Volume 34 — Federal Reporter

In Equity. On demurrer to bill. The case made by the bill was this: In April, 1880, one John C. Pierron was elected treasurer of the city of Fond da Lac. He executed to the city a bond for the faithful performance of the duties of the office, in the sum of $100,000.

<p>1. Fraudulent Conveyances — Taking Title is Wife’s Name — Agreement with Creditors.</p> <p>An insolvent trader sold the whole of Ixis estale to certain of his creditors for the amount of their debts, and certain others which they assumed, the to.ta.1 exceeding the value of the estate. The creditors immediately took possession, and managed the "business for a few days, after which one of their number bought out the others, and sold the estate to the insolvent’s wile, for cash and promissory notes. Bhe then went into possession, under her own sign, employed her husband, but vrithout salary, with others as assistants, and eventually paid off the notes. Held, that although the wife was not shown 1o have any separate estate prior to the purchase by her, there was no fraud.</p> <p>2. Husband and Wife — Liability of Wife’s Estate — Heists of Husband-Declarations to Commercial Agency.</p> <p>In a creditors’ suit against an insolvent’s wife to subject property in her hands to the payment of their debts, statements of the husband as to his financial condition made at periods antecedent to his insolvency, to a commercial agency, cannot defeat the rights of the wife, unless participated in by her.</p>

At Law. Suit for damages for injury to plaintiff while in the defendants’ em-ploymentf resulting from an elevator accident. The plaintiff’s testimony tended to show that he was employed by the defendants, who were manufacturers and dealers in wagons, carriages, etc., in the city of Chicago, to crate or box carriages. His place of work was on the fourth floor of defendants’ building.

<p>CURTESY — NATURE OF ESTATE DURING COVERTURE — EXECUTION—EXEMPTIONS.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. Mo. § 3295, exempting from levy of execution, during cov-erture, the interest of the husband in any right of the wife in any real estate acquired by her before or after marriage, for his sole debt, the husband’s estate, by the curtesy, is exempt, during coverture, from such sale, and the purchaser cannot maintain an action of ejectment for such interest after the death of the wife.</p>

At Law. Original action for services. The plaintiff, William 11. Strong, who is a commissioner of the United States circuit court, brought this suit to recover a balance claimed to he due him on an account for services rendered as such commissioner for and on behalf of the United States. The original account, as presented to the proper accounting officer of the treasury department, was for $919.10, and runs from February 18, 1887, to June 7, 1887.

At Law. John A. Williams brings this action against the United States, under the act of March 3, 1887, to recover compensation beyond the sum allowed for services as supervisor of elections in the city of Baltimore.

On Motion in Arrest of Judgment. This is a criminal action against George Ford. The indictment charges that defendant “did forcibly attempt to.rescue” certain property seized by a revenue collector. Defendant, being convicted, moves in arrest of judgment for want of certainty in the indictment.

<p>On Demurrer to the Indictment.</p>

In Equity. On motion to dissolve an injunction, and motion for injunction. On motions for injunctions under the Gatos “Sight-Feed Lubricator Pa1-ent, No. 138,243, of April 29, 1873. An interference proceeding was had in the patent-office, in 1880, between Parshall and others, who are strangers to these suits. The record in tho interference proceeding was stipulated into the case of Oil-Cup Co. v. Lubricator Co., 10,.Fed.

<p>PATBXTS TOR feVEKTIOKS — IXTRISGEMEKT—DRESS FORMS.</p> <p>Letters patent Ho. 233,240, issued October 12, 1880, to John Hall, for improvements in dress forms, in which, the skirt form consists of ribs suspended from braces hinged at each end to a movable block, supported by rests, and sliding up and down an upright central standard, is infringed by k device for the same purpose, having similar standard, ribs, and braces, in which a collar fixed to the standard takes the place of the upper block, and a nut, working on a thread in the standard, takes the place of the lower block, such collar and nut being1 merely an equivalent for the sliding blocks supported by rests.</p>

<p>In Equity. On bill for injunction.</p> <p>Bill for injunction by Leopold Kraus et al. against James Gr. Fitzpatrick et al., for infringement of design patent No. 13, 620, dated February 13, 1883.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Infringement—Reference.</p> <p>Upon a reference in a suit for infringement of reissued letters patent No. 5,940, for an improvement in artificial ivory, consisting of shellac and talc in substantially equal parts, it appeared that defendant used a composition of shellac and “fiber white,” claimed to be a different substance from talc, and to have been discovered since the issue of the patent. The master found that “fiber white” had all the physical and chemical properties of talc, and was talc. Held, that as his report showed there was, as to that fact, much conflicting testimony, his finding will hot be set aside.</p> <p>2. Same — Infringement—Damages. ,</p> <p>Where plaintiff’s invention relates to anew composition of matter, and the infringing article is made of the patented material, and this alone, the measure of the patentee’s damages is the entire profit he would have made, to the extent of the sales by defendant of the infringing article.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for injunction for infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Threatening Purchasers with Suits for Infringement-Injunction.</p> <p>A court of equity has jurisdiction to restrain an attempted intimidation by one issuing circulars threatening to bring suits for infringements against persons dealing in a competitor’s patented article, the bill charging, and the proofs showing, that the charges of infringement were not made in good faith, but with malicious intent to injure complainant’s business.</p> <p>% Same — Evidence—'Validity op Patent — Colt.atkrat, Attack.</p> <p>In a suit to restrain one from issuing circulars threatening to Tiring suits for infringements against, all customers dealing in a competitor’s patented article, a court of equity will not pass upon the validity of the patent, but it may consider the state of the art in connection with the defendant’s conduct, to ascertain his good faith in issuing the circulars.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by Hudgins and Hurst for the cost of sails furnished the sloop Sea Lark. The question at issue is whether the claim of libelants should have priority over the claim of one Mitchell, a seaman, for wages accruing prior to the claims of libelants.

<p>1. ShippiNG — Charter-Party—Seaworthiness—Continuing Guaranty.</p> <p>Libelant, the owner of a river steamer at Louisville, Kentucky, contracted with respondents that the master of the steamer should take her to Vicksburg, Mississippi, and employ her in respondents’ service upon the Yazoo river for five months, guarantying that the vessel should have the necessary underwriters’ certificate as to her seaworthiness. She was inspected at Louisville, and a certificate obtained from the secretary of the underwriters, but, upon a subsequent inspection, during her service, the certificate was withdrawn. The master charged the underwriters with fraud, threatened suit against them, settled up with respondents, took possession of the vessel, and respondents declared the contract at an end. field that, under all the circumstances, the guaranty must be construed as a continuing one, not limited to the time the vessel went into respondent’s employment.</p> <p>2. Release and Discharge — Effect.</p> <p>Respondents, in a suit for damages for breach of charter-party, filed a cross-libel for damages for false representations. It appeared that before the commencement of the suit the master of the vessel had settled with respondents, giving them a receipt and acquittance for moneys due from them, and had taken possession of the vessel. Held, that the settlement was conclusive, and the cross-libel should be dismissed.</p>

<p>1. SHIPPING — CHARTER-PARTY—SEAWORTHINESS.</p> <p>There is an implied warranty of seaworthiness or fitness for the contemplated voyage in every charter-party or contract of affreightment on the part of the ship-owner, and this is a condition precedent to performance by the shipper.1</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>The libelants chartered the Director to carry a cargo of wheat from Portland to Europe, and, when she was loaded, she commenced, from inherent weakness, to leak, so that her cargo had to he discharged. Held, that the vessel not. being- seaworthy at the date of the charter and the delivery of the cargo, there was a failure on the part of the ship-owner 1o perform the condition precedent of the contract, and the shipper was absolved therefrom, and was entitled to recover possession of his wheat, and such damages as he may have sustained by reason of such failure.</p> <p>8. Mauitimk Liens — Salk oe Vessel — Order oe Payment.</p> <p>Assuming that the proceeds of the sale, of the vessel are not sufficient to satisfy the demand of the libelants and those of the intervenors, the stevedore who unloaded the cargo, having a lien on both cargo and vessel for his services, is entitled to be first paid; the claim for towage up the river to Portland, and the claim of the libelants for damages for breach of the contract, are to he paid pro rata, the costs incurred by the libelants in arresting and keeping the vessel to be first paid in full; the carpenter who recalked and coppered the vessel after the cargo was removed from her, his labor and material being of no benefit to the prior lienors, must he paid last.</p> <p>A. Admiralty — Replevin—Costs.</p> <p>In a suit in admiralty for the possession of personal property, where the same is taken on process issued on the application of the libelants, the same should be delivered to them; and, therefore, if they procure the arrest of the property and leave it in the custody of the marshal, they cannot recover the cost and expense of such custody, either as damages or costs.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

In Admiralty. Libel for damages. Two libels to recover damages sustained in consequence of a collision, brought by Van Wie, owner of the steam-tug Edwin Hawley, against the ferry-boatSeacaucus, and by the Hoboken Land & Improvement Company, owner of the Seacaucus, against the Edwin Hawley.

<p>In Admiralty. Libels for damages.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for damages.</p>

<p>Mahitime Libs' — Quarantine Commissioners — Care op Sick Seamus.</p> <p>The services of the quarantine commissioners, in the care and treatment of sick seamen in the quarantine hospitals, are maritime in their character, and the lion of the commissioners on the vessel, arising out of such services, required by state statute, can consequently- be enforced by a proceeding in admiralty.</p>

<p>Seamer — Claim: rob Wages — Desertion— Cruel Treatment.</p> <p>As against libelant’s claim for wages, tbe defense set up was desertion. Libelant claimed that be left tbe vessel on account of cruel treatment by the master. As the cruelty alleged by libelant rested solely on bis own evidence, was denied by tbe master, mate, and steward, their evidence not being rebutted by libelant, and none of bis shipmates being called to corroborate him, held, that bis claim, resting on such testimony, was too uncertain, and too much ojien to suspicion as to his good faith, tobe allowed, and tbe libel should be dismissed.</p>

<p>Courts — Federal Jurisdiction — CmzENsmr—Act op March 8, 1887.</p> <p>Whore the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that, ihe action is between citizens of different states, suit may be brought in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or defendant.</p> <p> (Syiiabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>In Equity. On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>1. Courts — Federal — Jurisdiction— Homicide — Within Presidio Military Reservation.</p> <p>The Presidio military reservation, in the city and county of San Francisco, is not a place “under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States;” and a homicide committed within the reservation is not an offense against the ' United States, within the meaning of section 5889, Rev. St.</p> <p>2, Same.</p> <p>A homicide committed within said Presidio military reservation is not an offense over which the courts of the United States have jurisdiction.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>COURTS — FeDKRAL JURISDICTION — ACTIONS ON COUNTY WARRANTS.</p> <p>Under act Cong. 1887, (24 St. 553,) § 1, providing that the federal courts shall not. have jurisdiction of any action on airy promissory note or chose in action, except on'negotiable securities payable to bearer, and made by a corporation, by an assignee, or a subsequent holder, if the instrument be payable to bearer, unless such suit might have been brought in such court if no" assignment or transfer had been made, the circuit court has no jurisdiction of an action by an assignee on a county -warrant payable to the order of a person named therein, and passing only by indorsement, in the absence of averment that the assignor was qualified to sue in this court, buthas jurisdiction of an action by the holder on one payable to bearer, such being a negotiable security made by a corporation.</p>

On Exceptions to Master’s Report. The intervenor sought to recover damages for injuries received by being run over by a freight train operated by the receivers of the defendant railroad. The master reported adversely on the claim and inter-ven or. excepted.

In Equity. On demurrer to bill. The United States Bung Manufacturing Company, as maker, paid David Armstrong as receiver of the Fidelity National Bank a certain promissory note, and afterwards filed their bill in equity to secure right of offset. The defendants demurred to plaintiff’s bill.

In Equity. Bill for specific performance and injunction. - The city of Houston, authorized by its charter, passed an ordinance providing for the issuance of bonds to raise a fund for building a market. Under the terms of the ordinance the revenue from the market was to be devoted to the payment of the interest on the bonds, and to constitute a sinking fund to cancel them. Subsequently the city obtained a new charter.

<p>1. Prauds, Statute or — Agreements Relating to Land — Partnership.</p> <p>A bill in equity, by one claiming to be a partner, to obtain a conveyance of an interest in lands on the ground that they belonged to a partnership formed for buying and selling real estate, which alleges that the partnership was formed both by means of personal conversations and by letters, is demurra-ble, as such partnership cannot be formed by parol.</p> <p>2. Partnership — Power or Partner to Bind the Pirm.</p> <p>A bill by one claiming to be a partner, to obtain conveyance of an interest in land claimed to be partnership land, which alleges that the partnership was formed for the purpose of buying and selling land, does not state a cause of action against a vendee of one of the alleged partners, since, if the vendor was a partner, he had authority to sell the land.</p>

<p>Internal Revenue — Seizure of Land — Writ of Error — Procedure Above.</p> <p>Upon a writ of error to tbe' circuit court from a judgment of the district court, dismissing a seizure made upon land for want of prosecution, the circuit court, under Rev. St. U. S. § 686, has only power to reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment of the district court, and a judgment bj' the circuit court, affirming the district court and dismissing the action, will be set aside.</p>

At Law. In action for damages. Action by appellant, William Henry, employe of Vicksburg & Meridian Railroad, to recover for injuries received while in the employ of railroad against F. S. Bond, receiver.

<p>1. Principal and Surety — Surety or Guarantor — Bond to Secure Advances.</p> <p>A person who executes a bond with another as his surety, conditioned for the payment of moneys advanced to the principal by the obligee therein, is a surety, and.not a mere guarantor, and is not entitled to notice of the acceptance 'of the bond by the obligee.</p> <p>2. Same — Alteration op Instrument — Procuring Attestation to Signature op Surety.</p> <p>When a person executes a bond as surety, and leaves it with his principal for delivery to the obligee, and before doing so .the former procures a person to attest the signature of the surety, who is not authorized to do so, such attestation is not an alteration of the instrument that impairs or affects its value as an instrument of evidence in the hands of the obligee, because it was made before delivery.1</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>PRINCIPAL AND SURETY — BOND TO SECURE ADVANCES — DEATH OE SURETY.</p> <p>The death of a surety in a bond conditioned for the repayment of money advanced to the principal within a definite period or before notice to the ob-ligee of withdrawal therefrom, does not terminate his liability, and his estate in the hands of his administrator is liable for advances made after Ms decease,</p> <p> (jSyllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>At Law. Action on judgment.</p>

<p>At Law. Action upon coupons of certain bonds issued by the town of Elmwood, Peoria county, in aid of the Dixon, Peoria & Hannibal Railroad Company.</p>

<p>Exceptions to Report of Referee.</p>

At Law. Action to recover back custom duties. This action was brought to recover duties alleged to have been exacted unlawfully upon boxes containing matches imported from Sweden. The matches were of two kinds. Some were known as “safety matches,” and could be ignited only on a specially prepared surface; and the boxes containing them had on their edges a piece of such prepared surface.

<p>Libel and Slandes — Slander of Title — Damages—Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for defaming one’s title to land caused by filing for record a claim to have it conveyed, evidence that the plaintiff was thereby prevented from selling the land, and using the proceeds in his business, is sufficient to support a verdict for substantial damages, without further proof of special damages.</p>

<p>At Law. On motion for new trial.</p>

<p>Information for Desertion against a seaman.</p>

In Equity. On bill for injunction.. Bill for injunction by Mann’s Boudoir Car Company to restrain the Monarch Parlor Sleeping Car Company from infringement of letters patent granted William D. Mann for an improvement in compartment cars for railways, and an improved system and apparatus for ventilating railway cars.

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Anticipation by Prior Patents — Machines for Mincing Meat.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 271,398, issued January 30, 1883, to John G-. Baker, for a machine for mincing meat, which combines a casing corrugated by longitudinal grooves with retaining shoulders, a perforated plate, a knife, operating against the inner face of the plate, and a forcing screw, the thread of which ' extends to and rotates with the knife, the cutting action being produced by the operation of the knife on the perforated plate, are not anticipated by the Miles patents of 1861 and 1864, which combine a case having spiral grooves near the hopper end, then longitudinal grooves, a rotating shaft with spiral blades, and a perforated plate against which the ends of the spirals revolve, in which the principal part of the cutting is done by the revolving spiral blades in the body of the machine.</p> <p>8. Same — By English Patent.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 271,398, for a machine for inincing meat, describing a combination consisting of a casing corrugated by longitudinal grooves with retaining shoulders, a perforated plate, a knife, operating against the inner face of the plate, and a forcing screw, the thread of which extends to and rotates with the knife, the cutting action being produccd-by the operation of the knife on ‘the perforated plate, is not anticipated by the Dollman English patent which combines a case with a series of horizontal knives at the hopper end, with a series of screw-like blades on a hollow shaft passing through them, the other end of the shaft carrying an Archimedean screw, the case terminating with a perforated plate through which a solid shaft passes and carries on the outside radial cutting blades working on the perforated plate, the meat being cut into small pieces by being carried by the screw-like blades against the horizontal knives and thence carried by the screw to the end of the case, where it is forced through the perforated plate.</p> <p>8. Same — Infringement.</p> <p>The first, second, and sixth claim of letters patent No. 271,398, issued to John Q. Baker January 30, 1883, for a machine for mincing meat, which combine a casing corrugated by longitudinal grooves with retaining shoulders, a perforated plate, a knife, operating against the inner face of the plate, and a forcing screw, the thread of which extends to and rotates with the knife, the cutting action being produced by the operation of the knife on the perforated plate, is infringed by a machine manufactured under the Bhaw patent, dated March 9,1880, reissue No. 10,717, dated April 37, 1886, which is substantially a copy of the Baker machine, except that the internal grooves, though longitudinal, describe a long spiral in a direction contrary to that of the feed-screw, but there is no cutting action until the meat reaches the knife.</p> <p>4. Same — Extent of Claim.</p> <p>Tlie tenth claim of letters patent, No. 371,398, for amachine for mincing meat, describing the combinalion of the casing and a perforated plate, adjustable therein, with a feed-screw, and with a knife constructed to turn with the screw, but otherwise free thereon to accommodate itself to the face of the perforated plate, is limited to the combination therein described, and is not infringed by the claim of the Shaw patent for a stationary plate and an adjustable knife.</p> <p>5. Same — Patentability—Invention.</p> <p>The thirteenth claim of letters patent No. 371,398, issued to John G. Baker, for a machine for mincing moat, describing a knife constructed to turn with the feed-screw, but removable therefrom for the purposes of repair, is void, there being nothing akin to invention about it.</p>

<p>Collision — Between Schooner, While Waiting for Pilot, and Pilot-Boat.</p> <p>After a pilot-boat has put oíf a pilot in a skiff for a schooner, it is the duty of the schooner to wait for the skiff, and it is the duty of the pilot-boat to keep out of the way of the schooner. So, where a collision occurs between the pilot-boat and the schooner while so waiting, the pilot-boat is in fault, and responsible for the damages which may ensue.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On appeal from district court.</p>

<p>Shipping — Demurrage—Attachments.</p> <p>A claim against the cargo for demurrage will be allowed for delay caused by the issuing of attachments under conflicting claims to it.</p>

In Equity. On demurrer to bill. This bill was filed April 25, 1887, seeking to establish a monopoly in the supplying of water to the city of Mobile, under a contract of December 26, 1840, between the city and complainant’s testator, confirmed by act of the Alabama legislature of January 7, 1841; and, as a part of the relief, the bill prayed an injunction upon the defendant from constructing its new, improved, and much larger water-works.

