34 Ky.
Volume 34 — Kentucky Reports
148 opinions
- 34 Ky. 1Sarah Miles' Will (1836)
From the Shelby County Court. The will,S' quec. tion upon the manner of its ex ecptipn. A will which would not pass Is ndwUl not pass slaves.—Act of 1800.S.L.154& If testator writes his name in the body of the will, or elsewhere upon the paper, intending that as his signature— not intending to sign at the foot, it is, it seems, a sufficient signing within the statute.
- 34 Ky. 4Hawkins v. Beal (1836)
<p>ChaNcert.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court eor Boone County.</p> <p>credit (Sye¡irs° tew^imke^improveniente, con ij!|Uafteí>the'p'u^ chase money is isUeévicted° Pand files his bill for pay for improvements. The parParol contract for the sale of liitii] iinnn n Inna</p> <p>ties, in their pleadiugs, concur us to tnesaie, nominal pnce, terms, occupauey <yc. but tbe purchaser alleges that the price was to be paid in current bank notes, which the vendor denies, alleging that all dispute Wus com piouiiseti, winch tnepui chaser denies: the pioof upon the disputed points lncoriclu»ive. Held, that, under the circumstauces of this case, the purchaser may be allowed pay lor his impiovemeats, estimated, at the time of the eviction, at the difference between the value of the place without them, with them, in their then condition; and the \euuor entitled (as a set-oü) to the luir value of the use of the laud. Had it appeared cieurly, that the non-execution ol the contract was uttribuUble to the delinquency or fault ol the purchaser, he would have been allowed no pay for the improvements.</p>
- 34 Ky. 7Hause v. Judson (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. The facts and creetf^hifcircuit Court, Creditors fi}g ail account, as pad of tiioiv bilg lit, which they give the def’t credit for certain drafts drawn On him— but which they allege, they fear and believe have not been paid: this is not a positive averment that the drafts remain unpaid, and does not, therefore, authorize a decree including that sum; if paid, that fact should be shown by amendment. ÉLigíit of stoppage in…
- 34 Ky. 15Clark v. Bell (1836)
<p>CHA~NCE1fl~]</p> <p>From ti-ie Circuit Court eor Barren County.</p> <p>The pleading's.:</p>
- 34 Ky. 21Hood v. Hanning (1836)
Detinue^ From the Circuit Court for Marion Counts'. Detil™e and tr&~ Jolned^dltmiS and deljt may. ^“¿Maiíbld counts, if there fand n^rntjoinder; ageneraidel ReUUei l n8 A tenant may sell oí’, mortgage his goods, bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, and the sale or mortgage will prevail over the landlord’s lien, 'A Verdict for the tall amount of goods, in favor of ñ plaintiff who had sold part of them before the wrong complained of, cannot he ««stained.
- 34 Ky. 23Rhodes v. Cobb (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Edmondson County* An allegation, in an attachment bill, as to the amountofthe garnishee’s debt, may he sufficient without staling it precisely, if it shows that it exceeds the complainant’s judgment.
- 34 Ky. 24Funk v. Leachman (1836)
<p>SSriANCEIlY.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for, Jefferson County*</p> <p>A partnership for a limited time; bill for a dissolution, and account. before the expiration of the term, answer fyc. There was no sufficient ground for a dissolution, or an account, when the bill was filed;nor any sup plementnl bill; but pending the suit, the partnership expired, as appears by the bill and contract. The answer concurred in asking for a settlement #-e Held, that as the compl’t Was entitled t^ all account at the hearing, it wa? not proper to dis? piiss his bill be? cause he had nq grounds for it when it vya.s fil? ed.</p> <p>The hiere fact-, that a bill wa? prematurely filecj idpes ppt author? ize its dismis? sion, when it appears, at the hearing, úpoq, the pleadings If proof, that the epmpl’t is then entitled to relief. —Thp’ at .anytime while thq want of ground? continue, the bill may bo dismissed,</p> <p>Where one partner before a dissolution has with drawn from aetjveagency in the business, which is continued by the other, it is the duty of the latter to keep an account of all the transactions o'f the firm: and he may be examined, on oath, as to the receipts, dues, expenses, and business gen orally.</p> <p>Directions for taking an account between partners, under the circumstances of the case, and for a settlement by decrea</p>
- 34 Ky. 27Bank of U. S. v. Stewart (1836)
<p>Chancers-.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court eor JeeEerson Countv.</p> <p>A creditor has an equitableright to be substituted to the benefit of any collateral security which the debtor has given to his surety; #- ■where property is conveyed in trust for such pur pose, a creditor, whose debt is pro vided for by the conveyance, tho’ he is no party t* it, may maintain a bill, in his own name have the property applied to the pay-</p> <p>irlid deed of trust edV'mdnh°Sclass ijf cestui que cr^decteTfora 'distribution -pari |>,assw is irregtt:</p> <p>A" surety,, who. is indemnified by a deed of trust, buys articles of •the debtor, and thereupon assumes the debt: tho’there are mu, counts between ■ding1 'those1 artieies, it is uneeran'ce^is-^-the^efiijet is to cancel the surety's claim onaccount of the debt for which he was bound, fy throw him upon the per south responsibility of the debt- or, for the balance of the account; so that he can have no contribution out of the trust fund, to the prejudice of other cestui que trusts,</p>
- 34 Ky. 30Wickliffe v. Lee (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Washington County. The facts, and pleadings. Decree of the Circuit Court, «pon the original and vario us crossbills. further facts.
- 34 Ky. 36Hopkins v. Paxton (1836)
<p>.jSjEOÍMENTt</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Nicholas Counte.</p> <p>Wiese terms aro used in a deed— “thence north, ío a large black ash and sugar tree in P’s line; thence, with P’s line, to the beginning. ” The trees, however, are not in P’s line, and a line from them to the beginning, leaves a small slip of ground, between the tractsold and P’s tract:- Held, that this deed does not pass that slip.</p> <p>A tract 'of land is sold, but the deed, in consequence of a mistake in the description, does not include it all; and a stranger takes possession of the omitted part: notwithstanding his adverse possession, a new deed made, hona fide, to correct the mistake, and convey the omitted pait, according to the contract as originally made, is hotchampertous.</p> <p>Whether there Was in fact any fetich mistake, to correct which the new deed was made, or any adverse possession , are ques tions to be decided by a jury, not by the judge.</p>
- 34 Ky. 38Payne v. Riley (1836)
<p>'W.IANCEiay</p> <p>From ti-ie Circuit Court eor Knox County.</p> <p>\ grant, under the act of 1815, for appropriating ,he vacant lands ín this state, has ■elation to the time of the survey, and vests the legal title irom that date— provided,the plat S;c. are lodged in the Register’s office within one year; otherwise, the title vests ,it the date of. the registry:— hence, a patent upon a survey, registered within the year, confers a title paramount to an elder patent on an elder survey, not re-the year, nor unof tlie oonflict. '«g survey. an^ad" verse eluim tó one who already has the better lc~ Sal ««mot jjg decreed nn_ ]ess thereis some «“pediment to to give the chanNunsdicinctAVPil within</p>
- 34 Ky. 40Russell's Heirs v. Russell (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Bullitt County. The bill, and its object. Defence: N. fleets up title to Iheslaves in controversy under a deed of gift, from his grandfather: his attempt to keep the proving and recording of th e deed secret— a badge of fraud. Suit by N. R, sen. (in his life .time) v. N. R. junior, to set a* side the deed, for fraud in obtaining it; in the record of which, there is much, strong proof to support the bill.
- 34 Ky. 50Poage's Heirs v. Chinn's Heirs (1836)
Ejectment. From ti-ie Circuit Court eor Greenup County. The action, and plaintiffs’ title. Evidence for defendants, to bring them within the seven years, law.
- 34 Ky. 58Glascock v. Hays (1836)
Detinue,. From the Circuit Court for Breckinrid&e County. The points statftd. Where a party proves what his adversary has said, all he sajd on the subject, at thetime,must, in general, be admitted; and if an answer to a bill of discovery is used,the whole must, in general; be read. The respondent is not bound to confino himself to the special interrogatories.
- 34 Ky. 62McKinsey v. Anderson (1836)
Attachment From the Circuit Court for Fayette County. An attachment is a suit at law, admitting any plea appropriate to a com. law action on the «ame liability; ■andto which, the pendency of another suit between the same parties, for the same cause, is a good plea in abatement. That there was another suit when the attachment was sued out, would not per sc besuf ficient; but one then pending, $r continuing up to the time of the plea pleaded, is,.
- 34 Ky. 64Sebree's Heirs v. Harper (1836)
Chancery, From the Circuit Court for Franklin County. StHtement of the case.
- 34 Ky. 67McDowell v. King (1836)
Ejectment, From the Circuit Court for Boone County. Ejectment lies only against a tenant in actual possession. Pl’tf cannot, by electing to be disseized, make a party who merely claims the land, without entry up on it, a trespasser or disseizor, so as to maintain, the action against him.
