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337 Or. App. 38

State v. Craig

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided December 26, 2024

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2024-12-26

Applies OR 135 § 135.365 · OR 135 § 135.390 · OR 135 § 135.405 · OR 135 § 135.432 · OR 138 § 138.105

Vacated and remanded · Decided 2024-12-26

38                   December 26, 2024              No. 925

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
            SAMANTHA WILLIAMS CRAIG,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
              Douglas County Circuit Court
      20CR52406, 22CR07678, 22CR27036, 22CR35422,
     22CR56958, 22CR60060; A181088 (Control), A181089,
           A181090, A181091, A181092, A181093

     Ann Marie Simmons, Judge.
     Submitted September 05, 2024.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the briefs
for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce,
Judge.
     AOYAGI, P. J.
     Vacated and remanded.
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 (2024)                               39

        AOYAGI, P. J.
        Defendant was charged with numerous offenses
in six separate cases. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she
pleaded no contest to 14 charges, and the parties agreed to
recommend probation. The trial court rejected that recommendation and sentenced defendant to 95 months in prison.
On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court’s failure to ask her whether she wanted to withdraw her pleas.
Under ORS 135.390(5)(b), “[i]f the court determines that the
agreed disposition recommendation is inappropriate in a
particular case, the court shall so advise the parties and
allow the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.”
The state responds that the claim of error is unreviewable
and, in any event, fails on the merits. As explained below,
we conclude that the claim of error is reviewable and that
ORS 135.390(5)(b) required the trial court to ask defendant
whether she wanted to withdraw her pleas. We therefore
vacate and remand for defendant to be given an opportunity
to withdraw her pleas.
                           FACTS
         Over a two-year period, defendant was charged in
multiple cases with numerous crimes related to identity theft,
mail theft, and drug possession. On March 3, 2023, the parties appeared for a hearing and advised the court that they
had reached a plea agreement. Defendant was represented
at that hearing by a public defender, Mr. Bouck. Under the
plea agreement, defendant would plead no-contest to 14
charges in six cases; all other charges would be dismissed;
and the parties would recommend a downward departure
sentence of 18 months on probation, with a special condition
of probation that defendant complete drug court, and with
a 75-month prison sentence to be imposed in the event of
probation revocation.
        The court engaged in a colloquy with defendant
to ensure that her pleas were voluntarily and intelligently
made. As part of its initial remarks, the court described the
agreed-upon sentence, told defendant that the court was
not required to impose that sentence, and asked defendant
whether she understood that. Defendant confirmed that
40                                                           State v. Craig

she did. The court went through the charges in each case,
accepted defendant’s pleas, and had the prosecutor make a
record of the factual basis for each count to which defendant had pleaded no contest. Defendant was convicted of 14
crimes based on her pleas.1
         Once the plea portion was finished, the court turned
to sentencing. One of the victims of defendant’s crimes
made a statement. The prosecutor and defense counsel each
argued in support of the agreed-upon sentence. Defendant
then made a statement. The court was troubled by defendant’s statement and expressed concern that it did not bode
well for her success on probation. The court decided that it
needed some time to consider its options, including to decide
whether “in the end” it would be able to impose the agreed-upon disposition and, if not, what it would impose instead:
     “I cannot find it in good conscience to place you on a downward departure in these cases after that. So I think maybe
     it would be good for me to, I, I realize that everybody would
     like to be done with this today. I would too. But I am not sitting here feeling like I’m in a position to do what the agreed
     upon deal is. And I may not be able to do that in the end but
     I need to figure out what we are gonna do in that event.”
Defense counsel responded, “We would rather come back
than force the issue under these circumstances then, Your
Honor.” The court set another hearing for March 8, 2023.
         When the hearing resumed on March 8, defendant
was represented by a different public defender, Mr. Swallow.
The hearing was very short (five transcript pages). The
court began by stating, “So I indicated previously that I’m
not going to be following the agreement of the parties.” The
court then sentenced defendant in each case, imposing a
total prison sentence of 95 months.