<p>Public Lands — Patents—Actions to Set Aside — Lapse of Time — Innocent Purchasers.</p> <p>Patents to lands, after a lapse of 17 years, will not be set aside at the instance of the government, on the ground of fraud in entering the lands and procuring them, in the absence of any proof of a conspiracy, and where it is not shown that subsequent purchasers of the lands had knowledge of such fraud.</p>

<p>In Equity. Action in ejectment by John G. Wheeler against Thomas Sexton.</p>

Bill in Equity. Bischoff'sheim, survivor of the firm of Bisehoffsheim & Goldschmidt, complainant, filed a bill against J. C. Brown and Jesse Seligman, to recover certain moneys alleged to have boon paid to them as trustees for complainant’s ñrm, and applied by them contrary to the terms of the trust, in the matter of the loan made by them to the New York, Boston & Montreal Railway Company.

<p>1. Railroad Companies — Bonds and Mortgages — Fraudulent Prospectus-Rights op Bondholders.</p> <p>The complainants, acting as a syndicate, purchased part of an issue of railway mortgage bonds offered for sale to the public by a prospectus issued by the agents of the railway company. Trustees had been appointed by an agreement between the several constituent companies composing the railway company to receive and disburse the proceeds of the bonds for certain specified objects, among them the payment of the debts of the constituent companies. In a suit brought by complainants against the railway company, the trustees, and various defendants to whom the trustees had paid part of the proceeds of the bonds, the bill alleged that the prospectus contained various untrue and fraudulent representations; that the complainants relying thereon had been induced to purchase the bonds by fraud; that the trustees and the other defendants who had received part of the proceeds were aware when they received the money of the false and fraudulent character of the prospectus; and that the prospectus also contained a promise that the proceeds of the bonds should be used to complete the construction of the railway, and not for the extinction of liabilities of the constituent companies; but the proceeds were applied in part by the trustees, and were received by the other defendants in payment of such liabilities, with knowledge of this promise. The object of the suit was (1) to rescind the purchase for fraud, and charge the trustees and the recipients of the moneys from them as trustees emmalejicitr, and (2) to enforce the promise of the prospectus as a promise to the purchasers of bonds in the nature of a trust, and compel the trustees and the recipients from them to account for the part appropriated contrary to the promise. Held, that complainants were merely creditors of the company, and as such, even were the issue presented by the bill, could not assail the validity of the agreement appointing the trustees, nor question the doings of the trustees as such.</p> <p>2. Same — Pleading—Multieariousness.</p> <p>If the bill presented a case seeking relief because of the invalidity of the trust agreement, or the violation of the provisions of that agreement bjr the trustees, the conjunction of such a cause of action with the causes of action arising upon the prospectus would render the bill multifarious; and the join-der of causes of action so wholly disconnected would render the bill so obnoxious that the court sua aponte would refuse to tolerate it.</p> <p>8. Equity — Jurisdiction—Rescission oe Contracts — Fraud.</p> <p>Equity will not refuse jurisdiction of a suit to recover moneys obtained by fraud when the money in part has passed into the hands of several third parties with knowledge of the fraud, and the object of the suit is to roach what remains in the hands of the original wrong-doers, and follow the rest and reach it in the hands of the other defendants. In such a case the remedy is more adequate and complete in equity than at law.</p> <p>4. Same — Misrepresentation in Prospectus.</p> <p>Misrepresentation by prospectus, except as between promoters and shareholders, is to be tried by the ordinary criterion of misrepresentation. But a reasonable construction of the language of a prospectus may require that a future tense should be given to words in the past or present tense.</p> <p>5. Same.</p> <p>A right of rescission because of misrepresentations in a prospectus must rest upon misrepresentations concerning material facts, and not of mere matters of opinion, and must relate to existing facts, and not to matters of future conduct or expectation. It cannot be founded upon the breach of pure promissory statements.</p> <p>6. Same.</p> <p>Unless promissory statements are such as imply that a certain condition of things, or state of facts, exists at the time to form the basis of the promised future state of tilings, they do not give birth to a right of rescission. Fraud cannot he predicated of promises not performed for the purpose of avoiding a contract.</p> <p>7.Same.</p> <p>If a prospectus contains material false representations, those who authorize it to he issued cannot repudiate them as made without their authority, while retaining the fruits of the prospectus.</p> <p>8. Same.'</p> <p>A statement in a prospectus respecting the uses to which the moneys to he derived from the sale of bonds are to applied is to be construed as a representation of intention, or the expression of the expect ation and purpose of the promoters, if the language falls short of a distinct and unequivocal promise.</p> <p>9. Same — Following Moneys into Hands of Third Persons.</p> <p>"When a prospectus contains a statement which may be construed as a promise by the promoters to the purchasers of bonds that the moneys derived from the sale of the bonds will he used for certain specified objects, and not otherwise, and the promoters upon receiving the moneys pay them out to creditors of the company, disregarding the promise in the prospectus, the bondholders, although they relied upon the promise in parting with their money, cannot reclaim it upon the theory of a trust, and follow it into the hands of those who received it lawfully from the promoters, although with notice of the promise. It is only when money is held in a fiduciary character, so that the equitable title is in the beneficial owner, that the latter can follow it into the hands of a third person.</p>

<p>1. Contracts — Interpretation—Evidence—Admissibility.</p> <p>An order, otherwise complete, to a manufacturer of iron pipe for a large quantity of that material, given and accepted August 27,1884, was in writing, and concluded in these words: “The entire delivery to be completed within -weeks from date. We will wire you to-morrow in confirmation of those deliveries. ” Held, in an action by the manufacturer to recover damages for ' refusal of the buyer to accept the pipe when delivered, that a conversation between the parties had on August 27th prior to the execution of the contract, and subsequent correspondence by mail and telegraph, were admissible, to show that the blank was to be left until the buyer, who was under a contract to furnish the pipe with a per diem penalty, had ascertained what his limit was, and that he then was to, and did the next day, wire what was to go in the blank, viz., the word “nine. ”</p> <p>2. Same — Performance—Time of the Essence.</p> <p>One who was under a contract with a per diem penalty to deliver iron pipe to a city, gave a written order to a manufacturer, which was accepted the same day. The time of delivery was left blank, but the understanding of the parties was that the buyer was to telegraph the date the next day, which he did, fixing the delivery “within nine weeks from date. ” The order was then entered by the manufacturer. The buyer wrote from time to time urging the speedy prosecution of the work, and finally, when the period was more than up, rescinded the order as to all pipe not then delivered. -Held, in an action by the manufacturer for damages for refusal to accept, that time was of the essence, and that the manufacturer, having entered the order after the blank was filled, was bound thereby, and could not recover.</p>

At Law. Action to recover back custom duties. The plaintiff, (luring the period between March 3 and July 1, 1883, made various importations of Portland cement, from Germany. The goods were invoiced, and entered for consumption as “free on board,” and the invoice and entered value included packing and transportation charges.

<p>CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — AMENDMENT TO STATE CONSTITUTION — RlGHT TO QUESTION in Federal Courts.</p> <p>Act R. I. March 10,1886, (Puh. Laws, c. 550,) provides that the question of the adoption of article 5 of amendments to the constitution, prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors to he used as a bqverage, shall be submitted to the people, the ballots counted by the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general, and the result authoritatively announced by the governor by proclamation. Held, in an action on a promissory note, given for the purchase price of such liquors, by the indorsee, who took it with full knowledge of the consideration, that the circuit court of the United States sitting in Rhode Island had no power to inquire into the question of the legal adoption of the amendment, the political power of the state having declared that the amendment had hcen legally adopted, the amendment having been acquiesced in by the people, and it never having been adjudged illegal by the courts of the state, and that judgment should be entered for the maker of the note.</p>

<p>1. Counties — Liabilities and Indebtedness — Bonds—Bona Fide Holder.</p> <p>A purchaser of negotiable bonds of a county is not affected with constructive notice of the pendency of a suit to test the validity of such bonds.</p> <p>2. Same — Purchaser of Bona Fide Holder.</p> <p>A purchaser from an innocent holder of negotiable bonds of a county, issued under proper authority in subscription for stock of a railroad corporation, can recover thereon against the county, even though he purchased them with notice of .the pendency of a suit to test the validity of such bonds, in which they were adjudged void.</p>

<p>1. TIsited States Commissioners — Fees—CompJjAcnt in Criminad Case.</p> <p>A United States commissioner is not entitled to a fee for drawing a complaint in a criminal prosecution, bnt, such complaint being sworn to and filed, he is entitled to the fee, viz., 10 cents, prescribed (Rev. St. U. S. § 841, par. 1) for administering an oath, and to that, viz., 10 cents, tor filing a paper in a cause (Rev. St. U. S. § 817, par. 7, and § 8.78, par. 8.)</p> <p>2. Same — Reducing Testimony to Whiting.</p> <p>Code Ala. §§ 4256, 4257, provides that in the preliminary examination of a criminal the magistrate shall reduce to writing the testimony of the complainant and of such witnesses as he may oiler in support of the charge, and styles such testimony a deposition; but tlie testimony of each witness need only be “signed ” by him, and is not required to be certified and filed, nor are the same forma) itics observed in the proceeding as are proscribed (fd. §§ 2807, 2808) in the taking' of depositions. Held, that such an examination in the case of one charged with an offense against the United Slates, reduced to writing by a United States commissioner in Alabama, was not a “deposition” within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 5, prescribing a fee of 20 cents a folio “for taking and certifying depositions to lile. ”</p> <p>3. Same — Warrants and Summons.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 7, and § 828, par. 1-3, a commissioner is entitled to a fee of one dollar for issuing, and 10 cents for filing, a warrant, and 25 cents for issuing a summons, and Í0 cents for filing it when returned.</p> <p>4. Same — Entering Returns.</p> <p>The entering by a commissioner of a return of a warrant or subpoena issued by him, is not a like service as performed by clerks of the United States courts, within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 7; and he is not entitled to the compensation (15 cents per folio) provided for those officers by section 828, par. 8; the commissioner not being required by law or order of court to enter such returns, and he having no record on which to make such entries.</p> <p>5. Same — Continuance—Per Diem.</p> <p>When, by request of the accused, on the day of hearing, a continuance until the next day is granted, without other proceedings, the commissioner is not entitled to the per diem of five dollars, prescribed by Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 3, for the day of hearing.</p> <p>6. Same — Bail-Bonds.</p> <p>He is entitled under Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 7, and § 828, par. 8, to compensation for drawing bail-bonds at the rate of 15 cents for each folio, but not to a fee for filing such bonds; section 1014 requiring the bonds to be returned to the court before which the accused is bound over to appear.</p> <p>7. Same — Acknowledgment.</p> <p>The provision in Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 2, allowing commissioners 25 cents for “taking an acknowledgment” does not apply to acknowledgments taken by such officers to bail-bonds.</p> <p>8. Same — Oath to Sureties.</p> <p>The law of Alabama requiring the magistrate conducting a preliminary examination to justify persons offered as bail, a commissioner in that state, when admitting a person charged with an offense against the United States to bail, is entitled to a fee of 10 cents for each surety to whom he administers an oath. Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 1.</p> <p>9. Same — Witnesses.</p> <p>He is entitled to compensation for administering oaths to witnesses as to their mileage and attendance at the rate of 10 cents for each witness, (Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 1,) and for each certificate or order issued to a witness for his pay at the rate of 15 cents a folio, (Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 7, and § 828, par. 8.)</p> <p>10. Same — Docket Entries.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. § 828, par. 8, provides compensation for clerks “for entering any return, rule, order, continuance, judgment, decree, or recognizance, * * * for each folio, 15 cents. ” Section 841, after specifying certain fees to be paid commissioners for particular services therein mentioned, provides (paragraph 7) that “for any other service, such compensation as is allowed to clerks for like services. ” Held, that “any other service” meant “service” required of commissioners bylaw or by order of court, and that, commissioners not being required by law or order of court to enter on their dockets any of the items specifically mentioned in paragraph 8, § 828, they were not entitled to compensation for such entries.</p> <p>11. Same — Transcript.</p> <p>Where the order of court requires commissioners to forward to the clerk a transcript of the proceedings in each case examined by them, they are entitled to be paid for a copy of the proceedings as entered on their docket at the rate of 10 cents a folio, and for the certificate annexed thereto at the rate of 15 cents a folio. Rev. St. U. S. § 847, par. 7, and § 828, pars. 8, 9.</p> <p>12. Same — Monthly Report.</p> <p>They are entitled under the same sections, and order of court, to compensation for a monthly report in duplicate of all cases instituted or examined before them, at the rate of 15 cents a folio.</p> <p>13. Same — Copies of Process.</p> <p>They are entitled to 10 cents a folio for copies of the “process” returned by them into the clerk’s office of the court, as required by Rev. St. § 1014, providing for the arrest and removal for trial of offenders against the United States; “process,” however, signifying only the warrant or writ by which the accused was brought to answer the charge preferred against him. Rev. St. S 847, par. 7, and § 828, par. 9.</p>

In Equity. On motion for a preliminary injunction. This was a bill to recover damages for an infringement of letters patent No. 138,243, issued April 29, 1873, to John Gates, for an improvement in lubricators.

<p>Salvage — What Constitutes — Peril.</p> <p>The barge Wasp, while being towed up the Atlantic coast by the tug America, encountered a gale, and was anchored inside the Delaware breakwater, the America an ohoring about half a mile distant. The water becoming rougher, the Wasp, desirous of changing her position, signaled to the America. Her signal was answered by the tug McCaulley, which went to her, and was informed, — according to the McCaulley’s story, — that she had 18 inches of water in her hold. The McCaulley thereupon notified the America, and was told, —as the McCaulley’s witnesses testified, — that the America would not go to the assistance of the barge, whereupon the McCaulley returned, and to wed her to a place of safety. On these facts the McCaulley claimed to have performed a salvage service, asserting that the refusal of the America to go to the Wasp put the latter in great peril, and that without the aid of some tug the barge would have sunk at her anchor. The Wasp asserted that she had no water in her of any consequence, and that the McCaulley was not told that she had 18 inches; while the America swore that she had never refused to go to the aid of the Wasp, but had told the McCaulley that she would go as soon as she could get up her anchors. Held, on the evidence, that the America had not refused to go to the barge, and, as she was bound by her towing contract to render this service, the Wasp was at no time in peril; that the McCaulley’s service was therefore not a salvage service, and the libel should be dismissed.</p>

<p>1. Removal op Oaüsbs — Local Phhjudeok.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff is a citizen of Minnesota, and the defendant is a corporation of Wisconsin, doing hnsiness in Minnesota, the circuit court for the district of Minnesota has, under the act of congress of March 3, 1887. amending the “removal act” of 1875, original jurisdiction of the controversy, when that question depends solely on the fact of the diverse citizenship of the parties, and the defendant may remove the case on the ground of local prejudice. Bellowing Vales v. Railway Co., 33 Bod. Rep. 673, and overruling County of Yvbav. Mining Oo., Id. 183.</p> <p>3. Same— Practice — Act of March 3,1887.</p> <p>Under the act of congress of March 3, 1887, it is for the circuit court to determine whether or not the prejudice or local influence, for which a removal is sought, actually exists; and until that fact is made to appear no removal can be ordered. Overruling Fisk v. llenarte, 33 lfed. Rep. 417.</p> <p>3. Same — Affidavit for Removal — Sufficiency.</p> <p>The defendant, a corporation of Wisconsin, doing' business in Minnesota, having; been sued in the local courts of Minnesota hy a citizen of that state, filed through its proper officer an affidavit for removal in the form prescribed hy the act of congress of 1867, viz., that he had reason to believe, and did believe, that hy reason of prejudice and local influence ho would not be able to</p> <p>hiain justice in that forum. Held, on motion to remand, that the affidavit was insufficient; the inability to obtain justice in the state tribunal for the Masons set out not being “made to appear to the circuit court,” as required by the act of congress of March 3, 1887.</p> <p>4. Same-Riling Affidavit in State Court.</p> <p>Whore a removal is sought under the act of congress of March 3, 1887, on the ground of prejudice or local influence, the affidavit may be filed in the state court, and a certified copy of it in the circuit court.</p>

<p>Removal of Causes — Separable Controversy — Act of March 3, 1887.</p> <p>A bill of complaint, filed in a state court of New York by a citizen of Massachusetts, against a corporation of Connecticut and a corporation of New York, averred a cause of action, and prayed for damages and an accounting as against the Connecticut corporation alone, for failure to perform a contract. Held, that the Connecticut corporation was entitled to a removal under the act of congress of March 3, 1887; the plaintiff and the removing defendant having a separable controversy, they being citizens of different states, and the removing defendant not having been sued in his own state.</p>

<p>Removal of Causes — Citizenship of Parties — Removal by Ron-Resident Dependant.</p> <p>Under act Cong. March 3, 1887, defining the jurisdiction of federal courts, which provides that where jurisdiction is founded on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district where either the plaintiff or defendant resides, an action by a citizen of Michigan, brought in the state court of plaintiff’s district against a nonresident defendant, may be removed to the federal court by the defendant.</p>

<p>Corporations — Consolidation—Actions—Abatement and Revival.</p> <p>Act N. T. May 22, 1884, (Laws 1884, c. 367, p. 448,) authorizing the “consolidation of manufacturing corporations, ” provides that no action to which the old corporation was a party, shall he abated by reason of such consolidation pending suit, but that the cause shall proceed as if the consolidation had not taken place, or that the new corporation shall be substituted by order of court. Held, on motion to dismiss a bill filed by a corporation subsequently consolidated on the ground that plaintiff’s corporate existence was terminated by the consolidation, and that a bill of review was necessary under equity ruie 56, and on counter-motion to substitute the consolidated corporation, that the suit did not abate, the provisions of the New York statute being binding upon the federal courts, and that the latter motion should prevail.</p>