- 34 Ky. 68Hugley v. Gregg (1836)
<p>Dower..</p> <p>From the Circuit Court eor Henry County.</p> <p>Bef’t in a writ of dower may defeat the claim, by showing that bft holds under a title superior to that of demand-ant’s husband;3 tho’ he purchased of the husband, and entered originally under his deed,that does not estop Inin from introducing an adverse patent, and record of a recovery and evic tion under it, since his pui't cjiase.</p>
- 34 Ky. 69Nash v. Clarke (1836)
<p>Appeal from a J. J?.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Mason County.</p> <p>Construction of a will.</p> <p>A testator gives his daughter a legacy charged upon certain real estate devised to his wife, the executrix: she is liable as devisee, not as executrix, and a warrayt(or suit at law) will not lie to enforce the payment of the legacy; the remedy is in Equity.</p>
- 34 Ky. 70Hale v. Passmore (1836)
<p>Assumpsit.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Mercer Countt.</p> <p>A creditor recovers a judgment against the administrator and heirs of a surety; theprincipai obligor makes him partial payments on the judg’t— yet he levies his ex’on on land descended to the heirs, and, by a sale of it, makes the full amount: held, that the principal may recover back the amount paid by him—by assump sit, for money had and received to his use.</p> <p>The creditor’s atto. receives the money; pays his client only the balance due him, and applies the surplus to other demands against the surety’s estate, for which there are judgments against the adm’r only: this act of the atto. was, in effect, the act of the client; and being done without the assent of the prin cipal, or of the heirs; the arrangement does not exonerate the creditor from his liability to refund to the debtor— who still remains liabletothe heirs for the amount for which their, land was sold to pay his debt — If the liability had been to the adm’r, (instead , of the heirs) and he had assented to the arrangement, the principal would have had the benefit of all he paid, and could have recovered noth, ing back.</p>
- 34 Ky. 73Warner's Executors v. Bledsoe's Administratrix (1836)
<p>Covenant^</p> <p>From the C'rcuit Court eor Mercer Count?.</p> <p>In tlie ®a,e of «- greed’ that,"' hi case 11 Pr0^®4 purchaser ’might relu™atld re" tract; but he gave oiXSffoTthe price; and to an the'agree-men;, and that worth°ess,P1°and was tendered fy°g«fre°whetlf er he ctrald he es‘ topped from pleading this parol agreement to defeat the cove-pant. But held, that, the estoppel waived, the plea presents a good \ar; , . a dec’n in covenant vs. an iidm’r a'^non performanee by the in. before the time ^'¡npuffirient.0^ fi d.em’r to any deT’w° must6|^ overruled.</p> <p>Replication tp $, waives it, plea waives a demurrer. Replication that does net rely upon a» estoppel,</p>
- 34 Ky. 75Estill v. Jenkins (1836)
Covenant, From the Circuit Court for Madison County. Contract, that one party “delivers, between -the rst of Nov. and the thtii of the same,” so many iiogs~“ibr which j. (.the other party, is to give” so much per ,0o, payable An averment in 'a dec’n, that the 1def’t was unable to perform his covenant, is suffaicient, without an averment 'of performance, or tender, on thé part of the pl’tf.
- 34 Ky. 78Weatherhead v. Cunningham (1836)
<p>Ejectment.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Green County,</p> <p>Judgment by default, without ser vice of the common order, is erroneous.</p> <p>Ono ha. fa. being returned executed, no other cun legally issue.</p>
- 34 Ky. 79Hargis v. Price (1836)
Ejectment;; From the Circuit Court for Pike County. Verdict $-c. rqq-s tiorj % a trial. Notice to qvtif. is not necessary where the tenancy is disclaimed. Held: that tho’ these facts hardly ajnount to sufficient diligence, ■yet a new trial gnighj h^ye bge^ no^earea-^but the ’inference ^“^“ev^enee* 'is that the record tSTdefenl dant, andhefeiiq wouldW operate fw ilim>tha neW The bare produced, mighf he!pí11I— snlhcient, '
- 34 Ky. 83Bush's Heirs v. Hampton (1836)
<p>Chancery.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Clarke County,</p> <p>The bill-</p> <p>Defence—res jvs dicatas fyo,.</p> <p>The judgment or ‘decree of a court i>f competent jurisdiction, iá a good bar to any 'other suit between the same parties, or their privies, upon the same subject mat ter.</p> <p>Suit by heirs, ágainst the adm’r of their anees ■ tor’s adm’r, for an account, settlement it distribution, in which there was a final 'decree. Thehr’s file a new bill, and charge that a certain b'dn'd due their ancestor, was fraudulently ‘assigned away by bis adm’r, and hot included in any settlement: held, that the for mer suit was a fear, upon this, ,or any oilier Ha. bility of the deft. Upon facts dis covered after the former decree, vfthis was hot só 'there might be a .bill of review— tiot anew suit.</p> <p>The protection of a bar by former decision extends, not only to tlie parties to the former suit and their privies, but to ail those whose liabilities are hut ineiderAai, depending up*, on the liability of a former parity,: e. g. the sft:reties of an adm’r may piead and rely on any former decision, which bars a suit against him (or his representatives) as a good bar for them also.</p>
- 34 Ky. 87Butler v. Elliston (1836)
Covenant, From the Circuit Court for Anderson County. A covenant may relate to ¡\ times different from its date, or its actual execution; neither is material where the true intent of the parties, as to time, and object, appear upon the face of the writing.
- 34 Ky. 89Vanmetre v. Griffith (1836)
<p>Chancery.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court eor D .viess County.</p> <p>Statement ofthe, c‘1,e'</p> <p>All persons interested in a chati eery suit should be parties; but whether, as complainants or defendants is not, in general, very material.</p> <p>An adm’r brings suit to enjoin a judg’t upon his personal obligation: it was proper for him to sue alone; hutas the obligation, was given in satisfaction of a liability of the in-, testate, on whose equity he relies, his co-adm’r was a proper party, and was mado a def’t: the other def’t cannot complain thathis. co-del't is on the wrong side; he could not himself make that objection, after answering; he is. bound by the decree, and that is sufficient for the other defendant.</p> <p>If a mortgagee, or trustee or tenant for life, or purchaser, being in possession. buys an outstanding Claim to the land, tho etlect oi tiie purchase is, to unite the titie so purehas ed, to ihe previous possession, and give the purchaser a claim, in equity, upon the party under whom he enter ed, for the aemal cost of the new title, with interest on it. Equity will not p.urnit him to retain the possession, and use his new acquired title, by suit upon his Wiirranty or oth erwise, against him from whom he acquired the right under which .he entered. So, in this case— where an adverse claim was set up against a purehas er in possession, and he made a contract for the purchase of tiiat ‘claim, in case it should be established, by due course of law, as the better title, and a judg’t was recovered upon it, and the ha. fa. was executed, but tho possession immediately restored to the def’t, according to his contingent contract—it is held, that the tenant’s 'right in equity against his first vendor, is to the amount of his second puichase witli interest only ; and having collected thus much, upon a judg’t he had obtained upon his warranty, he is enjoined from further proceedings on that.judg ment;</p>
- 34 Ky. 95Clarey v. Marshall's Heirs (1836)
<p>Ejectment.</p> <p>From the General Court.</p> <p>Statement of the case'</p> <p>The Gen’l Court Iras jurisdiction of a joint action (by a non resi, dent against divers deft?s (citizens,) for a tract of land of the value of $500 or more - no matter how the deft’s hold — whether jointly or severally, or whether any one holds $500 worth or not.</p> <p>If it appears by any part of the record, that the court has jurisdiction, no exception can be taken after verdict, though thp dec’n may not show it.</p> <p>As between nortresidents fy citizens, consent in writing gives the Gen. Ct. jurisdiction of sums under $500;and, after verdict - no plea or objection to the jurisdiction appearing^ such consent wijj be presumed,</p> <p>A purchaser at a sale made unc^r the judg’t or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, will hold his purchase, not withstanding a sehseqoert reversal ofthejudg ment or decree But this principle, it seems, does not apply to conveyances made (without sale) by com’rs, in pursuance of decrees for specific execution of contracts, or the like.</p> <p>A comp’t, upon a covenant for 5000 acres of land, obtains a decree and con veyance for 5559 Afterwards, upon a bill of review, for errors on the face of the decree, it is corrected, and the deft’s re-invested with the title to the over-plus—the 559 acres.' In the mean time, the comp’t had sold the overplus to bona fide purchasers—# there was no decree formally divesting them of the title, they were not parties to the suit: hut, held, that the convey anee under the decree and commissioner’s deed, is no higher or better than a conveyance of the same title, by the comp’t himself, according to covenant, without a decree, wouldhavebeen; and the title of his vendees, depending on his, failed when that was annulled; §• the def’ts in the decree, reinvested, may maintain ejectment to recover the land from those vendees. A sale made between the time of a conveyance under a final dedecree, and the filing of a bill of review: the purchasers deemed pendente lit$i purchasers.</p>
- 34 Ky. 100Higgins v. Morrison's (1836)
Chancery* From the Circuit Court eor Fayette Counts'* The facts—bill tons raised?UeS Riil in chancery, by one joint indorser of a bill of exch. which he paid alter protest, against the other, for… Held: that these facts justify the presumption that he either had legal notice, or waived it, and is liable to bis co indorsor for contribution.
