BOLLINS V. LAKE COUNTY.
845
ROLLINS
v. LAKE
COUNTY.
(UirC1lit Uowrt, D. Uolorado. May 7, 1888.)
1.
COUNTms-LIMITATION OF INDEBTEDNESS.
The provision of Const. Colo. art. 11, 6, to the effect that "the aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county, for all purposes," exclusive of debts contracted before its adoption, "shall not exceed at any time" a certain limit therein named, is not confined to debts byloan. Following People v. May, 9 Colo. 80, 10 Pac. Rep. 641.
2.
SAME-COMPULSORY OBLIGATIONS.
Warrants issued by a county in payment of compulsory obligations, viz., fees of witnesses, jurors, constables, sheriffs, and the like, are not within the prohibition; and it is no defense to an action upon such warrants that at the time they were issued the general limit of county indebtedness fixed by the constitution had been reached. Overruling People,v. May, 9 Colo. 404, 12 Pac. Rep.838.
At Law. Action by Frank Rollins upon certain county warrants issued by the board of county commissioners of Lake county. The case was tried to the court. ,Teller &- Orahood, for plaintiff. A. E. Parks and H. B. Johnson, for defendants. BREWER, J. This action is upon county warrants. The circumstances which surround it make it one of peculiar importance., For 10 years, and from the admission ofthe state in 1876, many counties, whose tax levy was insufficient to meet current expenses, had been issuing warrants, which had accumulated to, as counsel says, at least $1,000,000. No question seems to have been made during these years as to the validity of such action; but the question being thereafter presented to the supreme court of the state, it construed section 6, art. 11, of the constitution of the state in such a manner as to invalidate the bulk of these warrants. The plaintiff, being a non-resident, comes into the federal court, and invokes its judgment as an independent tribunal on the question thus determined by the state supreme court. No more delicate or responsible duty is ever cast upon the federal court than when it is asked to determine, not what the state supreme court has decided, but whether its decision shall be followed. While the federal courts are in a certain sense independent tribunals, yet they sit within the state to construe and enforce its laws. Whenever a construction has been placed upon a state statute or constitution by hel' supreme court, that determines for both state and federal courts all questions and rights arising after such construction; but, when the rights or claims of right arose prior to such constructiOIi, then the duty rests upon the federal courts of independent examination and determination. The rule controlling in such cases is fully and clearly stated in the recent case of Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 33, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10, as follows: "Since the ordinary administration of the law is carried on by the state courts, it necessarily happens that by the course of their decisions certain rules are established which become rules of property and action in the state, at,d
8.49
.FEPEIML
','
have all the effect of law, and which it would be wrong to disturb. This is especially true with regard to the Qf Jeal and the construction of state constitutions and statutes. Such 'established rules are always regarded by the federal courtil, no less than by the courts theiDselves, as authoritative declarations of what the law 'But where the law has not been thus settled, it is the right and duty of the federal courts to exercise theirow,n judgment"as tbey also al ways do in reference to the doctrine of commercial law and general jurisprUdence. So when (lQntracts and transactions have been entered into, Il,ndrights have accrued thereon under a particular, state of the decisionS,or when there has been no decIsion, of the state tribunals, the federal courts properly clliim the right to adopt their own interpretation of the In W apthe case, although a different interpretation maybe adopted by the state after such rights have 'accrued. ,But even in such cases, for the sake of harmony, and toayoid confusion, the f{'deral courts will lean towards .an agreement of views with the state COuris if the question seems to them balanced with doubt. Acting on theSe principles, founded as they are on comity and good sense, the courts of the United States, without sacrificing their own dignity as independent tribunals, endeavor to avoid, and in most cases d() .avoid;BnY·:llDseemly contUct, with the, Well,C9nsidered decisions of the state ,courts,.;As"however, the very object of giving to the national courts juris,. diction fo administer the laws of the states in controversies between citizens of different states was to institutp. independent tribunals. which it might be supposed would be unaffected by local prejUdices and sectional views. it would be a dereliction of theil'dtity not'to 6xt!reise an independent judgment in cases not foreclosed by previous adjudication."
:' See,also, Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. 540, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep, 704; Green Co.v. Oonners,l09 U. ,So 104, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 69; CarroltOo. v. Smith, '111 U. S., Rep. 539; Anderson v.Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 362, 6 Sup. Ct. 413; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. 8.759, 7 Sup, ·Ct-Rep. '736. Aeceptingthat as therule to .control thiseourt, Ipas& to Ii ,and consi<ieration of the' immediate question. The sectionof . . .. ,', ':'.1 :. . ' _ ,: tOIsas f611ows:' ' , :. . J',"
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, , dHbt.by loan in any form except for, the purpose of erep,ting, pu blilJ buildings, making or pu bUe rOlul's 'and bridges;' alid such in any one shall tIOt ex'ceeil' the ratesnp'onthe taxal,lIe property' in 'such county following, to-wit: Counties in which the assessed va:luQtion of taxable property shall exceed i$5;000.OOO"$1.:50on each $1;000: thereof;, counties in which snch valuation ,1I})al! be less $3 ,on ther,eof.Andthe aggrEjgate amount of l;tllpul'poses, deuts co l1 the adoptwn pf thIS constItution, shall not at tilDe exceed twice the here.in' limited, Unless when, itr'Itiariner provided by claw, the qUElslllotIof incurring such debt shall, ata gei'u!j:alelectloh, be sub.mitted to.stI¢b of thequaliIiEid'electlJ1'B 'of Buch county as in,the yeal' Illst prefcedingsuch,electionshall haVl.qlaid a tax upon propel':ty aS8essed,to them in a yoti\1g ,thereon shall y()tein favor of ing tll,e, de, ,; 9U, t the b, ll, ,n,dS""i,f ,a 9J .c, U, rrin , , , Jssued n,ot, r,un,'" I, es,',s . than ten and',the aggregl\te debts so shall not',at 'anytime exceMtwice thtHate upon: the\1aluationlagf.-he'l'oinmentitJned': 'pr(j'vided, tllatitlHs'8ection sball not CQuntieshaving afalul\tionotless ,d
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of
404, 414,
838, and
ROLLINS' "'. LAKE COUNTY.
