Volume 339 — Connecticut Reports

In accordance with this court's decision in State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509), when a criminal defendant is charged with kidnapping in conjunc- tion with another underlying crime, such as robbery, the jury must be instructed that the defendant cannot be convicted of kidnapping if the restraint imposed on the victim was merely incidental to the commission of that underlying crime. The petitioner, who had been convicted of multiple counts of kidnapping in the first degree and robbery in the first degree in connection with armed robberies at two separate retail stores, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his due process right to a fair trial under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution was violated. In each armed robbery, after the petitioner obtained money from his victims, he forced them at gunpoint into the store's bathroom and attempted to jam the bathroom door shut. The victims remained inside of the bathroom for only a few minutes, exiting once they believed that the petitioner left the store. Following this court's determination that Salamon, which had been decided more than ten years after the petitioner's trial, applied retroactively in habeas actions, the petitioner challenged his kidnapping convictions on the ground that the jury instructions at his criminal trial were not in accordance with the require- ments set forth in Salamon. The habeas court denied the petitioner's habeas petition, concluding that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, had demonstrated that the absence of a Salamon instruction was harmless error. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the habeas court's judgment. The Appellate Court concluded that a jury reasonably could have found that the petitioner's movement and restraint of the victims were part of a continuous, uninterrupted course of conduct related to the robberies. The Appellate Court applied the harmless error standard set forth in Neder v. United States (527 U.S. 1) in determining that the absence of a Salamon instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On the granting of certification, the respondent appealed to this court. Held: 1. The standard articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson (507 U.S. 619), which requires a new trial only if the instructional error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, applies to Salamon claims raised in habeas proceedings: contrary to the petition- er's assertion that stare decisis required the application of the Neder standard, this court had not previously resolved the question of which standard applied to Salamon errors on collateral review; moreover, the Brecht standard provided the proper harmless error standard for Salamon errors in habeas actions, as it was consistent with the handling of other claims of error in habeas proceedings by both this court and the federal courts, a number of sister state courts had adopted that standard for the collateral review of constitutional errors, and it afforded a habeas petitioner significant protection, requiring a new trial unless the reviewing court has confidence that a properly instructed jury would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; furthermore, two of the principal rationales for applying a different harm standard (the Brecht standard) to constitutional errors in habeas actions than the harm standard applied to constitutional errors raised on direct appeal, namely, the finality of judgments and the extraordinary nature of the habeas remedy, applied equally to state and federal habeas proceedings, the United States Supreme Court previously had rejected the petitioner's claim that the rule preventing a trial court from directing a guilty verdict prohibited a reviewing court from finding that a Salamon error was harmless when the evidence presented at trial compelled such a conclu- sion, the Brecht standard was not so vague as to be difficult to apply, and the application of the Brecht standard would not be unfair to the petitioner but, rather, would strike a balance between bestowing a wind- fall on the petitioner and penalizing him for failing to anticipate this court's reinterpretation of this state's kidnapping statutes. 2. The habeas court correctly determined that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury at the petitioner's criminal trial in accordance with Salamon was harmless because it did not give rise to a risk of prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court's judgment was reversed: under Salamon, the jury, having found abduction, restraint, and the criminal intent associated therewith, necessarily had to find the petitioner guilty of kidnapping under the applicable statute (§ 53a-92 (a) (2) (B)) unless it found that the restraint and associated criminal intent were limited to that inherent in the robberies; moreover, even though the petitioner did not move his victims a great distance or restrain them for a long period of time, the jury could not reasonably have found that the asportation and restraint were limited to that which was necessary to carry out the robberies, as the actions occurred after the objective of each robbery had been completed, were conducted in order to make it more difficult for the victims to summon assistance and to reduce the petitioner's risk of detection, and subjected the victims to unique risks and harms, both physical and psychological, beyond those inherent in the robberies them- selves. (Three justices concurring separately in two opinions) Argued December 16, 2019—officially released May 12, 2021

In accordance with this court's decision in State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509), when a criminal defendant is charged with kidnapping in conjunc- tion with another underlying crime, such as robbery, the jury must be instructed that the defendant cannot be convicted of kidnapping if the restraint imposed on the victim was merely incidental to the commission of that underlying crime. The petitioner, who had been convicted of multiple counts of kidnapping in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, among other crimes, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming a violation of his due process rights to a fair trial under the federal and state constitutions. His convic- tions stemmed from robberies that he had committed at two separate restaurants. While committing one of the robberies, the petitioner forced the sole, remaining employee to open the restaurant's safe, ordered her to sit in a chair facing in the opposite direction of the safe, and, after approximately one or two minutes, ordered her to enter the restaurant's walk-in refrigerator and to remain inside of it for fifteen minutes. While committing the other robbery, the petitioner ordered the restaurant employee to enter the restaurant's walk-in refrigerator immediately after she had opened the safe for him. The petitioner confessed to both robberies and indicated that he had removed money from the restau- rants' safes while the victims were in the walk-in refrigerators. Although unarmed during the robberies, the petitioner had positioned a wooden coat hanger under his jacket to make it appear as if he were brandishing a firearm. Following this court's determination that Salamon, which had been decided after the petitioner's trial, applied retroactively in habeas actions, the petitioner challenged his kidnapping convictions on the ground that the instructions at his criminal trial were not in accor- dance with the requirements set forth in Salamon. The habeas court denied the petition, concluding that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, had demonstrated that the absence of a Salamon instruc- tion was harmless error. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the habeas court's judgment. The Appellate Court applied the harmless error standard set forth in Neder v. United States (527 U.S. 1) in determining that the absence of a Salamon instruction at the petitioner's criminal trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The respondent, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that it was unclear whether the absence of a Salamon instruction at the petitioner's criminal trial was harmless error, as this court could not conclude that a properly instructed jury would have found the defendant guilty of the kidnapping charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and, accordingly, the petitioner was entitled to a new trial on those charges: in the companion case of Banks v. Commissioner of Correction (339 Conn. 1), this court clarified that, on collateral review, the harmlessness of a trial court's failure to give a Salamon instruction is to be assessed in accordance with the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson (507 U.S. 619), which requires a new trial only if the instructional error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, rather than in accordance with the standard set forth in Neder; moreover, in circumstances such as those that were at issue in Banks, in which it was clear that the petitioner forcibly moved and restrained his victims, after having taken their property, for the apparent purpose of escaping from the crime scene undetected and unhindered, it was reasonable for the habeas court to conclude that the Salamon error was harmless, as the asportation and restraint of the victims in Banks bore criminal significance indepen- dent of the underlying robberies; in the present case, however, unlike in Banks, it was not clear whether the petitioner forcibly moved and restrained his victims after having taken possession of their property, as the jury reasonably could have found that the petitioner forced the restaurant employees into the walk-in refrigerators not to facilitate his escape but, rather, to incapacitate them while he completed the robber- ies and to maintain the illusion that he was armed, as he would have needed to remover the coat hanger from under his jacket in order to use both of his hands to empty the safes. (Two justices concurring separately in two opinions) Argued December 16, 2019—officially released May 12, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 4-181a (a) (2)), an administrative agency may recon- sider a final decision within forty days of personal delivery or mailing of that decision, regardless of whether a petition for reconsideration has been filed. Pursuant further to statute, (§ 4-183 (c) (3)), a party may appeal an agency's final decision made after reconsideration within forty-five days. The plaintiffs, two candidates for state elective offices, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the State Elections Enforce- ment Commission, which assessed fines against the plaintiffs upon determining that they had violated certain state election laws and regula- tions. The plaintiffs filed a timely petition for reconsideration of the commission's final decision on February 14, 2018, pursuant to § 4-181a (a) (1), which provides, inter alia, that an agency's failure to decide whether to reconsider a decision within twenty-five days of the filing of such a petition shall constitute a denial of that petition. The commis- sion took no action on the petition for reconsideration within twenty- five days of its filing, resulting in the denial of the petition on March 11, 2018, by operation of § 4-181a (a) (1). Nevertheless, the commission's executive director and general counsel subsequently placed the plain- tiffs' petition for reconsideration on the agenda of a special meeting of the commission that was conducted on March 23, 2018, at which the commission formally denied the petition. Thereafter, on May 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed their administrative appeal with the trial court. The court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the denial of their petition for reconsideration had occurred on March 11, 2018, by operation of § 4-181a (a) (1) and, therefore, that the plaintiffs had failed to timely file their appeal under § 4-183 (c) (2), which requires such appeals to be filed within forty-five days of the denial of reconsideration by opera- tion of § 4-181a (a) (1). On the plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's judgment, held that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiffs' administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs' appeal was timely under § 4-183 (c) (3): because § 4-181a (a) (2) authorizes an agency to reconsider a final decision sua sponte for up to forty days from the issuance of that decision, regardless of whether a petition for reconsideration is filed, the commission had authority under that statutory provision to reconsider its final decision in the plaintiffs' matter until March 26, 2018, and, in light of the denial of the petition for reconsideration by operation of § 4-181a (a) (1) on March 11, 2018, reconsideration pursuant to § 4-181a (a) (2) was the only lawful action that the commission could have taken on the petition at the special meeting held on March 23, 2018; accordingly, under the particular facts of the case, the timeliness of the plaintiffs' appeal to the trial court was governed by the forty-five day limitation period of § 4-183 (c) (3), which commenced on the date the plaintiffs were notified by the commis- sion of its action on the petition for reconsideration at the special meeting, rather than the forty-five day period of § 4-183 (c) (2), which, if applicable, would have commenced forty-five days after the denial of the petition by operation of § 4-181a (a) (1); moreover, a contrary determination by this court would effectively have penalized the plain- tiffs for the commission's mistake in considering the petition for recon- sideration after it had been denied by operation of law, especially because the plaintiffs were entitled to presume that the commission's action in considering the petition at the special meeting was apparently consistent with law, and the commission could claim no prejudice or unfairness by virtue of this court's remand for a resolution of the merits of the plaintiffs' administrative appeal. Argued October 22, 2019—officially released May 20, 2021