- 34 Ky. 109Lee's Administrators v. Reed (1836)
Covenant. From the Circuit Court for Lincoln County. Held: that, the transactions being between the principal and his creditor—not payments by the sureties, they stand on the same ground with the principal, and cannot resist the correction of the accounts, nor the consequent diminution of the credit on the note, though thereby, the principal being dead, in-¡sol vent, the payment of a larger…
- 34 Ky. 120Holburn v. Neal (1836)
<p>C^ase.</p> <p>.From the Circuit Court for Fayette County.</p> <p>Action for a malicious prosecution ; verdict, and grounds for a ¡new trial.</p> <p>In a suit &r a malicious prosecution, express proof of malice - in the absence of probable causéis not required; the legal implication will sus tain a verdict. No eonrt can say that a verdict for $250 damages, for an injury to character and liberty, is excessive; or that any sum is so, that is not, per se, evidence of prejudice or corruption.</p> <p>The character, habits and appearance of a man,and the pub lie opinion about him—tho’ coupled with the fact that a crime was committed where he, with others, was present, will not amount to probable cause, in his suit for a malicious prosecution.</p> <p>Def’t did not prepare for trial, believing that pl’tf did not intend to prosecute the suit, as he had “gone off;” but there wa3 no other indication that he or his lawyer had abandoned it; and the deft’satto had pro raised to inform him in time, in case it should be necessary,to pre pare for trial— but did not do so: these facts are not a sufficient excuse for not being ready for trial, and not sufficient ground for a new trial— altho’ the def’t swears that the prosecution for which he is sued, was commenced without malice, and relies also, on excess in the damages.</p>
- 34 Ky. 123Pulliam v. Pulliam's Heirs (1836)
Chancery, From the Circuit Court for Barren County. A^/eme covert the contract’of,her ancestor> °r her own, made before coverture, t0 coavey lan(J> may be deemed a trastee, and rec^y dte0 make the con-com’iTheed? in execution of the the^Ma ^ut where she is not there ¡s nó évidence °£ laSal consent by her, a decree against enf0™'ed would be nuga¡^e^cT1imite with her husband in a lawful deed.
- 34 Ky. 126Thruston v. Masterson (1836)
Chancery. From ti-ie Circuit Court eor Boone County. The bill. Publications against absent defendants, and un known h’rs must begin and be con tinued, as long before the appearance day as the law requires (2 mo’s for the former, 8 weeks for the latter,) otherwise they will be nugatory.
- 34 Ky. 129McKenzie v. City of Lexington (1836)
Assumpsit. From the Circuit Court for Fayette County. a party makes a lease of premises to which he has then no title; but afterwards, the trueownerleases them to one who leases them to the first lessor. These subsequent leases operate, by estoppel, to confirm the first. Tiie surrender of bis lease, by a tenant, will not divest big subtenants of their rights; and he will be justly liable for .their subsequent use and occupation.
- 34 Ky. 133Henly ex rel. Marshall v. Gore (1836)
<p>Chancery,</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Franklin County.</p> <p>Statement of the case.</p> <p>An occupant, to take advantage pf the 7 years jaw, must show a grant from tho state, to himself—directly, or by a regular succession of conveyances ; that it povers the land jn controversy, and n residence upon it for seven years, before the suit was brought.</p> <p>A contract,made after the recovery in eject, for a purchase of the land, from the plaintiff, by the def’ts, would es-top thepi from denying his title; but a purchaser from the def’ts, before their contract with the pit’f. might set up his adverse title against the pit’f; ior no admission by a vendor, made after the sale, can be used against his purchaser; but a purchaser from the def’t, pending the suit, is in the same predicament as hisvendor—bound by the judgment, liable to eviction by process upon it &c. so also if he purchased of one whom he knew was connected with dc. fendant by privity; and def’t being in possession, would be strong evidence of such knowledge.</p> <p>upon a bill to on chase money— Üho’ 1’1616 mi;y be a tenant in possession, asserting an adverse claim, the complainant may have a decree for the sale of the title purchased of him; and, if the tenant was a pedente lite purchaser of one from whom the complainant had recovered the land, and is bound by that judgment, lie must surrender the possession to go with the title decreed to be sold.</p> <p>Where there are infant deft’s in ch’y, the cause should not be heard without answers for them: the failure of a guardian ad litem to answer, is not cause for dismissing the bill; the court should coerce an answer, or appoint a new guar dian,.& defer the hearing until thd answer comes in.</p>
- 34 Ky. 137Howard's Administrator v. Burgen (1836)
Assumpsit-. From the Circuit Court for Madison County. A contract t© board a man during his life, for a sum—part to be paid down, arid the balance “thereafter,” is riot an “agreement which is not to be performed witbitt the space of one year,” as the man may die within that time; so it is not within the statute of frauds.
- 34 Ky. 138Overstreet's Administrator v. Potts (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. An adm’r is not —nor arc his vepresentatives, liable to distributees for interest, unless it appears that, he or they used the estate. A decree for distribution should not bo enforced against an adin’r .—nor against the personal representative of an adm’r. until arefundingbond, approved by the court, has been given.
- 34 Ky. 140Simpson v. Simpson (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Garrard County.. Statement of the ^*86- Contracts between husband and wife are contrary to tlie policy of the law, null and void. A valid agreement for a seperation, between husband & wife, and for a seperate allowance for her support, may be made thro, the medium of a. 3.4 party, (astrustee, for the wife) by & against whom the contract may he enforced.
- 34 Ky. 144Maude v. Rodes (1836)
CiiANCEim, From the Circuit Court for Madison County. Statement of the case‘ One of four partners in a factory-filed his bill againstthe others, charging, that one of the def’ts,who was to furnish skill &c—no oapi tal,had,by deceitful representations, induced a large expenditure of the money of the others, forma cbinery that proved utterly useless, and had, hi other ways also, misapplied the funds — praying (among other things) for damages occasioned by these alleged frauds…
- 34 Ky. 148Southard v. Lewis (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. The bill—its objects. Decree of the C. Court.
- 34 Ky. 150Shoffet v. Menifee (1836)
Error coram vobis. From the Circuit Court for Barren County. Plea in nullo est erratum, to a writ of error co-ram vorbis, is in the nature of a demurrer, and makes the question whether the writ, upon its face,is maintainable. Errqr coram vofyis does not lie ^o vacate a judg’-t upon the ground, that—cqntrary to the sheriff’s return of executed—therewas in fact no service.
- 34 Ky. 153Patterson v. Smith (1836)
Chancery* From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. Comp’t charges toat sífpievla was form 'the answer, t!’at he sanction-thing, without proof. A party whoso name has been f0r<red, or affix-e<* without his --authority, to a replevin bond. “PJ mamJam a for an injunction, 0^oeuSf so fer as it pur-f^ writ of error coram »o-but the for” mer is tlie Leiter remedy.
- 34 Ky. 154Keasy v. City of Louisville (1836)
Case. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. The power of the~ Legislature to incorporate a city'(Louisville) is not questioned; nor is it doubted that the municipal government has authority, ' as an incidental corporate right, to grade and pave the-streets, and to alter & change the ' grades, at any time and in any way that the public convenience may require; and of that the city authorities are the judges; and their docisions—made with a due regard to paramount laws…
- 34 Ky. 158Baker v. Red (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Trigg County. Tho will. Settlement with (he ex’ors, division of the estate, &c. Bill, proceedings and decree, and objections to it— by the pl’tfs, and def’ts.
- 34 Ky. 166Kercheval v. Ambler (1836)
Traverse. From the Circuit Court for Mason County. Statement of the case. Where a sheriff executes aha. fa and delivers the land to the plaintiff’s agent, the possession is the plt’f’s, Sr the fact that he prosecutes a writ of forcible entry, for a subsequent intrusion on the land, is sufficient evidence of the agent’s authority The return upon a ha. fa. is conclusive between the parties, as to the land held by the def’t when thenoticein eject ment was served.
- 34 Ky. 172Wilhite v. Roberts (1836)
Debt. From: the Circuit Court for Nelson County. Debt on bond; plaintiff sets out the condition as reciting that an eject, had been commenced for deft “upon the Remise, of the said def’t and his wife, B W” &c. oyer is craved, and a bond produced, in which the recital is, that an eject, had been commenced, “upon the demise of my [def’ts] wife, B. W. formerly B. D.” &c. The variance is fatal, upon demurrer.
- 34 Ky. 177Campbell v. Johnston (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court nor Jeefersgn County. The [facts^and i,leadra53- tóese't offi SS t0 Decree, and sep' arate writs of er rorby twodef’ts. Held: that C. is entitled to a set-off, as claimed by him—p. 178, be» cause of the insolvency of J. G. the debtor; but, that J. may rebut that right with the old debt due him from C. p. Í78.
- 34 Ky. 187Blackwell v. Irvin's Administrators (1836)
Assumpsit. From the Circuit Court eor Madison County. The paymaster of a regiment is entitled to the custody of its funds; and if the adrp’rs of a deceased paymaster refuse to pay over the balance that was in his hands, to his successor, upon proper demand, or the order of the Col, com’dt, they are liable to an action. Assumpsit will lie for such balance—tho’ the decedent may have given bond and security to account: the liability exists independent of the bond.
- 34 Ky. 188Black v. Meaux (1836)
Assumpsit. From the Circuit Court for Mercer Countt. A colored man who was emancipated by the last will of his master, remained with and labored for the defendant, during the period of a controversy as to the validity of the will.