847
15 Pac.. Rep. 36. 1' In the first of these cases' the question was whether this section in all its sentences referred exclusively to debts contracted by Joan, and it was held that it did not; that there were two independent declarations in it ; and that the third sentence, commencing, "And the aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county for all purposes," was 110tlimited to debts by loan, but applied generally to all. In the second case the question was whether the limitation upon county indebtedness imposed by this section included debts incurred by operation of law as well as those arising from express contracts, and it was held that it did. Returning now to the first question, it was and is earnestly insisted by the learned counsel for plaintiff that the scope and intent of the entire section is indicated by its opening lines, which expressly name debts by loan; that, .!U! a general rule, each separate section is to be construed as carrying one idea through all its sentences, and that, even without special words of reference in the later sentences, they are to be construed as ,based upon, the first idea or controlling fact; th3-t not only is such the ordinary ·rule·""f construction, but also to establish a different one for this section would result in glaring absurdities, hindering the administration of county affairs .in such a manner and to such an extent as shows that such was not the intent of the framers of the constitution or the people . who adopted it. Again,it is insisted that although, prior to the framing of this constitution, seven states had incorporated into their. constitutions limitations uponcounty'indebtedness{'a comparison of the condition of those states with this, in territory, population, and county organization, shows the absurdity of the meager powers given to counties in this state under such a construction of this section. And, again, great reliance i51placed upon contemporary construction, inasmuch as for 10 years manycountiesbave transacted business and issued warrants as though no such limitation:as'isnow- claimed existed; inasmuch as several suits were brou/!:ht in: different courts, both state and federal, upon county indebtedness, in which the defense of tbislimitation existed, but was not presented; inasmuch, ,also, as several acts of the legislature applied to facts as they existed, 'and as'it must be presumed were known to exist, conflict with the limitation imposed by this construction. It will be observed that the language of the third sentence is general. Itsays: . "That the aggregate amount of indebtedu of ltnycountyfor ss all putposes, exclusive of debts coritra:eted before the adoption of this constitution, shall not at any time exceed," etc. Now, in order to make it meanw-pat counsel claim it means, the word "such," or some word of similar meaning, must be implied prior to the word "indebtedness': or "purposes;" and counsel insist that such word should be implied, and that. the meaning is cOITectly expressed,' when the language is"theaggregate amount of such indebtedness," or "for all such purposes. '! . rrhat a word maybe supplied or im:plied when necessary to carry out the ob-
848
FEDERAL REPORTER.
vious intent of the sentence is, of course, conceded; but can the intent be presumed to justify the supply of the omission? It is, of course, always a question of construction, and the thought and intent of the framer is the thing to be determined. I have read the opinion of the supreme court on this matter, and studied it with care. The solid tread of the argument of the learned judge who wrote that opinion is to my mind irresistible. It compels conviction. Starting with the conceded and elementary proposition that, in determining the meaning of any instrument, whether: agreement, statute, or constitution, we look fhst to the words used, and seek their natural signification in the order of grammatical arrangement in which they are found, he shows that the sentences are sep'arate and complete, the propositions in them independent declarations, and that there is no grammatical necessity of implying or supplying any word to· perfect either, Hence the supplying or implying of a word must find some other reason than the mere grammatical arrangement for its justification. , Again, he calls attention to what, in my judgment, is most significant,...:-.the proceedings of the convention that framed this constitution. If, in construing any sentence, it becomes a question whether any word should be implied which is not found, in order to·fullyexpressthe true meaning, and,we can know that when the sentence was being prepared the question of whether that very word should be inserted was presented, discussed, and if was finally determined to reject h, we should be driven almost irresistibly to the conviction that the ineaning which that omitted word would disclose was ,nott.he meaning intended by the makers. Now, it appears from the debates ,in the convention that the question of introducing this word "such" intotbe sentence was presented and dis cussed; that two or three times itwas voted to introduce it, and as often voted to strikeitout;andthat finally it was left out, and the proviso at the close of the section added. I do not see how demonstration could be made more ,perfect as to the intent of the framers of this section. Cooley, Const.. Lim. 66. That,which waf:! their intent as shown by the grammatical arrangement ,of the language, and by-their discussion, must, in a matter of this kind, be presumed to have been the intent of the people in adopti.ng this constitution. The learned judge also notices other matters, such as the language of an address prepared by the convention, and subniiUed 'with the constitution to the people; but I do not care to pursue ,this: matter further, or notice the various reasons urged by him in support of the conclusion. It is enough to say ,that I think his rea.soning unanswerable. . I pass now tothe second question: Does the limitation upon county ,indebtedness imposed by this section include debts incurred by opera'tion of law as well as those arising from express contracts? This quesmay be really separated into two: First, in determining when the limit is reached I what is to be l$lCluded; and l -secOndl what effect has th(} .Jimit when the powers and liabilities of the county? In regard to the first, it wiJI be noticed that county indebtedne'Ss may arise in one of three ways: It may spring voluntary contracts