Volume 34 — New York Miscellaneous Reports

<p>Eobeclosttbe of mechanics’ liens.</p>

<p>Action for partition.</p>

<p>Application by attorneys to have their lien declared and ascertained under section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

<p>Application for an injunction.</p>

<p>Uncontested action for an absolute divorce.</p>

Action to recover the amount of four improvement assessments and five annual taxes paid by her, on the ground that the real estate assessed which belonged to her deceased husband, was purchased with pension moneys.

<p>Habeas corpus — Custody and production of an infant — Award of custody as between father and mother.</p> <p>Where the court has gained jurisdiction of the custodian of a child and he can produce her, the fact that the child actually resides in another State does not preclude the court from ordering the custodian to produce her.</p> <p>Where the Court of Chancery of another State has awarded the custody of a child to its father, the disposition made will not be changed by our courts where, the circumstances have not changed and particularly where the mother, who had procured an illegal foreign divorce, is living in adultery by virtue of a second marriage which our courts have declared to be illegal.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus — Conviction when not reviewable thereunder — Writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, and writ of review, distinguished.</p> <p>A conviction by a magistrate cannot be reviewed by a writ of habeas corpus if he had jurisdiction of the charge and authority to impose the sentence.</p> <p>It is unnecessary to take out at the same time a writ of habeas corpus and also one of certiorari, as neither is a writ of review, and certiorari is proper only where production of the body of the prisoner is not desired.</p> <p>An ordinary writ of certiorari distinguished from the writ of review mentioned in Code C. P., § 1991, a remedy proper only where a criminal contempt is sought to be reviewed.</p>

<p>Kegligence — Degree of care required of an engineer of an elevated railroad locomotive towards a mere licensee upon the track.</p> <p>A corporation operating an elevated railroad, owes to a mere licensee, who came upon its track while seeking employment from a contractor with the corporation, who was doing work upon the structure, the duty of having the engineer of an approaching locomotive exercise reasonable vigilance and care to see and avoid hitting him, and where the engineer fails in this respect and the licensee is killed by the locomotive, the lessee is liable in damages for his death, provided he was free from contributory negligence.</p>

<p>¡Pleading — Denials struck out of a defence as irrelevant — Code C. P., § 545.</p> <p>Denials raise an issue upon the complaint and can be no part of a “ defence ” as this must consist of new matter, viz., matter which cannot be proved under a denial or under the issue raised by a denial, but constitutes a defence to the action on the assumption that the complaint is true, and therefore denials in a defence will be struck out upon the ground of irrelevancy.</p> <p>In the nomenclature and terminology of pleading, a “ denial ” is not a “ defence ”,</p>

<p>Motion to make the complaint more definite and certain in an action of ejectment.</p>

<p>^Replevin — Warehouseman — Unconstitutionality of L. 1895, ch. 663, § 8 — Where the original taking was wrongful, demand need not be made of a subsequent innocent bailee — Demand excused by a conversion — Scope of a general denial.</p> <p>Section 2 of chapter 663 of the Laws of 1895, forbidding an action against a warehouseman concerning the title to or possession of goods stored unless he claims some right in them other than a lien for storage is unconstitutional in that it may, without due process of law, deprive the claimant of his goods.</p> <p>Where goods are wrongfully taken from the possession of the true owner and are thereafter stored by the taker with a warehouseman who accepts them innocently, a demand of the latter is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of replevin by the true owner, as a wrongful taker cannot confer lawful possession upon another.</p> <p>Assuming that a demand is necessary in the case of an innocent bailee in possession under a wrongful taker, it is excused where the bailee is guilty of a conversion by refusing to inform the true owner whether he has the chattel and by remitting her to her rights under a void statute (L. 1895, ch. 663, § 2).</p> <p>A general denial interposed in such an action only puts in issue the question whether the warehouseman was in “ lawful ” possession, and not whether he was in “ innocent ” possession, and where that issue is decided against the warehouseman he becomes liable and proof of demand and refusal is unnecessary.</p> <p>That the defendant is in innocent possession as bailee of the wrongful taker, or that he is a dona fide purchaser of such taker, if tenable as a defence, is not provable unless pleaded as a defence.</p>