- 34 Ky. 191Bank of Commonwealth v. McChord (1836)
Pet. & Sum. From the Circuit Court eor Washington County. Where a party, intending to enter into an obligation, signs the paper, in blank, entirely, or as to any particular, as the amount, date &e. there is an implied authority to any holder to fill all blanks, at his discretion, and in such imperfect instrument, the name of a new obligor may be inserted, vyithoutjY¡üaJing_V. lt-^=®spedaliy if the first signers intended only to be his sureties But any alteration of a perfect…
- 34 Ky. 193Reeder v. Anderson's Administrators (1836)
<p>Assumpsit»</p> <p>From the Circuit Court eor Mason County.</p> <p>When a man loses a piece of property, there is an implied request from him to every body else; to aid him in recovering it; and any one who finds and restores it, may recover of the owner, upon the implied assumpsit, at least an indemnity for his time and expenses-.</p>
- 34 Ky. 194Rowland v. Wood (1836)
Covenant, From the Circuit Court for Madison County.- Constables are andUd’byy their d°Udetur°r ™alie thelr process and precepts; and theplamtifl, or the defendant in an person injured by a failure of a con-a process,^a™ as relator, mainoThis bond?UP
- 34 Ky. 195Blackwell v. Oldham & Co. (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court eor Madison County. Held: that as the damages for the alleged fraud,' were unliquidated, and there is no special ground, shown for the jurisdiction over-that branch ol’the. case, thq. remedy is af Iaiy,
- 34 Ky. 198Taylor v. Bate (1836)
Chancery. Froj] the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. Facts of [he eagB. The pleadings.
- 34 Ky. 207Stone v. Porter (1836)
Assumpsit, From the Circuit Court eor Bourbon County.. A count in assumpsit, for mo- • ney paid, laid out and expended, is sufficiently supported by proof of a payment in any thing equivalent to mo ney—as notes of the Bank of the U. S.orof any other bank, or even the notes of individuals,when paid by one party, and received by the other, as money.
- 34 Ky. 209Wall ex rel. Redd v. Humphreys (1836)
Debt. From the Circuit Court for Harrison County! Held: that, under this assignment of breach, the value of the slaves, or damages for failing to return them, could not be recovered, and so no error in rejecting the evidence of their value.— Tho,’ it seems, their value might have been recovered (without a judgment pro retorno) if the failure to restore them was assigned as a breach of…
- 34 Ky. 211Bainbridge v. Caldwell (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. The bill, and in-^1111011011' Answer,. Decree, and que*., t;ons heie' Evidence. Held: that the delivery shouldbedeemed to have been conditional, and that the seller may, at his election, either reclaim the goods, or insist on an equitable lien upon them.
- 34 Ky. 216Bakewell v. Talbot (1836)
0AS]E> From íhe Circuit Court for Jefferson County. The declration. The proof. ” The owner of ft little colored boy-allowed him te go and stay most of the time 'with his mother — a slave who had been hired by a neighbor — who became fond of the boy.
- 34 Ky. 219Brown v. Calvert (1836)
<p>Assumpsit.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Spencer County.</p> <p>Whenever a declaration is so general as not to apprize the defendant of the nature and extent ¡of the demand, he is entitled to a bill of particulars—to which the plaintiff will be restricted ip his proof.</p>
- 34 Ky. 220Baker v. Dobyns (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Mason County. Statement of the case. Held: that as the purchaser was no party, and it did not appear that his money had been refunded, this complaint-was rightly dismissed without-prejudice.
- 34 Ky. 227Boyd v. Barkley (1836)
Ejectment. From the Circuit Court for Mason County. A pl’tf in ejectment cannot recover upon a demise, the date of which is anterior to the time when his right of entry accrued. A demand of pos session, or notice to quit, was necessity; and the date of the demise is before the time at which the tennant was required, by the demand or notice to surrender the possession: the pl’tf fails.
- 34 Ky. 229Rudd v. Jones (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. Facts of the case Tsultj, arl>ltia tion and award. Suit in chancery* aside the award. Arbitrators, being the judges chosen by the parties themselves, constitute their ultimate tribunal, as to fact and law; and ¡mere error of judgment as to either, is no ground for reversing or vacating the award.
- 34 Ky. 232Ormsby v. Phillips (1836)
<p>Chancery.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County.</p> <p>The bill.</p> <p>Decree, sale &c</p> <p>Extreme haste in progressing to a decree and sale of mortgaged estate, especially when great inadequacy of price is attributable to it, will not be ap proved by this court.</p> <p>title is indefeasi-le ™’tll0ut any . terest) may go into chancery to When a right redemption is levied on and sold under execution, nothing remains tothemortgagor, but his right to redeem the equity; and the purchaser has no ground for a bill, of foreclosure— for the chancellor cannot take away the right of redemption which the statute secures to the mortgagor for a year; and after that- (if there is no redemption) the purchaser’s foreclosure or de cree. The purchaser of the equity (who has no other in-redeem the mortgage by paying the debt, and thus complete his title; but in that proceeding, the mortgagor can be a party only pro forma, to obtain a discovery of the amount of the debt &c. he.is not liable to any snbstantiardecree in favor of either the holder of the equity, or of the debt, nor for costs.</p> <p>The assignee of a mortgage debt is invested with the rights of the mortgagee, and if he acquires the equity of redemption also, there is a union of the rights of mortgagor and mortgagee in the same person, and so -no ground for a bill to redeem: the same party, in such a ease, would be, in effect, plt’f and de fondant, and the decree a mere nullity,</p> <p>Ifthe debt is not, in such case, extinguished, (of which quere) it “ a me„re !®gal right, of which the chancellor h.as n° ilinscllc; proceed in rem ag^^to^haa no longer any in-made subject* to his debt, or foreolose<5‘</p> <p>A party who, bq ing invested witli the rights of mort gagor and mortgagee, needs not the aid of the chancellor in re. lation to his title, cannot sue in Equity for the mere purpose of being let into pos session. If he is only an assignee of the mortgage debt, if any thing . . . . is it only a formal transfer of the mortgagee’s title, and even that, the court incline to think, is not necesto possession by a proceeding at law. sary.</p> <p>The chancellor’s control over the possession of real estate—except where he acts in aid of the legal remedy—is but an incident to hi? jurisdiction to establish the right, and where he ha? no jurisdiction for that purpose, he can take none in relation to the possession.</p>
- 34 Ky. 236Boyce v. Nancy (1836)
Trespass. From the Circuit Court for Jessamine County. Suit for freedom —under an emancipalion, by will, in Maryland. Held: that a jury may infer, that one suing for free dom given there, wasfit[tobeeman eipated,/rom the fact, that she is held in slavery, and her right to freedom resisted.
- 34 Ky. 242Aleck v. Tevis (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Shelby County. The bill. Defence. Facts admitted. Depositions. Bill dismissed» and questions to be decided.
- 34 Ky. 251Hanson v. Buckner's (1836)
Covenant. From the Circuit Court for Bracken County. Statement of the case. Held: that where a grandfather had conveyed land té the husband of his grand-dangh-' ter, as an ad vancement to her, he (the gran-, tee) might maintain his action Upon the covenant \yarranty, notwithstanding the conveyance was so far voluntary as to leave the land subject to the prior debt of the grantor.
- 34 Ky. 258Morton v. Robards (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court eor Ohio County. i*actsofthecase. The bill.
- 34 Ky. 264Miller v. Shackleford (1836)
Ejectment» From tiie Circuit Court for Fayette County. Reties and their titles. Held: that it implies no more than that the deed, as it is, was executed by her, when it was made. •The construction and effect of a deed, are matters of law; and if a jury undertake to find what effect a deed has —as, that the grantor did convey the land by the deed— the court will disregard the finding, thus far, and give the deed its…
- 34 Ky. 289McIlvoy v. McIlvoy's (1835)
Ghancery; From the Circuit Court eor Anderson County; A second dissolution of an .junction with da* ipages^ when but one injunction had been granted—erroneous. The act giving ten per ct. damages, specifies an injunction “ to any judgment at law,” and do'eá not apply to dei crees.
- 34 Ky. 291Honore v. Colmesnil (1836)
Chancery, From the Louisville Chancery Court. Decree in Bul-, lit, for a sum of money; bill in Jefferson, where the deft resided and was served, with pro cess—ta¿subject his equit-. able interest in real estate in Jefferson, & divers choses in ac\ tion, to the pay-, ment of the decree.
- 34 Ky. 299Arnett v. Cloudas (1836)
Detinue, From the Circuit Court for Grant Countv., Fraud will vitiate any contract; but does, not render, any absolutely void:whether a fraudulent contract is void, or binding, depends upon the… Held: that the rights of innocent purchasers will not beafFccted by the reclamation.
- 34 Ky. 302Pirtle's Administrator v. Cowan's Administrator (1836)
Detinue. From the Circuit Court for Fayette County. The action, and fe^r'oFthe apar- (ies. The facts. Instructions #c. The mere assent of an adin’r, that slaves descended, may pass to the beiis,is sufficient to render their title complete, & divests the adm’r of all right. And if a slave descends to several co-heiis, and the adm’r assents to the title of one of them, it is aprima facie) sufficient for all the heirs. The assent of the adm’r may be ex press or implied.
- 34 Ky. 307Boggess v. Boggess (1836)
Chancery, From the Circuit Court eor Muhlenburgh County, Thepowerofthe. court of appeals to revise the. proceedings of in ferior courts, upon writs of error, extends to all final judg’ts, decrees, and judicial orders, with' some statutory exceptions.—De crees granting divorces are among the exceptions; but decrees. refusing divorces are not: aw. e. lies upon a decree refusing a, divorce, and upon decrees either allowing or refusing alimony. haspower to ^ecree a divorce ior…
- 34 Ky. 309Underwood v. Brockman (1836)
Chancery,, From the Circuit Court for Ci-iristjan County, Origin of Under-, wood’s claim. Held: that a compromise made by a guardian, of a baseless claim against the wards, shall not bind them; nor shall the obligation given upon the compromise, he enforced against her individually. ° The husband of a co-heir, who had, without the participation of his wife, acquiesced in the compromise, and given his note for her rateable…
- 34 Ky. 321Pearson v. Baker (1836)
EjECTMENTt From the Circuit Court eor Estill County, The titles-. i’81b5y tb| a junior patent f°andecl uPon an elder survey, under that act, will r.L id,'” tent on a junior smvey‘ The actual slipYey is made the commencement patent cannot bo An act of 1831 -secures to settlers certain preemption rights; but does not declare that grants in derogation of those rights shall he void;and as i avoided at law, collaterally, by matter dehors the grant, (unless a statute makes it…
- 34 Ky. 325Miller v. Henshaw & Co. (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Statement of the case. Held: that this attestation is pri ma facie evidence, that there is a city (St. L.) in tho county of St. Louis; consequently, that the mayor was the proper officer to certify the acknowledgment; tho justices not authorized, and their .certificate no evidence of the execution of ■the deed.