The plaintiffs, G Co., C Co., and S, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Banking, who ordered the plaintiffs to cease and desist and to pay certain civil penalties in connec- tion with the commissioner's determination that G Co. and C Co. had violated Connecticut's banking and usury laws by making consumer loans to Connecticut residents without a license to do so. G Co. and C. Co. were created pursuant to the laws of a federally recognized Indian tribe, of which S is the chairman. S is also the secretary and treasurer of both G Co. and C Co. The plaintiffs had moved to dismiss the adminis- trative proceedings initiated by the defendant Department of Banking, claiming that G Co. and C Co. were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity as arms of the tribe and that S shared in that immunity because his actions were undertaken on behalf of those entities in his official capac- ity. The commissioner denied the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss, conclud- ing that, because G Co. and C Co. had failed to demonstrate that they were arms of the tribe, neither they nor S was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. After the commissioner issued final orders requiring, inter alia, the plaintiffs to cease and desist from violating Connecticut law in connection with their lending activities and S to pay a civil penalty, the plaintiffs appealed to the trial court. The trial court determined that G Co. and C Co. bore the burden of proving that they were arms of the tribe entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, but the court disagreed with the test the commissioner used to determine whether a business entity should be considered an arm of an Indian tribe. Specifically, the test the commissioner had applied focused on the financial relationship between the tribe and the business entity. Instead, the trial court employed a multifactor test that considered not only the legal or organi- zational relationship between the tribe and the entity but also the func- tional aspects of the entity's financial relationship with the tribe and the entity's stated purpose. Under that functional test, the court deter- mined that, although the evidence was sufficient for G Co. and C Co. to meet most of the various factors, the plaintiffs failed to show how the entities actually functioned in relation to their stated purpose. The court also concluded that the viability of the claims against S depended on whether G Co. and C Co. were arms of the tribe. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment sustaining the appeal and remanding the case to the commissioner for further proceedings to consider whether G Co. and C Co. satisfied the functional test. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed and the defendants cross appealed. Held: 1. The trial court correctly determined that G Co. and C Co. bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity as arms of the tribe; allocating the burden of proof to the entity claiming immunity was consistent with the deci- sions of state and federal courts in arm of the tribe cases, as well as the standard employed by this court with respect to whether a corporate entity is entitled to assert a sovereign immunity defense as an arm of the state, and the entity claiming arm of the tribe status likely will have the best access to the evidence needed to assume that burden of proof. 2. The trial court applied an improper test for determining whether an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity as an arm of the tribe by requiring proof of how the entities functioned in relation to their stated purpose and incorrectly determined that further proceedings were required to determine whether G Co. was an arm of the tribe: this court concluded that whether an entity shares a tribe's sovereign immunity as an arm of the tribe is a determination to be made in light of the federal laws and policies underlying tribal sovereign immunity and in view of five specific factors, namely, the method of the entity's creation, the purpose of the entity, the structure, ownership and management of the entity, including the amount of control the tribe has over it, the tribe's intent with respect to sharing its sovereign immunity, and the financial relation- ship between the tribe and the entity; in the present case, all five factors supported the determination that G Co. was entitled, as a matter of law, to share in the tribe's sovereign immunity as an arm of the tribe, as the record demonstrated that G Co. was created under tribal law and was controlled by directors appointed by the tribe's governing council for the purpose of promoting tribal economic development and welfare, and there was a significant financial relationship between the tribe and G Co. such that withholding immunity would interfere with the tribe's self-governance and economic development; moreover, the minimal evi- dence in the record, consisting only of a certificate of license, the tribal resolution creating C Co., and certain conclusory statements contained in the affidavit of the tribe's vice chairman about the purpose and structure of C Co., was insufficient to conclude that C Co. was an arm of the tribe entitled to share in its sovereign immunity, and, accordingly the trial court correctly concluded that further proceedings were neces- sary to determine whether C Co. was an arm of the tribe. 3. The trial court correctly determined that S was immune from the civil penalty imposed on him but was not immune from the order of prospec- tive injunctive relief in connection with his actions as an official of G Co.: tribal officials are entitled to an extension of tribal sovereign immunity if the tribe, rather than the individual officer, is the real party in interest and if the tribal official acted within the scope of his authority; in the present case, the department sought relief from S only nominally because of his policy-making role as a high ranking officer of the tribe and the entities, rather than as a result of his personal actions taken within the scope of his official capacity, and made only a conclusory and nominal allegation without referring to any specific actions taken by S, such that it was apparent that the tribe, rather than S, was the real party in interest and that S's actions were entirely within the scope of executing his duties as an officer of the tribe, G Co., and C Co., and, in the absence of any allegation that S acted beyond the scope of his authority, he was immune from the civil penalty imposed on him; moreover, tribal sovereign immunity does not extend to injunctive relief against tribal officers responsible for violating state law, and, therefore, S was not immune from the order enjoining him from violating Connecticut bank- ing and usury laws. Argued October 21, 2020—officially released May 20, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 12-55 (b)), an assessor, ''[p]rior to taking and subscrib- ing to the oath upon the grand list . . . shall equalize the assessments of the property in the town . . . and make any assessment omitted by mistake or required by law.'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 12-63c (d)), a property owner required to submit information to an assessor for any assessment year who fails to submit such information shall be subject to a penalty equal to a 10 percent increase in the assessed value of the owner's property for such assessment year. The plaintiffs, entities that owned commercial properties that operated together as a retail shopping center in the town of Wilton, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals of the defendant town. The board had denied the plaintiffs' appeals from the allegedly improper assessment of penalties under § 12-63c (d) by the town assessor as a result of their late submission of certain annual income and expense reports. The trial court rendered judgments for the town, concluding that, although § 12-55 (b) required the assessor to impose the penalties before taking and subscribing to the oath upon the grand list, the only redress for the failure of the assessor to comply with § 12-55 (b) was to postpone the right of the plaintiffs to appeal from the action of the assessor until the succeeding grand list. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgments. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that § 12-55 (b) required the assessor to impose penalties under § 12-63c (d) before signing the grand list but concluded that tax penalties imposed without statutory authority are invalid. On the granting of certification, the town appealed to this court, claiming that the assessor was not bound by the requirement in § 12-55 (b) that assessments omitted by mistake or required by law must be made before the assessor signs the grand list for the applicable assessment year. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the assessor improperly imposed the late filing penalties under § 12-63c (d) on the plaintiffs after the assessor took and subscribed to the oath upon the grand list for the assessment year in question: 1. Penalties imposed pursuant to § 12-63c (d) are required by law within the meaning of § 12-55 (b); this court's reading of the language in § 12- 63c (d) led it to conclude that the penalty imposed under that statute when a property owner fails to submit required information is mandatory unless one of two exceptions apply, and neither exception applied in the present case because it was undisputed that the plaintiffs owned the subject property at all relevant times and the town had not enacted an ordinance permitting the assessor to waive penalties under § 12- 63c (d). 2. The town assessor lacked authority under § 12-55 (b) to impose the late filing penalties after signing the grand list; this court having concluded that the term ''assessment'' in § 12-55 (b) must be read to include penal- ties imposed under § 12-63c (d), the assessor was bound by the time limitations in § 12-55 (b) and was required to impose the late filing penalties under § 12-63c (d) prior to taking and subscribing to the oath upon the grand list. 3. The assessor lacked authority to impose the late filing penalties against the plaintiffs under the statute (§ 12-60) applicable to the correction of clerical errors or mistakes, as the assessor's intentional decision to delay imposing the penalties until after he signed the grand list, although mistaken, was not a clerical error but, rather, was an error of substance. (One justice concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued October 19, 2020—officially released May 26, 2021