<p>1. PRINCIPAL AND A GENT — CONTRACT 01' AGENCY — -ALTERATION—ItrGHTS OP Agent’s Guarantor.</p> <p>A contract of agency in writing provided that the agent was to conduct a lumber-yard for the principals, they to supply him with' stock, which he was to sell; sales, however, for “cash in all cases.” K. indorsed this agreement, guarantying the “due performance” by the agent “of his obligations in the above contract,. ” Shortly after the yard was opened, the agent began selling on credit, and continued to do so for several years, when he defaulted. The principals not only knew of these sales, but they warned the agent “to be cautious in giving credit,” and told him “to watcli his book-accounts, and keep them closely collected. ” They also made him shipments under the contract, which they authorized him in express terms to sell on credit. Held, that the contract of employment had been materially altered, and that the guarantor was discharged.1</p> <p>2. Same — Liability op Guarantor — Construction op Contract.</p> <p>Whore the contract of agency makes it the duty of the agent to pay over whatever money was received in the course of the agency, a guaranty of the agent, in which the^ guarantor agrees generally that the agent will duly perform all the obligations imposed upon him by the contract of employment, is not to be construed as an assumption by the guarantor of a personal liability in any event for all money received by the agent, and not accounted for, simplj'because such accounting is “particularly” mentioned in the instrument out of abundant caution.</p> <p>3. Same — Liability op Agent to Principal — Accounting.</p> <p>Under a contract of agency it was provided that the agent was to open a yard for the purpose of selling the principals’ lumber, which they undertook to supply him, and.which he was to sell “for cash in all cases.” The agent was to account for the who1esale price of the lumber, for his services, and for all expenses of running the yard, including freight, and he was to receive whatever the lumber sold for in excess of the wholesale price at which it was billed to him. Shortly after the business was opened, the agent, with the knowledge and subsequent ratification of the principals, made sales on credit. Held, on an accounting, that the agent was entitled to credit forthe wholesale price of all lumber covered by outstanding bills as to which he had exercised due care in giving time, but not for money laid out by him for taxes and insurance.</p> <p>NOTE.</p> <p>WitiTTEii iNSMMJMBjtTS — Aj/TEiíA/nccr. A material alteration of a contract of guaranty will release the surety. Osborne v. Van Houten, (Mich.) 8 N. W. Rep. 77. Material alteration made hy one of the parties without knowledge or consent of the other, after signing, but before delivery, is fatal. Pew v. Laughlin, 3 Fed. Rep. 39. No recovery can be had on a promissory note that has been materially altered. Bank v. Clark, (Iowa,) 1 N. W. Rep. 491, oven though innocently done, Davis v. Eppler, (Kan.) 16 Pac. Rep. 793. But where the alterations have been erased before transfer, a bona fide holder may recover thereon. Shephard v. Whetstone, (Iowa,) 1 N. W. Rep. 753. Writing changing indorsor into guarantor is material alteration. Bolden, v. Hann, (Iowa,) 15 N. W. Rep. 591. Adding’ seal to name of maker is material where it affects nature of contract, or the running of statute of limitations. Rawson v. Davidson, (Mich.) 14 N. W. Rep. 565. Adding figure “7” to indicate rate of interest, when note was not to bear interest, is material, Davis v. Henry, (Neb.) 14 N. W. Rep. 523; or adding, “after maturity shall draw ton per cent, interest. ” Wyerhauser v. Dun, (N. Y.) 2 N. E. Rep. 274; or erasing “order” and inserting “bearer” after execution, Needles v. Shaffer, (Iowa,) 14 N. W. Rep. 129, Alteration of note by being- signed by one as joint maker, alter execution by the original maker, is material, and will defeat the instrument. Sullivan v. Rudisill, (Iowa,) 18 N. W. Rep. 856. Alteration by writing in place of payment, is material, Charlton v. Reed, (Iowa,) 16 N. W. Rep. 64; Townsend v. Wagon Co., (Neb.) 7 N. W. Rep. 274; or any alteration of the contract of the indorser in a part which may in any event become material, is fatal. Id. Where a contract which is written on same paper modifying the note is detached, and the note transferred, this is a material alteration, and there can be no recovery. Davis v. Henry, (Neb.) 14 N. W. Rep. 523. Where a material alteration is appai’ent on the face of a promissory note, offered in evidence, the question as to whether such alteration was made before or after the execution and delivery is for the jury. Bank v. Morrison, (Neb.) 22 N. W. Rep. 782. Where the payee of a note altered the same and transferred it before due to a bona fide purchaser, it was held that such alteration vitiated the note, and there could be no recovery thereon. Bank v. Shaffer, (Neb.) 1 N. W. Rep. 980; Horn v. Bank, (Kan.) 4 Pac. Rep. 1022. Adding the name of another maker to a note, without the consent of those already bound, is a material alteration. Singleton v. McQuerry, (Ky.) 2 S. W. Rep. 652. Where no explanation is given of a material erasure of a note for the payment of money there can be no recovery thereon. Hood’s Appeal, (Pa.) 7 Atl. Rep. 137. See, also, as to what is a material alteration, Coles v. Yorks, (Minn.) 10 N. W. Rep. 775; Osgood v. Stevenson, (Mass.) 9 N. E. Rep. 825; Crawford v. Bank, (N. Y.) 2 N. E. Rep. 881; Johnson v. Moore, (Kan.) 5 Pac. Rep. 406; Stephens v.Davis, (Tenn.) 2 S. W. Rep. 382. Where a promissory note has been rendered void by a material alteration, made without fraudulent intent, the payee may recover upon the original consideration, and may establish the indebtedness as though no note had been executed therefor, by any evidence he may have, either written or oral, which has not been vitiated by the alteration. Gordon v. Robertson, (Wis.) 4 N. W. Rep. 579; Morrison v. Huggins, (Iowa,) Id. 854; Sullivan v. Rudisill, (Iowa,) 18 N. W. Rep. 856. Immaterial alterations, as filling blanks in a contract with the name of the party thereto, will not avoid the contract, not changing its legal effect. Briscoe v. Reynolds, (Iowa,) 2 N. W. Rep. 529; Rowley v. Jewett, (Iowa,) 9 N. W. Rep. 353; Canon v. Grigsby, (Ill.) 5 N. E. Rep. 362; Bank v. Carson, (Mich.) 27 N. W. Rep. 589. An interlineation made by a stranger, of the words “ or bearer ” after the name of the payee, in a note, has no effect upon the rights or liabilities of the parties. Andrews v. Calloway, (Ark.) 7 S. W. Rep. 449. Figures in margin of promissory note are no part of it, and alteration does' not vitiate, Harvester Co. v. McLean, (Wis.) 15 N. W. Rep. 177; and it has been held that obtaining the signing of another name, as co-surety is not material alteration, and will not relieve the first surety. Ward v. Hackett, (Minn.) 14 N. W. Rep. 578. It has been held that where a mortgage was executed by husband and wife of her land for the accommodation of a partnership of which the husband is a member, and as security for the payment of a negotiable promissory note made by the husband to his partner, and indorsed by the partner for the same purpose, and to which note the partner, before negotiating it, adds the wife’s name as a maker without the consent or knowledge of herself or husband, such note is not thereby avoided as against one who, in ignorance of the note having been so altered, lends money to the partnership upon the security of the note and mortgage. Mersman v. Werges, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. If an alteration of a promissory note is not material, it matters not with what intent it was made, for under no circumstances can it in any way affect the liabilities of the parties. Fuller v. Green, (Wis.) 24 N. W. Rep. 907. The extension by alteration of the time of payment of a promissory note is not such an alteration of the note as will avoid it, the maker being free to pay the note on or before such day, and the payee being restrained from compelling payment before that time. Drexler v. Smith, 30 Fed. Rep. 754. The burden of proof as to an alteration is upon the party asserting it. Odell v. Gallup, (Iowa,) 17 N. W. Rep. 502; Gordon v. Robertson, (Wis.) 4 N. W. Rep. 579; Cox v. Palmer, 3 Fed. Rep. 16. In a civil action a preponderance of evidence is all that is necessary to establish a fraudulent alteration. Coit v. Churchill, (Iowa,) 16 N. W. Rep. 147. See, also, on the general subject of the alteration of written instruments, Sawyer v. Perry, (Iowa,) 17 N. W. Rep. 497; Woodworth v. Anderson, (Iowa,) 19 N. W. Rep. 296; Scofield v. Ford, (Iowa,) 9 N. W. Rep. 309; Martin v. Insurance Co., (N. Y.) 5 N.E. Rep. 338; Church v. Fowle, (Mass.) 6 N. E. Rep. 764; Martin v. Insurance Co., (N. Y.) 5 N. E. Rep. 338; Martin v. Mining Co., (Nev.) 3 Pac. Rep. 488; Arguello v. Bours, (Cal.) 8 Pac. Rep. 49; Pereau v. Frederick, (Neb.) 22 N. W. Rep. 235.</p>

Bill in equity for specific performance and damages. Held: the same, subject to all the obligations originally assumed by and binding on the said New Orleans, Mobile & Chattanooga Railroad Company. These obligations have never been complied with.

<p>In Equity. In re petition of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company.</p>

<p>In Equity. On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for the appointment of a receiver or trustee.</p>

<p>In Equity. On exceptions to master’s report. In re intervening petition of St. Louis, Keokuk & Northwestern Railroad Company.</p>

<p>On Motion to Modify a Decree. The original opinion is reported in 38 Fed. Rep. 132.</p>

<p>In Equity. On exceptions to master’s report.</p> <p>In re intervening petitions of Theodore Gilman and Charles H. Bull, .trustees; Quincy, Missouri & Pacific Railway Company; George I. Seney, trustee, and St. Joseph & St. Louis Railroad Company.</p>

<p>1. Equity — Practice—Behearing.</p> <p>An application for a rehearing must be denied where it is based solely on evidence already before the court, and passed upon adversely to applicant on rehearing before another judge, and no manifest error is shown.</p> <p>2. Patents for Invention — Practice—Findings of Master — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>In a reference to find and report the number of cans made by defendants under a patent on which royalties should be paid, the decree directed the master to take an account of all cans made and sold by defendants since January 1, 1888, (to which date royalties had been paid,) “which embody or make use of the improvements patented. ” The master called for an account of all cans made and sold by defendants since January 1,1883,which purport to use the letters patent. Defendants furnished such account, stating that the cans included therein were all similar to those made by them under their license, and on which they had paid royalties down to January 1, 1883. Held, that there was sufficient evidence on which to base the master’s report as" to the amount of royalties unpaid.</p>

<p>Customs Duties — Actions to Recover Payment — Valuations in Depreciated Currency — Failure to Snow Production op Consular Certificate.</p> <p>in an action to recover an excess of dntjr paid on an importation valued in depreciated foreign currency, where it appears that a bond was given by the importer under authority of the treasury regulations of February 1,1857, £ 326. for the production of the consular certificate of its valuation in Spanish or United States silver dollars, the plaintiff cannot recover if he fails to show that such certificate was produced within the time prescribed in said bond.</p>

<p>At Law. Ex parte application by an infant to sue in forma pauperis.</p>

<p>Railroad Companies — Bonds op Mortgages — Power to Guaranty Bonds of Other Companies.</p> <p>A railroad corporation, which has power by its charter to issue its own bonds, has power to guaranty the bonds of another railroad corporation, which it receives in payment of a debt due to it, and which it sells for value, or transfers in payment of its own debts, the guaranty being given as the means of augmenting the credit of the bonds, or to enable it to obtain an adequate price for them.</p>

On Motion for a New Trial. This was an action by Herbert Pearce, for personal injuries received in the yard of the Wabash Railway Company in Detroit, of which company the defendant Solon Humphreys and another were the receivers. Plaintiff' was the driver of a pair of horses attached to a heavy truck, which he had driven into defendant’s yard to deliver some tobacco at the freight depot.

At Law. On demurrer to replication. This was an action of trespass upon the case to recover damages for the alleged expulsion of the plaintiff from one of defendant’s passenger cars within the state of Kansas. Plaintiff, who is a resident and citizen of this county, bought from the Wabash Company, in Detroit, a ticket for Denver, Colo., and return.

<p>At Law. Trial by the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from district court.</p> <p>Iii Bankruptcy. On motion for cancellation of judgment, or for perpetual stay of execution thereon.</p>

Indictment for murder, under Rev. St. U. S. § 5339. That section provides that “ever}»- person who commits murder within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, * * * shall suffer death.” Francis H. King, the accused, a private in the Fifth artillery, U. S. A., stationed at Fort Hamilton, New York harbor, was indicted for the murder of Ryan H. Willis, a civilian.

On Motion in Arrest of Judgment. The prisoner was convicted upon the first and third counts of ah indictment charging him with the embezzlement of letters containing money.

<p>Copyright — R'i’ate Reports — Connecticut Derisions.</p> <p>The act oí March 22,1882, (Acts Gen. Assem. Conn.,) directing the reporter to publish the decisions of the supreme court of errors, and copyright the volumes, does not prohibit any one else from publishing the opinions separately or collectively, but restricts the exclusive right of publication to the Reports compiled and edited by the reporter.</p>

In Equity. Bill for infringement of letters patent. This is a suit brought against the American Artificial Stonfe Pavement Company for infringing letters patent No. 269,480, granted December 19, 1882, to Peter Stuart, of Edinburgh, Scotland, for an improvement in composite pavements.

<p>1. Patents foe. Inventions — Patentability—Novelty—Metallic Buttons.</p> <p>The first claim of letters patents. No. 216,973, of July 1, 1879, to Charles RadeliS, for “improvement in metallic buttons” is as follows: “A metallic button consisting of two disks, a crown and bottom piece, in combination with a wire placed between them, so formed as to fit and strengthen the periphery of said disks, and to act as the bar for the thread, substantially as and for the purpose described. ” Held, void for want of novelty; buttons formed of an upper and lower disk, with an intermediate wire thread-bar, viz., the glove button, the Woodbury button, the Hornish button, the Fernald button, and the Thalheimer button, having been old at the date of the patent.</p> <p>2. Same — WANT op Invention.</p> <p>In view of the prior state of the art, as evidenced by the glove button and the Woodbury, Hornish, Fernald, and Thalheimer buttons, letters patent No. 216,973. of July 1, 1879, to Charles Radcliff, for “improvement in metallic buttons,” are void for want of invention; Radcliff having simply straightened the bar of the old glove button, and possibly exercised greater care in making its length correspond with the diameter of the disks, or straightened the bar of the Woodbury button and added a covering as suggested by the patent.</p>

In Equity. Bill for infringement of letters patent No. 199,908, of February 5, 1878, to John W. Hyatt, assignor to the Celluloid Manufacturing Company, for the manufacture of celluloid and other plastic compositions. , On motion for preliminary injunction.

In Equity. Bill for infringement of letters patent No. 322,194, of July 14, 1888, to G-ustavus Miehaelis, assignor of one-half to William T. Mayer, for “the manufacture of chloroform, and purified acetates.”

<p>In Equity.</p> <p>Sur motion for leave to ñle a supplemental bill, which was exhibited to the court.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Intentions — Clay-Bird Traps — Infringement.</p> <p>The only object of the invention, as stated in the specification, covered by letters patent No. 253,330, of January 10, 1883, to the Ligowski Clay-Pigeon Company, as assignee of George Ligowski, for “target traps,” is to furnish a trap especially adapted for throwing the saucer or cup shaped flying target formed as a thin shell of clay or similar material, suitably hardened, and slotted at or near its periphery, and provided with a detachable tongue, embraced by letters patent No. 331,919, of September 7, 1880, to said Ligowski. In the trap used by the Amercan Clay-Bird Company, the clamp of the trap-lever is in form and construction so unlike that of the Ligowski patent that, while it can be used for throwing a saucer or cup shaped target, it cannot be made to throw the targets described in the Ligowski specification in the manner set out in his patents; nor, on the other hand, can the Ligowski clamp be made to throw the targets thrown by the American Clay-Bird Company’s trap, unless they are provided with tongues, or their equivalents. Held, that the clamp of the American Clay-Bird Company’s trap-lever was the equivalent of that of Ligowski, and being so, the fact that it might be an improvement did not render its use any the less an infringement.</p> <p>2. Same — Letters No. 252,280 — Invention.</p> <p>The first claim of letters patent No. 252,230, of January 10, 1882, to the Li-gowski 01 ay-Pigeon Company, as assignee of George Ligowski, for target traps, is as follows. “The combination, in a target trap, of a spring-lever, a rack, and an adjustable tension-arm carrying the trigger, with which latter is engaged said lever, as herein described.” The holding clamp for grasping the target is' omitted from the claim. The target referred to is that eovered by letters patent No. 231,919, of September 7,1880, to said Ligowski. Held, that the omission of the holding clamp did not invalidate the claim, that being susceptible of ready application in any desired form by a skilled mechanic, and that the limited combination in the claim was not anticipated by the patents to Bogardus, Call, and others in'evidence; the saucer shape of the Ligow-ski target giving it, when projected horizontally or at an angle by the trap, a rapid rotation upon a vertical or inclined axis, and the concavity, which imprisoned the air, causing the target to rise in a curve with a downward convexity, like that followed by a bird rising from its cover; a result the exact reverse of that secured by previously known projectiles, imd insuring, in addition, a gradual descent.</p> <p>3. Same — Infringement.</p> <p>The second claim of the same patent is for “the combination of spring-lever, head, segmental rack, adjustable tension-arm and trigger, as herein described. ” The third claim is for “the combination in the target trap of the head, having the spring portion of the lever coiled about it, the jointed standards, the notched knuckles, and the bolts and nuts connecting the same. ” The various styles of traps pictured in the circulars and advertisements of the American Clay-Bird Company, offered in evidence, showed a segmental rack in the same combination, and serving the same purpose, as that described in Ligowski’s second claim. Held, that the second and third claims were valid, and infringed by said traps; every element of the third claim appearing in said traps, save for the substitution of the old and equivalent ball and socket joint for the knuckle joints.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>The fourth claim is for “the combination, in a target trap, of a clamp consisting of the bar, pivoted lever, spring, seven-threaded rod, and adjustable nut, as described.” Held valid.</p> <p>5. Same — Want of Novelty.</p> <p>The fifth claim of letters patent No. 252.230, of January 10, 1882, to the Li-gowski Clay-Pigeon Company, as assignee of George Ligowski, for target traps, covers nothing more than a spring-latch. Held invalid, as not displaying invention, and the device being so old and well known that the court would take judicial cognizance of it without notice or proof.</p> <p>6. Same-- Omission of Element from Specifications.</p> <p>In letters patent No. 252.230, of January 10, 1882. to the Ligowski Clay-Pigeon Company, as assignee of George Ligowski, for target traps, there is no mention of the pin, which is introduced in the clamp as a, guide and fulcrum for the setting and discharge of the target. In a sui‘ for infringement by that, company, the preponderance of the evidence was that the pin was added simply to serve inexperienced trappers as a guide in inserting the clay pigeon, that it originated long after the application for the patent; and that tlié trap could be successfully operated without it. Held, that the omission did not invalidate the patent.</p> <p>7. Same — Letters No. 818,804 — Combination—Novelty.</p> <p>The invention in letters patent No. 318,804, of March 10, 1885, to the Li-gowski Clay-Pigeon Company, as assignee of Jacob Bloom, for an improvement upon the Ligowski “target trap, ” covered by letters patent No. 252.230, has for its object to provide that 1-rap with a second and weaker spring, coiled, reversely to the throwing spring, about the head of the trap.within the drum, and concentric with the actuating spring, and so adjusted as to intercept the throwing lever in the radial movement when at about its maximum speed, and then, gradually checking the throwing-arm, to return it to its position of rest. The violent recoil of the Ligowski arm is thus obviated, and the target is discharged with greater certainty, andwithlessliability to breakage. Held, that the patent was valid, Bloom being the first to demonstrate, by reduction to practical use, the utility and value of the combination of the two concentric springs, not only in the head of the tra p, hut also to apply such a combination of the concentric springs, acting on different radii in opposite directions, for any purpose whatever.</p> <p>8. Same — Abandonment—What Constitutes.</p> <p>The inventor in letters patent No. 313,804, to the Ligowski Clay-Pigeon Company, as assigneee of Jacob Bloom, for an improvement upon the Ligow-ski “target trap, ” filed his application March 22, 1882. Notice of allowance was forwarded to him, and he, being compelled to go to Europe on business, left instructions with his clerk to pay the final fee within the statutory six months. He was absent more than a year, and some 10 months longer than ho expected he would be gone. Upon his return he found that the fee had not been paid, and on August 0, 1883, he renewed his application, which was allowed September 20, 1888. In January, 1884, a new specification was filed, and the two original claims expanded to eight. The patent was allowed February 19, 1885. Held, that the date of the original application was the one to which reference should be made in determining whether or not there had been two years’ public use and sale of the invention before application, there being nothing- in the evidence to warrant the conclusion that Bloom had at anytime abandoned either his invention or his application.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions — Several Assignments before Issue.</p> <p>Letters patent issued to the assignee of the inventor are not void because prior to the issuance thereof such assignee had made an assignment of the invention to a third person, who had assigned the same to still another person. all the assignments being recorded in the patent-office: but by operation of law the legaf title to the patent, upon the issuance thereof, eo instanti vested in the ultimate assignee. Poll owing Light Co. v. Light Co., 25 Ted. Rep. 719.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Sash Balances — Patentability—Invention.</p> <p>The invention covered by letters patent No. 126,031, of April 23, 1872, to John J Cowell, for an “improvement in sash balances, ” relates to a cast metal pulley-box, and consists, in the second claim, in forming the box with two or more semi-tubular swellings, one, at each end of the box, adapted to fit auger-holes bored in the frame for inserting the box. Held, that the improvement, though a very simple one, involved something more than ordinary mechanical skill, and that it showed inventive novelty in the saving of time and attention to details called for in the use of prior devices.</p> <p>2. Same — Evidence oe Inventive Novelty.</p> <p>The fact that as soon as a patented improvement was made and introduced, its advantages over devices which had preceded it became manifest at once, and it commended itself to the public as a practical and desirable improvement, affords a safer criterion of inventive novelty than any subsequent opinion of an expert or intuition of a judge.</p> <p>3. Same — Anticipation—By Prior Patents.</p> <p>In letters patent No 64,957, of May 21, 1867, to Simon Drum, the method of inserting pulley-boxes in the window frame by making an auger-hole at each end of the proposed recess, and cutting away the intermediate wood, is described, and the specifications set out an oblong pulley-box with rounded ends, the arch of which would correspond with the arch of the auger-holes. Held not an anticipation of letters patent No. 126,031, of April 23,1872, to John J. Cowell, for an “improvement in sash balances, ” the essential feature of the Cowell device, viz., the semi-tubular swellings, being wanting.</p> <p>4. Same — Infringement.</p> <p>The invention covered by the second claim of letters patent No. 126,031, of April 23,1872, to John J. Cowell, for an “improvement in sash balances, ” relates to a cast metal pulley-box, and consists in forming the box with two or more semi-tubular swellings, one at each end of the box, adapted to fit auger-holes bored in the frame for inserting the box. The device covered by letters patent No. 185,369, of December 12,1876, to John. Vetterlein, is provided with semi-tubular swellings, not only at each end, like the Cowell box, but also with intermediate semi-tubular swellings which practically connect with each other. Held an infringement.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement against the Pioneer Iron-Works and the Safety Steam Generator Company.</p>