<p>'Trust — Illegal provision for paying mortgages out of the rents and profits rejected in determining the time for distributing income — Validity of annuities — Rights of a grandchild who died before distribution — Illegal accumulation during minorities.</p> <p>A testator created a trust in all his property for the life of his daughter Rosana, gave out of the rents and profits an annuity to her and to his granddaughter Loretta until the mortgages on his real estate had been fully paid, gave an annuity for the support of the three infant children of his deceased son Eugene with directions to accumulate so much thereof as was not needed until the youngest of the children became of age and then to pay the accumulations and annuity equally to all, directed upon the death of Rosana that one part of the corpus should be distributed to her children, one part to the children of Eugene and one part to Loretta, provided, however, that if Loretta should be dead at the time of the division, leaving lawful issue, her share should go to her issue, but if she died without issue it should go to the children of Rosana and Eugene equally. Loretta died before the testator and left a son Francis who has since died. The testator also directed that after payment of the said annuities the surplus income should be devoted to paying the incumbrances upon his real estate and, further, he divided among the same beneficiaries any income remaining. He further directed distribution of the income after the mortgages had been paid.</p> <p>Held, that the direction to pay off the mortgages with the surplus income was void as an illegal accumulation.</p> <p>That, rejecting this direction, distribution of the income was to be had at once and that the annuities were valid until distribution, but ceased thereupon.</p> <p>That the administrator of Francis, deceased child of the deceased Loretta, was entitled only to so much of one-third of the income, his mother’s share, as accrued during the life of Francis, the other two-thirds passing to the presumptive owners of the next eventual estate.</p> <p>That Francis, having died before the termination of the trust, took no interest in the principal of his mother’s share.</p> <p>That the direction for accumulation during the minorities of the three children of Eugene, was void in so far as it was to endure during the majority of any of the beneficiaries, and that, consequently, so much of the fund as was thus accumulated passed to the infants themselves as the presumptive owners of the next eventual estate.</p>

<p>Bequest — To erect a vault, void for lack of plans and specifications referred to in the will.</p> <p>A bequest to a cemetery for the erection of a vault upon a plot owned by the testator can be given no effect where the plans and specifications of the vault, referred to in the testator’s will and wholly controlling the expenditure, do not exist.</p> <p>Where the testator subsequently built a vault upon the plot, the court considered that another clause of the will, containing a provision for maintaining the plot and keeping the' vault in repair, could be given no effect in the absence of proof that the vault the cemetery was to build on the plot was in any manner similar to the one which the testator had built.</p>

<p>Application to continue a temporary injunction.</p>

<p>Application to continue pendente lite a temporary injunction.</p>

<p>Trust — Implied power of sale — Illegal accumulation.</p> <p>A testator who did not leave personalty sufficient to pay his funeral expenses, left real estate worth $330,000 subject to mortgages of $30,000, while his other debts and a legacy he gave amounted to about $20,000 more. He devised all his property, except some jewelry and wearing apparel, to his executor in trust and directed him to pay all legacies and debts, and the mortgages from a part of the net income of the trust real estate. He stated the main intention of his will to be to provide out of the income for his wife and children during their lives and to divide his estate among his surviving children equally, giving them the income only and the corpus of such child’s share to his or her issue, share and share alike, A literal compliance with the will, without selling any real estate, would have left his widow and his only child and heir without any substantial provision whatever.</p> <p>Held, that the executor had an Implied power to sell so much of the real estate as was necessary to pay the mortgages, the unsecured debts, the funeral expenses and the legacy.</p> <p>That the direction to pay the mortgages out of the income resulting from the rents and profits was void as an illegal accumulation.</p>

<p>.Habeas Cobpus proceedings.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus to procure release from custody under a warrant of extradition.</p>

<p>Motion by the defendant to require the plaintiff to reply to the defencés or new matter set up in the answer.</p>

Motion to vacate a Us pendens filed herein, on the ground that no cause of action is alleged for which a Us pendens could be filed.

<p>Action to compel specific performance by defendants of a contract to purchase $100,000 of bonds of a village to be issued foi water works and a lighting system.</p>

<p>Action brought by a receiver" in sequestration proceedings, appointed in a matrimonial action, to restrain payment to the husband of a legacy, accruing since the order of sequestration and in the hands of the defendant executors; the wife being made a co-plaintiff with the receiver.</p> <p>Issues of law upon demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>Action for construction of will.</p>

The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree. On the trial the People offered to prove, by comparison with standards proved to the satisfaction of the court to be the genuine handwriting of the defendant, that a check found on the body of the deceased, and a pad containing the words “E. Maxwell and wife ” Avere in the handwriting of the defendant.

<p>Motion to compel defendant to submit to a physical examination before trial.</p>

<p>Demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>Motion by defendants for a resale.</p>

<p>Civil service — Veteran’s preference as to retention in office.</p> <p>Semble, that a veteran is entitled to a preference in retaining a position in the civil service of a city and that where he has been discharged ostensibly for lack of city funds, while others, performing similar duties in the department and not entitled to a preference, are retained, he is entitled to reinstatement.</p>

<p>Application for mandamus against police commissioners.</p>

<p>Uncontested action for an absolute divorce.</p>

<p>Motion to confirm the report of a referee.</p>

<p>Action for annulment of marriage.</p>

<p>Action to recover damages for failure of defendant to carry out “a contract in writing,” alleged to have been made in October, 1897, by which defendant “ agreed to let this plaintiff the cattle space ” in certain vessels of its. line of steamships “ for the purpose of carrying or transporting cattle from the city of New York to the city of Liverpool, England, from the 1st day of December, 1897, until the 30th day of November, 1898, in consideration of the plaintiff’s agreeing to ship all the cattle required to fill said space, and paying to the defendant therefor the sum of forty shillings and six pence per head, and in further consideration of plaintiff’s giving satisfactory guarantee on or before November 15, 1897.” Motion for a new trial on the minutes.</p>