- 34 Ky. 333Jones' Administrator v. Warren's Administrator (1836)
|*et. & Sum. From the Circuit Court eor Bourbon County. Statement of tl^ case. The dioses in fiction belonging to the wife at the time of the marriage, vest in the husband, when, and provided, he reduces them to possession,or disposes of them effectually, during the coverture; otherwise they do not vest in him, but survive to the wife if she outlives thehusband.
- 34 Ky. 336Venable v. McDonald (1836)
Ejectmení. From the Circuit Court for Fayette County; The facts, and questions for decisión. The judg’ts and orders of inferior courts are presu- J . med to be right till the contrary appears. A nonsuit Was entered, and set aside, m tno same term; the record does not show the ground for either order: both are presumed to hays 'fceen proper.
- 34 Ky. 338Cain v. Hays (1836)
Casej From the Circuit Court eor Knox County. Any person injured by the erection of a mill dam (without his consent,) may re cover damages, notwithstanding the mill was duly authorized, & altho’ the inqnisition were of opinion that ho would sustain no damage: But hist, consent to the erection of the dam,willamount to a license, which may be pleaded in bar., of the action.
- 34 Ky. 339Nailor's Children v. Nailor (1836)
Chancery... From ti-ie Circuit Court for Garrard County. The bill—ita al legations, Injunction. Demurrer, and bill dismissed. The persons and arfdlunatics,!°ih ^ntStantí aicbSUb cenor°’s power.1 Th^fpim of pro-t^fontotheclian bellor, which the ny friend of the idiot or lunatic may prefer; and upon which a' writ de • 'idiota fyc. issues,' returnable in chancery, where the inquisition may be traversed.
- 34 Ky. 347Hunt v. Weir (1836)
Chaucb&t. From the Circuit Court eor Hopkins Countt,. Held: that ag the party seeking to invalidate the conveyance, is hound to make out his ground hy proof, he can have no relief up on this inconclusive evidence* The deed of an insane grantor passes the legal title to land— subject to be defeated, not by any party who maywishit overturned ; but by the heirs only, and at their election made…
- 34 Ky. 352Anderson v. Anderson (1836)
Assumpsits. From the Circuit Cduáí for Jefferson Countt. The acceptor of a bill is thé principai debtor: he cannot assume the attitude of a surety, even when the acceptance was merely for the accommodatiou of another party; to the acceptor, the tnnéíretpecdng sureties do not they^did^woul'd not be available nponSla written ■acceptance—for law'0 merchant, there is a suffi' c)ent. considera- acpeptancesof bills in the common forma, (e..g.‘I ^ept’the with-within the act of…
- 34 Ky. 354Moore's Heirs v. Moore's Devisees (1836)
Chancert. From the Circuit Court for Harrison County. Held: that the devise {supra) to the county court (of a fund, t.o educate poor orphans) is not illegal. Nor void, (as the court incline to think)' for uncertainty, ^vben - tested ...by the rules of the common law alone; but maybe enforced independently of any English statute'.
- 34 Ky. 369Ball v. Lively (1836)
Ejectment* Erom the Circuit Court for Bracken County! Reference to a fn\hi?case?1S1°tt Evidence on thé ^J^beiow ^ ' Instructions* Verdict &é. Held: that this defence is not available. If there was no fraud about the lease, he is bound by it (tho9 the eviction may have been unauthorized;) and if there was vitiating fraud in the lease, before he can avoid it on that score, he must restore the possession.
- 34 Ky. 375Breckinridge v. Shrieve (1836)
Assumpsit. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. The facte, The declaration, pleas &c. Assiimpsit lies, in this state, on h written acceptance. Ante, 853.
- 34 Ky. 381Steele v. Curle (1836)
Covenant. From the Circuit Court for Madison Countf. Theaction, plena, and demurrers,1 and questions arising. Held: that this writing (tho’ made, and, according to its face, to be per:* formed, in Pa.) comes within the act of 1812, and that covenant fnot assumpsit) is the appropriate action upon it. A contract for doing that which is malum in se ■, or malum prohibitum will not be enforced in a court of justice.
- 34 Ky. 391Smith v. Paxton (1836)
Efl~CTMENT. From the Circuit Court for Mercer County. ttatement of the case. Held: that, however beneficial the provisions of the act might have been to them as defendants in possession, it gives them no rights, & is in no wise available to them, as pltf’s, seeking to recover tlie land from others. The Legislature eorara^sshainjo deemed vicious, and withhold all 3ogal remedy upon them.
- 34 Ky. 395Gaines v. Bryant (1836)
Chancery,. From the Circuit Court for Franklin County. Facts and pleadJng3, Decree and appeal. Further facta dp inferences from the proofs.
- 34 Ky. 403Boone v. Helm (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Mercer County. Various entries and surveys upon which the titles and claims of the parties, respectively, depend. The interference —and bill, and former proceedings thereon, in the circuit court, a;id,.in this cqm'U Further proceedings in the court below; decree & appeal. A decree which cannot be enforced without further action by the Court, it is interlocutory, not final.
- 34 Ky. 422Bennett v. Runyon (1836)
Ejectment. From ti-ie Circuit Court for Madison County. The action, &c. A verdict that the court below— nesses for both pañíes were seen fused to set aside, must be clearly ngamst the evideuce, to inducg this court to reverse the cuuse, on^that ground.
- 34 Ky. 424Slaughter v. Huling (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Wayne County. Held: that the decree is, in that respect, erroneous, An interest in salt works, including various implements, is sold, and the sale afterwards rescinded as fraudulent. A decree that the purchaser shall pay for the implements, besides paying lor their Use, is unjust & erroneous.
- 34 Ky. 429Bustard v. Gates (1836)
Jfrit of right. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. Held: that, after 20 years possession under such a sale, the ex’on book and the recitals in the sheriff’s deed are sufficient evidence, prima fa cif ijfa valid sale.
- 34 Ky. 443Pearl's Heirs v. Davis (1836)
Ejectment.. From the Circuit Court for Lincoln County., Titles under the appropriatingthe vacant lands in, this CQm’th, ren. iatet.o,and,comr ™ence. at> th®date of the surVey—if the sur'’¶.13 record?d within a certain time; if not, then at the date of th% registration:- the,. duteof the pau. “j/8 not mate' If two surveys of the same land, w,ere.made at the same time, under that act, the first possessor, it¡ seems, must have.. the best right.
- 34 Ky. 445Steele v. Taylor (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. Held: that the agents, havingactedwith good faith, and apparently with sound discretion, in both transactions—cannot be made accountable for the original demand of $9000, nor for the nominal amount of the notes received for it; but shall be held liable for the neat proceeds, as it finally came to their hands, in money, only.
- 34 Ky. 452Thomas v. Mann's Administratrix (1836)
Scire Facias. From the Circuit Court for Grant County. Special bail canfna suit by pkh tion and sum-case where the process is a summons only—not a capias. And, 1821 abolishing jmprispninentfor bíréquíred exi cept when,under particularcircmn stances, & forms <>r proceeding, it thafact.'IZB^ by Bail taken with-does no^subjeot' the bail to, any tion^úpon^ demurrerto. a scire case^the0 jndgment must bp for him.
- 34 Ky. 454Williamson v. McConnell (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Fayette County. Held: that, — as the fact Was, if it existed, within his personal knowledge, and too recent to be probably forgotten, - the allegation might, perhaps, be taken for confessed: it is clear that, such a denial does not bring, the case within the rule requiring inore proof than the testimony of ®ne witness.
- 34 Ky. 456Sowder v. McMillan's Heirs (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Scott County. Character of the cage. A surveyor’s plat and report are not evidence against deft’s who had no notice of the survey; nor can they be used against one who —though he was conusant of the survey, and present wlien it was made, had not then been made a def’t, and had no right, there - fore, to give any directions respecting it.
- 34 Ky. 465Jeffreys' Heirs v. Callis (1836)
Chancery: From the Circuit Court eor Bourbon County: Amendment of a ^gters’ cfertlfi' Editors are n«t authorized by the cerüfy publ’icltions: ‘h? certifi* cate of the printer is required. Held: that the amendment was properly allowed.
- 34 Ky. 471Commonwealth v. Brashears (1836)
Í)eba Form ti-ie Circuit Court eor Perry County. Th(í j„s{¡ces a county court* maintain'an^ction, inthename , wealth* for the benefit of the cb’unty, upon the bond of the sheriff* for the collection of the county levy. A county creditor (according to the case of Kennel v* Fugate* 1 Mon. 1 *) cannot*
- 34 Ky. 474Weathers v. Ray (1836)
Assumpsit. From the Circuit Court for Nelson County, The two adm’rs of S. C. sue for a debt that wag due their intestate; one ofthem -dieSj and his administrators undertake to settle the suit, and take a note for the debt, payable to “S.C’s adm’rs” —which they afterwards Collect: It was competent lór the surviving adm’r of S. C. to affirm that settlement.