<p>1. Finri’ING — BOTTOMRY AND Rl'NPONDUNTIA — WHAT CONSTITUTES.</p> <p>The master of a ship, having need oí money in a foreign port, executed two instruments to secure loans, the tenor of which was that the master, for necessary disbursements of the vessel, pledged the vessel and freight for the payment of the amount expressed, to he made 10 days after the arrival of the vessel at the port of destination, any other draft or obligation to be secondary. Except, by implication there was no renunciation of the claim for repayment of the loan, unless the ship arrived at her port of destination. Held, that these instruments had the force and validity of bottomry bonds.</p> <p>2. Same — Rank—As between Bonds on Same Vessel.</p> <p>In a question as to the rank of two bottomry bonds upon the same ship, the fact appeared to he that the obligations, though dated one one day, and the other the next day, were for moneys expended during the same period and to relieve the same necessity. Held, that since the priority must ho determined according to the necessity at the time of the advances, and these advances were contemporaneous, and furnished relief from the same wants, the obligations must rank as of the same date.</p> <p>8. Same — Advances by Ship’s Agent for General Average.</p> <p>A ship made jettison of part of her cargo, and upon her arrival in a foreign port was libeled and sold. Held, that the claims of the agents of the ship for money advanced in payment of her part of the general average should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale, before the bottomry bonds.</p> <p>4. Same — Nature of Agents’ Limn.</p> <p>The lien oí a ship’s agents in a foreign port for money advanced in payment of her part of a general average arising out of a jettison of part of the cargo is a lien enforceable by a proceeding in rem in admiralty,</p> <p>o. Same — Expenses in Preparing Ship for Sale.</p> <p>A ship deviated from her course, and, after making jettison-of part of her cargo, reached a foreign port. Held that, upon a libel and sale of the vessel, a claim of the ship’s agents for money advanced for the preservation of the ship after she reached the harbor, and after she was condemned, to place her in a condition where she could bo sold as a condemned vessel, should be first paid, before the bottomry bonds.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On appeal from district court.</p>

In Admiralty. On motion to strike amended libels. Libels to recover damages to a cargo oí prunes shipped by the libelants on board the Thomas Melville, at Trieste. The main damage was caused by sea water, but a portion of the packages had coal-dust on the outside, which seems to have penetrated some of the cases. This latter element of damage was not referred to in either libel as a separate cause of action.

<p>Maritime Liens — Enforcement—Unsatisfied Judgment in State Court.</p> <p>A judgment recovered in a state court against a master for the value of sup.plies furnished a vessel, and which remains unsatisfied, is no bar to the enforcement in admiralty of the lien upon the vessel for such supplies.</p>

<p>COURTS-- JURISDICTION — CLAIM'S AGAINST UNITED STATES — SURVEYING CONTRACTS.</p> <p>The net of Congress March 8,1887. (24 St. 505,) provides that where tlio amount in controversy is’between §1,000 and §10,000 the circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims oí “all claims * * * founded upon #' i:' * any law of congress. * * * or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United Slates, ” etc.; “claims which have heretofore been rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same” being ox-copied. The complaint upon a surveying contract set. out that the surveyor general of California had approved the field-notes, and certified them, as well os ihe performance of the work, but that before he forwarded his report to “Washington, D. C., he was instructed by the commissioner of the general hind-office to proceed no further in the matter. Under the terms of the agreement, this report should have gone to the said commissioner, and, if approved by him, been then referred to the auditor for final allowance and payment,. field, on demurrer to complaint, that the claim had not been “heretofore rejected or reported on adversely, ” within the meaning of the act, and that the circuit court, sitting in California, had jurisdiction, the amount sued for being between §1,000 and (810,000.</p>

<p>At Law. On demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>1. Taxation — Taxable Property — Trusts—Statutes—Repeal.</p> <p>The Pennsylvania statute of April 22,1846, (P. L. 486,) which imposes a tax of three mills “upon all property, real or personal, (not taxed under existing laws,) held, owned, used, or invested by any person, company, or corporation, in trust for the use, benefit, or advantage of any other person, company, or corporation, ” was not repealed by the act of 1870 and its supplements, passed in 1881 and 1885, in so far as it relates to property in Pennsylvania, held by a Pennsylvania corporation in trust for non-residents of the state. The assessment of such a tax upon property so held is within the literal scope of the act 22d April, 1846.</p> <p>2. Same — Mon-Resident Beneficiaeies.</p> <p>A state has the power to tax property within its boundaries held by a resident trustee for a non-resident cestui que trust.</p>

In Equity. The complainant’s bill was for an injunction to restrain the defendant from prosecuting at law a suit began by it against the complainant to recover rent reserved in a lease executed by them in 1870. Upon a motion for an injunction the court dismissed the bill.

<p>1. Mortgages — -Recitals—Conclusivbness.</p> <p>A mortgage on land in Delaware, given as additional security for the purchase price of land in Maryland, was dated July 28,1871, and recited that the deed from the vendor and the purchase-money mortgage bore date both, and were delivered bbth, on that day. Held, on bill to foreclose the Delaware mortgage, that the recital as to dates was not conclusive, and, it being shown that both mortgages and the deed were delivered, all three simultaneously, August 6, 1871, parol evidence was admissible to show that the three instruments formed one transaction.</p> <p>2. Deed — Of Bargain and Sale — Omission of Bargainee — Construction.</p> <p>In Delaware, where the common mode of assurance is a deed of bargain and sale operating under the statute of uses, the words in a deed, “bargains and sells unto the sole and separate use of the said P., ” will be construed, in equity, when the intention of the parties is clear, to mean “bargains and sells unto P., and to the only proper use and behoof of the said P.and such a deed will be reformed to carry that intention into effect.</p> <p>3. Vendor and Vendee — Surety for Vendee — Release by Few Contract.</p> <p>A deed, which contained the usual covenant for “further assurances,” recited that grantors' title was under a certain will and proceedings in partition in orphans' court. As security for the purchase money a mortgage was taken on the land; and, as security for that mortgage, the purchaser’s father gave a mortgage on other land of his own. After the deed and mortgages were delivered, it was discovered that the orphans’ court had no jurisdiction to make the allotment under the will. The vendors, who had a right to the fee-simple In the land, and who had made no intentional misrepresentations, thereupon, of their own motion, secured quitclaims from all interested, and made the purchaser a good title. Held, on hill to foreclose the mortgage from the father, that the father’s obligation as surety was_ not discharged, it not hoing made to appear that he had suffered any loss or injury, and the execution of the “further assurance” not constituting a new contract.</p> <p>4. Same — Foreclosure or Purchase-Money Mortgage — Appointment op Receiver.</p> <p>The maker of a mortgage given as additional security for the payment of a purchase-money mortgage is not discharged hy the fact that a receiver has been appointed in the suit to foreclose the purchase-money mortgage at the instance of the mortgagee, and with the consent of the purchaser; such an appointment not changing the title to or creating any lien upon the land, or giving any advantage or priority to the mortgagee..</p> <p>5. Same — Depreciation in Value op Land.</p> <p>'A serious depreciation in the value of land after the time of its purchase, the vendor and vendee having bargained on equal terms, in the absence of proof of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of any material fact on the part of the vendor, hy which the purchaser was betrayed into an unfortunate speculation, will not discharge the surety of the latter.</p>

<p>1. Vendor and Vendee — Bona Fide Purchaser.</p> <p>One who takes a mere conveyance of another's interest in real property, or a quitclaim thereto, is not a purchaser for a valuable consideration within the rule in equity, which protects such a purchaser against a prior conveyance or right of which he had no notice; for by the'very terms of his conveyance he has notice that he is purchasing nothing more than the interest or right his vendor then has in the land.1</p> <p>3. 8am k — Purchases for Vataje — Avtkohdext Debt.</p> <p>A purchase of real property, or the assignment of a mortgage thereon for an antecedent debt, does not'make the vendee or assignee a purr baser for a valuable consideration so as to entitle hint to protection against a prior conveyance of or right in or to suck property,</p> <p> (Syllabus by the. Court.) </p>

<p>1. PARTNERSHIP — -Bight op Survivor to Continue Business.</p> <p>The surviving partner in a cotton plantation, before the late war, not being authorized by the articles of copartnership, or the will of the deceased partner, was not authorized to continue the partnership business, after the death of the deceased partner, longer than was necessary to gather and sell the then growing crop.1</p> <p>2. Same — Bight or Survivor to tiie Personalty.</p> <p>Upon the death of the deceased partner intestate, the title to the personal property, including the slaves belonging to the firm, vested in the surviving partner, for the purpose of being applied — First, to the payment of the partnership liabilities; secondly, for a division of the residue of any between the surviving partner and the personal representative of the deceased partner, according to the rights of each.1</p> <p>3. Same — Liability of Survivor Accounting.</p> <p>It was the duty of the surviving partner to sell so much of the personal property, including the slaves, if necessary, to pay off debts due by the firm to himself or any other person, and to so apply it. Bailing to do so, and continuing the planting business on the plantation, and with the slaves and other personal property of the firm, he is liable to account for a reasonable rent for the land and hire for the slaves and personal property, after he should have sold so much of the property as was necessary to pay the debts against the firm, including the indebtedness to himself as a creditor of the firm; and was entitled to the crops raised during the time he was liable for rents and hire.1</p> <p>4. Same — Title to PARTNERSHIP Realty.</p> <p>The legal title to the lands owned by the firm, they being equal partners, upon the death of the deceased' partner vested in the surviving partner and the heir at law of the deceased partner as tenants in common, subject to the dower right of the widow of the deceased partner out of one moiety of the land; but the equitable title to said land vested in the surviving partner, so far as the same was necessary to pay the liabilities of the partnership, including that due the surviving partner as a general creditor, or any balance due him on a settlement of the partnership accounts. The surviving partner had a right to sell the land, if necessary for said purpose, publicly or privately, and a court of equity would have compelled the heir at law to convey the legal title vested in him to the purchaser.1</p> <p> {Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

In Equity. Motion for the appointment of a receiver. The Austin, Tomlinson & Webster Manufacturing Company, plaintiff and judgment creditor, apply by motion for the appointment of a receiver after disclosures upon examination of Charles W. Shatto, defendant and judgment debtor, in proceedings supplementary to execution.

<p>At Law. Action by JET. Levison against A. Balfour and others.</p>

At Law. On motion to strike out part of answer and demurrer to part of answer. Proceedings to condemn land by the Denver Railroad Land & Coal Company against the Union Pacific Railway Company.

Ill Equity. Tin;; is a suit brought by Thomas Halton, complainant, against William P. Lhlinger, respondent, for an alleged infringement of letters patent, No. 185,027, and dated December 5, 1876, granted to Thomas Halton, for improvement in Jacquard looms; the application for which letters patent was filed September 11, 1876. The invention is for a broad blade, or griff, which is not lifted above the top of the book heads of the Jacquard machine.

<p>In Equity. On application for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Infringement—Patent for Separate Parto— REPAIRS.</p> <p>Where different parts of a machine are covered by separate patents, a purchaser of such machine from the patentee, who replaces one of the parts or elements covered by an individual patent, when worn out, is guilty of an infringement.</p> <p>2. Equity — Pleading—Mumteariousness.</p> <p>It is within the discretion of the court to decide whether or not a bill in equity is multifarious in its nature, such question depending upon the circumstances of each individual case.</p>

In Admiralty. On exceptions to libel. Wilson & Lozano, a firm engaged in the retail dry goods business in Mobile, Ala., purchased on credit from Tefft, Weller & Co., of New York, a number of packages of merchandise, and these were shipped by the steani-ship Vidette-, of the New York & Mobile Steam-Ship Line, in the latter pari of January, 1887, consigned to libelants, and bills of lading vero also duly forwarded them at Mobile.

<p>1. Maritime Liens — Supplies—Home Pout.</p> <p>There is no implied maritime lien against a vessel for supplies furnished to her at her home port.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>There is an implied maritime lion against a vessel for supplies furnished by one at the home port, at the owner’s request, and shipped to the vessel elsewhere.</p> <p>3. Same — Waiver—By Taking Draft.</p> <p>Taking a draft for supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port is not a1 surrender of the right to a lien for the same. The right to the lien is a security, and passes with a draft to the indorsee.</p> <p>4. Same — Home Port — What Constitutes.</p> <p>The home port of a vessel is whore her owner has a Iona fide residence, and this rule binds ail who know where the owner resides, even though the vessel has a foreign register, and sails under a foreign flag.</p> <p>5. Courts — Federal District — Practice—Following Similar, Decisions.</p> <p>The decisions of other district courts in similar cases will be followed in order to secure uniformity, although those decisions do not seem to be based upon sound principles.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Appeal from district court.</p>

In Admiralty. The schooner C. G. Cranmcr, being well and sufficiently manned and equipped, while on a voyage from Norfolk to Philadelphia with a cargo of cedar logs, partly below and partly on deck, on the 17th day of December, A. D. 1887, met with tempestuous weather, the wind rising almost to a hurricane, during which she lost part of her dock-load, being part of the gunwale tier on the starboard side.

In Admiralty. These were three libels against the ferry-boat Manhasset, the tug Portsmouth, and the Barge 40, jointly, and one libel against the tug and barge, for damages .from collision, which were consolidated, and heard together. The evidence submitted in these cases fills 885 type-written pages of legal-cap paper, and is augmented in volume by the usual complement of documentary exhibits.

<p>Collision — Between Steamers — Crossing Vessels.</p> <p>The steamers A. and B. were sailing down the Delaware bay, the A. being a iew miles ahead of the B. When the A. arrived at the breakwater, she signaled for a boat to take oil her pilot. None responding', she determined to nut back up the bay a few miles, and anchor for the night, it being then about 7.45 3?. ¿i. The A. selected an anchorage east of the regular channel for outbound steamers, and was slowly proceeding- to it, with all lights burning brightly,1 and obeying every requirement of the law touching the mode of giving notice to approaching vessels. She discovered another steam-vessel approaching on her port side, involving danger of collision, and kept her course as required by the rules of navigation. The B.’s officers saw the A.’s lights, but mistakenly supposed them to be those of another vessel passing down the bay, and did not discover their error until too late to avoid the collision. Held, that the B.’s officers were guilty ol' carelessness or recklessness, and that the B. must be held accountable for the consequences.</p>

In Admiralty. On exceptions to commissioner’s report. As the bark Maria Margaretta was lying at anchor ready for sea, she was injured in collision by the respondent’s vessel. She had been chartered for a voyage from New York to Callao, and in consequence of the collision was obliged to put back to New York, and report for repairs. The damages have been assessed by the commissioner at $1,451.30, besides interest, including demurrage for 14 days, at the rate of $40 per day.

<p>Ooiirsiosr — Measure of Damages — Actual Cost of Repaiks.</p> <p>When a vessel, damaged hy collision, has an estimate made of the cost of repairs at the place of the injury, hut is afterwards repaired at another place at less cost, the latter amount is the measure of her recovery. The rule in insurance cases, that the cost of repairs at the place of injury or the nearest port is the measure of damage, does not apply to such case as this.</p>

<p>1. ADMIRALTY — PRACTICE—COSTS—EXCESSIVE CLAIM.</p> <p>A libelant who has filed a claim for <¡¡20,000, and recovered only §500, will not be allowed costs where it appears that by ■waiting two days he could have ascertained, without risk, that his loss would be less than §1,000.</p> <p>2. Sami-: — Excessive Claim as Puxisiimuxt.</p> <p>The law does not permit the insertion of an excessive demand in a libel against a ship by way of punishment for previous wrong-doing on the part of the ship’s owner.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Jurisdiction—Torts—Death by Wrongful Act.</p> <p>Gen. St. Minn. p. 825, § 2, providing that, “when death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any party, the personal representatives of the deceased may maintain an action, if he might have maintained an action had he lived, ” etc., does not confer upon the United States district court jurisdiction of a libel in rem, filed by the administratrix of an injured person to enforce a marine tort, as in case of death from such a tort the action does not survive in admiralty.</p>

<p>In Equity. On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>Courts — Federal Jurisdiction- — Patents tor Invention» — Entorcuto As-SKi-XSIBNT.</p> <p>An action where the relief demanded is an assignment of letters patent, and damages, and where all the parties are residents of the same state, does not lie within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Following Trading Co. v. Claeuser, 130 Fed. Hop. 387.</p>

<p>1. Judgment — Operation and Effect — -Conclusiveness as to Prtor Grantees.</p> <p>As against a prior granice and purchaser at an execution sale under a pro-ceding judgment, a subsequent judgment against the grantor and debtor is not conclusive, either as to the amount of the debt, or as to the circumstances and character of the transaction out of which the indebtedness arose, and where made defendant to a bill by the holder of such judgment to set the conveyance aside as in fraud of debtors, and to subject the land, such prior grantee and purchaser may show that the debt for which the judgment was rendered had been more than paid when the judgment was obtained and that the creditor had taken an unfair advantage of the debtor in the matter of interest.</p> <p>2. Fraudulent Conveyances — Actions to set Aside — By Creditor whose Debt has been Paid.</p> <p>The keeper of a house of ill fame, having bought §6,000 worth of furniture, borrowed of G., who had negotiated the sale, §2,700, to apply to the purchase money. She gave him her note for that amount, with an accommodation in-dorser, secured on the furniture, and, in addition, on 320 acres of land belonging to the indorser. This note bore interest at5 per cent, a month. She was also charged §300 as a bonus, and gave G. her note for that amount. She paid $910 as interest on the first .note, and having then defaulted, G. seized the furniture, and sold it at auction for §1,519.43. He also foreclosed on the land, and got from it §253.10, thus realizing, with interest, §2,682.53 on a debt of §2,700 in about a year. He then sued the indorser for the full amount of the note, and, the defendant’s attorney being drunk at the trial, and a new man being assigned in his s.tead, got a judgment against him for §2,171. When this suit was commenced, he issued a writ of garnishment, and thus came into possession of a note for §1,350, secured on lands worth many thousands of dollars. This note was advertised for sale without any reference to the security, and bought in for §80 by G., who foreclosed, and took the land. He then filed a bill against the brother of the indorser, who had bought in certain land of the indorser at an execution sale under a judgment rendered against him prior to his indorsement on the §2,700 note, setting up that he had levied on the land to satisfy his judgment for §2,171, and bought it in, and that the purchase by and the deed to the brothel-was the result of conspiracy to defraud creditors. Held, that under the circumstances the bill should be dismissed, the creditor having, in equity, been more than paid in full.</p>