Convicted, after a trial to a three judge panel, of the crimes of murder, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, and carrying a pistol without a permit in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. The defendant had approached the victim, who was working at a construction site, to ask whether the construction company was hiring new employees. One of the victim's coworkers suggested that the defendant go to the company's office to fill out a job application. The defendant appeared to walk away but, shortly thereafter, again approached the victim and shot and killed him. At trial, the defendant raised the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect under the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a)), claiming that he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. According to the defendant, on the morning of the offense, he experienced auditory hallucinations and delusions that influenced his thinking and behavior. These included hearing voices and seeing flashing lights, which indicated to the defendant that the victim was dangerous and that he should be shot. The defendant presented the testimony of two expert witnesses, both of whom opined that the defendant's mental condition impaired his ability to control his conduct within the requirements of the law. The trial court, however, found that the state had met its burden of proof on the counts charged and that, although the defendant demon- strated that he suffered from an unspecified psychotic disorder at the time of the murder, he failed to prove his affirmative defense because he did not demonstrate the requisite connection between his condition and his criminal conduct. The Appellate Court upheld the defendant's conviction, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had reasonably rejected the defendant's defense of mental disease or defect and the opinions of the defense experts related thereto: although the state did not present any rebuttal experts, the trial court was not bound to accept the opinions of the defense experts relating to the defendant's mental disease or defect, as long as the court's rejec- tion of such testimony was not arbitrary; moreover, the trial court's principal findings in support of its determination that the defendant had not met his burden of proving the defense of mental disease or defect were largely related, were supported by the record, and provided a reasonable basis for that determination, as the defendant's conduct immediately following the shooting did not reflect an inability to control his conduct, the defendant's motivation for shooting the victim was not borne out of psychosis but out of frustration and anger, which was exacerbated by anxiety and stress relating to the situation, the testimony of the defendant's experts and their reports reflected considerable diver- gence in the bases for their opinions, and the trial court's determination that the defendant was malingering by exaggerating or fabricating symp- toms was supported by the facts, including that the defendant had no prior history of mental health treatment other than for substance abuse, and the defendant never told anyone, prior to the shooting, that he had been experiencing hallucinations; furthermore, although it was undis- puted that the defendant suffered from some form of psychosis at the time of the offense, the fact that the defendant violated the law did not prove that his psychosis substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Argued May 8, 2020—officially released May 28, 2021

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that the Department of Correction violated his constitutional rights to procedural due process in assigning him a certain sex treatment need score and to substantive due process in classifying him as a sex offender, even though he never had committed or been convicted of a sex offense. The petitioner had been convicted of unlawful restraint in the first degree and failure to appear, and had been found to be in violation of probation. Prior to the petitioner's incarceration, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to a charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship after the petitioner's wife, M, recanted her statement to the police that the peti- tioner had sexually assaulted her during the same incident that formed the basis for the charges of which he was convicted. Following his release from incarceration, the petitioner pleaded guilty to new charges stemming from another incident and was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration. Upon his return to prison, the petitioner was notified that a classification hearing would be held to determine whether, on the basis of the prior charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship, he would be assigned a sex treatment need score of greater than 1 and that, in making its determination, the department would be relying on the police report of the petitioner's arrest and the petitioner's Connecti- cut rap sheets. Prior to the hearing, the department denied the petition- er's requests that, at his hearing, he be permitted to present live witness testimony and to be represented by counsel. During the hearing, the petitioner denied sexually assaulting M and submitted several docu- ments, including M's letter recanting her statement to the police, in support of his denial. Following the hearing, the hearing officer, T, notified the petitioner that she had assigned him a sex treatment need score of 3, that, in arriving at her decision, she reviewed not only the record concerning the earlier incident that led to the charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship but also his complete Connecticut criminal record, including numerous corresponding police reports and arrest warrant applications, and that her supervisor, D, had reviewed and approved the petitioner's assigned sex treatment need score. There- after, the petitioner appealed, challenging the assigned score, and T and D denied the appeal after discussing it briefly. As a result of his sex treatment need score, the petitioner could not be placed in a correctional facility lower than level three without authorization from the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, which rendered him ineligible for a veterans program available only at a level two facility. He also was referred to the department's sex treatment program staff for an evalua- tion, but he refused to participate in the evaluation on the ground that the department had incorrectly classified him as a sex offender. In addition, the petitioner refused to sign his offender accountability plan, which resulted in his forfeiture of twenty-five days of earned risk reduc- tion credit and his being barred from earning additional credit until he signed the plan, and it negatively impacted his eligibility for parole and community release. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petitioner's habeas petition. With respect to the petitioner's procedural due process claim, the habeas court, applying the standard set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell (418 U.S. 539), considered and rejected each of the petitioner's contentions regarding the inadequacy of the process he was provided prior to being classified as a sex offender. The court also rejected the petitioner's claims that the sex offender classification vio- lated his right to substantive due process and that his sex treatment need score constituted punishment not clearly warranted by law in violation of article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed from the habeas court's judgment. Held: 1. The department violated the petitioner's constitutional right to procedural due process in classifying him as a sex offender, the petitioner not having been afforded all of the procedural protections required by Wolff: the petitioner was not provided an opportunity to call witnesses in his defense, as the department denied his request to call witnesses without knowing who the witnesses were or what they would say, or considering whether their presence would be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, and, under Wolff, in the absence of a showing by the department that the presence at the prison of the witnesses whom the petitioner planned to call would have been unduly hazardous to institutional safety concerns, the petitioner should have been permitted to call those witnesses; moreover, the petitioner was not provided ade- quate notice of the information on which department personnel would rely in determining his classification, as T conducted additional research after the classification hearing had concluded into the petitioner's crimi- nal record, which included reviewing all of the petitioner's arrest records, in order to assess the reliability of M's recantation but never notified the petitioner that the facts of his past arrests would be used against him, and, under Wolff, the petitioner was entitled to this information to allow him an opportunity to marshal the facts in his defense, and the department did not satisfy the notice requirements of Wolff by notifying the petitioner that his Connecticut rap sheets would be reviewed as part of the decision-making process; furthermore, the petitioner was not afforded an impartial decision maker to rule on his administrative appeal insofar as T and D ruled on that appeal from their own initial classification decision, and, although the petitioner was denied due process of law because of the manner in which the department con- ducted the classification hearing, this court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the petitioner's classification as a sex offender in light of M's detailed statement to the police describ- ing the petitioner's sexual misconduct and the petitioner's own statement to the police, which corroborated some of M's account of the incident. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court incor- rectly concluded that the department had not violated his state constitu- tional right to substantive due process by classifying him as a sex offender: contrary to the petitioner's argument, there was no evidence that the petitioner was classified as a sex offender on the basis of mental disability or psychiatric illness, and, therefore, because the petitioner was classified on the basis of neutral considerations that did not target a suspect class, his claim was subject to rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny; moreover, the petitioner's contention that the depart- ment's classification decision could not withstand rational basis review was unavailing, as the department's interests in effective population management and rehabilitation were both legitimate and rationally related to its classification policy and procedure, and the department's policy and process for classifying the petitioner as a sex offender did not come close to shocking the conscience. 3. The petitioner's classification as a sex offender on the basis of nonconvic- tion information violated article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitu- tion, as the petitioner was not afforded the full panoply of the procedural protections set forth in Wolff prior to receiving that classification; accord- ingly, the habeas court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with direction to issue a writ of habeas corpus and to direct the respondent to expunge the petitioner's sex treatment need score. Argued December 10, 2020—officially released June 17, 2021

Convicted of multiple counts of first degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child in connection with the sexual abuse of S, the daughter of the defendant's girlfriend, N, the defendant appealed. S first disclosed the abuse, which began when she was eight years old, at a meeting with several members of her family, including N, that occurred when S was seventeen. At trial, S testified that she was crying during the meeting. Thereafter, the trial court, over defense counsel's objection, allowed N to testify about S's demeanor during the meeting, and N also testified that S had been crying. The defendant testified at trial and denied any inappropriate contact with S. In response to a question from the prosecutor, the defendant stated that he had an interest in the case insofar as he did not want to go to jail and leave his children behind. During closing and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor stated that the defendant, having been present in the courtroom and having listened to S and N testify, displayed a ''lack of outrage'' at the accusations against him. The prosecutor also purported to summarize the reasonable doubt standard, telling the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is based on common sense and life experience and determined by a totality of the evidence rather than ''just . . . one picky little point.'' The prosecutor also remarked on defense counsel's failure to cross- examine S, calling S's testimony ''unchallenged and uncontroverted.'' On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly admitted N's testimony about S's out-of-court demeanor and that the prosecutor made certain improper remarks during closing and rebuttal argu- ments. Held: 1. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the admission of N's testimony regarding S's out-of-court demeanor was improper because any error relating to the admission of that testimony was harmless: N's testimony that S was crying during the family meeting was unlikely to have substantially swayed the jury's verdict because it was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence, namely, S's own uncontested testi- mony, of peripheral importance to the state's case, and did not relate to the elements of the crimes charged; moreover, defense counsel did not object to S's testimony that she cried during the family meeting, and counsel had the unfettered opportunity to cross-examine N on that point. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor engaged in certain improprieties during closing and rebuttal arguments: a. The prosecutor did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation by commenting on his ''lack of outrage'' because that remark was a permissible comment on the defendant's testimonial demeanor: although it was unclear whether the prosecutor was referring to the defendant's demeanor while testifying, which is a permissible subject of commentary insofar as it constitutes evidence on which the jury may properly rely in assessing the defendant's credibility, or his courtroom demeanor unre- lated to his demeanor while testifying, which is an improper subject of commentary, this court concluded that, when the prosecutor's remark was viewed in context, the jury reasonably would have construed it as a reference to the defendant's testimonial demeanor, as the prosecutor immediately followed her remark with a description of the defendant's testimony on the witness stand; moreover, defense counsel did not object to the remark and, during his own closing argument, apparently con- strued it as a reference to the defendant's demeanor on the witness stand. b. Certain remarks made by the prosecutor were not improper: the prosecutor's remarks regarding the defendant's ''lack of outrage'' did not improperly appeal to the jurors' emotions and passions but, instead, asked the jurors to assess the defendant's credibility in light of his testimonial demeanor and implicitly urged them to infer, on the basis of their common sense and experience, that an innocent man falsely accused of sexually assaulting a child would have exhibited outrage while testifying; moreover, the prosecutor did not improperly dilute the presumption of innocence or infringe on the defendant's right to testify by referring to the defendant's interest in the case or improperly express her personal opinion on the defendant's credibility by questioning incon- sistencies in the defendant's testimony that he never was alone with S, as those comments were based on the defendant's properly admitted testimony and the inferences that reasonably could be drawn therefrom rather than on the prosecutor's personal opinion; furthermore, it was clear from the context that the prosecutor was referring to defense counsel's closing argument, and not to the defendant's testimony, when she stated that the jury could not consider the statement that the defen- dant is an innocent man wrongly accused, and, because that statement was consistent with both the law and the trial court's instructions, it did not improperly mislead the jury; in addition, the prosecutor's comments regarding S's lack of motive to lie and testimonial demeanor were not expressions of her personal opinion but called on the jurors to draw inferences based on their common sense and life experience, and, accord- ingly, the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for S's credibility. c. Two of the prosecutor's remarks were improper: the prosecutor's description of the reasonable doubt standard was an improper statement of the law, as a reasonable doubt may be based on a single point, so long as that point has a foundation in the evidence and produces a real and honest doubt in the jurors' minds, or on an evidentiary consideration outside of the jurors' own common sense or life experience, and, in light of the fundamental role the reasonable doubt standard plays in the criminal justice system, counsel should utilize a previously approved definition or the one set forth in the trial court's jury instructions instead of paraphrasing the standard; moreover, the prosecutor improperly mis- characterized the evidence and risked diluting the state's burden of proof by informing the jury that S's testimony was ''unchallenged and uncontroverted,'' because, although defense counsel did not cross-exam- ine S, the defendant, during his testimony, expressly denied touching S inappropriately, and, contrary to the prosecutor's suggestion, defense counsel was not required to cross-examine S in order to undermine her credibility or to prove the defendant's innocence. d. Applying the factors set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 523), this court could not conclude that the prosecutor's improper statements deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial: neither of the improprie- ties were invited by the defense, they were isolated and infrequent, and the state's case was not so weak as to be overshadowed by them; moreover, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's misstate- ment of the reasonable doubt standard, that impropriety was not blatantly egregious or inexcusable, and was counterbalanced by defense counsel's frequent description of the high burden imposed on the state, and the trial court's instruction to the jury, which accurately described the reasonable doubt standard and directed the jurors to disregard counsel's recitation of the law to the extent that it differed from the court's own instructions, served to cure the impropriety; furthermore, although the prosecutor's improper reference to S's unchallenged and uncontroverted testimony was central to one of the critical issues in the case, namely, S's credibility in light of the lack of physical evidence or eyewitnesses, the trial court promptly issued the curative instruction requested by defense counsel, that instruction specifically targeted the impropriety, and, when that impropriety was viewed in the context of the whole trial, its impact was minimal, especially in light of the jury's finding of not guilty on certain other charges. Argued October 22, 2020—officially released June 21, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 49-15 (a) (1)), ''[a]ny judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an interest in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and modified . . . provided no such judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer . . . .'' The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, and, while negotiating over the next five years, the parties filed numerous motions to open the judgment, each prior to the passage of the law day. The court thereafter opened the judgment for a final time and set the law day for March 12, 2019. Before that date, the plaintiff's loan servicer, S Co., sent the defendant letters erroneously stating that a ''foreclosure sale'' of the property would occur on March 13, 2019. On the evening of March 12, the defendant called S Co. and was told that the foreclosure sale was scheduled for the following day. The defendant then contacted a new attorney, who, on March 13, filed a motion to open the judgment, claiming that the defendant's reliance on S Co.'s misrepresentations caused her not to file the motion before the passage of the law day. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to open the judgment under § 49-15 and that the equities of the case did not warrant granting relief. After the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal was moot because the passage of the law day precluded the defendant from obtaining any practical relief. The Appellate Court dismissed the defen- dant's appeal, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, claiming that the Appellate Court had improperly dismissed her appeal because § 49-15 did not render her equitable claims moot and that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying her motion to open. Held: 1. The Appellate Court improperly dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot in light of the equitable nature of her claims: although § 49-15 generally precludes a judgment of strict foreclosure from being opened after title vests absolutely in an encumbrancer, which occurs when the law day passes, under the common law of this state, courts may, in rare and exceptional cases, exercise a limited form of continuing jurisdiction over a motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure after the passage of the law day; in the present case, the defendant's motion to open the judgment raised a colorable claim in equity, namely, that her reliance on S Co.'s erroneous written and oral misrepresentations justified the court's exercise of its inherent, continuing jurisdiction, that claim, if meritorious, could have afforded the practical relief sought, and, accord- ingly, the defendant's appeal was not moot. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to open the judgment, as equity did not warrant granting the relief sought: the trial court's conclusion that the expiration of the defendant's right to redemption was caused, at least in part, by her own inaction was supported by the court's factual findings that the defendant was not confused by S Co.'s letters, that she was represented by an attorney who had informed her of the correct law day, that the trial court previously had granted numerous motions to open the judgment during the parties' negotiations, that the defendant had corrected a similar misstatement about the law day made by S Co., and, that even if the defendant was confused about the law day, her counsel was not; moreover, the defendant did not claim that she lacked the ability or resources to unilaterally file her own prevesting motion to open, and this court's review of the record indicated that the trial court's factual findings, including that the defendant's choice not to affirmatively pro- tect her rights by filing a prevesting motion while negotiating with the plaintiff was dilatory and cavalier, were not clearly erroneous. Argued December 9, 2020—officially released June 23, 2021

The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commis- sioner dismissing the plaintiff's claim for certain disability benefits. While working for the defendant employer, the plaintiff, who had a history of cardiac disease, among other conditions, and who was stand- ing on a level surface, became lightheaded, passed out, fell backward, and hit her head on the ground. The plaintiff was then taken to a hospital, where she suffered cardiac arrest and was treated for her cardiac episode and head trauma. In denying the plaintiff's claim for benefits, the commis- sioner determined that the plaintiff's head injury did not arise out of her employment but, rather, was caused by her cardiac condition, and, therefore, was not a compensable injury. After the board upheld the commissioner's decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the board's decision and remanded the case with direc- tion to sustain the plaintiff's appeal. In doing so, the Appellate Court relied on this court's decision in Savage v. St. Aeden's Church (122 Conn. 343), in which this court concluded that a head injury sustained by an employee at his or her workplace due to a fall caused by the employee's purely personal medical condition, i.e., an idiopathic fall, was per se compensable. On the granting of certification, the defendant employer and the defendant insurer appealed from the Appellate Court's judgment to this court. Held that this court overruled its decision in Savage to the extent that it held that an idiopathic fall on a level surface occurring during the course of employment is compensable as a matter of law, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment with direction to affirm the board's decision upholding the commission- er's denial of the plaintiff's claim for benefits: because Savage was predicated on a misapplication of prior precedent and out of step with modern day, workers' compensation jurisprudence, this court instead followed the prevailing view, adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, that an employee's idiopathic fall at a workplace, occasioned by a personal medical infirmity wholly unrelated to the employment, does not arise out of that employment and is not compensable in the absence of some evidence that the workplace conditions contributed to the harm by increasing the risk of the resulting injuries; in the present case, the plaintiff acknowledged that her head injury was precipitated by a per- sonal medical infirmity unrelated to her employment, and, because she did not challenge in the Appellate Court the board's determination that there was no evidence in the record on the basis of which the commis- sioner could have found that the hardness of the ground on which she fell increased the risk of injury from her fall, she abandoned any claim that her head injury was causally related to her employment and, there- fore, compensable. Argued October 25, 2019—officially released June 24, 2021

Pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 53a-64bb (b)), ''[n]o person shall be found guilty of strangulation in the second degree and unlawful restraint or assault upon the same incident . . . .'' Convicted of assault in the third degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, strangulation in the second degree, and threatening in the second degree, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The defendant and the victim had been socializing and drinking together in an apartment build- ing in which the defendant lived. When the victim indicated that she need to go to the bathroom, the defendant told her that he could use his bathroom. When the victim finished using the bathroom, the defendant prevented her from leaving, restrained her and, over the course of eight or nine hours, alternated between hitting and choking her in various areas of his apartment. After the jury returned its verdict, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the assault and unlawful restraint charges on the ground that they were ''upon the same incident'' as the strangulation charge for purposes of § 53a-64bb (b). The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sup- port the jury's verdict because the incident occurred over an extended period of time and the acts of assault and unlawful restraint were readily separable from the acts of strangulation. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, and the defendant, on the granting of certifi- cation, appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the language in § 53a-64bb (b) prohibiting a person from being found guilty of strangula- tion in the second degree ''upon the same incident'' as unlawful restraint or assault is an element of the offense of strangulation that must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by the trial court, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey (530 U.S. 466). Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated when the trial court, rather than the jury, determined that the assault and unlawful restraint charges were not ''upon the same incident'' as that giving rise to the strangulation charge, as that determination did not implicate the constitutional princi- ples underlying Apprendi and its progeny: the core concern of Apprendi and its progeny is to safeguard the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to a jury determination that he or she is guilty of every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, those cases generally define an element as any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defen- dant, and whether a fact constitutes an element is informed by whether the jury had a historical role in finding that fact; in the present case, an analysis of the statutory design revealed that the ''upon the same incident'' prohibition in § 53a-64bb (b) did not constitute an element within the scope of Apprendi, as that language was not included in subsection (a) of the statute, which defines the crime of second degree strangulation and its three elements, or in subsection (c), which classifies that offense as a class D felony, but was included in subsection (b), a separate, procedural subsection that included no act, mental state, or attendant circumstances that must be present for the crime to occur; moreover, the legislature routinely has employed, and this court consis- tently has interpreted, the same ''upon the same incident'' language or similar language in other penal statutes to express the intention to bar multiple punishments for double jeopardy purposes, and this court was aware of no evidence that juries historically played any role in resolving double jeopardy issues, which the applicable rule of practice (§ 42-20) commits to the judicial authority for resolution; furthermore, in light of the evidence that the defendant attacked the victim in multiple locations in the apartment over an extended period of time and that, in addition to restraining the victim by the throat, he punched her and prevented her from leaving the apartment, the trial court correctly determined that the defendant's conduct was readily separable and sufficient to support the jury's verdict as to each of the offenses, that determination did not increase the defendant's sentencing exposure, and the defendant's total effective sentence fell within the maximum sentence he could receive for the crimes of which he was convicted. Argued November 18, 2020—officially released June 29, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-174 (b)), ''any party offering in evidence a signed report . . . for treatment of any treating physician . . . may have the report . . . admitted into evidence as a business entry and it shall be presumed that the signature on the report is that of such treating physi- cian . . . and that the report . . . [was] made in the ordinary course of business.'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages, pursuant to the municipal defective highway statute (§ 13a-149), from the defendant city for personal injuries he sustained when he fell on a city sidewalk. After his fall, the plaintiff received treatment for certain symptoms from a number of medical professionals, including his primary care provider, V, at a Veterans Administration hospital. V ultimately wrote a final report for the plain- tiff's medical file, in which she concluded that his injuries, namely, a permanent disability of neuropathy and permanent weakness in his left hand, were caused with a reasonable degree of medical certainty by the fall. Prior to trial, the city filed a motion in limine to preclude the admission of V's treatment records and reports, as well as her medical opinions and conclusions, on the ground that they were inadmissible under § 52-174 (b) because the city would have no opportunity, either at a deposition or at trial, to cross-examine V, who was precluded from testifying by virtue of the applicable federal regulation (38 C.F.R. § 14.808 (2017)) prohibiting Department of Veterans Affairs personnel from pro- viding testimony in certain legal proceedings. The trial court denied that motion, and, on the first day of trial, the city moved to preclude the admission of V's final report on the ground that V, a physician assistant, was not competent to render an opinion on the permanency of the plaintiff's injuries. The court denied that motion, as well. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The city thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court had improperly admitted the plaintiff's medical records under Rhode v. Milla (287 Conn. 731), in which this court held that certain medical bills were inadmissible under § 52-174 (b) because the defendant did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the treating health care provider. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff's medical records and V's final report, which were made and maintained in the ordinary course of the business of diagnosing, treating and caring for the plaintiff, were inadmissible under § 52-174 (b) on the ground that the city was unable to cross-examine V: § 52-174 (b), which was enacted to avoid the expense and delay caused by procuring the testimony of a treating physician, permits the admission of medical reports, which otherwise would consti- tute inadmissible hearsay, under the hearsay exception for business records, the statutory (§ 52-180) business records exception to the hear- say rule, by expressly providing that business records are not rendered inadmissible by virtue of a party's failure to produce the author or to show that the author was unavailable, specifically contemplates that the opponent of the proffered evidence need not be given the opportunity to cross-examine the author of the record, and, to the extent that Rhode and its progeny, including Milliun v. New Milford Hospital (310 Conn. 711), suggested that an opportunity for cross-examination of the author of a medical record prepared for purposes of the diagnosis, treatment or care of a patient is an absolute prerequisite for the admission of such record, this court disavowed that proposition; moreover, the city did not claim or present any evidence in the trial court that V's final report was prepared in contemplation of litigation, and the mere fact that the final report contained V's opinion on causation and the permanency of the plaintiff's injuries did not establish that the report was not prepared for purposes of the diagnosis, treatment or care of the plaintiff. Argued June 12, 2020—officially released June 29, 2021

The plaintiffs served a subpoena on the defendant L in Connecticut to depose her in connection with an action the plaintiffs were litigating in Florida against a company owned by L, after a Florida court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to subpoena L, who resided primarily in Connecticut. L filed a motion to quash the Connecticut subpoena, which the trial court denied, and L appealed to the Appellate Court. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which L opposed, and the Appellate Court dismissed L's appeal as frivolous. After the Appellate Court's dismissal of L's appeal but before this court granted L's petition for certification to appeal, the plaintiffs served L with a subpoena in Florida while L was visiting that state and withdrew, without prejudice, the Connecticut subpoena. On appeal from the Appellate Court's dismissal of L's appeal, held that, because the plaintiffs' withdrawal of their Con- necticut subpoena rendered L's appeal to this court moot, that appeal was dismissed, and, because L was thereby prevented from challenging, before this court, the Appellate Court's dismissal of her appeal as frivo- lous, the Appellate Court's judgment was vacated; the plaintiffs, having unilaterally withdrawn the Connecticut subpoena, prevented L, through no fault of her own, from challenging the Appellate Court's adverse determination, and the plaintiffs, after having received favorable rulings from the Appellate Court and the trial court, should not have been able to moot L's appeal to this court to prevent the possibility of an unfavorable decision. Argued February 19—officially released July 2, 2021

The plaintiff attorney appealed to the trial court, challenging the reprimand imposed on her by the defendant, the Statewide Grievance Committee, for having violated rules 3.3 (a) (1) and 8.4 (3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The plaintiff, who was a court-appointed trustee of an estate, had filed an amended final accounting with the Probate Court that sought fiduciary fees for her work after she previously had represented to that court that she would waive the fees and remove them from the final accounting. The defendant upheld the determination of its reviewing committee that the amended final accounting constituted a knowingly false statement in violation of rule 3.3 (a) (1) and that the false statement also was dishonest in violation of rule 8.4 (3). The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, concluding, inter alia, that the reviewing committee's decision was not clearly erroneous and that the record supported the reviewing committee's findings of fact. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly expanded the application of rule 3.3 to include attorneys functioning in a fiduciary role and improperly upheld the reviewing committee's determinations that she violated rules 3.3 (a) (1) and 8.4 (3). The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that rule 3.3 (a) (1) did not apply to her because the Probate Court had appointed her to act as a fiduciary for an estate and the commentary to that rule indicates that it governs the conduct of a lawyer representing a client in the proceed- ings of a tribunal: although the commentary illustrates the most common context in which the rule would apply, that is, lawyers appearing before a tribunal in the course of client representation, there are many other contexts in which a lawyer might appear before a tribunal, and a fiduciary role is one such example; moreover, case law supported the conclusion that the commentary to rule 3.3 (a) (1) was insufficient to exempt attorneys serving as court-appointed fiduciaries, and this court would not conclude, without more evidence in the rule's text or commentary, that the drafters of the rule intended that an attorney serving as a court-appointed fiduciary was not subject to discipline for making false statements to the Probate Court when the same attorney, serving in a traditional representational capacity, would be subject to discipline for the same conduct. 2. The reviewing committee correctly concluded that the plaintiff had made a false statement in violation of rule 3.3 (a) (1); contrary to the plaintiff's claim that she did not make a false statement because the amount of the fiduciary fees listed in the accounting was accurate, the false state- ment at issue was not the amount of the fees claimed but her assertive conduct of including them in the amended final accounting in the context of her prior representations to the Probate Court, and, even if her statement in filing the accounting was not false within the meaning of rule 3.3 (a) (1), her failure to qualify the inclusion of the fees with some form of clarification that they had been waived amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation and, therefore, was a false statement. 