     1
       In case number 20CR52406, defendant was convicted of three counts of
mail theft, ORS 164.162. In case number 22CR07678, defendant was convicted
of identity theft, ORS 165.800. In case number 22CR27036, defendant was convicted of first-degree theft, ORS 164.055; fraudulent use of a credit card, ORS
165.055(4)(b); and five counts of computer crime, ORS 164.377(5)(b). In case number 22CR35422, defendant was convicted of mail theft, ORS 164.162. In case
number 22CR56958, defendant was convicted of first-degree failure to appear,
ORS 162.205. In case number 22CR60060, defendant was convicted of computer
crime, ORS 164.377(2).
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        Defendant appeals. In her sole assignment of error,
she argues that the trial court erred in failing to give her an
opportunity to withdraw her pleas.
                          REVIEWABILITY
         The state argues that defendant’s claim of error is
unreviewable because this court lacks authority to review
the validity of a no-contest plea or of a conviction based on
a no-contest plea. See ORS 138.105(5) (“[t]he appellate court
has no authority to review the validity of the defendant’s
plea of guilty or no contest, or a conviction based on the
defendant’s plea of guilty or no contest,” subject to exceptions not applicable here). Defendant counters that she is
challenging the sentencing procedure, see ORS 138.105(7)
(“the appellate court has authority to review any sentence
to determine whether the trial court failed to comply with
requirements of law in imposing or failing to impose a sentence,” subject to exceptions not applicable here), and that
requiring the court to comply with the requirements of law
for imposing a sentence on a guilty or no-contest plea is fundamentally different from challenging the validity of the
plea or conviction.
         We agree with defendant, as this case is analogous
to State v. Johnson, 
288 Or App 220
, 
406 P3d 139
 (2017). In
that case, the parties entered into a tentative plea agreement
governed by ORS 135.432, and the trial court departed from
that agreement in sentencing, without giving the defendant
an opportunity to withdraw his plea as required by ORS
135.432(3). Johnson, 288 Or App at 221; see ORS 135.432(3)
(“If the trial judge concurs, but later decides that the final
disposition of the case should not include the sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement, the trial
judge shall so advise the defendant and allow the defendant
a reasonable period of time in which to either affirm or withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.”). We concluded that the
claim of error was reviewable and proceeded to the merits.
Johnson, 288 Or App at 225-26 & n 4.2 Although this case

    2
      In Johnson, we relied on a case decided under former ORS 138.222(4)(a),
repealed by Or Laws 2017, ch 529, § 26. The successor statute contains “materially identical” language. State v. Fernandez, 
334 Or App 81, 85
, 
555 P3d 350
(2024).
42                                                            State v. Craig

involves a different statute governing a different plea situation, the statutes are similar in nature, and there is no
apparent reason that the claim of error in Johnson would be
reviewable but the claim of error in this case unreviewable.
We therefore conclude that the claim of error is reviewable.
            CONSTRUCTION OF ORS 135.390(5)(b)
         Turning to the merits, we must first decide the scope
of our review. Defendant perceives that she is limited to
plain-error review because she did not raise the issue of plea
withdrawal herself, and the state readily agrees.3 However,
“we have an independent obligation to assess preservation,
regardless of what position the parties take.” State v. Taylor,
323 Or App 422
, 427 n 3, 
523 P3d 696
 (2022). In this case,
we choose to excuse preservation due to an unusual confluence of circumstances.
          “Preservation rules are pragmatic as well as prudential.” Peeples v. Lampert, 
345 Or 209, 220
, 
191 P3d 637
(2008). The preservation requirement sometimes “gives way
entirely, as when a party has no practical ability to raise an
issue.” 
Id.
 Here, at the conclusion of the hearing on March
3, the trial court had not made a final decision whether to
follow the agreed-upon disposition, so defendant was not yet
entitled to an opportunity to withdraw her pleas, and there
was no basis for her counsel to make any objection. When the
hearing resumed on March 8, one would have expected the
court to advise the parties that, after further consideration,
it had decided not to follow the agreed-upon disposition, then
ask defendant whether she wanted to withdraw her pleas—or
fail to ask at which point defense counsel could have objected.
         Instead, the court inadvertently misstated that it
had already told the parties that it would not impose the
agreed-upon disposition (“So I indicated previously that
I’m not going to be following the agreement of the parties.”)
and proceeded to sentencing. And because the attorney representing defendant on March 8 had not been present on
March 3, he was not in a position to recognize the disconnect
    3
      “Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered
on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 
331 Or 335, 341
, 
15 P3d 22
 (2000). However, we have
discretion to correct “plain” errors. ORAP 5.45(1); State v. Vanornum, 
354 Or 614, 629
, 
317 P3d 889
 (2013) (describing plain-error review).
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 (2024)                                                  43