<p>1. Equity — Ekaud—Laches.</p> <p>A bill in equity on a, life insurance policy issued in 1854, alleging that at the lime oi' the issuance of the policy the company agreed to distribute the surplus every three years in interest-bearing’ scrip; Unit in 1857 the company fraudulently sent plaintiff a document which was simply a statement of 'a permanent addition to the policy, but which she, owing to her imperfect understanding of the English language, supposed lotea statement of the scrip; that she received similar documents in 18(H), I860, and 1886, the true nature of which she has only recently learned; but, which fails to set out a copy of the policy, or the alleged documents, or that she remained ignorant of the English language after 1857,- -fails to show grounds for equitable interference, after the lapse of so many years, and the consequent changed condition of the parties.</p> <p>8. Same — Laches oio Married Woman.</p> <p>A bill in equity by a married woman against an insurance company, alleging that when the policy was issued the company agreed to distribute to her a portion of its dividends; that she always paid ike premiums until 1866, ■when, on account of her sickness, her husband was sent to pay them; that the agent of the company procured him to sign an application'for more insurance, which it was agreed should not he binding on her until assented to by her; that instead of being an application for more insurance, it was a waiver of future dividends in consideration of a permanent addition to the policy; that she did not discover this fact until 1874; that she then requested the company not to send her any more premium notes, but the company still sent the notes, which she continued to sign and pay till 1886, — fails to show any ground for equitable relief; the wife being all the time capable, by the law of the place where she resided, of making contracts, and of maintaining an action on them.</p>

<p>1. Attachment — PROPERTY-Subject to — -Property in Hands of, Assignee for Benefit of Creditors.</p> <p>Property in tho possession of an assignee for the benefit of creditors under the Missouri statute is not exempt from seizure on a writ of attachment isru:-ing from the federal court in a suit by a non-resident against, the assignor.</p> <p>2. Same. — Bights of Assignee — Intervention.</p> <p>Where property assigned as provided in the Missouri statute for the benefit of creditors has been seized under a writ of attachment issuing from the federal court, in an action by a non-resident against the assignor, the assignee may intervene in the attachment suit, and have his rigid to the property determined.</p>

<p>In Equity. Exceptions to report of special master.</p>

<p>In Equity. Intervention in attachment. On motion for judgment by default.</p>

<p>1. Executors and Administrators — Actions against — Bill for Renewal of Mortgage — J urisdiction — Parties.</p> <p>A. sold land to B., having given a prior mortgage to C. B. died. A. and C. filed a bill against the administratrix of B. to “authorize” her to take up the mortgage, and give a new mortgage therefor. The hill and answer were filed, and the verdict and decree granting the grayer rendered on the same day. The children and heirs of B. were, not parties or represented. It did not appear that A. was unable to pay oif his mortgage. Meld, that the court had no jurisdiction to authorize such a proceeding, and as to the mortgage in the hands of A., who had become the owner by assignment, it was null and void as to the children.</p> <p>2. Same — Powers over Real Estate.</p> <p>Under the laws of Georgia, realty descends directly to the heirs, subject t.o he administered by the legal representative for the payment of debts of the estate, and the purposes of distribution only.</p> <p>3. Same — Construction of Statutes.</p> <p>Statutes giving administrators power over realty are in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly construed; and the administratrix is not the legal representative of the heirs when acting without the scope of her limited powers.</p> <p>4. Same — Power to Sell and Incumber Real Estate.</p> <p>Under the laws of Georgia an administratrix is not authorized to dispose of the real estate of her intestate at private sale, nor to create any incumbrance on the estate by note, mortgage, or otherwise.</p> <p>5. Same — Equity Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Under the laws of Georgia, equity cannot interfere with the regular administration of estates, except upon application of the representative for construction and direction; for marshaling the assets; or upon application of any person interested in the estate, where there is danger of loss or other injury to his interest.</p> <p>6. Same.</p> <p>In the absence of statutory authority the equity courts of Georgia have no power to authorize an administratrix to incumber the estate of her intestate by a mortgage, or to change the priority and dignity of debts against the estate.</p> <p>7. Same — Authohity to Compromise.</p> <p>The authorization of an administrator to compromise contested and doubtful claims against the estate is no warrant for illegal transactions in the process and result of the settlement.</p> <p>8. ¡Same — Personal Liability- — Execution oe Negotiable Paper.</p> <p>If an administratrix make, indorse, or accept negotiable paper, she is, 'prima facie, liable individually, even if she signed as administratrix, and the estate is not bound, and in this case a prima facie case is made against her as to her individual interest which she is called upon to meet.</p> <p>9. Mortgages — Payment—Assignment.</p> <p>When a mortgage debt is paid by one in equity bound to pay it, an assignment of it to him upon payment operates as a discharge, and he will not in a court of equity be allowed to hold it as a subsisting incumbrance, and such court will look through the entire transaction, and fix the duty of payment where it belongs.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p>

At Latv. On motion to strike out portion of defendant’s answer. This is an action brought by John P. Knoche against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, for damages for the taking of his land by defendant company for right of way purposes, under an alleged verbal agreement to which plaintiff consented to the entry upon defendant’s promise to pay the damages sustained.

<p>At Law. On motion for new trial.</p>

At Law. The plaintiff was the owner of a steam-vessel known as the “John D. Dewar,” and the boat was engaged in passenger and freight traffic between the Lake Michigan ports of Manistee and Frankfort.

<p>Shipping — Liability op Owner or Vessel por Tort- -Personal Injuries— Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Contributory negligence is not a bar to a suit in admiralty for damages on account of a personal injury; and. where the fault which caused tho same is concurrent or mutual, the court will apportion the damages according to the equity and justice of the case.</p> <p> 8yüo.bus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Iu Admiralty. On appeal from district court.</p>

<p>In Equity. On motion for injunction.</p>

<p>1. Trusts — Dutv of Trustees — Bills for Accounting — Misjoinder of Causes.</p> <p>In a bill by Hie stockholders to compel the trustees of a company to account for the unpaid profits on their respective shares upon 1he completion of the trust, it is improper to join a complaint against the trustees to compel them to acounl for and pay over to one of the complainants certain dividends wrongfully paid by them to a third party upon his nominal and fraudulent ownership of stock, in which dividends the other complainants have no interest.</p> <p>3. Same —Parties—Of Corporations — Stockholders.</p> <p>To a bill by the stockholders against the trustees of a company to compel an accounting and distribution of the dividends and profits upon the completion of the trust, the real owner of shares obtained by fraud from the trustees by a nominal owner, is a proper party complainant, although such real owner has not complied with the trust agreement; the compliance by the nominal owner inuring to the benefit of such real owner.</p> <p>8. Same — Estoppel of Trustee to Allege Fraud.</p> <p>A contract for the construction of a railroad was assigned in trust for a company, the trustees of which were also the directors of the railroad. Held that, in an action by the stockholders of the construction company to compel the trustees to account for the profits from such contract, the trustees could not assert that the contract was in fraud of the railroad, nor that the stockholders had paid no consideration for the contract, and that the railroad was not a necessary party.</p> <p>4. Same — Laques or Limitations — Demurrer.</p> <p>A bill by stockholders to compel the trustees of a corporation to account for the dividends and undistributed profits derived from the construction oía railroad is not demurrable on the ground of laches or limitation where the hill fails to show on its face when the road was completed or when the right to final accounting accrued.</p>

In Equity. On demurrer to bill. The plaintiffs, the Merchants’ National Bank, of Chicago, and First National Bank, of Ithaca, are judgment creditors of the firm of J. H. Towns-Rend & Co., composed of the defendants James H. Townshend, P. M. Sabin, and George M. Brush.

<p>1. Equity — Pleading—Cross-Bill—Right to Rile — Demurrer.</p> <p>A cross-bill is a mode of obtaining relief or making a defense to which a defendant may resort as against the plaintiff or a co-defendant in the original bill, without leave of the court, and the question of his right to file the same when and as it may be done, may be made and determined on demurrer.</p> <p>2. Same — Time to File — After Publication of Testimony.</p> <p>Where a cross-hill does not seek to introduce new or further testimony on the matters in issue in the original suit, it may be filed after publication has passed, or the testimony thereabout is taken.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>As the testimony in equity cases is no longer taken secretly or kept from the inspection of the parties until what was called publication, the mere fact of publication having passed or the testimony being closed in the original suit, ought not to prevent a defendant from filing and maintaining a cross-bill even touching matters in issue in said suit.</p> <p> (■Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

At Law. On motion for now trial. Action by Amelia A. Gunther, executrix, etc., and others against the Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Company on a policy of insurance issued by such company.

<p>At Law. Damages for assault and battery. Demurrer to plea.</p>

<p>At Law. On motion to sot aside judgment.</p> <p>The action was for damages for personal injuries causing death of intestate. The state statute provides that in entering judgment upon verdict in such causes the clerk shall add to the amount of the verdict interest from the date of the death. Plaintiff having filed a waiver with the clerk, that officer entered judgment for the amount of verdict without interest.</p>

At Law. Action by plaintiff, C. W. Buster, against defendants, Solon Hum-phreys and Thomas IS. Tutt, receivers of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad, to recover damages for stock killed.

At Law. On demurrer to complaint. This was an action by A. G. Hulbert, the Missouri administrator of one Frances G. Hulbert, to recover damages from the city of Topeka, on the ground that her death had been caused by the negligent manner in which that city kept its steeets. The accident occurred in August, 1879, and Mrs. Hulbert died in St. Louis, Mo., in March, 1886.

<p>1. Minus and Mining — Acquisition—Annual Expenditure.</p> <p>An applicant ior a patent to a mining claim, who has made final entry, paid the purchase money for the land embraced in the survey of the claim, and has obi ¡lined his certificate of purchase therefor, is not obliged to continue the animal expenditure upon the claim required by section 2824, Rev. St., pending final decision upon his application, and issuance of patent.</p> <p>2. Same — Certificate on Purchase.</p> <p>An entry and certificate of purchase, so long as they remain uncanceled, are equivalent to a patent, so far as the rigbls of third parties are concerned.</p> <p>3. Same — Location without Prior. Entry.</p> <p>A mining location made without prior right of entry upon the ground is void. There can be no valid location made without prior right of entry. Location confers no right of entry where such right did not previously exist.</p> <p>4. Same — General Land-Office — Collateral Attack of Decision.</p> <p>The decisions of department officers upon questions of law or fact are not subject to collateral attack. Upon questions of fact their decisions are conclusive upon all parties; upon questions of law their decisions can only be reviewed in a proper case made in a direct proceeding for that purpose. Evidence is not admissible, in an aciion at law, to show on-cv in the decision of an officer of the land department upon any matter submitted to such officer for his decision.</p> <p>5. Samis — Ejectment—Title to Maintain.</p> <p>Generally, any person vested with immediate right of possession can maintain ejectment. As ag'ainst a trespasser, prior possession will support, the action. As to mining claims, possessory title is sufficient. Rev. St. § 910.</p> <p>6. Same — Conversion of Ore — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>Rule adopted in this case.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

At Law. Intervening petition of Gus. Lehman, assignee of II. C. Ea-gon against John W. Emerson, United States marshal. Plaintiffs, John H. Boltz et a.L, brought suit by attachment against defendant II. C. Eagon, and caused it to be levied on property which had been conveyed by the defendant by a deed of general assignment to Gus. Lehman, as assignee for the benefit of creditors.

<p>At Law. Motion for new trial.</p>

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus, by Plyant Mahon. Abner Justice, jailer of Pike county, having made his return to the writ of habeas corpus issued heroin on the-day of February, 1888, and Plyant Mahon having filed bis response thereto, and produced evidence, the court certifies the following to be the facts as admitted by the parlies or proven to the court’s satisfaction, viz.: Tho petitioner, Mahon, together with 19 other persons, was, at the September term, 1882, of the…

<p> Habeas Corpus. </p>

<p>Trade-Marks — Infringement—Measure op Damages.</p> <p>The owner is entitled to recover of the infringer of a trade-mark the profits arising from the sale of the spurious goods, with the trade-mark impressed upon them. He is not limited to the difference between the price for which the spurious goods would sell without, and the price of the same goods with, the trade-mark impressed upon them.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

In Equity. On exceptions to master’s report. Bill by A. S. Tomkinson against the Willets Manufacturing Company, for the infringement of a patent. Judgment for plaintiff, and the case now comes up on defendant’s exception to master’s report assessing the amount of damages. Dobson v. Carpet Co., 114 U. S. 440, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 945; Dobson y. Dorman, 118 U. S. 10, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 946; Bates v. Railroad Co., 32 Fed.

<p>'In Equity. Hearing upon the sufficiency of the plea. Action by the Seibert Cylinder Oil-Cup Company against Henry S. Manning etal.</p>

<p>1. Patents fob Intentions — Coins rations — Use ob- Different Elements.</p> <p>Under the ruling in 20 Fed. Hep. 114, loker’s patent .No. 9,239, for an improvement in friction drums for pile-drivers was confined to the peculiar elements of the combination therein described, one of which was a cross-grained friction surface; and the use by a defendant, against whom an injunction had been issued restraining the use of tho patented device, of a drum having a sidewise friction surface, is not a violation of the injunction.</p> <p>2. Same — Injunction —Violation by Carelessness— Failure to Notify Agent.</p> <p>The carelessness of a defendant, against whom an injunction has been obtained res raining him from using a patented device, in omitting to notify his agent of such injunction and i1s effects, will render him liable for a technical contempt for sales of the patented articles by such agent after the injunction had been obtained.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for damage.</p>

<p>1. Collision — Between Steamers — Crossing Steamers — Thwarting Maneuvers.</p> <p>A crossing steamer, required by old rule 18 to keep out of the way of another vessel is hound at her peril to take into account all the circumstances, including both the speed and heading of the other. The latter has no right to thwart the former’s maneuvers. A vessel's stopping is not “keeping her course, ” but is a violation, of rule 23, and a fault, specially so after an agreement by signals, unless its necessity in order to avoid collision is reasonably certain. Till then the privileged vessel must rely on the other's performing her duty, and the burden of proving the necessity is on the former. Mere doubt and apprehension are not sufficient to justify a departure from the rules by the adoption of a thwarting maneuver.</p> <p>2. Sajis — Privileged Vessel — Change of Course — Signals.</p> <p>Rule 22, in requiring the privileged vessel “to keep her course,” is not designed to confer a favor or privilege, but to impose an obligation in order to enable the other vessel with certainty to keep out of the way. After the other’s intention is known, or, an agreement by signals had, the former is bound upon any change thought necessary, to give notice of her intention by any available signals, either danger signals, under supervising inspectors’ rule 3, or the short blasts provided by new article 19, when these would be certainly understood.</p> <p>3. Same — State Statutes — On Wrong Side of Channel — Proximate Cause.</p> <p>Where the statutes require vessels to keep on the right-hand side of the river channel, a colliding vessel will not be held in fault merely because she was in the wrong part of the river, if there was, nevertheless, ample time and space to avoid collision. Bad navigation is then deemed the only proximate cause. But in case of an unexpected crossing from the right to the wrong side of the river, which causes embarrassment to the other, or such reasonable apprehension of collision as leads to erroneous orders by the other vessel, whereby a collision is produced, the former’s disobedience of the statute should be deemed a contributing and proximate cause, which renders her liable.</p> <p>4. Same — Negligence.</p> <p>The Beaconsfield, going out of the East river, came in collision off pier 1, in the northerly third of the channel, with the Britannia, which was turning up the East river. They exchanged signals of one whistle when two-thirds of a mile apart, and when the Britannia was just past Governor’s island. Both understood that they were to pass port to port. The latter had to make a swing of about 6 points to starboard. Owing to the ebb tide and the high west wind, her swing to starboard during the first minute and a half was much delayed, whereupon the Beaconsfield, uncertain as to the other’s eventual course, reversed when 1,500 feet distant, and came to a stop in the water without giving any signal to indicate her change of intent. The helm of the Britannia was all the time hard a-port, and she would have gone clear had the Bea-consfield kept on. Her swing to starboard was perceived directly after the Beaconsñeld reversed. As soon as tie latter’s stop was perceived, about 600 feet distant, tire Britannia reversed full speed but too late to avoid collision. Held, that the Beaeonsiield was in fault (i) for not keeping her .course, but stopping without apparent necessity; (2) forgiving no signal of her change of intention; (6) for not pursuing any lirm or consistent course; (4) for lying still and doing nothing to avoid collision, for a minute and a half after she had stopped and the real danger was evident.</p> <p>6. Same.</p> <p>Held, further, that, the Britannia was in fault for coming within 100 yards of Governor's island, instead of going further to the westward, and for not shaping her course so as to make her turn within the right-hand side of mid-channel, where the state statutes required her to go.1</p>

<p>1. Removai, oi’ Causes — Procedure-Acts oe State Oocrt.</p> <p>The United States removal act. as amended by net of March 3,1887, gives to the circuit court immediate jurisdiction upon the filing of the required petition and "bond in the state court, where the action is pending, tiie case being removable; and no act of the state court is necessary to, or can prevent, the jurisdiction of the circuit court, which court, upon the filing of a copy of the record, may proceed with the case as if it had been originally entered there.</p> <p>2. Same — Kmuit oe Removal — Yon-Resident Dependant — Act op March 3, 1887.</p> <p>Under the act of March 3, 1837', providing that United States circuit, courts shall have jurisdiction of civil causes between citizens of different states, and that when the jurisdiction is founded only on diverse citizenship suit may bo brought in the district where either plaintiff'or defendant resides; and that civil suits, of which the circuit court has jurisdiction, and which are brought in slate courts, may be removed to the circuit court by defendant, if a nonresident of the slate, — a foreign corporation sued in a state court by a citizen of the state has a right to a removal to the circuit court.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement. On demurrer to bill.</p>

In Equity. On demurrer to cross-bill. The cross-bill of Sunman alleged that the City National Bank of Lawrence-burgh closed its doors on August 10, 1883, in insolvency, and never opened up for business thereafter; Walter Fitch, a defendant to the cross-bill, was its cashier, and owned $5,000 of the stock of the bank; that defendant Gatch was a depositor in the bank at the time of its suspension in the sum of $14,-492.37; that there were alarge number of creditors, and the…

la Equity. On final distribution under master’s report. Held: they had acquired valid judgment liens; but for these sums they are required to account only as credits upon their demands against the carriage company, thereby reducing pro tanto their share in the fund derived from the chattel property, which they obtained and hold only by virtue of the mortgages, which have been declared invalid…

In Equity. Bill to restrain the building of a street railway by defendant, plaintiff' claiming the exclusive privilege in the city by virtue of a contract with the city.