3. The evidence supporting the conclusion that the plaintiff violated rule 3.3 (a) (1) was sufficient to support the reviewing committee's conclu- sion that her conduct was dishonest, in violation of rule 8.4 (3): the plaintiff's knowingly false statement amounted to conduct involving a lack of straightforward dealing, honesty and integrity, and, given that the plaintiff knew that the Probate Court judge considered her fiduciary fees waived, the reviewing committee did not incorrectly conclude that it was dishonest for the plaintiff to include fiduciary fees in her amended final accounting; moreover, even if the final accounting did not amount to a violation of rule 3.3 (a) (1), her course of conduct, as found by the reviewing committee and supported by the record, was sufficient to support the conclusion that she violated rule 8.4 (3), as the plaintiff acknowledged that she sought fiduciary fees because she was otherwise unable to reimburse the estate for the tax penalties and interest she had incurred in her role as the estate's fiduciary, and the inconsistencies between the different final accountings the plaintiff had submitted to the Probate Court supported the conclusion that she was not straightfor- ward with that court. Argued December 7, 2020—officially released July 2, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-102a (a)), a court presiding over a pending case involving a violation of certain sex offenses, including patronizing a prostitute who was the victim of human trafficking, may order that the accused be examined for any sexually transmitted disease (STD). Pursuant further to statute (§ 54-102a (b)), a court presiding over a pending case involving a violation of certain sex offenses during which a sexual act occurred, including patronizing a prostitute who was the victim of human trafficking, may order that the accused be tested for the presence of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), ''[n]otwithstanding the provisions of'' the statute (§ 19a-582) requiring a person's ''general con- sent'' for that person's HIV-related testing. The defendant, who had been charged with the crimes of patronizing a prostitute who was the victim of human trafficking and conspiracy to commit trafficking in persons, appealed from the trial court's order, in response to motions filed by the state and certain of the defendant's alleged victims, requiring that he submit to an examination for STDs pursuant to § 54-102a (a) and HIV testing pursuant to § 54-102a (b). The charges stemmed from the defendant's involvement with a person who had arranged for young males to engage in sexual activities with the defendant in exchange for money. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion in ordering HIV testing on the ground that the trial court was required to find, before issuing such an order, that there was a clear and imminent danger to the public health or the health of a person and that there was a compelling need for the HIV test result that could not be accommodated by other means, and the state presented no evidence in furtherance of satisfying that standard. The defendant also contended that, to the extent that an examination for STDs and HIV testing could be ordered under § 54-102a (a) and (b), respectively, without a finding of a compelling need, those statutory provisions violated the defendant's constitutional rights. Dur- ing the pendency of this appeal, the defendant was convicted of the charged crimes. Held: 1. The trial court's order was an appealable final judgment, and the defen- dant's conviction of the charged crimes had no bearing, jurisdictional or otherwise, on this appeal: the court's order terminated a separate and distinct proceeding, as it involved a discrete matter entirely distinct from and independent of the adjudication of the defendant's guilt, and, accordingly, the proceedings concerning the propriety of that order were wholly severable from the proceedings pertaining to the resolution of the defendant's criminal case, which could and did advance separate and apart from this appeal; moreover, although § 54-102a authorizes a trial court to issue an order pursuant to that statute while a case is ''pending'' in that court, whereas a related statute (§ 54-102b) delineates the circumstances under which a defendant's HIV testing shall be ordered upon motion following conviction, there was nothing in § 54- 102a or § 54-102b to suggest that § 54-102b was intended to place a temporal limitation on the execution of an order properly issued pursu- ant to § 54-102a prior to a conviction, and § 54-102b made no provision for the HIV testing of persons convicted of offenses of which the defen- dant ultimately was convicted. 2. The trial court did not abuse the discretion conferred on it by § 54-102a (b) in ordering that the defendant submit to HIV testing: there was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court was obligated to adhere to the requirement set forth in § 19a-582 (d) (8) that it find, before ordering HIV testing, a clear and imminent danger to the public health or the health of a person and that the person seeking the testing of the defendant has demonstrated a compelling need for the test result that cannot be accommodated by other means, as a review of the language of § 54-102a (b), its legislative history, and related statutes, as well as the language of § 19a-582, indicated that the legislature did not intend for the requirement of § 19a-582 (d) (8) to apply to an order for HIV testing under § 54-102a (b); accordingly, § 54-102a (b) broadly authorizes a trial court to order HIV testing when, as in the present case, the conditions of that statute—that the defendant has been charged with committing an offense enumerated in that statute, the offense involved a sexual act, and the charge is pending before the court—have been met. 3. To comport with the provision of the Connecticut constitution (art. I, § 7) prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, a court is required to make a finding, prior to ordering an examination for STDs pursuant to § 54-102a (a) or HIV testing pursuant to § 54-102a (b), that such an examination or testing would provide useful, practical information to a victim that could not reasonably be obtained in another manner, but this court rejected the defendant's contention that a trial court must find, before issuing an order for such an examination or testing, that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has an STD or HIV: this court reviewed the factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672), which included consideration of federal case law concerning suspicionless searches and the special needs doctrine, sister state case law addressing the constitutionality of statutes that authorize noncon- sensual HIV testing of persons charged with certain crimes, and contem- porary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, and relevant public policies as reflected in the legislative history of § 54-102a, and concluded that the issuance of an order for HIV testing pursuant to § 54-102a (b) based solely on a finding that the conditions of that statute have been met violates a defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under article first, § 7, as, in many cases, such testing would provide no real benefit to the victim, and, under those circumstances, the state's interest in requiring testing is not sufficient to override a defendant's recognized privacy interest; accordingly, this court placed an interpretive gloss on § 54-102a to render it compatible with the requirements of article first, § 7, by requiring a court to find that an examination for STDs or HIV testing would provide useful, practical information to a victim that could not reasonably be obtained otherwise; moreover, because the trial court did not apply the foregoing standard and the state and the victims were not on notice that they were required to satisfy that standard in filing their motions pursuant to § 54-102a (a) and (b), the trial court's order was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new hearing on those motions. (Two justices concurring separately in one opinion) Argued October 21, 2019—officially released July 14, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 53a-54b (7)), a person is guilty of murder with special circumstances when such person is convicted of ''murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction'' and was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense. Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of murder with special circum- stances in connection with the shooting deaths of A and J, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had incor- rectly instructed the jury on the ''in the course of a single transaction'' element of murder with special circumstances, thereby relieving the state of its burden of proving that element beyond a reasonable doubt. On the night of the murders, the defendant, along with passengers O and R, drove around in the defendant's car looking for J, with whom the defendant had a feud. Upon finding J sitting in the driver's seat of A's car, the defendant stopped, exited his car, and walked toward J, who had exited A's car. When the defendant reached J, he shot him two times and then walked to A's car and fired multiple shots at A, who was seated in the front passenger seat. The operative information charged the defendant with having committed the murders in the course of a single transaction but not at the same time. At trial, the defendant presented a third-party culpability defense implicating O in the murders. Specifically, defense counsel argued during closing argument that only O had the motive, means and opportunity to murder A and J. The trial court instructed the jury, with respect to the ''in the course of a single transaction'' element of murder with special circumstances, that, to prove that element, the state was required to establish beyond a reason- able doubt either that there was a temporal nexus between the murders of A and J or that there was a plan, motive, or intent common to both murders. Defense counsel did not object to that instruction. Held: 1. The defendant did not implicitly waive his unpreserved claim of instruc- tional error under State v. Kitchens (299 Conn. 447); although the trial court provided the parties with a copy of its revised jury charge and defense counsel did not object to the court's instruction on murder with special circumstances, that court, under the circumstances of this case, did not provide the parties with a meaningful opportunity to review a change that it had made to the instruction on the ''in the course of a single transaction'' element of murder with special circumstances prior to charging the jury. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court had incorrectly instructed the jury that, if it found that there was a temporal nexus between the two murders, it could find that the state had proven the ''in the course of a single transaction'' element: contrary to the defendant's assertion, this court did not hold in State v. Gibbs (254 Conn. 578) that evidence of a common plan, motive, or intent is required to prove that multiple murders occurred in the course of a single transaction but held that a temporal connection alone is sufficient to satisfy the ''in the course of a single transaction'' element and that, in the absence of a temporal connection, evidence of a common plan, motive, or intent is sufficient to demonstrate a clear connection between multiple murders and to establish that those murders occurred in the course of a single transaction; accordingly, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could find the ''in the course of a single transaction'' element proven by evidence of a temporal nexus between the murders of A and J, and, therefore, the defendant's claim of instruc- tional error failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233). 3. The trial court did not commit plain error by failing to provide the jury, sua sponte, with a special credibility instruction with respect to the testimony of O, who the defendant claimed was the actual perpetrator of the murders of A and J, and, thus, had a strong motive to testify falsely against him: even if the defendant had requested such an instruction, it would not have been plain error for that court to have declined to provide it, as this court has not endorsed, let alone required, such an instruction; moreover, the trial court instructed the jury on O's credibility generally, and defense counsel, during cross-examination and closing argument, highlighted for the jury O's motivations for testifying falsely, including the defense's theory that O was the actual perpetrator of the murders. 4. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court had violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to present a defense by precluding defense counsel from arguing during closing argument that the absence of testimony from V, O's best friend, created reasonable doubt: the trial court reasonably determined that defense counsel was making an improper missing witness argument rather than raising a significant issue or making appropriate comment about V's absence at trial to the extent that V's absence reflected on the weakness of the state's case, as V was not a witness to the murders of A and J and, thus, could not corroborate or dispute the version of events to which various witnesses testified, and there was ample testimony, without the need to discuss V's absence, from which defense counsel could argue to the jury that O had a stronger motive than the defendant, as well as the means and opportunity, to murder A and J; accordingly, the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in limiting the scope of defense counsel's closing argument to prevent comment on facts that were not in evidence, and, therefore, the defendant's claim failed under the third prong of Golding. Argued January 12—officially released July 15, 2021