and the resulting skipping of a procedural step.4 If the two
attorneys conferred later and realized what had happened,
we are unaware of any “formal or established mechanism”
to raise the issue at that point. State v. Keene, 
317 Or App 19, 23, 24
, 
505 P3d 418
 (2022) (excusing preservation where it
was unrealistic to expect a contemporaneous objection and
“there was no formal or established mechanism for defendant” to object later).
         Excusing preservation under the circumstances
is consistent with the pragmatic and prudential nature of
preservation rules. Moreover, if given an opportunity to
withdraw her pleas, defendant either will or will not do so,
just as would have occurred on March 8 had she been given
the opportunity then. A decision in defendant’s favor does
not give her any kind of windfall, and it “deprives neither
the state nor the trial court of procedural fairness.” 
Id. at 23-24
.
         We proceed to the statutory construction question.
The parties agree that this case is subject to ORS 135.390(5),
which applies when “the district attorney has provided a
plea offer and agreed disposition recommendation to the
defendant as provided in ORS 135.405 and the defendant
is entering a guilty plea based on the plea offer and agreed
disposition recommendation.”5 ORS 135.390(5)(a). They disagree, however, as to what ORS 135.390(5)(b) requires in
such a situation.
        ORS 135.390(5)(b) states that, if the court accepts
the plea, it must either impose the agreed-upon disposition
or “advise the parties” if it decides that the agreed-upon

    4
      There is no way to know on this record whether defendant was aware of her
right to withdraw her pleas or what, if anything, she told either attorney on that
issue before March 8, and we decline to speculate on those points as relevant to
whether some conversation could have occurred that would make us less likely to
excuse preservation.
    5
      Although the parties do not mention it, we note that ORS 135.390(5),
which was added to the statute in 2001, refers to “a guilty plea,” whereas ORS
135.390(1) and (3), which were part of the original 1973 enactment, refer to “a
plea of guilty or no contest.” Or Laws 1973, ch 836, § 168; Or Laws 2001, ch 635,
§ 11. For present purposes, we accept the parties’ position that ORS 135.390(5)
applies here and express no opinion on any potential significance to the variance
in statutory language between subsections.
44                                                    State v. Craig

