parenting time agreement embraces. It is
also entirely consistent with modern day federal and international travel with children.”
The development of a parenting plan that is in the
best interests of the children is within the trial court’s discretion. See ORS 107.101(4), (5) (stating policy that courts
and parents are granted “the widest discretion” in developing a parenting plan that considers the best interests of the
child); Gilbride v. Smith, 328 Or App 565, 576,
537 P3d 961
(2023) (citing Oregon’s public policy directive to “[g]rant parents and courts the widest discretion in developing a parenting plan[.]”); Murray and Murray,
287 Or App 809, 814,
403
P3d 473 (2017) (A trial court’s decision on parenting time is a
matter of discretion that we review accordingly.); Sjomeling
v. Lasser,
251 Or App 172, 187,
285 P3d 1116, rev den,
353 Or
103 (2012) (reversal of trial court’s parenting plan decision
is proper “only if a trial court’s discretionary determination
is not a legally permissible one”). We conclude that the trial
court’s decision to require the parties’ mutual approval for
international travel was supported by the record and was
well within the range of legally permissible outcomes. See
Olson and Olson,
218 Or App 1, 16,
178 P3d 272 (2008) (“[A]
trial court’s … award must reflect the exercise of discretion under the correct methodology, and it must lie within
the range of legally permissible outcomes.”). There was no
abuse of discretion.
346 Wintle v. Martin
We move on to the assignments of error relating to
the property division. ORS 107.105(1)(f) governs the property division upon dissolution of marriage, and directs the
court to divide the parties’ real and personal property in a
manner that is “just and proper in all the circumstances.”
In reviewing the property division, we are bound by the
trial court’s express and implicit factual findings, if they
are supported by any evidence in the record, and we review
the trial court’s legal conclusions for errors of law. Morton
and Morton, 252 Or App 525, 527,
287 P3d 1227 (2012). We
review the trial court’s overall “just and proper” division of
property for an abuse of discretion. Kunze and Kunze,
337
Or 122, 136,
92 P3d 100 (2004).
The parties moved to China so that mother could
study for her PhD. Mother paid no tuition, but took out
student loans that were used primarily for the family’s
expenses. In her first assignment of error, mother asserts
that the trial court erred in not treating her student loan
debt as a marital debt to be divided equally.
As part of determining a just and proper division
of the parties’ property, “a court may divide the debts that
the parties incurred during their marriage.” Shlitter and
Shlitter, 188 Or App 277, 283,
71 P3d 154 (2003) (quoting
McInnis and McInnis,
62 Or App 524, 527,
661 P2d 942
(1983)). Mother is correct that, as with assets, when a debt
is considered to be a marital debt, an equal division is generally a just and proper division. Morton,
252 Or App at 541
(“If the debt was incurred to pay family expenses, equal
division of the debt is generally appropriate.”). There are circumstances, however, that “may require a division of debts
that departs from what is generally appropriate.”
Id. Here,
the trial court identified such a circumstance:
“[Mother] did an earnest and skillful job of quantifying
what amount of her remaining student loans are joint debt
of the marriage for which [father] should be responsible for
half. The evidence shows that both parties incurred student debt to pay for family expenses when they were young,
poor graduate students with a baby to raise. Additionally,
[mother] obtained a PhD which has already begun to reap
her rewards in terms of her career opportunities and current as well as potential future income. Each party should
Cite as 337 Or App 343 (2025) 347
be assigned the student loan debt in their name without
equalization.”
(Emphasis added.) The court reasoned, in essence, that it
was fair that mother be assigned her own student loan debt
incurred in obtaining her PhD, because mother “has already
begun to reap her rewards in terms of her career opportunities and current as well as potential future income.”
The record supports the court’s conclusion. There
is evidence that, although the funds had been used for family expenses, the loan allowed the family to travel to China
so that mother could advance her PhD studies, for which
mother has begun to “reap the rewards” through professional opportunities. The record shows that the loan funds
also assisted mother to later develop a nonprofit in which
mother applies her advanced degree expertise.