Convicted of the crime of murder, the defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court upheld the defendant's conviction. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction insofar as the state failed to prove the manner, means, place, cause, and time of the victim's death, and that the inferences that the jury apparently drew from the evidence were unreasonable because the state failed to prove that the defendant had committed or intended to commit any criminal acts. Held that the Appellate Court's well reasoned opinion, in which that court determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction, fully addressed the evidentiary sufficiency issue, and this court adopted that portion of the Appellate Court's opinion as a proper statement of the applicable law concerning that issue; moreover, this court empha- sized two facts that were not expressly applied by the Appellate Court in its analysis but that were noted in the Appellate Court's opinion and further supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant intended to cause or did cause the victim's death, namely, that the victim had been seen at the defendant's residence within two hours of the victim's last cell phone communication and was in good health, and the defendant missed his first work shift the day after the victim disappeared but arrived for his second shift later that day. Argued March 29—officially released July 16, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of murder, criminal attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. Several days after the shooting, a confidential informant told a detective, P, about a conver- sation he had with the defendant in which the defendant admitted to murdering the victim and wanting to sell the rifle that he had used to do so. At P's urging, the informant went to the defendant's residence to place a hold on the rifle. During the ride back to the police station, the informant told P that he saw a rifle and ammunition in the defendant's bedroom. P immediately began preparing an application for a search warrant while the police surveilled the defendant's residence. The police became concerned that their presence had been noticed and entered the defendant's residence in order to secure it until the warrant was obtained. During a protective sweep, an officer entered the defendant's attic and saw the rifle in plain view. The search warrant application was then approved on the basis of P's affidavit, in which P averred, inter alia, that the police were relying on an informant whose ''information has been proven true and reliable.'' Thereafter, the defendant was detained and, in the early morning, brought to the station, where he waived his Miranda rights. He was then interviewed by two detectives, N and Z, for more than three hours, during which he confessed to the murder. Prior to trial, the defendant filed motions to suppress the rifle and other evidence discovered during the search of his residence and the statements he had made to N and Z during the interrogation. Specifi- cally, he claimed that the rifle was illegally obtained during a warrantless search and that his confession was involuntary as a result of certain coercive interrogation tactics employed by N and Z, namely, interviewing him while he was sleep-deprived, presenting him with false evidence of his guilt, maximizing the consequences of not confessing, threatening his family with arrest, and suggesting that his confession would be met with leniency. The trial court denied both motions, concluding, inter alia, that the defendant's confession was voluntary. With respect to the rifle, the court concluded that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the defendant's residence and that, even if the entry into the attic was not permitted as part of the protective sweep, the rifle was admissible under the independent source doctrine on the ground that the search warrant that was issued was supported by proba- ble cause independent of any information obtained during the initial entry. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence found during the warrantless search of his residence, because, regardless of whether the initial entry and protective sweep were justified by exigent circum- stances, the trial court correctly determined that the evidence was admis- sible pursuant to the independent source doctrine, as that evidence would have been lawfully and inevitably discovered pursuant to the search warrant: the defendant conceded, and this court agreed, that the decision to seek the search warrant, which P was preparing before the initial entry took place, was not prompted by information obtained during the initial entry and protective sweep, and P's affidavit in support of the search warrant, excised of any potentially tainted information from the initial entry, established probable cause to search the defen- dant's residence; moreover, although P's affidavit did not disclose any details to substantiate his averment that the informant's information had been ''proven true and reliable,'' other aspects of the affidavit estab- lished the informant's reliability, as the affidavit made clear that the informant's identity was known to the police, stated that the informant would be willing to testify in court in the future, indicated that P indepen- dently corroborated certain information provided by the informant, including the caliber of the firearm used in the shooting, and noted that the information the informant provided to P was based on the informant's firsthand observations while at the defendant's residence. 2. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court had improperly admitted his statements to N and Z on the ground that those statements were not voluntary and that their admission therefore violated his due process rights under the federal and state constitutions: a. The trial court correctly determined that the state met its burden under the federal constitution of establishing the voluntariness of the defendant's statements by a preponderance of the evidence, as the record demonstrated that the combined effect of the interrogation tactics employed by N and Z did not cause the defendant's will to be overborne: although N and Z engaged in false evidence ploys by referring to evidence they did not have in order to give the impression that the state's case against the defendant was stronger than it actually was, most of the false evidence claims, viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, were made during the first hour of the interview and were not particularly egregious, and the defendant demonstrated that he was capable of resisting and pushing back on these claims by falsely accusing another individual, Q, of the murder for more than two hours; moreover, the detectives' statements regarding the defendant's sentencing exposure were an accurate representation of the severity of the consequences that he faced, and, although N inappropriately referred to the death penalty during the interrogation, that was a single, isolated statement, the defen- dant had no audible reaction to it, and he continued to blame the murder on Q; furthermore, N's comment suggesting that members of the defen- dant's family would be arrested if he did not confess was not causally related to the confession of the defendant, who apparently recognized the threat as an empty ploy, and certain comments made by the detectives suggesting that the defendant would receive leniency if he confessed and that he could be charged with the lesser crime of manslaughter depending on the statement he gave were not inherently coercive, as N and Z did not make any definitive promise to the defendant or represent that they had the authority to determine the charges against him; in addition, the length of the interrogation was far shorter than other interro- gations held not to have been inherently coercive, N and Z never subjected the defendant to physical abuse or threats of such abuse, the defendant twice waived his Miranda rights, and, although the defendant showed signs of being tired during the interrogation, he was lucid and responsive throughout the interview, was able to understand the detectives' ques- tions, communicated clearly and coherently, and pushed back on certain of the interrogation tactics by consistently denying his involvement in the murder, fabricating and maintaining the story that Q committed the murder, and pretending to cry to give credibility to his story. b. Applying the factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672), this court declined the defendant's request to adopt a prophylactic rule under the state constitution requiring Connecticut trial courts to consider whether coercive interrogation tactics, such as those employed in the present case, raise questions about the voluntariness of a confession: the text of the state due process clause did not support the defendant's claim, the defendant did not cite to any federal or Connecticut authority in support of his claim that the state due process clause requires a more stringent analysis regarding the admission of confessions, the only case from another state cited by the defendant was distinguishable, and the defendant did not refer to any evidence that the authors of our state constitution intended to provide greater protection against involuntary confessions; moreover, public policy did not support adopting the pro- phylactic rule urged by the defendant, as courts already are required to consider the coercive nature of an interrogation under the totality of the circumstances, and defendants are capable of vindicating such con- cerns by introducing social science evidence or expert testimony to demonstrate that the interrogation tactics employed by interrogators overbore an individual's will. (One justice concurring separately; one justice concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued June 1, 2020—officially released July 22, 2021

The defendant was convicted of one count of interfering with an officer, one count of disobeying the direction of an officer while increasing the speed of a motor vehicle in an attempt to escape or elude, and two counts of assault of a peace officer in connection with two separate incidents between him and certain police officers. During the first inci- dent, an officer, S, turned his cruiser into a parking lot adjacent to a library at about 9 p.m. S observed the defendant walking quickly from a picnic table near the library to a parked vehicle in the lot. Once in the vehicle, the defendant took a few moments to set up a dashboard camera in order to record the incident. Shortly thereafter, the defendant drove his vehicle toward the exit, S turned his cruiser's light bar on briefly, and S motioned with his hand for the defendant to pull alongside the cruiser, which he did. After a brief dialogue, S told the defendant to put his vehicle in park. The defendant ignored S's command and abrubtly began to drive toward the exit. S turned on his lightbar again and pulled his cruiser behind the defendant's vehicle. The defendant stopped, shouted to S, ''hey asshole,'' and then proceeded to exit the parking lot and to drive north on a local road. Another officer, who had just arrived at the scene, and S pursued the defendant, and the defendant stopped a short distance up the road. After the defendant continued to argue with the officers and declined a request to provide his operator's license and registration, the officers let him leave the scene and applied for an arrest warrant. The second incident occurred when the defendant, in response to being informed by the police that they had obtained a warrant for his arrest, arrived at the police station. The defendant brought a video camera with him and began recording. The defendant was told by an officer, V, that he was in custody and under arrest. V also told the defendant that he had to secure the camera and that it would be returned. The defendant declined to surrender the camera and attempted to leave. A struggle between the defendant and V ensued, shortly after which another officer, D, came to V's assistance. Once the defendant was subdued, he was carried to the booking area. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence derived from the encounter relating to the first incident, claiming that S lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant had been engaged in criminal activity and that his detention was therefore illegal. The trial court denied that motion. On appeal from the judgments of conviction, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of both counts of assault of a peace officer. Held: 1. The trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence relating to the first incident, as the defendant's detention by S in connection with that incident was unlawful, and, accordingly, the judgment of conviction of interfering with an officer and disobeying the direction of an officer was reversed; the defendant's conduct could not, in and of itself, give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, as the totality of circumstances did not objectively indicate that the defendant was attempting to elude detection, there were no signs limiting access to the parking lot, members of the public frequently used the area after the library was closed in order to use the book drop and to access the library's free Wi-Fi, the fact that crimes previously occurred nearby did not alter this conclusion, and S's observa- tion that the defendant walked quickly toward his vehicle fell short of the type of flight that has been found to indicate criminal behavior. 2. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of both counts of assault of a peace officer in connection with the second incident on the ground that the jury could not have reasonably found that the defendant had intended to interfere with the performance of either V's or D's duties or to cause D's injuries, and on the ground that the evidence did not support a finding that V's use of force was reasonable: the context afforded by the argument preceding the struggle at the police station, the defendant's attempt to leave the lobby, the fact that he kicked V multiple times, and the length of the struggle were facts from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant's resistance was undertaken with an intent to delay his arrest, and not the result of mere reflex; moreover, the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that V's use of force was reasonable, as V testified that he grabbed the defendant, who had been informed that he was under arrest, in order to prevent him from leaving the lobby and brought him to the ground only after the defendant began to struggle, V was outsized and alone at the moment the struggle began, and V never struck the defendant or resorted to the use of any type of weapon; furthermore, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant injured D during the struggle, as D testified that he experienced neck and back pain as a result of the defendant's resistance and that he took time off from work to recover from those injuries. 3. The defendant was entitled to a new trial with respect to the count charging him with the assault of V, as the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury that, to find the defendant guilty of that assault, it must first determine that V's use of force was reasonable, and, accordingly, the defendant was entitled to a new trial with respect to that count; nevertheless, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury, with respect to the charge relating to the assault of D, that the defendant's conduct must have been the proximate cause of D's injuries, as the trial court's instruction on causation was both legally correct and adequate when viewed in the context of the evidence presented at trial. Argued February 24—officially released July 23, 2021

The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant town for, inter alia, breach of contract. The plaintiff worked as a police officer for the town and retired on disability in 1986 after sustaining an injury in the course of his employment. In 1985, the town had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union in which the plaintiff was member. At that time, federal law did not permit municipal employees to enroll in Medicare, but the law was amended thereafter to permit or require municipal employees to participate in Medicare. The 1985 collective bargaining agreement provided that union members who retired due to disability would be entitled to town paid private health insurance. In 2016, the year after the plaintiff reached the age of sixty-five, the town informed him that he would be required to enroll in Medicare and to pay the cost of his Medicare Part B premiums. The plaintiff claimed that the town was bound to provide him with town paid private health insurance under the collective bargaining agreement or, alternatively, that it was obligated to subsidize the costs of his Medicare Part B premiums. Follow- ing a trial, the court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement did not bar the town from requiring that the plaintiff transition to Medi- care, so long as the Medicare plan did not substantially reduce the benefits provided. The court also concluded, however, that the town was bound to subsidize the costs of his Medicare Part B premiums. Thereafter, the town appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held: 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the collective bargaining agree- ment did not preclude the town from terminating the private health insurance in which the plaintiff was enrolled and requiring him to transi- tion to Medicare coverage: the collective bargaining agreement did not specifically require that the plaintiff be placed, and that he remain, on the same health insurance plan as the town's ''active employees,'' as that term did not appear in the agreement, and the agreement did not address what rights retirees would have following the expiration of that agreement in 1987; moreover, the agreement did not specify whether Medicare qualifies as an insurance carrier or whether retirees who become eligible for Medicare can be treated differently from active employees, and, although a 2010 collective bargaining agreement between the town and the union required eligible union retirees to participate in Medicare, that did not necessarily mean that the silence in the 1985 collective bargaining agreement with respect to that issue was purposeful, as federal Medicare law changed after the 1985 collective bargaining agreement went into effect, and testimony at trial suggested that, when the town agreed, in 1985, to subsidize retirees' health insur- ance costs for life, it was with the expectation that the retirees would not be eligible to enroll in Medicare and that private insurance would be their only available coverage option; furthermore, the town's course of performance in allowing the plaintiff to remain enrolled in private health insurance since his retirement in 1986 did not demonstrate that the plaintiff was entitled to continue on that path, as he was not eligible to enroll in Medicare until he turned sixty-five, the only reason why the town did not immediately terminate the plaintiff's private insurance coverage when he did turn sixty-five was that there was confusion over whether that transition needed to be delayed pending the resolution of a workers' compensation claim, and other union members who retired along with the plaintiff under the 1985 collective bargaining agreement also had been transitioned to Medicare. 2. This court declined to address the plaintiff's claim that the town illegally transferred him from private health insurance to Medicare without his consent, as the record was inadequate for review of that claim and the claim was inadequately briefed. 3. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the town was required to reim- burse the plaintiff for the cost of his Medicare premiums; the plaintiff conceded that the town was required to provide him only with benefits that are afforded to active employees, rather than benefits comparable to those that he received under the 1985 collective bargaining agreement, the 2010 collective bargaining agreement required that active employees share the costs of their private health insurance, active employees were required to contribute toward the town's premium equivalent costs, and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff suggested that he was paying no more for his health insurance than the town's active employees. Argued January 14—officially released July 28, 2021

Convicted, after a trial to the court, of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child in connection with the sexual abuse of his daughter, R, when she was ten years old, the defendant appealed to this court. During a forensic interview conducted in response to R's statement to a camp counselor that the defendant had been touching her inappropriately, R stated that the defendant had on multiple occasions touched her vagina and vaginal area. R also reported that the defendant's conduct caused her to experi- ence pain and made her feel uncomfortable. At trial, the court admitted, over defense counsel's objection, a video recording of the forensic inter- view, and the defendant, through his own testimony, denied inappropri- ately touching R. In addition, the defendant presented the testimony of his sister and former girlfriend, S, both of whom testified that R experi- enced dry skin around her vaginal area. S testified that the defendant supervised R as she cleaned herself but did not touch her directly. The court found R's account to be credible and rejected the contrary testimony offered by the defendant. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video recording of R's forensic interview into evidence under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule: the interview took place in a hospital, during which a forensic interviewer asked R about her physical and mental well-being, and the interviewer testified at the defendant's trial that, as a result of the substance of R's statements during the interview, she encouraged a medical examination of and therapy for R; accordingly, on the basis of R's statements and the circumstances in which they were made, including the location of the interview and the nature of the interviewer's questions, an objective observer reasonably could infer that R's statements were made for the purpose of receiving medical treatment and were pertinent to that end. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was deprived of a fair trial on the ground that the prosecutor improperly referred to facts not in evidence and commented on the credibility of a witness insofar as he mischaracterized the testimony of J, the defendant's former girl- friend, by stating that J had previously admitted that she saw the defen- dant inappropriately touch R: even if the prosecutor's statements were improper, this court was provided with the requisite assurance that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, as the trial court, which was the trier of fact, expressly rejected the allegedly improper statements, it having acknowledged, following defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's remarks concerning J, the concerns that motivated the objection and having stated that it would not consider the prosecutor's statements in determining the defendant's guilt; moreover, the court noted that, if the prosecutor's comments regarding J had been made during a jury trial, it would have instructed the jury that it was its recollection of the evidence that controlled, and there was no evidence that the court failed to follow its own instructions. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he engaged in the criminal conduct described by R during her forensic interview and at trial because he presented witnesses who contradicted R's testimony, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted with the intent to degrade or humiliate R, or that he gained sexual gratification from engaging in the conduct in question, for purposes of his conviction of sexual assault in the fourth degree: the trial court credited R's testimony and discredited the contradictory testimony offered by the defense, and R's testimony was sufficient to support the court's conclusion that the defendant engaged in the criminal conduct on which his conviction was based; moreover, there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant acted with the necessary intent to be convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree, as the evidence adduced by the state, including R's testimony, was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions that the defen- dant's contact with R's intimate parts, despite her repeated pleas to him that he stop, was made for the purpose of degrading or humiliating her, and that the defendant acted for the purpose of his sexual gratification. 4. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the statutes criminalizing sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct; the language of those statutes and the relevant judicial decisions interpreting them provide a person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice that the digital penetra- tion of a child's vagina and the touching of a child's vagina with a rag in a sexual and indecent manner are criminally prohibited. Argued January 14—officially released July 28, 2021