<p>1. Railroad Companies — Bonds and Mortgages — Reorganization Agreement —Diversion op Funds.</p> <p>A railroad being about to be foreclosed under a consolidated deed of trust, a committee of the consolidated bondholders, the members of which were large holders of stock and prior bonds, drafted “a plan for purchase and reorganization. ” This provided that the old stock should be deposited, and that the new company should issue (1) first mortgage 6 per cent, bonds, to be used Qnly to fund the past due and maturing interest on the prior bonds, and for permanent construction and improvement; (2) preferred 7 per cent, stock, to represent the par value of outstanding consolidatedbonds; and (3) common stock to represent the outstanding common stock. Holders of common stock were not to be entitled to shares, or to vote, until preferred stock had been paid five successive annual dividends of 7 per cent. The property was bought in, and a reincorporation effected on this basis. The new charter provided that the funds applicable to the payment of dividends on preferred stock was the net income, “after paying interest on prior bonds, repairs, expenses of equipment, ” etc., any surplus, after paying 7 per cent., to stand over until next dividend day. At the first meeting of the new board it was resolved that “under operating expenses only such improvements and additions shall be included as are necessary to keep the property efficient, and that all beyond this shall be provided for out of funds other than net earnings. ” Held, that the provisions of the agreement and the charter, as interpreted by the resolution, were binding upon the directors, and, it having been made to appear that the earnings and income, which had been wrongfully converted to pay for improvements and extensions, would, if applied to dividends, be sufficient to pay five successive dividends of 7 per cent, each on the preferred stock, that the common stock was entitled to representation.</p> <p>ft. Same — Rights on Common Stockholders — Liens on Land Grant.</p> <p>Pursuant to an agreement for purchase and reorganization, a railroad company, which was about to be foreclosed under a consolidated trust deed, conveyed to the trustees of the separate mortgage of its land grant all its equities therein, in trust to pay off all liens on the lands, and to turn in the balance to the trustees of the consolidated deed of trust. When the property was sold under this last trust, and bought in by the purchasing committee, these equities wont, with it. The land trustees paid oil all liens, except one of §300,000, which was secured, in part, on other property, and from 1881 to 1885, both inclusive, had on hand fourfold security for that charge. Held, as between preferred stock and common stock, which latter under the charter was to.be debarred from participation until the former had been paid successive dividends oí 7 per cent, during those five years, that the surplus, after providing for the security of the §300,000 lien, was to be applied to dividends.</p> <p>3. Same — Premiums on Mortgage Bonds.</p> <p>The same is true of premiums received by the company on first mortgage bonds issued and sold by it</p> <p>4. Same - Operating Expenses.</p> <p>As between such stockholders, a steel rail betterment should be charged to “construction account” and not to “operating expenses.”</p> <p>5. Same.</p> <p>The same is true as to money spent on steamers owned by the company to make them “more efficient;” and, where no “depreciation account” is kept, it is error to charge “expense account” with an estimated depreciation, when the money so charged was not actually spent upon repairs.</p> <p>6. Same — Money Bokrowed to Purchase Engine.</p> <p>N or, under such circumstances, should money borrowed by the company and laid out in the purchase of new freight engines and coal cars be charged to operating expenses.</p> <p>7. Purchase on- Other Roads — Action to Restrain — Supplemental Bill.</p> <p>A suit having- been brought by holders of common stock of a railroad company to compel the board of directors to recognize them as such, another hill to tiio same effect, was hied by substantially the same parties, November 28, 1887, setting out, in addition that the defendant was about to buy in another road, and asking that the contemplated purchase, which was to take place two days later, be enjoined, on the ground that it was ultra tires, etc. The road about to be bought, was improperly made a party to this bill. Held, the right to the relief demanded in the original bill having been established, that the second bill was properly a supplemental bill, and that, although it had been filed without the leave required by equity rule 57, it should, under the circumstances, be allowed to stand as to the defendant in the original suit.</p> <p>8. Same — Right to Purchase Franchise of Other Roads.</p> <p>There is nothing in the general railroad law of Michigan (act of 1873) authorizing one railway corporation to acquire the stock and franchises of another completed company, with the intention of itself exercising; such franchises; and, in the absence of such a statute, such an acquisition is unlawful.</p> <p>9. Same — Injunction.</p> <p>Where holders of common stock of a railroad company are entitled to, but are deprived of, the right of representation, equity will enjoin, pending suit for the enforcement of such right, a disadvantageous, illegal, and ultra tires purchase by such company of another road.</p>

<p>1. Master and Servant — Negligence of Fellow-Servants.</p> <p>An expressman and baggageman was killed in a collision, while in the discharge of his duty on defendant’s passenger train, through the negligence of the employes of defendant’s freight train. Mold, that they were not fellow-servants.1</p> <p>2. Death by Wrongful Act — Damages.</p> <p>Intestate left a widow, but no children or descendants of children. He was about 80 years old; had been earning $55 a month; had been in defendant’s employ several years; was temperate, industrious, living with and supporting his wife. He left'no estate, and his widow was without means of support. Damages assessed at $4,000. . •</p>

At Law. On motion for return to defendant of money brought into court to keep good a tender. ■ The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the wholesale shoe trade at Cincinnati, had sold goods to the value of $2,540.50 to Miller, a retail dealer at Fort Wayne.

<p>1. Claims against United States — Appropriations—Authority of Executive DEPARTMENT — ACT OB' MARCH 3, 1887.</p> <p>Though an executive department has no authority to hind the government in excess of appropriations, yet where an appropriation has been made by congress for a general purpose contemplating- a multitude, of acts to be done by the department, its agency is general within those limits; and where persons act in good faith under orders of the department, no excess of authority in giving orders above the prescribed limits will be presumed, and the burden of proving this defense is upon the government, when the facts are peculiarly within its power, and the creditor was not in circumst anees to ascertain them.</p> <p>2. Same — Consuls—Expenditures under Directions.</p> <p>The government having appropriated fU 0,000 to enable the state department to participate in the World’s Industrial Exposition, at New Orleans, the department sent to the petitioner, then consul at Nicaragua, a circular letler, “suggesting” that he procure certain characteristic articles as souvenirs of his consulate for the exposition, referring to an appropriation by congress, and stating that dependence should not be placed upon voluntary contributions. A lew articles were accordingly purchased by the petitioner, and forwarded to the representative of the department, and accepted. A year and a half afterwards, when his bill was presented, he was told that the appropriation was exhausted. Upon suit in this court under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1887, held, that the reasonable construction of 1he circular was a request or order to procure the articles at the expense of the government.</p> <p>8. Same — Duty of*Consul.</p> <p>Held, also, that there was no presumption that this order when made was an illegal act, or in excess of the appropriation; that the consul was in no situation to inquire into the extent of previous orders issued by the department; and had then, and has now, the right to rely on the presumed authority of the department under the appropriation, until the contrary is proved.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>The fact that the appropriation was found a year and a half after to bé exhausted. is not such proof. The petitioner was therefore held entitled to judgment, as on an authorized and binding contract with the government.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Judgment — Res Adjudioata — Who Concluded.</p> <p>The trustee under a mortgage executed by a Kentucky street-railway corporation filed a bill in the chancery court of thatstate to foreclose. To these proceedings G., who resided in Ohio, and who was the manager and a large stockholder of the company, was made party by a “warning order,” and an attorney appointed by the court to defend his interests, according to the laws of Kentucky. Pending suit, G. sold out his interest in the concern, including certain unpaid and overdue coupons secured by the mortgage which he warranted to be a first lien, to a purchaser who bought with the view, known to G. at the time, of bidding in the property and franchise at the foreclosure sale. The purchaser intervened, and set up the assignment from G., who did not appear, save as a witness in behalf of his assignee. The court ruled that the coupons had been paid, and that their holder was not entitled to come in under the mortgage. Held, in an action in the federal court in Ohio by the purchaser against G. for damages for breach of warranty, that the Kentuclsy court, being a court of competent jurisdiction, and the proceeding in rem, its finding as to the coupons was res adjudioata, and that G. was estopped to set up their validity as a defense to the action.</p> <p>2. Coupohations — Bonds and Moutgages — Coupons—Payment.</p> <p>G. agreed with B., a bondholder, and also the largest stockholder in a street-railway company, to take his holdings if B. would put G. into control. B. thereupon got the company to give him its notes for $15,000, which was about the amount of its pressing debts, in consideration for which he undertook to pay off the outstanding claims. These were made up in the main of mortgage coupons, and tlie understanding was that B. was to hold these eotiiions. when taken up, as collateral security, and that, as fast as 1ke not.es were paid, coupons to a proportionate amount, were to be surrendered. G. was then installed as manager, and the notes turned over to him. Ho raised the money on them, and paid it to B., who then gave him the coupons. Of these coupons — 313 in number — but 192 belonged to B.’s bonds. The remainder had been paid when presented at the company’s oflico, but they had passed into B.’s hands without the knowledge or consent of the former holders. (1. took up the notes for $ 15.000 as they fell due, and the company then paid him the difference between their value and that of the coupons in consideration of their surrender, it being agreed that the coupons should thereafter belong to G. absolutely. Held, that as against the other bondholders secured by the mortgage, the coupons had been paid, and that G., who had sold them with a warranty that they were a lien under that mortgage, was liable in damages to the purchaser for a breach thereof.</p> <p>8 Same — Confusion of Accounts.</p> <p>After G. had gotten control of the company, as indicated, he chose hit own directors, in the main from his own family and his clerks, and exercised absolute and exclusive authority over its finances and business for many years. He kept no separate account'in bank of the company’s funds, but deposited all money earned by it to his own individual account, and paid coupons and current hills that wore presented for settlement in cash or in checks drawn upon the same account. Held, in the absence of proof that the moneys used to take up the coupons were individual funds, and in view of the fact that those who presented them for payment did so under the belief that they were to he canceled, that the coupons had been paid, and that, G., who had sold them with a warranty that they were a lien under the mortgage executed to secure the bonds from which they were cut, was liable in damages to the purchaser for a breach thereof.</p> <p>4. Same — Advances by President — 110301,11110x8 of Directors.</p> <p>The president of a street-railway company, who was practically i1s solo owner, sold certain of its mortgage coupons under a, warranty that they were unpaid. As a matter of fact they had been paid by the corporation, but the president, claiming to have advanced the money to pa,y thorn out of his own funds, procured the passage of a resolution by the directors who were controlled by him, subrogating him to the rights of the original holders. Held, in an action for breach of the warranty, that the resolution was no defense; its recitals being false, and entitled to no more weight than the statements of the president himself to the same effect.</p> <p>5. Judgment — Assignment—Sabe.</p> <p>An agreement for the sale of the vendor’s interest in a street-railway company recited that he “hereby sells and agrees to deliver ® * the following-securities: Three judgments against said company for $4,703.So, 61,282.12, and «1,030.53, respectively, which have been paid by him, and which lie now holds against the company, "reciting the facts as to said judgments fully and correctly. The first two amounts represented money which the vendor, who was largely Interested in the company, had paid a surety on the company’s appeal-bond, who had been compelled to make them good. The surety had thereupon assigned and transferred to the vendor “all right, title, and benefit in and to the said sum. ” The last amount was a partial payment macie by the vendor on a judgment against the company. The agreement contained no warranty as to these judgments. Held, that the fact that the judgments had not been entered to the use of the vendor was not ground for recovery of damages by the vendee.</p> <p>6. Bale — Breach, of Warranty — Damages.</p> <p>In an action for a broach of warranty in the sale of mortgage coupons, where there is no evidence as to the market value of the coupons at the dale of sale, the price paid by the purchaser will ho considered the market price, and that is the measure of damages.</p> <p>7. Same — Deceit—Damages.</p> <p>In an action to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment of material facts in the sale of mortgage coupons, the price paid by the purchaser with interest thereon is the measure of damages, whore ihore is uo evidence as to the market value of the coupons at the time of sale.</p> <p>8. LIMITATION of Actions — Exceptions—Fraud.</p> <p>Ia Ohio, “limitations” is not a good plea to an action to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment of material facts in the sale of mortgage coupons, where the suit was commenced within four years after the fraud was discovered.</p>

At Law. Action for malicious prosecution for causing the. plaintiff to be indicted and prosecuted in the courts of the state for stealing $60,000. On the trial the plaintiff’s counsel called one of the grand jurors, who had served on the grand jury by which the indictment was found, and proposed to "show by him what testimony had been given before the grand jury when the indictment was found.

Habeas corpus in re the application for the extradition of George Benson, alias Charles Bourton, alias Mayer, under the provisions of the treaty of oxtiadition between the United Btates and the republic of Mexico of December 11, 1861. The application and the arrest were made under the first and second articles of that treaty, which, so far as they affect this proceeding, are as follows: “Article 1.

<p>Shipping — Domestic Liens — Repairs—Authority of Owner or Agent — State ' Statutes.</p> <p>The yacht Sea Witch was owned by one W., who had authorized B. to procure her sale. B. in turn employed a yacht broker, and negotiations were had for a sale to one F. About July 1st B.’s authority was revoked by W., who, on the 2d of July, made an informal written instrument of sale to claimant. B. and the broker, however, continued their negotiations with F., aud about the 8th of July came to a verbal agreement with him for a sale, after which the broker, at F.'s request, ordered libelant to do caulking on the yacht. The verbal agreement between F. and the broker was never ratified by the owner, and the work on the vessel was stopped by claimant. Specifications were filed to secure the lien, and this libel filed to enforce it. Reid, that the repairs were made without the authority of the owner or agent, -ji any one authorized to charge them; no lien was therefore created on tfes vessel, and the libel should be dismissed.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel for damages. On appeal from district court. Libel for damages for breach of charter-party, by Thomas George Greenwell against Ross, Keen & Co.

<p>Iii Admiralty. Libel for damages.</p>

<p>Salvage — Fire on Pier — Towing Vessels into Stream — Apportionment oe Award.</p> <p>On the afternoon of January 29,1887, a fire broke out on the bulkhead adjoining piers 8 and 9, North river, in the city of New York, and spread with great rapidity along pier 9. The steam-ship Louisiana lay moored on the northerly side of this pier, and the steam-ship New Orleans on the southerly side, and both vessels caught fire. Two tugs hauled the Louisiana into the stream, and two others assisted in putting out the fire. Two other tugs hauled out the New Orleans; one of them rendering hut slight service was not a party herein. The steam-ships were in great danger if they remained long at the pier. There was at no time any special peril to the tugs. The Louisiana and cargo were worth from $800,000 to $400,000; the New Orleans was worth $180,0J0. The above suits were brought by the various owners of the tugs to recover salvage. Held, that the Louisiana should pay $2,000 as salvage to the four tugs which assisted her. viz., $1,400 to those that hauled her out, and $600 to the others; and that the New Orleans, whose.danger was greater, though her value less, should pay the same to the libelant’s tug; the awards to be divided three-fourths to the owners, one-fourth to master and crew.</p>

<p>Demurrage — Liability or Charterer — Failure to Turkish Clearance Papers — Custom akd Usage.</p> <p>A vessel’s laydays expired on Saturday. Her loading was completed on Friday, but her clearance papers -were not furnished by charterer until Monday afternoon, and the ship sailed Tuesday. The charter provided that charterer should be liable “forany detention of the vessel by his default” after the expiration of the lay days. Evidence was given of the existence of a custom allowing a charterer one day after the loading is completed in which to furnish necessary papers, and charterer claimed that he was entitled to one day for furnishing papers after the expiration of the lay days. Held,, that under the above clause of the charter a detention of clearance papers would render the charterer liable. Held, further, that no custom was proved, or would be sustained, allowing charterer more than one day after the loading is in fact completed, or until the end of the lay days, if that be later; and that a ship cannot be detained after her lay days have expired, without compensation, when the loading has been actually completed more than a day previous. Charterer was therefore held liable for one day's demurrage.</p>

<p>1. Shipping — Charter-Party—““Working Hours” — Custom op Post.</p> <p>The phrase “working hours” in a clause of a charter-party means those hours during which work is ordinarily done about the business to which the clause relates, and is to be construed according to the custom of the port as to the working and hauling of vessels in loading and discharging.</p> <p>2. Samis — Burden op Proof.</p> <p>In the charter-party under which libelants chartered claimants' steam-ship P. was a clause providing that “in the event of damage preventing the working of the ship for more than 24 working hours”payment of hire should cease till she should he again fit to resume her service. The steam-ship, having broken a propeller blade, was dry-docked for repairs on the afternoon of Saturday, and was taken off on Monday afternoon. Libelants claimed a rebate of charter money for the three days the vessel was on the dock, and brought this suit to enforce it, claiming that “24 working hours” meant, hours during which work might possibly go on, i. consecutively, night and day. Claimants contended that the phrase meant only the ordinary working hours in the handling- oí a ship in port, and that, on this construction, the vessel's repairs had not detained her for 24 working hours. Held, that the burden ivas on libelant to prove his interpretation of the clause, and that it was not proved.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for damages.</p>

<p>At Law. Action for compensation for use of land. On demurrer.</p>

In Equity. Action by the city of Galesburg against the Galesburg Water Company to have a contract for a water supply set aside as fraudulent and unfulfilled. The action was brought in the state court. On application oí the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company of New York, the assignees under a trust deed of the water company, they were made parties defendant, and the suit was removed to this court.

In Equity. On bill for injunction. The complainant, Abner Taylor, seeks to enjoin the defendant, J. M. Robinson, sheriff and tax collector of Oldham county, Tex., from collecting taxes assessed against him upon certain state lands which he holds under a contract of purchase.

<p>Trusts — AotioN to Establish — Lost Imbtkcmbnts — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>In a suit brought in 1884 to establish and enforce a bond to reconvoy, alleged to have been given in 1847 by defendant to his uncle J., under whom plaintiff claimed, one witness testified that he saw certain papers executed about that time, and understood them to be deeds of J.’s land to defendant, given to enable defendant to sell it in tlie States whither he was returning after a visit to J., and a bond to reconvey in case defendant failed to sell. Another testified that from talks with defendant at that time he understood that such an arrangement had been made, and that he afterwards saw such a bond to •reconvey produced and proved in a suit in 1854; that tho witnesses to the bond were dead. It appeared that in 1847 defendant was poor, and tho consideration he alleged was very small — less than one-ninth of that expressed in the deed. Plaintiff and his’ grantor had been in continuous possession and paid taxes since 1850. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to relief.</p>

<p>Equity — Practice—Appearance—Filing Pleadings.</p> <p>When a defendant served witli subpoena entered his appearance, and filed his answer before the rule-day at which the writ was returnable, held, that under United States equity rules such practice was proper, and that replication should be filed on or before the rule-day succeeding that on which the writ was returnable.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill to set aside alleged fraudulent preferences.</p>

In Equity. Bill by Chester C. Corbin, an unsecured creditor of Boies, Fay & Conkey, to set aside certain judgments confessed by them, as in fraud of the Illinois limited partnership act, (2 Starr & C. St. Ill. c. 84, pp. 1564 — 1568.)