Mother contends that if the funds were used for
family expenses, the court must treat the debt as a marital
debt to be divided equally, and that it is error in the just
and proper analysis to consider subsequent circumstances.
We reject the contention that the trial court was so bound.
When a trial court exercises discretion in making a division
of debts that departs from an equal division, we review the
court’s deviation from an equal division for an abuse of discretion. Kunze, 337 Or at 135 (“[T]he court’s final inquiry
as to the ‘just and proper’ division concerns the equity of
the property division in view of all the circumstances of the
parties.”). The court identified the circumstances that it concluded required a deviation from an equal division, and the
record supports the court’s conclusion that it was just and
proper for mother to bear her own student loan debt. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning to each
party their student loan debt.
In her second assignment of error, mother contends
that the trial court erred “in disregarding the parties’ stipulations concerning their post-separation personal debts
and by double-counting those debts by treating them both
as marital debts and personal debts.” Generally, stipulations of fact are binding on the parties, absent fraud, duress
or other circumstances justifying relieving a party of their
burden. See Morey v. Redifer, 204 Or 194, 214,
264 P2d 418,
348 Wintle v. Martin
282 P2d 1062 (1955). Additionally, “when the facts are stipulated the court is bound by them, and the case must be
decided upon said facts and such other evidence as may be
adduced.” Crouch v. Central Labor Council,
134 Or 612, 616,
293 P 729 (1930). But here there were no stipulations—no
binding agreements of the parties entered into in court as to
how their debts should be divided.1 It is true that the parties
each testified that they would take responsibility for their
own post-separation personal debts.2 But their testimony on
that issue did not bind the trial court in determining a just
and proper division of marital property, including debts.
And, contrary to mother’s contention, the trial court’s consideration of the parties’ post-separation debts in making a
just and proper division of marital property was not “double
counting.” The court could properly consider those separate
obligations incurred during the marriage in determining a
just and proper division of the marital property.
In her fourth assignment of error, mother contends
that the trial court erred in valuing the marital home as
of the date of the dissolution trial rather than the date of
separation. She asserts that she made improvements to the
home after separation to which father did not contribute
and that she has rebutted the presumption of equal contribution to those improvements as well as to the increase in
the value of the home after the parties separated. But the
trial court found that any increase in the value of the home
post-separation was due to market factors rather than to
any improvements made by mother, and the record supports
the trial court’s finding. The trial court did not err in treating the appreciation in the value of the marital home after
the parties’ separation as a marital asset. See Massee and
Massee, 328 Or 195, 202,
970 P2d 1203 (1999) (appreciation in
1
A “stipulation” is a covenant to which the parties to litigation agree. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 1455 (8th ed 2004), which defines “stipulation” as:
“1. A material condition or requirement in an agreement; esp., a factual representation that is incorporated into a contract as a term …. 2. A voluntary
agreement between opposing parties concerning some relevant point; esp.,
an agreement relating to a proceeding, made by the attorneys representing
adverse parties to the proceeding <the plaintiff and defendant entered into a
stipulation on the issue of liability>.”
2
We note additionally that the general judgment of dissolution states: “Each
party shall pay, indemnify, and hold harmless the other party from any debts or
obligations incurred by that party since their separation on July 1, 2019.”
Cite as 337 Or App 343 (2025) 349
the value of a marital asset is a marital asset); see also ORS
107.105(1)(f)(C) (stating rebuttable presumption that both
parties have equally contributed to the acquisition of property during the marriage); Stokes and Stokes,
234 Or App
566, 576,
228 P3d 701 (2010) (proper date for valuation of a
marital asset is date of dissolution); Peterson and Peterson,
141 Or App 446, 450,
918 P2d 858 (1996) (trial court erred
in not using value of asset at date closest to date of dissolution); Olinger and Olinger,
75 Or App 351, 357,
707 P2d 64,
rev den,
300 Or 367 (1985) (stating general rule that, in the
absence of a long period of separation with mutual financial
independence, property interests are to be valued as of the
date of dissolution).
Affirmed.