- 34 Ky. 476Catherine Bodine's Will (1836)
From the Nelson County Court. The will—which directs that certain slaves shall 6e set 'free at future periods: question whether they can prosecute a writ of error to revise the judg’t of the county court, rejecting the will! Slaves, directed, by will, to be set free after designated peripda, must be deemed to be still slaves —each till the time for bis emancipation arrives.
- 34 Ky. 479Chiles v. Jones (1836)
<p>ÍhéctMentí</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Nicholas County*</p> <p>Reference to a former decision, for a history of the case. Evidence on the last trial.</p> <p>ínsttuctionss</p> <p>Questio ns for.€§-ciaio.n here,</p> <p>The champerty act ofVirginia of 1786 was intended to apply to such titles only (the court incline to think,') as were consummated at the time of the convey-mice, or bargaining to convey.— For entries and inchoate titles were «assignable by express statute. But—</p> <p>If a purchase of inconsequence of the Va. chert)still Jraa purchaser Who had entered under an executory contract and under the authority ot the vendor, (and derSsuoh purchaser) would be tl1o°vendor’s™tie—their possession---whether the contract was valid or void— would enure to his benefit and be, in effect, his possession.</p> <p>All titles to land which originated under the laws of Va. tho’ perfected underthelaws of Ken. are within the saving.? of the act oP98. In such cases, the purchaser is exempt from the champerty acts, may recover the land,though there was an adverse possession at the time of his purchase.</p> <p>Twenty years un interrupted possession, not only tolls the right of entry of all adversary claimants, who are under no disability, but gives a right of re-entry to the party who had such-possession and those claiming under him, when' ousted. Such, right of entry* must prevail in eject, altho’ the'* def’t. may rely, upon an elder tk tie*</p> <p>Occupancy of dence™uporTu; are not synonijnous terms.: It is the latter only' that makes the Seven years la.w available.'</p> <p>A party cannot set up a title adverse to that un-' Her which he acquired the possession; nor can Inte himaimi"S:</p>
- 34 Ky. 485Myers v. McMillan's Heirs (1836)
<p>Ejectment.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Scott County.</p> <p>A tenant upon whom an eject, had been served, but who had nev .er been served with 'the common order, was made h' def’t, & at the same term, a consent was entered of record, 'that, a plat, filed in another casé, might be read on the trial. At the next term, the tenant had his name struck otí^' as a def’t, becausehehadbeen made a defendant] without his consent or privity,- and had no im. terest in the land." Afterwards the true def’ts were admitted. They \vei;e. not bound by ' the consent obtained before they became patties: the plat' could not he its— •ed, as evidence against a def.’t who was no patty to the survey.</p> <p>The plt’fs, without title, rely upon a former alleged possession, showing the ex~ tent of it only, by deeds. The def’ts, also without title, rely on their possession. To maintain an eject, upon a mere possession shortof 20 years, the pl’tf must show, that he, or those under whom he claims, had, at the time of def’ts entry jon the land, such ¡a possession as would enable him to maintain trespass. But an actual possession may extend to a definite boundary beyond the improvements,& may continue a reasonable time after the pedis possessio has peased.</p> <p>History ofthe various tenancies, which have ex,isted, from time the land’in 'con^ froversy.</p> <p>The fact, that a party who has had an actual pos session of land, but has left it, “has not abandoned bis claim to the land”—a mere claim of ownership, does not, j)er se> a" mount to a continuation of the possession. Whether the pos .-session coniin,yes or not, must be determined by {his acts at the time of his departure, .and by ihe appearance of thé land afr ierwards, as woll as his claims and intentions.</p> <p>And, though the acts of a party at thetimeheleaves the land, may be sufficient to relict, for a time, the presumption that the posses eior* is abandoned—unless there is something on the land itself to indicate it, the presumption of a continued posses sion can be but temporary*</p> <p>A party who, by himself or his tenant, takes possession of a tract of land, a part of which is held by another occupant, acquires, by his entry, no possession of the part thus adversely held. And though the occnpant, being the tenant of another, shall attorn to, take a lease from, and pay-rent to, the claim ant who holds the other part of the tract claiming the whole, the attornment will avail the latter nothing. He can maintain no action upon his me-fi possession* against the .intruder who was thus previously possessed. '</p>
- 34 Ky. 492Lightfoot v. Bank of Commonwealth (1836)
Error Cor am' vobis. From the Circuí? Court for Ohio County.
- 34 Ky. 493Breckinridge v. Quertemus (1836)
<p>Traverse,</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County.</p> <p>statement of th$ casm-</p> <p>A forcible entry, and aforcible'ietainer, are distinct offences.— And (as is well settled,) if the warrant charge but one, unless the def’t is found guilty of that, there can be no judg’t for restitution. But, proceedings of this sortniust be construed liberally; and objections to mere forms are waived by a traverse.</p> <p>Where the writ Sjbdl'&ed n forcible ehtry of 'detainer, 'and' the def’t was’’found guilty of both',' the verdict was held to be sufficient.</p> <p>Held that finding the defendant ‘‘guilty of the forcible entry or detainer complained of in the warrant,” which charges' "only a forcibleeiitry, is,' in effect, finding him guilty''of both offences, &' therefore, of that charged in the warrant—and is sufficient to authorize a judg’t of resititution. .</p> <p>When the inquisition found true upon a traverse, is insufficient, & the judg’t is arrested for that cause—theinquisition should be qua-h’d:hy which the plt’f will be remitted to his remedy denovo. It is not competent for the circuit court to dismiss the warrant.</p>
- 34 Ky. 496Commonwealth v. Alfred (1836)
Presentment From the Circuit Court for Mercer County. Held: that a present. for retailing liquor, on the IZth of' Feb. was sustainedby proof of the fact about that time.
- 34 Ky. 497Payne v. Smith (1836)
<p>Trespass.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Fayette County.</p> <p>11 ,s the duty riding or driving J?eSpét cialiy in large cipersons or propevty. And the streets tips and towns, to be prudent & cautions not to expose others to injury, in theif And where are narrow, or casu.ally obstructed, increased vigi: ^ey^who disregard these answerable’ 3to those who, with°”rtf'may^sSfer by it. So—</p> <p>the deft’s gig, in which he was dri ™s a ”s trot, through a narrow pass, came in contact with the pltf’s horse,----which was loose in the street, and was walking obliquely across the defendant’s course, —& struck him with the point of the shaft and accident was attributable to the defendant s negligence, or recklessness; or at least, to his imprudent driving; and that he is, therefore, liable to the plaintiff for the value of the horse.</p>
- 34 Ky. 499Cain v. Flynn (1836)
<p>BíE.ct-ment»-</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Estihl County».</p> <p>The patents, spr,. panie*C'respee-'': tively.</p> <p>Evidence.</p> <p>Provisions of the act of 1815, as to the times when titles derived under that act, shall commence.</p> <p>Parol proof is not admissible to contradict or vary written instruments, made by authority of law, or the compaot of parties.</p> <p>A surveyor's certificate, or the recital of its contents in a patent, cannot be eontradicted by parol evidence,— Evidence, even by the surveyor himself, to show that the survey was never made, or made at a different time, is inadmissible.</p> <p>A patent has the dignity of record evidence of title, and its contents connot be questioned collaterally, by any thing de hors the patent, in the absence of any statutory provision authorizing it.</p>
- 34 Ky. 502Ditto v. Ditto's Adm'rs (1836)
<p>Assumpsit.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court eor Hardin County.</p> <p>The action, and defence.</p> <p>Evidence.</p> <p>Demurrer to the evidence &c.and questions for decision.</p> <p>a party has a t0 demur to the evidence (written or verversL^&Thereby withdraw the j^10^01refer it to the Court, if”the evidence ry might draw an™circímstances: otherwise ty° rannot* Pbe B„t! Where the evidenoo is notcontmdictory.or re™aTVut'lis plain and direct, it is sufficient to state to be demurred to, is loose and circumstantial,he who demurs to it must admit every fact proved, and every inference which a jucompelled to join in the demurrer. the evidence itself, omitting matters of inference; as the Court will then draw all just inferences in favor of the party offering the evidence.</p> <p>Any direct promíñe to pay a deSaw wiu'imply1^ promise wherever the party ought to promise,) any admission that the demand is then (supporteddeby the original con-take the case'out of the statute of that "the^áction will not be barred until 5 years after the last promise or admission was made.</p> <p>A merchant’s a'c-count.fol- “store goods” is barred in 12 months; but the action may be maintained, it seems; upon any new promise to pay it (coupled with the original consideration ) at any time within five years after the last promise.</p> <p>An admission that an account is right has been held not to be enough to take it out of the statute—as it may be right, though it lias been paid; but an admission that it is jusl, is enough, for it cannot be y«sf, if it has been paid.</p> <p>cept asto the one The pit’fs prow, e'd 'that the debt- or had, within 5 years, admitted the justice of a store account, except one item, and by another, that he said ha calculated upon paying the plaintiffs with a horse or note: held, that from either of these admissions, a new promise to pay the account (ex- , item) ought to he implied; oil which the action, commenced within five years after, could be sustained.</p> <p>An opinion expressed by a debtor, that somethings in an account admitted by him, were charged too high, can have no effect on the admission, considered with reference to the limitation; nor would it justify any reduction of the amount.</p>
- 34 Ky. 507Williams' Heirs v. Wilson (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Hardin County. Reference to a this case, and sub^equen^proeeedings, and dcciee’ One deed, in a chain of title, is _ to 7 heirs of the same ’surname; the next, by 4 femes covert of different names, their hus-, bands, and one other; no proof that the ladies, grantors in the latter, are the same who are’ gtantees m the former; nor, to account for the interest of two grantees in the former, who do not join in the latter, deed: so, a failure…
- 34 Ky. 511Commonwealth v. Turner (1836)
From the Garrard County Court* Statement of the case* The mother of two or morebaswritin^^Jaíed •/Zttg. 21, :35,dis fromStwo prosed eutions set on him (as tlrTfabeTefit ofh fant children”— naming two, &, directing the dismissal of the prosecutionspe?» ¿¿mg in the county court: held'. that that writing could noq apply to, or authorize the dismissal of, a warrant dated Mug. 27-, against the same man, charged as the father of an, unnamed chitó.