<p>1. Taxation — Assessment—Oath oe Assessor.</p> <p>The constitution of the state of Arkansas declares that “all property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value; that value to be ascertained in such manner as the general assembly shall direct. ” The, revenue act of the state requires the assessor, before entering on the discharge of the duties of his office, to take the oath of office proscribed by the constitution for all state and county officers, and, in addition thereto, a comprehensive oath covering in detail h'is official duties, and particularly the declaration that “ all real property will be appraised al its actual cash value,” This oath is required to be indorsed on the assessment book, which the clerk makes, prior to its delivery to the assessor; and, if the assessor fails to take said oath within the time prescribed, his office is declared vacant, and the clerk is required to notify the governor, and the vacancy is to be tilled according to law. Held, that the oath which the assessor is required to take is one of the means provided by the legislature to give effect to the constitutional requirement that property shall be taxed according to its value; that the failure to take the oath vacates ipso facto his office; and that where the assessor fails to take the oath, aud the clerk, in violation of lawn delivers to him the assessment book, no assessment on that book can bo made the foundation of a valid tax title.</p> <p>2. Same— Bat,e- — Publication.</p> <p>When the delinquent list end notice of sale, mid proof of their publication, arc required to he perpetuated by a record, to be certified to by the clerk before the salo, it is indispensable, that such record be kept; and parol evidence is inadmissible to supply the omission.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>Where a statute requires the notice of sale of delinquent lands to he published “weekly for two weeks” between the fourth Monday in April and the fourth Monday in May, two weeks must elapse between the first publication and the fourth Monday in May; and whore the publication is made on the Kith and 23d days of May, and the fourth Monday of the month is the ‘loth, the notice is void.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>Where the notice of sale prescribed by law has not been given, the collector has no authority or jurisdiction to sell, and before he sells, his jurisdiction, in this regard, must he mado to appear of record, in the mode proscribed by the statute.</p> <p>5. Same.</p> <p>Affidavits of the proof of publication of the notice of the tax sale, made and placed in the clerk's office more than two years after the tax sale, are no part of the record of the tax proceedings, or of the’official files of the clerk’s office, and have no legal sanction.</p> <p>6. Same — Right to Redeem — Misconduct of Officer.</p> <p>When the owner of a lot which has been sold to the state for taxes, without his knowledge, is prevented from discovering the sale and making redemption by the official misconduct or mistake of the officer who makes out the assessment book, he will be permitted to redeem on discovering the facts.</p> <p>7. Same — Caveat Ehptor.</p> <p>The rule of acweat emptor applies to the purchaser of a tax title.</p> <p>8. Same — Tax Titles — Grounds of Contest.</p> <p>Mansf. Dig. Ark. §§ 5782, 5791, do not apply to meritorious defenses, and by meritorious defenses is meant any act or omission of the revenue officers in violation of law and prejudicial to the rights and interests of the owner, as well as those jurisdictional and fundamental defects which affect the power to levy the tax, or sell for its non-payment. Radoliffe v. Beruggs, 46 A.rk. 96.</p>

<p>At Law. In action for ejectment.</p> <p>Esther O. Mowey brought suit against William 0. Cummings. Judgment for plaintiff.</p>

At Law. Action to collect penalty under Rev. St. U. S. § 2117, for driving cattle on land belonging to the Indians. This action was brought against J. C. Loving to collect the penalty for driving cattle into the Comanche, Kiowa, and Wichita Indian reserva» Ü011S.

<p>At Law. Action by John E. Robertson against George II. Gornclson, for damages for personal injuries.</p>

<p>Death by Wrongful Act — Damages—Interest—Pleading.</p> <p>Wliero the complaint demands judgment “in the sum of $5,000, with the costs of this action, ” and a verdict is returned for plaintiff for $5,000 damages, the plaintiff may waive the interest from the date of decedent's death, under Code Civil Proc. ÍT. Y § 1904, providing that “when final judgment for the plaintiff is rendered the clerk must add to the sum so awarded interest thereon from the decedent's death, and include it in the judgment."</p>

<p>At Law. On demurrer.</p> <p>Action by J. J. Albert, to recover $8,000 from the supreme council of the Order of Chosen Friends.</p>

<p>1. Insurance — Assignment of Policy.</p> <p>When the owner of an insurance policy, after loss, places the same in the hands of an attorney for collection, with instructions to apply the proceeds in payment of his debt to a third person, this does not constitute an assignment of the policy to such third person.</p> <p>2. Same — Validity—Change of Possession — Recording.</p> <p>The written assignment of a policy, made by the holder after loss, notice of such assignment being served upon the company, and the original holder of the policy retaining possession, is valid as against a subsequent garnishment, and need not be recorded as required by Code Iowa, § 1923, in case of a sale or mortgage of personal property when the vendor or mortgagor retains possession.</p>

<p>At Law. Intervening petition.</p>

<p>Indictment lor Robbing Mail Train.</p>

<p>In Equity. On bill for injunction.</p>

In Equity. On bill to restrain infringement of letters patent. Aaron Van Camp brought a bill against the Maryland Pavement Com- ' pany to restrain the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 174,648.

<p>Patents for Inventions — Infringement—Actions for Damages — Pleading.</p> <p>Rev.'St. U. S. § 4919, providing that damages for the infringement of a patent may be recovered by action on the case, and Rev. St. U. S. § 914, providing that the forms of pleading in the federal courts shall be the same as those employed in the same action in the state courts, are construed together, and the pleadings in an action for damages for infringement of a.patent should be in the state form, except as modified by Rev. St. U. S. § 4920, providing that in such action defendant may plead the general issue, and, having given notice, may prove certain special matters.</p>

<p>Patents for, Inventions — Licenses—Breach of Contract — Injunction.</p> <p>A bill in equity alleged that complainant licensed defendants to use the former’s patents on certain terms, among which were payment of royalties, the rendering of monthly accounts, etc.; that defendants soon refused to fulfill any part of the agreement, but continued to use the patents; that they had conspired with other licensees to destroy complainant's license system, and irreparable injury would result. Defendants answered that the agreement was obtained by fraud on the part, of complainant, and was therefore void. Ileal, that complainant has no adequate remedy at law. and an injunction will issue against defendants, unless they will give satisfactory bonds pending litigation.</p>

<p>In Equity. On bill for an injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement.</p>

<p>At Law. Demurrer to a complaint for infringement of letters patent.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill founded upon the infringement of letters patent.</p>

<p>1. Smrrns'G — Liability for Tort — Injuries suom Swell or Steamer.</p> <p>The duly of a passing steamer to guard against the injurious effects of her swell and suction upon the smaller craft in rivers and harbors, has often been enforced in courts of admiralty.</p> <p>3. Same — 'Negligence—Costs—Piety Ninth Rule.</p> <p>The steamer .Now York, going up the Hudson river against the tide, and the steam-boat Norwich, coming down with a tow, passed each other in the channel opposite to where libelants canal-boat lay along the shore taking in cargo. The suction and swell caused the latter to strike the bottom, causing damage, for which this suit was brought. The channel at the point was about 350 to 1100 loot wide, and the steamers passed port to port, both moving slowly. The New York was notified before reaching- the place of the presence of the canal-boat by the whistles of a steam-tug lying near, and her pilot recognized the fact that ho must pass close to her. Held, that the Norwich, going slowly with, the title, committed no fault, and the libel against her should he dismissed. Jleld, that it was the duly of the New York, in the situation which her pilot foresaw, to have waited below the landing until the Norwich had passed, so that the New York could have gone further to port; or else to have stopped her wheel entirely while passing- libelant’s boat; and for her failure to do either she should be held liable for the damage. The Norwich’s costs of trial were also imposed on her, as she opposed the libelant’s offer to discontinue as l.o the Norwich, and required that she bo retained under the fifty ninth rule.</p>

<p>1. Shipping — Liability op Vessel for Tort — Master and Servant — Defective Appliances.</p> <p>Libelant, who was one of the gang of the stevedore, was at work in the hold stowing cotton, when a sling containing three bales parted, and one of them fell clown the hatchway and struck him, inflicting serious injuries. The vessel at the time was in full charge of the stevedore, who was selected by the charterer and paid by the ship, and who furnished all the hands, including a man at the gangway whose duty it was to warn the men in the hold when the cotton was on the way. This duty he failed to perform. The ship supplied the appliances for loading, and among these were the slings, which, owing to the hard usage, rapidly wore out. The stevedore, his foreman, the gangway man, and the man at the winch all testified that at least one of the slings (there were two) furnished by the mate for this particular gangway had all the appearance of being an old one, and the stevedore and his foreman, to whom the master showed the broken sling after the accident, swore that not only was it dark in color like an old sling, but that its ends at the break were stranded. The testimony of the officers of the ship was to the effect that both slings were entirely'new, and had never been used before. The mate, who got possession of the broken sling, and kept it, admitted on his examination, which was de bene esse, that it was on the ship. The ship was then in port, but the sling was not produced at the trial. In addition, the foreman of the stevedore testified that he had frequently called the attention of the mate to the unsafe character of the slings. Held, that as a matter of fact the sling was an old one, and it being the duty of the ship to furnish the stevedore with safe appliances, the ship was liable.</p> <p>,2. Same — Negligence op Fellow-Servant.</p> <p>A vessel taking in a cargo of cotton was in full charge of the stevedore, who furnished all the hands, including a man at the gangway and others in the hold. It was the duty of this man to warn the men below when the cotton was on the way. This he failed to do, and, a sling breaking, one of the bales fell down the hatchway and struck the libelant, who was employed by the stevedore to stow the cotton. The immediate cause of the accident was the rope of which the sling was made, and which was old. It was the duty of the ship to supply these slings, and to see that they were in good condition. The libelant was permanently disabled by the accident for the most exacting duties of a longshoreman, though he was not incapacitated, with his experience and skill, from making a living. He was confined to bed a considerable period by his injuries, and lost much time. Held, the negligence of the ship being the immediate cause of the accident, that the fact that the negligence of a fellow-servant contributed thereto was not, in admiralty, matter in discharge, but only in mitigation of damages; and that $1,500, with $75 as doctor's fees, should be allowed.</p>

<p>1. CoTjTiTsion — Signals—Coxtraiiy Maneuvers.</p> <p>A vessel that agrees by signal to pass ahead of another vessel, and thereafter stops without reasonable necessity, is in fault if collision ensues.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>As the steam-tug It., with a canal-boat on her starboard side, was turning from the North into the East river, another tug, the 1)., being a little astern, and going in the same direction, she observed 1he steamer St. J. coining tip on her starboard hand. She signaled her intention to pass ahead of the St. J., to which the latter, by whistles, agreed; and the St. <7. at the same time agreed to go ahead of the I). As the vessels drew nearer, the It., fearing that site would not clear the St. J., stopped and reversed. As soon as this was perceived by the St. J., she also slopped and reversed, but collided with the B.’s tow, striking it about 10 fool from her stern. Had the B. kept on, she would have cleared the St. J. by at least 100 feet, the same distance that the St. J. passed ahead of the D. All the vessels were moving slowly', and on direct lines. HeM, That there was no reasonable or apparent necessity for the stopping of the B., contrary to the agreement, under win ell both had been acting, and such stopping was the fault that caused the collision; that the St. J. owed no duty to the R., except the duty of not thwarting her in keeping out of the way, and except that, aiter risk of collision appeared through the R.’s fault, the St. J. was hound to do what was possible to avoid her, which she did. The R. was therefore held solely liable for the damage.</p> <p>3. Same — Safe Margin is Crossikg.</p> <p>It is not culpable navigation in the harbor of Hew York for vessels of moderate size,'moving at moderate speed, upon direct lines, in the day-time and in clear weather, to shape their courses so as to pass 100 feet from each other.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel for damages. The Grand Isle, a steam-propeller, was plying between New Orleans and Grand Island, through the “Company Canal,” an outlet from the Mississippi river. On the 9th of November, 188G, she was on her way to Grand Island, Laving a model barge in tow, which a man was steering. On her way, just after leaving the canal lock, she approached the lugger San Pierre, which boat she was charged with having run into and damaged.

<p>In Equity.. Bill for specific performance.</p>

<p>Bminest Domain — Transfer-Boat Landing.</p> <p>Act Ill. July 1, 1887, known as the “Water-Craft Act, ” provides that all railroad companies having a terminus upon any navigable river bordering on that state shall have power to own for their own use any water-craft necessary in carrying across such river any cars, etc., “provided that no right shall exist under this act to condemn any real estate for a landing for such watercraft, or for any other purpose. And this act shall only apply to such railroad companies as own the landing for such water-craft. ” lleld, that a rail-roatl company whoso road terminated on the Ohio river at Cairo could not condemn land for an incline track and transfer ferry-"boat landing, in order to connect with another railroad company.</p>

<p>1. Banks and Banking — National Banks — Insolvency—Fraudulent Transfers — Pleading—Misjoinder of Causes.</p> <p>The complaint in an action to recover the value of certain notes alleged to have heen the property of a hank of which plaintiff was receiver, and to ha.* been wrongfully converted by defendant, contained two counts. The first charged that an officer of plaintiff's hank surreptitiously took these notes from its vaults, and delivered them to defendant, which took with knowledge, etc.; the second charged that plaintiff’s bank, in contemplation of insolvency, and with a view to prevent the application of these assets in the way prescribed by law, transferred them to defendant. Held, that, a demurrer on the ground oí' a misjoinder of causes of action would not lie, tire two counts in reality stating but one cause of action.</p> <p>% Same.</p> <p>The first count states clearly and distinctly what, would be tantamount to the common-law action of trover, and does not attempt to unite that form of action with one under Rev. Bt. (J. H. § 5242. declaring void all preferences made by a national bank after, or in contemplation of, insolvency.</p> <p>8. Same — Conclusions of Law.</p> <p>The allegation in the second count of the complaint, that plaintiff s bank, having refused to pay its circulating- notes, and suspended payment to its creditors, and, being in default, and in contemplation of insolvency, assigned and transferred certain notes to defendant, with a view to prevent the application of its assets among its creditors in the manner provided by law, is not open to objection as stating merely conclusions of law.</p>

At Law. Action on county bonds. The plaintiff, Joseph Haag, brings this action on bonds issued by the board of county commissioners of Rio Grande county, Colo., to aid in the construction of a wagon road.

<p>At Law. Plea to the jurisdiction of the United States circuit court.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Patentability—Novelty.</p> <p>TJfcie invention in reissued letters patent No, 6,606, of August 24. 1875, (original granted September 29, 1874.) to William S. O’Brien, for an “improvement in that class of harrows which are made in sections connected to each other by eye-bolts and a coupling rod, ” consists in making the coupling rod with a loop or crook, which may be engaged with a hook on one of the sections to retain it in its place, and may be released therefrom simply by turning it. JTM not anticipated by harrows which had been made in sections prior to the date of the invention; the sections in such harrows being coupled together only with hinges and with hooks, eye-bolts, and straight coupling rods passing through eyes located in the sides of the adjacent sections.</p> <p>2. Same — Reissue—Description op Claim".</p> <p>In letters patent No. 155,543, of September 29, 1874, to William S. O’Brien, for an ■'improvement in that class of harrows which are made in sections connected to each other by eye-bolts and a coupling rod, ” the device is described in substantially the same'manner in which it is described in the reissue, (No. 0,500, of August 21,18T5,)but the claim is: “The combination of the coupling rod, having the bend, with the harrow sections and eyes by means of the hook.” The claim in she reissue is: “The coupling rod having a crook or loop arranged to operate with a hook for securing said coupling rod in the eyes, and tile barrow section:! to each other.” Held, that “combination,” as used in the original claim, was synonymous with “connection, ” and that the reissue was therefore valid; it being evident from the original specification that what the inventor wished to secure; was his now coupling rod, which was his invention, and which consisted of the combination oí two or more harrow sections, by means of a coupling rod hating a hinged or pivotal connection, centrally on the side of one section.</p> <p>8. Same — iNt-’iaifOEUiWT—What Constitutes.</p> <p>Sectional harrows coupled loosely with a looped or bent coupling rod, but having the band or loop made wide enough to allow its back to engage with two hooks projecting from the side of the opposite section, and at some distance apart, instead of one hook only, as in reissued letters patent No. (5.000. of August 24,1815, (original granted September 29,1874.) to William S. O Brion, for an improvement in harrows, is an infringement thereof ; the looped coupling rod, for the purposes to which it is applied, constituting 1he invention, anti the fact that strength is gained by the use of an additional hook and an improvement over the original device thus secured being immaterial.</p>

<p>At Law. Action on the case under Rev. St. U. S. § 4919, for an alleged infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>Irt Equity. Bill for infringement.</p>

<p>1. Patents bor Inventions — 1Telephones—Infringement.</p> <p>Tlie Bell telephone patent, having been held by the supreme court to extend .o tho idea of, and not the mere device for, tho transmission of vocal sounds by means of electrical undulations which are similar in form to tho air vibrations that constitute the sounds to be transmitted, defendants’ instruments, which, although in some respects different from the Bell patent, produce electrical changes corresponding to the vibrations of sound waves caused by articulate speech, must be held to be an infringement of the Bell patent.</p> <p>2. Same — laches.</p> <p>Defendants resisted an application for a preliminary injunction on the ground that complainants were guilty of laches. Defendants engaged in their enterprise in tho summer of 1885, and this suit was brought in the fall of 1887. Por two years before suit defendants bad been in operation, and bad built up a business of 400 telephones. The fact that they were establishing the business was well known to complainants, who took no steps to restrain them. But, before and at the time defendants began their business, complainants and their patentee were carrying on litigation in several courts of the United States, and in many ways were vigorously asserting and enforcing their ciaiins, and a case involving the validity of that patent was then pending in the supreme court, all which facts were well and publicly known. Held, that, as defendants chose to rely upon their belief that the supreme court would hold the Bell patent invalid, they could not complain of the consequences of a different decision, nor urge laches on the part of the complainants, and the injunction should issue.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for injunction against infringement of patent. On exceptions and special demurrer to hill.</p>

<p>SlIIlTING — LIBERTY TO CATjTi AT A NY PORT — QUARANTINED PORT — DETENTION —Damage to Fruit Cargo — Bir.u oe Lading — .Evidence.</p> <p>The shipper of a cargo of fruit took from the ship a bill of lading containing permission to the vessel to call at any port or ports. One port, at which the ship was accustomed to call, was known to all parties to be quarantined. Evidence was given to show that the agent of the ship gave the shipper to understand that the vessel would not call at the quarantined port. .Nevertheless the shipper thereafter accepted the bill of lading containing the permission, without objection. Thereafter the ship did so call, and was detained in quarantine, and by such delay the shipper’s fruit was damaged. 7hid, that the bill of lading governed, and that he could not recover in an action brought upon it.</p>

In Admiralty. Libels for salvage. Eleven different suits were brought against the wreck of the steam-ship Lone Star for salvage services rendered to her in the lire at Morgan’s Line pier, in February, 1887. The suits were consolidated on motion.

<p>Collision — Steamers Meeting — Misunderstanding Signals — Failure to Slow and Stop.</p> <p>Respondent’s tug M. was coming down the East river somewhat on the Brooklyn side, and libelant’s steamer C. was going up. A ferry-boat crossed the river between-them, which required the M. to sheer a little only towards the New York shore. The C. gave two whistles to the tug, indicating that the latter should pass between her and the ferry-boat, and slowed. She heard no answer, and repeated the signals. She also stopped her engine on perceiving that the tug was still swinging towards the New York shore. The tug had given one blast, and continued at full speed, swinging across the course of the C. until near the moment of the collision. Meld, that the tug was in fault for not slowing, as required by inspectors’ rule 8, on the want of a common- understanding; for her continued sheer across the other’s bow; and for not reversing sooner; that the C. was without fault, and should recover her damages.</p>

<p>Collision — Between Steam and Sail — Changing Course Unnecessarily.</p> <p>Where a collision occurs between a steamer and schooner on account oí tha schooner’s violation of the sailing rules, in changing her course from starboard to port, and then back again to starboard, without any excuse arising out of the exigencies of navigation, and no negligence is shown on the steamer’s part, the schooner is liable for the resulting damages.</p>

<p>At Law. Exception to allowance of item of damages.</p>

At Law. Motion by defendant for a new trial. This is an action by Jonas H. Platt against Jerome F. Manning upon a promissory note given to the plaintiff for services rendered, and' also to recover a small balance due upon a check drawn by the defendant. On the 24th of January, 1887, the clerk of this court issued a summons in the usual form.

