Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

34 F. 324

Celluloid Manuf'g Co. v. Arlington Manuf'g Co.

United States Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey · decided 1888-01-10

In Equity. Bill for infringement of letters patent No. 199,908, of February 5, 1878, to John W. Hyatt, assignor to the Celluloid Manufacturing Company, for the manufacture of celluloid and other plastic compositions. , On motion for preliminary injunction.

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““If the defendant intends in good faith to keep its promise, the injunction will not harm it; otherwise it will be a security for the complainants that their rights will not again be invaded.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including General Electric Co. v. Bullock Electric Mfg. Co.

Relies on Celluloid Manuf'g Co. v. American Zylonite Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1888-01-10

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently January 1922

3 federal appellate · 1 district ·

6018881890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Patents for Inventions — Actions for Infringement — Preliminary Injunction.

¶2Defendant corporation did not deny infringement, but claimed that it had ceased to infringe before bill filed, and did not intend to renew the use of the infringing machine, which still remained in its possession. Held, the patent having been adjudicated to be valid, that a preliminary injunction should be granted.

¶3In Equity. Bill for infringement of letters patent No. 199,908, of February 5, 1878, to John W. Hyatt, assignor to the Celluloid Manufacturing Company, for the manufacture of celluloid and other plastic compositions. , On motion for preliminary injunction.

¶4Rowland Cox, for the motion.

¶5John R. Bennett, contra.

¶6Wales, J.

¶7The patent has been held to be valid.1 The defendant admits, or at least does not deny, infringement, but claims that it had ceased to infringe before the bill was filed, and does not intend to renew *325the uso of the infringing machine. It still continues in possession of all tlio contrivances and appliances to enable it to violate the patent, but promises not to use them for that purpose. This is a naked and unsupported promise. The practice of the courts in such cases is well settled. In Woodworth v. Stone, 3 Story, 752, it was decided that “a bill for an injunction will lie, if the patent-right is admitted or has been established, without any established breach, upon well-grounded proof of an apprehended intention on the part of the defendant to viólale the plaintiffs right.” A fortiori should an injunction issue where, as in the present case, the defendant has already infringed, and nothing but a more promise stands in the way of its doing so again. The general rule is stated in Walk. Pat. § 676, and concludes as follows: “Indeed, no injunction can bo averted by affirmative evidence that the defendant has ceased to infringe, even though coupled with a promise that he will infringe no more.” See, also, Curt. Pat. § 422, which gives the same rule, only in different language. Further authority on the same point may be found in Chemical Works v. Vice, 14 Blatchf. 179, and in Losh v. Hague, 1 Webst. Pat. Cas. 200. If the defendant intends in good faith to keep its promise, the injunction will not harm it; otherwise, it will be a security for the plaintiff that its rights will not again be invaded. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree.

/34/f1d/324 · .json · Public domain