disposition is inappropriate “and allow the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw the plea.” Specifically:
         “(a) … Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b)
     of this subsection, if the court finds that the plea is voluntarily made, the court shall impose sentence as provided in
     the agreed disposition recommendation.
        “(b) If the court determines that the agreed disposition
     recommendation is inappropriate in a particular case, the
     court shall so advise the parties and allow the defendant an
     opportunity to withdraw the plea.”
ORS 135.390(5) (emphasis added).
         Defendant reads ORS 135.390(5)(b) as requiring the trial court to advise the parties if it decides not to
impose the agreed-upon disposition, then ask the defendant
whether they want to withdraw their plea in light of that
decision, before imposing a different sentence. The state
disagrees. It argues that the statute imposes a “passive”
requirement, rather than an “affirmative” one, putting the
onus on the defendant to raise the issue of plea withdrawal.
In the state’s view, it is untenable to read ORS 135.390(5)
(b) as requiring the trial court to “immediately stop the proceedings” and “expressly offer” the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.
         The parties’ dispute presents an issue of statutory construction. “Issues of statutory construction present
questions of law that we review for legal error.” State ex rel
Rosenblum v. Living Essentials, LLC, 
371 Or 23, 33
, 
529 P3d 939
 (2023). “We resolve those questions by seeking to give
effect to the intent of the legislature as demonstrated by
the text, context, and any helpful legislative history.” Id.;
see State v. Gaines, 
346 Or 160, 171-73
, 
206 P3d 1042
 (2009)
(describing methodology).
         When words are not statutorily defined, we usually
presume them to have their ordinary meaning. Gaines, 
346 Or at 174
. The ordinary meaning of “opportunity” is “a combination of circumstances, time, and place suitable or favorable for a particular activity or action.” Webster’s Third New
Int’l Dictionary 1583 (unabridged ed 2002). That definition
and three aspects of the statutory context, taken together,
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lead us to conclude that the legislature intended “opportunity” in ORS 135.390(5)(b) to refer to a distinct point in time
at which the court asks the defendant whether they want to
withdraw their plea.
         First, ORS 135.390 is generally concerned with the
voluntariness of pleas and puts the onus on the trial court
to determine voluntariness. That lends at least some support to reading ORS 135.390(5)(b) as requiring the court to
ensure that the defendant is voluntarily proceeding with
the plea notwithstanding the court’s decision not to impose
the agreed-upon disposition.
          Second, ORS 135.390(5)(b) contains two closely
related requirements. It requires the trial court to “advise
the parties” if it decides that the agreed disposition recommendation is inappropriate, then “allow the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw the plea.” The only way to “advise
the parties” is to make an express statement. The statute
therefore necessarily contemplates a moment in the proceedings in which the trial court expressly advises the parties of its decision not to impose the agreed-upon disposition. Given that context, it seems likely that the legislature
intended the next event—the defendant being allowed to
withdraw the plea—to also involve an express statement
by the court. That is, it seems likely that the legislature
intended the court to follow its express notice that it is not
going to impose the agreed-upon disposition with an express
question whether the defendant wants to withdraw the plea
in light of that decision. Contrary to the state’s characterization, a court need not “stop the proceedings” to ask that
question. Asking the question is part of the proceedings,
flows naturally from the immediately preceding notice, and
is no more disruptive than pausing to wait and see whether
the defendant says anything about plea withdrawal.
         Third, under ORS 135.390(5)(b), the trial court
must “allow the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the
plea.” (Emphasis added.) If the statute provided only that
the court must “allow the defendant to withdraw the plea,”
the state might have a better argument that the court need
not affirmatively ask about plea withdrawal, only “allow” it
upon request. Cf. ORS 135.365 (“The court may at any time
46                                              State v. Craig

before judgment, upon a plea of guilty or no contest, permit
it to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted therefor.”). But that is not what it says. ORS 135.390(5)(b) directs
the court to give notice, then “allow the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.” In context, that strongly suggests that the court is supposed to provide the opportunity,
in conjunction with advising the parties of its rejection of
the disposition recommendation, rather than the onus being
on the defendant to find an opportunity to raise the issue.
        The last consideration is legislative history. The
parties have not provided any legislative history, and our
own review of the legislative history has not revealed anything helpful on the present point of statutory construction.
         Accordingly, based on the text in context, we construe ORS 135.390(5)(b) as requiring the trial court, in proceedings subject to ORS 135.390(5), to advise the parties if it
decides that the agreed disposition recommendation is inappropriate, then ask whether the defendant wants to withdraw the plea in light of the court’s decision not to impose
the agreed-upon disposition. Because that procedure was
not followed here, we vacate and remand, so that defendant
may be given the opportunity to withdraw her pleas in light
of the trial court’s decision not to impose the recommended
disposition.
        Vacated and remanded.

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