- 34 Ky. 516Pollard v. Otter (1836)
Traverse. From the Circuit Court for Warren Countt. The proceeding® “ponwaSf forcibleentryand to1'be^ónsu-üed with technical dicuhafthe jury do not think or Señenethedof ts guilty, will au•n°theír The júdg’t rena tice in the country, on an inquisition of forcible entry or detainer —whether the verdict is sufficient or not—i concludes the rights of the parties, until it is reversed or annulled, A judg’t on an insufficient verdict, should be set aside, and the…
- 34 Ky. 518Hinkle v. Commonwealth (1836)
Indictment, From ti-ie Circuit Court for Jefferson County. Settingup agamjng table may be an entire offence; keeping a gaming table and inducing others to bet upon it, may also, constitute a distinct offence: for either, unconnected with the other, an injiictment will lie. ■Jfet when both ¿re perpetrated by the same person at the same jitne, they constitute but one of-fence, for which pne count is suf|icient, and for which but one penalty can be in Jlicted.
- 34 Ky. 519Elms v. Randall (1836)
<p>Traverse.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County.</p> <p>The tenant of j]e enters uncJei a lease, a eon-an exp^titioíof Purchasing, or otherwise without legal title— owes allegiance whom he enter. ford^an^is”®topped to deny set up acclaim! or light of postoSft.°"And—1S° Ifatenantrenouu m3 his^an^tm-cq or 4wasi land* lord,and attempts to take shelter imde,rthe “,1?,0*" another; or if he violates any of tlle condlu°ns an^cno^Tpe™ Aaps,awarrantof [o'ejMtlhim!161^ upon which he was permitted to take possession, his landloid may enter upon him,</p> <p>All the duties & obligations of a tenant, or quasi tenant, to his landlord, devolve upon his sub tenant, and upon every one, in succession, to whom tile possession is transferred: so—</p> <p>Held, that where a party,-claiming title to land, bought out the improvements made by a tenant of his adversary, and thus gained the possession, and leased the land to another, the obligations'of the tenant who sold his improvements, and delivered the possession with them, devolved upon his vendee and his tenant—each of whom was bound—as he from whom they got the possession, was bound—to restore it to his landlord; and tile tenant who was in, having virtually done so, by taking a lease from that landlord, may hold under it—and against the party (purchaser of the improvements,') under whom lie first entered.</p>
- 34 Ky. 522Tesh v. Commonwealth (1836)
Indictment. From the City Court of Louisville* Prosecution and conviction in the “City Coatt of Louisville,” and objections made to the validity of the judgment.
- 34 Ky. 530Bruce v. Bruce (1836)
Pet. & OUM. From the Circuit Court eor Lewis County. Held: that this was no evidence of an accord and satisfactionofthonote— remaining in the plaintiff's possession; inslruc- . tions, that tho’ the jury believed that plaintiff liad so received if, were abstract, and therefore erioneous; and nr verdict for defendant, conirary to evidence, and í roun 1 for a new trial.
- 34 Ky. 532Moore v. Wilcox (1836)
Ejectment. From the Circuit Court for Caldwell County. By an act of’24, a def’t in eject, may rely on a former judg’t in eject, in his favor, as a bar, ‘where the pl’tf shall not : have had previously the actual occupancy 'imd possession of the land:’ the possession of those under whom, the •pl’tf claims, is available to him, to save his case from the bar.
- 34 Ky. 535Woolfolk v. Woolfolk (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Woodford County. Held: that the compromise-being hut on executory agreement, not operating as a release or conveyance of the land, was not available as a defence to the action of eject, and the remedy (if any) was in equity, And— Held, (upon the supplement especially) that the true spirit of the compromise required— not merely that Th. should dismiss his…
- 34 Ky. 542Mosely v. Taylor (1836)
<p>Cuaxcf. ar.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Orno County.</p> <p>The promise of an ex’or to pay the debt of his testator, tho’ in writing (according to the statute of frauds) would not be binding, unless it was founded upon a valuable consideration. But/orbearance may be a sufficient consideration, even when there was no assets of which the debt could be macle. Thecreditorstipulated to allow ten years indulgence; gave up the note of the testator and his co-obligor, and took that of the ex’or.: held that these facts clearly constituted a sufficient consideration to uphold the personal obligation of thb executor.</p>
- 34 Ky. 544Chiles' Executors v. Craig (1836)
Assumpsit. From the Circuit Court for Mason County» The action, and facts and circumstances—constitutmg a case of peculiar cliaracter. Verdict, &c. in actions ex ^ntractu for to be recovered greement) is the ™ces. °f the aer When a special ved!eorenma/b8 inferred from the circumstances, it may be enforced, although the amount may greatly exceed the usual estimate of similar services.
- 34 Ky. 547Combs' Devisees v. Branch (1836)
Covenant-. From the Circuit Court eor Henry County. Devises of land are construed according to the common law: legacies of personalty according to the civil law. bequest of pereonaUy, to be diveral,a™anfuture period, no interest vests in the legatees until the dj™selon takesWhere there is a where land is devised to several devisees, to be divided at a future period (as‘ ofage)San Eter¡‘h?dland Vests in the devisees^at the death p ,.
- 34 Ky. 549Cameron v. Boyd's Administrator (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court eor Trigg County. 11 ? general effec’t to wdlsq tha! general Jebe-luestf: hut the rule that the will must be so con-effect* to'ever0 part of it, ancf tSof*the'mstutor into effect, „n^verShantand -phe testator de-. v!sed and be- siaves and per-' soaal property— described, to hia ,wife; and lavpropertyjike,wise specificate ly desfll)ed> to these devisea thengaveandbeniece,'3 Croke?s rule for jjgnBtrpmg wills!
- 34 Ky. 552Park's Heirs v. White's Aministrators (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court eor Madsion County. Reference to a former decision in this case. Held: that, under these cireutnátanceu, the judgment acquired by W. against P’s adm’rs, ought to be considered' as a trust • for the benefit of P’s heirs; and that the eh’r should afford no aid in enforcing it against ■ ■ them— neither against •the grand children of W. nor their co-heirs.
- 34 Ky. 559Graham v. Hardin's (1836)
Chancery* From the Circuit Court for Franklin County. An amendment to a writ of error to make it include a decree to which it does not apply and aa to which time has barredthe to* et when the aznendment is offered, will not be allowed. A decree foreclosing a mortgage—tho’ there may be subseXesamecause^ is a finaMecree, w^of«Toriles) ?ta«y timowithm three years— after which it is barred.
- 34 Ky. 561Griffith v. Dicken (1836)
Ejectment. From the Circuit Court eor Daviess County. Held: by one whose title has thus passed to them, is their possession, and a sale of the land by them, is not champertous Where a lessor ivas under disability when his right of entry ac crued, the timé when the disability ceased, & the time which would bar his en try commenced running, are matters of fact and law; and the facts must be…
- 34 Ky. 565Barnett v. Higgins (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Christian County. Statement of thq case‘ Incumbrances pn the land. ‘ '■ ‘ Uiiless the vendor of land has1 a clear title when’ his bill for a specific execution comes to a' hearing, he can haveno decree—even though he' may have been lulled or thrown off his guard by the purchaser. Want of proof that the grantors in a deed arte fife heirs,- and the' only heirs, of one who died seized of the land, is a fatal defect.
- 34 Ky. 570Roberts' Executors v. Brinker (1836)
<p>Agreed case.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Fayette County.</p> <p>A will, by which the testator gives his estate to his wife, and children &c. contains the following clause: “it is my will that my ex’oi'3 retain in their hands one equal share of my estate, which they are directed to give in equal portions to my three grand children (naming them) equally, when they marry or come of age; & my ex’ors are not to be charged with interest on that portion willed to [them] until after they many or come of age.” Held, that, the interest of these legatees was not contingent, but vested at the death of the testator—the share of each to be paid when he comes of age, &c. and that one of the legatees having died before he came of age or married, his father, as heir at law, was entitled to his portion.</p> <p>A bequest to se-, verallegatees,to he divided among them, they tal e as tenants in common; and if one dies, theothers are not en - tjtled to his share by survivorship; it relapses to the original sto/'.k from which it was taken.</p> <p>A legacy given when ihe legatee marries or attains a certain age &c. is deemtention °appear■ing in the will) gent legacy, i. e.' feet if m^pro" vided the legatee marry &c. not otherwise. Bat a legacy -to an íi^to*tálm^eífect i i fu'uro, is vested^ and not to depend on the ImtU the time of payment.: And cumstances will be sufficient to show ' that alegacy is vested, not contingent,</p> <p>The will directs theex’ors toretain certaim money legacies until the legatees come of age or marry; and that the ex’ors shall not be charged with interest: they are entitled to hold and use the money, free of interest, until the time of payment arrives.</p> <p>Where there is legacy given, to be paid at some' future time, as when the legatee is of age, and an' intermediate vest ed interest is also given, both bequests are considered as vested on the death oil the testator, eé instanti. ^</p>
- 34 Ky. 574Bank of United States v. Dallam (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Fayette County. An act incorporating a manufacturing company, provides that the estate and property of every individual shareholder shall be liable, in proportion to his interest, for all debts contracted by the corporation, while he holds stock—upon a failure ofthe corporate funds to discharge the j¡ame— f/eW,tliata judg mentj ex’on and return of no property,against the corporation, is sufficient ground for proceeding against the…
- 34 Ky. 580McCoy v. Martin (1836)
Covenant. From the Circuit Court for Fayette County. The action. The declaration. Held: that the issue was not immaterial ; that the ver ■ diet and judg’t might be effectually pleaded in bar of another suit for the same cause, & the defects are, therefore, cured by thestatuteofjeo- -
- 34 Ky. 586Harris v. Campbell (1836)
Covenant. From the Circuit Court eor Floyd County; The pleadings.