In Equity. Bill for infringement. On motion to dismiss. Tho Gonmilly & Jeffrey Manufacturing Company, an Illinois corporation, filed its bill against tho Topo Manufacturing Company, a Connecticut corporation, but alleged to have its principal place of business in the city of Boston, in the state of Massachusetts, and to be a citizen of the state of Massachusetts, charging the defendant with the infringement of a certain patent issued from the patent-office of the United…

<p>On Motion to Remand.</p>

<p>On Motion to Remand.</p>

<p>1. Eqluty — Jurisdiction—Recovery of Land — Adequate Remedy at Law.</p> <p>A bill to recover land, which shows a legal title in complainant, and alleges that defendants claim under a fictitious French grant, and that the officials of the land department have made certain rulings adverse to his title which are without jurisdiction and void, shows no ground for equity jurisdiction, since such rulings might, if void, be as well disregarded at law'as in equity</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>The validity of complainant’s legal title derived from the United States and the state depending on the question whether those under whom defendants claim had a sufficient title before the acquisition of the territory of Orleans, there is no ground for the interference of equity.</p> <p>8. Same — Multiplicity of Suits.</p> <p>Tiquily will not take jurisdiction of a suit to recover land on the ground of the number of defendants and the multiplicity of suits required at law, it not appearing" that these would be any more numerous than in equity, and the petitory action allowing the joinder of all persons in possession of the land and claiming under the same common title.</p>

<p>I. Injunction — Jurisdiction —Property Claimed through Acts or a Foreign Government.</p> <p>While this court, having jurisdiction of tho person of a defendant, may no doubt enjoin him from wasting or interfering with property, or asserting title thereto, though the property be situated in a foreign country, it will not grant such injunction, asked for on tho sole ground that certain acts of the officials of a foreign government, creating defendant’s title to the property, are alleged to be void. A bill asking such relief on such ground is properly de-murrable.</p> <p>1. Equity — Pleading—Bill.</p> <p>A bill of complaint which does not set forth a copy of an instrument vital to complainant’s claim, or contain any averment setting forth the terms thereof, is demurrable.</p>

<p>1. Bait,road Companies — Bonds and Mortgages — Exchange oe Bonds.</p> <p>Wliere provision is made for retiring a series of secured income bonds of a railroad, and issuing new bonds in exchange, the bonds surrendered to be held by a trust company uncanceled until all are retired, a bondholder who does not consent to render his bonds is not entitled, in an accounting under the mortgage, to claim for interest duo him more of the income than his share would have been had no bonds been surrendered.</p> <p>2. Same — Accounting.</p> <p>In an accounting in favor of income bondholders of a railroad, if the company has seen lit to pay a higher rate of interest titan needful upon prior in-cumbrances, it cannot charge the difference against the income to the injury of the bondholders in direct contravention of the provisions of the mortgage securing the income bonds.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>lleW that, under the particular facts of this case, an allowance made by the mortgagor to a connecting road for a diversion of earnings should be rejected from tlie expense account in ascertaining income applicable to the payment of interest.</p>

<p>1. Pubt.io Lands — Jurisdiction op Courts to Determine Titi.es.</p> <p>The question of determining' whether certain land is open for settlement or whether it has passed under a" railroad grant, is one which requires the exercise of judicial power and discretion on part of the officers of the land department, with which the courts of the United States cannot interfere by injunction or otherwise.</p> <p>2. Same — Injunction—Against Department oe Land Oepice.</p> <p>Act Cong. March 3,1887, providing that in certain cases suit maybe brought against the United States, does not give the courts the right to interfere by injunction or otherwise with the action of the departments in matters requiring the exercise of judicial, as distinguished from ministerial, duties.</p> <p>3. Same — Bin for Injunction — Parties.</p> <p>The persons named as seeking to pre-empt the land claimed by complainants under arailroad grant are necessary parties to a bill to enjoin the United States land-officers from allowing the proof to be made or acted upon requisite to the completion of the entries made by such persons.</p>

Error from district court, district of Colorado; Haijjctt, Judge. Tlie United States, plaintiff, sued the Denver & Rio Grand Railroad Company and others, defendants, in two suits, for cutting timber illegally on the public lands. Judgments for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Doth suits were consolidated.

At Law. Action by Frank Rollins upon certain county warrants issued by the board of comity commissioners of Lake county. The case was tried to the court.

<p>1. Deers — Statutory Construction--11 Grant, Bargain, asd Sell.”</p> <p>Under 1 liev. St. Mo. 1879, c. 20, § 675, p. 110, as construed by the supreme court of that state, the words “grant, bargain, and sell, ” used in a conveyance in which an “estate of inheritance in fee-simple is limited, ” amount to a covenant of seizin of the estate so limited, and the covenant runs with the land.</p> <p>2. OovjüNAnts — SifiisaK—1Tttijs by Judgment in Ejectment.</p> <p>In Missouri ejectment is a mere possessory action and a judgment therein confers no title upon the party in whose favor it is given. U is no defense, therefore, to an action in the "United Stales circuit court in Now York, by the grantee of land in Missouri, to recover damages for breach of covenant, of seizin, that the covenantor has succeeded to the rights of the prevailing party in ejectment, and has duly convoyed them to the plaintiff, in the absence of other proof of title in such prevailing party.</p> <p>8. Same — Purchase oe Paramount Title.</p> <p>A covenantee, in Missouri, under a covenant of seizin is not bound to wait for actual dispossession, hut may at once, upon the hostile assertion of a paramount right or title, pay olí or extinguish the right by purchase; and his measure of damages is the reasonable sum paid for such title.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>The life-tenant of land in Missouri compromised litigation with B., who claimed an interest in it, by taking from him a deed of nineteen-thirtieths, and giving- him in turn a conve.yance of the remaining eleven-thirtieths. Upon her death intestate, the remainder-men in fee, who were also her children, set up title to the land conveyed to B., and he filed hill to remove cloud. - The bill was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed by two appellate courts, on the ground that the children were not estopped from asserting title to the land B. had got by reason of the fact that they had succeeded as heirs to the land he had given their mother in exchange. S., who had bought B.’s land, and been compelled to purchase the interest of the heirs, then sued B. on his covenant of seizin in the United States circuit court in New York. Held, that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant would have had a valid defense in an action of ejectment, in Missouri, at the suit of the remainder-men.</p>

At Law. This was a proceeding for ascertaining the damage to certain premises situated in Waukesha, Wis., owned by the plaintiff, and alleged to have been injured by the construction of the defendant’s road across the same. Connected with said premises was a hotel, kept by the plaintiff for the accommodation of summer guests, known as the “Fountain House,” with its appurtenances; which included a mineral spring, and pleasure grounds, and drives for the use of guests.

<p>1. Factors and Brokers — Factor’s Lien — Agreement to Honor Consignor’s Drafts.</p> <p>Farlow, a dealer in live-stock at Marshall, Mo., shipped live-stock to the defendants, live-stock brokers at Chicago, which were purchased by Farlow with money advanced him therefor by the plaintiffs, bankers at the place of shipment in Missouri. Farlow drew drafts on the defendants, payable to the plaintiffs, on each shipment, and all drafts so drawn were honored, excepting the last one, involved in this suit. This draft was dishonored, the defendants applying a large part of the proceeds of the last shipment on an old claim against Farlow, claiming a factor’s lien. The plaintiffs in this suit claimed that the defendants had orally agreed with them to honor all Farlow’s drafts drawn on shipments, and that on the faith of such agreement they advanced the money to Farlow to purchase the cattle, which agreement the defendants denied. The plaintiffs further claimed, regardless of such agreement, that the defendants knew that the cattle were purchased with money advanced by the plaintiffs to Farlow. Held that, if such agreement was made, the defendants were liable.</p> <p>3. Same — Notice of Advances on Shipments.</p> <p>If the cattle were purchased by Farlow with money obtained from the plaintiffs with the agreement that the plaintiffs were to be paid for their advances on such cattle out of the proceeds of the same when sold by the defendants as Farlow’s brokers, and that the defendants knew of such agreement between Farlow and the plaintiffs, then the defendants, as Farlow’s brokers, had no right to apply any part of the proceeds of said cattle to the payment of the debt of Farlow to themselves, until the draft was fully paid.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>And such is the law, whether such knowledge on the part of the defendants was actual or constructive, the question being whether the defendants knew that Farlow had obtained advances from the plaintiffs upon these cattle, and had appropriated the proceeds of the cattle to the payment of those advances by the draft. If they had such knowledge, they had no right to appropriate these proceeds to the payment of their own debt'against Farlow. Such knowledge might be derived expressly, or from the course of business between the parties theretofore, or from the defendants’ knowledge of Farlow’s financial ability, or other pregnant facts.</p>

<p>At Law. Action on life insurance policy.</p> <p>Tliis was an action by Giovani B. Adreveno, plaintiff, on a certificate of insurance issued to the son of plaintiff by the Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, defendant, for the sum of $5,000. Plaintiff was the beneficiary named in the certificate. The defendant relied upon alleged false representations in the application for the certificate as to the previous health and habits of the deceased. To prove that these representations were false, the defendant offered to introduce the testimony of several physicians, who had attended deceased prior to the date of the application. The plaintiff objected, on the ground that the witnesses were precluded from testifying under section 4017 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri. The questions and objections thereto were as follows:</p> <p>“Question. I will now ask you with what disease he was afflicted while he was there in the hospital? Counsel for the plaintiff objected, if the information of the witness was obtained from the patient while attending him. Q. From whom did you get your information as to what he was afflicted with,</p> <p>■ — from him by an examination of his person, or from talking with him? A. Tes, sir. Q. Was it necessary for you to get that information in order to treat him properly? A. Certainly it was. Plaintiff’s counsel renewed his objection.”</p>

<p>Hew Trial — As op Right — Time op Motion.</p> <p>After judgment for defendant in an action for the possession of land, plaintiff paid the costs, and filed a motion for a now trial before the first day of r,h<i succeeding term. Held, under Code Civil Proc. Colo. § 2nd, providing that tha party against whom such judgment is rendered may, at any time “before tha next succeeding term, ’’upon paying all costs, have the judgment vacated npon application to the court, that Ihe motion was in timo, and that delay of tha court in acting upon the motion did not defeat the right granted by the Code.</p>

<p>Indictment under Rev. St. U. S. § 3893, prohibiting the mailing of obscene matter, etc. On demurrer.</p>

<p>Error to District Court.</p>

<p>Patents eoR Inventions — License—Unconscionable Covenants — Símeme PERFORMANCE.</p> <p>P., the owner of some 65 patents for improvements in bicycles and tricycles, and engaged in the, manufacture of machines covered by those patents, granted a license in June, 1883, to G., who was a similar manufacturer and owned somewhat similar patents. This license covered only two of P.’s patents, and the machines made under them were ol' an inferior character. By its terms, this license was to expire, as to one patent, in nine months, and as to the other at any time upon written notice from G.; and nothing was expressed or implied as to any other of P.’s patents. G., desiring to make more perfect machines, applied to P. for licenses under some of his other patents. Corre-, spondonce passed between the parties, from which it appeared that G.’s only object was to have the terms of his existing licenses widened so as to take in his contemplated improvements. The contract in suit was finally executed in December, 1884, G. signing it without referring it to a lawyer. Under this contract, which was drawn with much artificiality, G. was granted licenses under 15 out of the 65 patents of P. until April, Í886, and, in consideration thereof, he was made to recognize and admit the validity of all, and P.’s title to the same, and a,Iso to covenant not to manufacture or sell any machines covered by any of the patents a flor his license ran out or was surrendered, and oven after'the expiration of all the patents covered by his license. After the license had terminated, P. filed a bill for injunction and account, alleging infringement. Hold, that the bill amounted to one for specific performance, and that, under the circumstances, it should be dismissed, the contract being unconscionable, and, in a measure, against public policy.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement.</p>

<p>1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS — ASSIGNMENT—SINGLE CLAIM.</p> <p>It is competent for the patentee to assign a single claim only of the patent, anil as to that t.o reserve to himself a shop-right; and such an assignment carries with it to the assignee the right to maintain a hill for an infringement of such claim so assigned.</p> <p>3. Same — Patenta hi i jty — N ove i /nr — V e t.ocipe joe Seats.</p> <p>The second claim of letters patent No. 310,311, of June 3, 1878, for an “improvement in velocipedes, ” is, “in a velocipede, the adjustable hammock seat.” .Held void for want of novelty, hammock-seated saddles being old when the patent was granted, as evidenced by the Bishop saddle, the Miller patent of 1806, the Gurry patent of 1807, the Harris patent of 1875, and the English patent of 1878 to "Lamplugh and Brown.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>The first claim of letters patent No. 314.143, of March 17,1885, to Thomas B. Kirkpatrick, for a “bicycle saddle,” is “the combination, with the perch or backbone of a velocipede, or similar vehicle, of independent front and rear-springs secured to such porch or backbone, and flexile seat suspended dire ally over said spring at the front and rear, respectively. ” Held, in view of the state of the art, as evidenced particularly by the Fowler patent of 1881, that the claimnmst.be restricted to the special device for the bifurcated forward springs which are carried beyond the steering head.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement.</p>

In Equity. Bill for an infringement of letters patent. This is a shit brought by Albert II. Spencer against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, for an infringement of letters patent of the United States, No. 99,723, and bearing date February 8, 1870, granted to the said Albert H. Spencer.

In Equity. Exception to master’s report. Order for injunction and account, July 19, 1886. See 27 Fed. Rep. 684. Master reported nominal damages. Plaintiff excepted to report on account of ruling therein that a license fee of $1,000 per furnace had not been proved.

<p>Shipping — Carriage op Goods — Liability por Loss.</p> <p>Tin was'shipped from New York to Buffalo in an open boat, contrary to custom, and, by reason of heavy rains, and some leaking of tlie boat, was"delivered damaged, for which damage this suit was brought. The evidence indicated that there had been a complete misunderstanding between libelant and claimant as to the hatches of the boat, the libelant supposing they were to be used, the claimant supposing the libelant waived the use of them. Held, that both were in fault for the damage; the claimant, as common carrier, being bound to carry the goods safely, and to know what was improper to be carried without hatches; and the libelant, whose employe loaded the boat, for not seeing to it that the latter had hatches. Both were also in fault for not dunnaging such a cargo in an open boat. Held, that libelant should recover half his damage.</p>

<p>Shipping — Carriage op Goods — Negligent Stowage — Limiting Liability.</p> <p>Two drums of glycerine in a consignment of 102 on board the steam-ship Britannia, were cut by chafing together during the voyage, whereby the glyc-erine leaked out. It appeared that the dunnage wood which was placed between all the drums of the consignment, had fallen out during the voyage from between these two drums only. The voyage had been a rough one, The damage was within the exceptions of the bill of lading. Held, that the only fair inference was that the wood between these drums was not secured in the usual and proper manner,! and that the loss was therefore the result of negligence in stowage, for which the steam-ship was liable, notwithstanding the exceptions of the bill of lading.</p>

<p>Í. Shipping — Carriage ob Goods — Liability cow Loss.</p> <p>The lighter ,1. C., with a deck-load of iron bars, moored outside of another vessel lying at a wharf. As the tide went down, she took the bottom, or some obstruction, gradually careened, and lost he.r dock-load overboard. She selected the mooring place herself, which was an improper one, and was left without a watchman. Held, that she was responsible for the loss of the iron,</p> <p>2. Collision — At Pier — -Costs—Fiety-Nintii Role.</p> <p>On being libeled in this suit, the lighter brought in under the fifty-ninth admiralty rule the barge S., which was the vessel along-side of which she had moored,’claiming- that the barge, being moored unskillfully, had careened against her, forced down her rail, and thus caused the loss of the deck-load. Held that, even had the accident occurred in this way, the barge S. was not liable, as she owed no duty to the lighter, which had moored along-side of her own volition, without request or permission, and at her own risk. Being brought into the suit by petition of the lighter O., held, that the barge should recover her costs of the C., and not of the libelant.</p>

In Admiralty. The above are cross-libels arising upon a charter party of the Giulio to H. M. Cormack and others, dealing under the name of Latassa & Co. In the second action damages aré claimed for the delay oí the Giulio in proceeding to her destination, and for not taking on board a full cargo; in the first, freight was claimed for the cargo delivered.

<p>1 Shipping- — Garríase op Goons — Demurrage.</p> <p>Libelant, the owner of three barges, one of them propelled by steam, entered into an agreement for the transportation of certain coal at a fixed price per ton, the coal to he delivered at the port of discharge on hoard, and to he there unloaded within three days after its arrival. There was no charter-party or contract of hiring in whole or in part, and the entire negotiations were in parol. Bills of lading were afterwards made out in the usual! orm, and transmitted in the ordinary course of business. Upon arrival at port of discharge, the facilities provided by consignees for unloading were so poor that only one barge could unload at a time, and about 11 days, including one Sunday, were taken up in the discharge. Meld, that the parol agreement for a discharge in three days was superseded by the bill of lading, and that the consignees were entitled to a reasonable time; that six days, including Sunday, was such reasonable time; and that demurrage should he allowed for the remaining five days.</p> <p>3. Admiralty — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>A libel by the owner of three vessels constituting “one ship” against the cargo for demurrage arising from unreasonable detention by the consignee at the port of discharge is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court.</p> <p>8. Same — Practice.</p> <p>Where the owner of the ship libeling the cargo for demurrage had knowledge of what had been done by the master, and had proceeded in recognition of it, it is too late for him to object to the authority of the master to execute the bill of lading under which the cargo was carried, on the ground that the hill was made in the home port.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.</p> <p>The canal-boat Martha E. Loomis brought a cargo of posts from East Haddam, Conn., to New York, and the libel claimed that the vessel was delayed after arrival in New' York by the fault of the consignees. It also claimed damage to the boat from floating ice through the fault of the shipper, which latter claim the answer averred had been settled. The claimant asserted that the boat had been sent at once to a proper dock, and that the delay arose from the slowness and absences of the master, and from the fact that he negligently discharged a part of the cargo at the wrong place.</p>

<p>SlUPPING — LIABILITY FOR TORT — STEAMERS RAISING SWELLS. In plying about rivers and harbors, steamers raising heavy swells must give heed to the presence of other boats following their legitimate business, and slow or stop to avoid damaging the latter by such swells. rH</p> <p>Same — Notice of Defect. Masters of old and weak boats are bound to take corresponding precautions to give notice to others of the need of special caution in dealing with them. 05 .</p> <p>Same — Damages. It appeared that libelant’s canal-boat was injured through being thrown against a dock by the swells from the yacht A., but it also appeared that the canal-boat was old and weak, and was hence damaged more than a boat in ordinary condition would have been. Held, that libelant should recover half his damages only. CO</p>

<p>Collision — Between Steam and Sail — Mistake op Wheelsman.</p> <p>As a barkentine and. a steamer were approaching, and before they were so near as to require or justify a chango of course on the part of the s'ailing vessel, the master of the latter ordered the wheel starboarded, which would have carried her further from the course of the steamer. By a mistake of the wheelsman the helm was ported, and thebarkentine thus thrown in the course of the steamer. Held, that the sailing vessel was alone responsible for the collision.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On exceptions to commissioner’s report.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for salvage.</p>

In Admiralty. Libels for salvage. There wore two separate suits: one against the lighter, and the other against the cotton which composed her cargo at the time of the fire.

<p>In Admiralty. On motion to dismiss levy.</p>

<p>Salvage — Compensation—Tender—Costs.</p> <p>Where the tug-boat M. took the barge R. into the stream on the occasion of the breaking out of a fire on the Morgan Line pier in February, 1887, and thereafter the claimant of the barge made a tender of §70 in payment of such salvage service, which tender was refused, and this suit begun, it was held that such tender was sufficient, and should have been accepted, and that the tug should not recover the taxable costs which had accrued since the filing of the answer.</p>