- 34 Ky. 589Hudgens v. Spencer (1836)
<p>Chancery.</p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Cumberland County.</p> <p>Aslaveholderexemancipation^ in mo, in which belief^'timt all men by nature areequallyfree,” and that, “from a?i®wrconviction and^ criminality p([11^livins his of their natural he does thereby “emancipato and set ^men women and children,’ viz. naming 15 persons, and designating future periods at which they shall be discharged: e. g: ‘Bob and Dan. Dec. 25, 1790”-—“Judy—to go out, Sept. 1806;” and adds, “I do herebyrelinquish all right, title and claim to the said people after they severally arrive, at the dates above mentioned, and not before: in witness whereof, I have hereunto,” &c.</p> <p>Meld, upon the peculiar phraseology of the instrument, that the intention of the grantoa was, and the effect of the deed, therefore, is, that the persons emancipated should be absolve^ from the condition of slavery at the date of the deed,* but remain in service, in a state of pu{ pilage, or quasi apprenticeship, until the periods designated for them “to go out,” or be dis-^ charged. And that a son horn of one of the women (Judy) between the date of thedeadt and the time for her “to go out,” was free a nativitate.</p> <p>As to compensation for his services—see the last note to, this caso.</p> <p>In general, a deed of emancipation in the present tense—“I hereby emancipate,” &c. gives immediate f dom-. But terms ^yfngethatd the emancipation is a° futurePtim&wkey; as “A hereby emancípate on the 25th of Decent thennt^t;”0“¿¡d tion of slavery the^designated period. The ingranToHn^deedt and of the testaSways'1 To'11’ ba sought for, and feet'6 lnt& 6</p> <p>A deed k to be construed most the gi-antor-r-eserty or^Uvery is the question.</p> <p>The decision of the circuit court R^thk^ourtk convinced that it Affirmance must be the consec|uence of serious doubts—especial cisionas l'm' f»I vor.qf liberty.</p> <p>A free men of ,00'01;’ Ye tanmí cover no compen sation for his services, unless it appears that he was kept in bad faith. But— If, pending his suit for freedom, he is hired out by order of court, the net hire will be awarded to him, if he succeeds.</p>
- 34 Ky. 595White v. Johnson (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Scott County. To a bill io.ch.’y upon a jointobligation, all.who may be liable— as well the per-, sonal representatives of deceased obligors, as the survivors—must, be made def’ts.
- 34 Ky. 596Case v. Roberts (1836)
Traverse. From ti-ie Circuit Court eor Nicholas County. The proceedings in the country, in cases of forcible entry and detain-er, are not to be strictly scanned. The warrant charged a' forcible entry and detainer’ the dePts were found “guil' ty of the forcible entry or detainer complained of:” the verdict vyas sufficient; for there can be but one judgment, and that thesam'e for either, orboth of the offences.
- 34 Ky. 597Hamlin v. Stevenson (1836)
<p> Appeal front a J. P. </p> <p>From the Circuit Court for Lewis County.</p> <p>A person is' of full age on the day preceding the 21st anniversary of his birth.</p> <p>Infancy &- want of prochein amie is not plead-able in abatement after the plaintiff is of age —tbo1 the suit was brought ba fore.</p>
- 34 Ky. 598Runyon v. Bennett (1836)
Motion.' From the Circuit Court eor Madison County. A supersedeas iuspends the efficacy of a judg’t; |pt docs not annul it, as a reversal does. Held: that the-proceeding was valid; the judg’t of the circuit court, quashing the ha. fa, and return, and awarding restitution, reversed.
- 34 Ky. 598Bank of Commonwealth v. Hiles (1836)
Pet. & Sum. From the Circuit Court eor Scott County. Held: that there should be no reversal for error in granting the new trial.
- 34 Ky. 600Craig v. Barker (1836)
From the Bracken County Court. The statute authorizing the county courts to appoint commissioners to divide land among parceners, allot do w er &c. confers a special jurisdiction the record in every such ease, must show every fact essen? tial to the valicf ity of the proceeding, A recital .in a record, that there Ivas due notice of an intended ap plication, is not sufficient: the notipe itself, and the proof of 'service, must be inserted, that this court may judge of their…
- 34 Ky. 602Chalfant v. Sterns' Heirs (1836)
From the Pendleton County Court. It is the duty of the county courts to revise, and approve or reject, the reports of their commissioners of accounts; & therefore,the appointment of one of the justices to be a commissioner, seems not altogether proper— but it is not prohibited by law, and the proceedings are not, on that account, irregular.
- 34 Ky. 603Cloudas' v. Adams (1836)
Pet. & Sum. From the Circuit Court eor Boone County. Statement of the case‘ Real estate devi-, the payment debts, and mon-, . ey raised by the sale of estate so devised, are equitable assets, constituting a trust fund, in the hands of the executor, subject to the control of the chancellor, and distributable amongthe' creditors, pro rata, without regard to the dignity of their claims. 4-n ex’or is not chargeable, - hi the trial of an issue upon a plea of plene administramt,…
- 34 Ky. 606Louisville & Portland Canal Co. v. Rowan (1836)
Case. From the Circuit Court eor Jxxxerson Countt. Action on the case- First count. Second count. Held: that there was a misjoinder of different causes of action; other questions waived. Seperate demurrers to different counts, do not reach a misjoinder.
- 34 Ky. 610Bridges v. Wood (1836)
Detinue. From the Circuit Court for Lincoen County. Slaves owned by a woman at the time of her marriage, and those ■which come to her, by bequest or otherwise, du ring coverture, vest, by statute, in her husband, and pass to his adrn’r, upon his death.
- 34 Ky. 613Lansdale v. Kendall (1836)
Award. From the Circuit Court eor Bullitt County. When arbitrators have once decided the controversy submitted to them, made an award, and given the parties notice of it, their authority is exhausted ¡they can not afterwards, either alter their decision, or amend the award, The possession of an award, apparently complete, by one of the parties to it, (in the absence of any proof as to how he obtainedj is prima facie evidence, that the arbitrators delivered it to him as…
- 34 Ky. 614Shipp v. Haskin (1836)
Chancery. From ti-ie Circuit Coort for Mercer County. Statement of the ?i!se- To entitle a party to relief iit cb’y, opon the' ground that specie is required in payment of his note given for a debt that was payable in depreciated Bank paper, he must allege and proveí that there was fraud or mistake, in giving the note.
- 34 Ky. 617Steele v. Morrison's Administrator (1836)
From the Harrison County CoUrT-. Settlementof the adm’rs accounts, by the commissioners; exceptions to their-report, &o, When exceptions to the settlem ent -of an account are overruled, in the county court, a party dissatisfied, and intending to appeal should put the evidence upon the record by a regular bill of exceptions.
- 34 Ky. 620Breckinridge v. Waters' Heirs (1836)
Chancery. From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. to enjoin a note for the eon«deration for a which, the. title of the grantors is… Held: that this •sentence, in an ■unanswered bill, being evidently susceptible of va rious meanings, vague and uncertain, is not sufficient to put in issue the fact, (never before con averted that r. J. W. and others named with him, are.ln th® devisees referred to, nor to justify that P^e'lieira1 viz:T.J.W.&c. a^dlffererirpersons- It…
- 34 Ky. 629Irvine v. McDowell (1836)
debt From the Circuit Court for Mercer County. Statement of the CJSe' “An action cannot be sustained on a guardian’s bond,' executed before the passage of the act of 1813, authorizing the sale of real estate of infants—for the proceeds of aside made under that act”—as held in p. case, 4 Litt, 1.
- 34 Ky. 633Holton v. Greenwell (1836)
<p> Appeal froú á J. P. </p> <p>From the Circuit Court eor Franklin County.</p> <p>A justice of the peace may grant a new trial in any civil case in which he has rendefedajudg't. A new trial may be granted (by a justice) on a day subsequent to that on which the first trial was had; but not after the time allowed for appealing, is out; nor after the judgment is satisfied, or replevied; nor without notice to the adverse party.</p>
- 34 Ky. 634Wilson v. Stivers (1836)
T R. AVERSE'» From the Circuit Court for Jefferson County. Where grants ‘of land interfere with each other, a possession taken under the Junior grant-,outside of the interference, will not include any of the land with-in the lines of the elder grant.