<p>Incompetent person — Appointment of committee of property within this State where the incompetent and his committee are both nonresidents — Code C. P., § 3826.</p> <p>A non-resident committee or guardian of a non-resident incompetent may be appointed by our court committee of the property of the incompetent within the State of New York, but it is discretionary with the court whether it -will take such action or appoint a resident.</p>

Action to set aside a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, entered in the Onondaga county clerk’s office on ¡November 15, 1898, in a certain action brought by 0. Julia Rodger and Alfred ¡D. Lewis, as administrators of the estate of William 0. Rodger, deceased, guardian, etc., of certain infants, against D. Munro Hill, individually and as assignee of Robert E. Greene, surviving partner of Rodger & Co.

<p>Motion on behalf of the plaintiff for an extra allowance of costs.</p>

Petition by the Mew York Botanical Garden for modification of decree heretofore entered, assessing and fixing a tax on the estate of said deceased. The material facts appear in the opinion.

<p>Appeal from an order of the General Term of the City Court of the city of New'York, denying a motion to vacate and set aside the taxation of defendant’s costs.</p>

<p>Accident insurance — Construction of “ poison ” and “ contact with poisonous substances ”.</p> <p>Where an accident policy exempts the ■ insurer from liability for “ injuries fatal or otherwise, resulting directly or indirectly from or in any wise contributed to by * * * poison in any form or manner, or contact with poisonous substances ”, the insured cannot recover for injuries sustained by a woman’s throwing in his face a poison known as carbolic acid.</p> <p>The contentions that the “ poison ”, contemplated by the policy, must be one taken internally, and that the “ contact with poisonous substances ” must be voluntary, are untenable.</p> <p>Meehan v. Traders & Travelers’ Accident Co., 33 Mise. Rep. 812, reversed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment and order of the General Term of the City Court of the city of Uew York, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff rendered by the said City Court on the verdict of a jury.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Mew York, seventh district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Sale of goods to be manufactured — Estoppel of vendee by acceptance — Variance between pleading and proof.</p> <p>Where the vendee, after some dispute and correspondence as to the price of goods to be manufactured, accepts some, orders more and retains all, he is estopped from subsequently claiming that the price is excessive.</p> <p>In an action brought to recover the value of the goods, where plaintiff proves the contract price, the court may amend the pleadings to conform to the proof or direct that the variance be disregarded.</p>

<p>Offer of settlement — Broker’s commissions.</p> <p>An offer of settlement cannot be given in evidence.</p> <p>A real estate broker cannot recover commissions unless he has been the procuring cause of the sale.</p>

<p>Conversion — Failure of proof.</p> <p>Proof that the plaintiff gave the defendant money to invest, without instructions ás to the manner of investment, the plaintiff to have all profits and bear all losses, and that the money was afterwards invested and lost in stocks, does not show that the defendant converted it to his own use.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order vacating an attachment and a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, second district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, ninth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the .defendant.</p>

<p>Partnership — When one partner may sue another without an accounting.</p> <p>Where, upon entering on a joint adventure, one party gives the other a note as security for future advances, upon condition that, if the business done by the maker of the note for mutual account is satisfactory to the holder, the advances of the latter shall Be charged against the profits and the note be void, the holder may, where the business is unsatisfactory to him, sue upon the note without waiting for an accounting.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, first district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Check — Must be presented at bank to charge indorser.</p> <p>Under ordinary circumstances the indorser of a check is not liable to an action upon it unless it has been duly presented to the bank upon which it is drawn and notice of its dishonor has been given the indorser.</p>

Appeals by the plaintiff from judgments of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, seventh district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant. Actions of replevin.

<p>. ITegHgence — Bear collision while a driver was turning off a street car track and into a cross-street.</p> <p>Proof that, as the plaintiff, after driving for some distance upon a street car track during daylight in a populous city street and in a wagon covered on the sides and in the rear, was turning into a cross-street and had nearly cleared the track, his wagon was struck from behind by a motor car, does not justify a dismissal of the complaint against the corporation operating the car, as the plaintiff had a right to drive on the car track provided he exercised ordinary prudence and was not negligent per se if he failed to look Behind him from a covered wagon and while turning into a cross-street.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, first district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendants.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court - of the city of Hew York, second district, borough of The Bronx, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Election — Upon the trial as to cause of action.</p> <p>Where the defendant has made no motion in the matter before the trial, it is not erroneous for the court to refuse to make the plaintiff elect at the opening of the case whether she will proceed for negligence or upon the ground of nuisance, and it is sufficient that her election was made at the close of the evidence.</p>

Appeal 'from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, third district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant. Action for rent.

<p>Municipal Court of the city of Mew York — Has no power to grant a new trial for newly discovered evidence.</p> <p>A justice of the Municipal Court of the city of New Tork has no power to grant a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence.</p>

<p>Motion to amend a return from the Municipal Court.</p>

<p>Check — Holder “ in due course ”</p> <p>Where the evidence given upon the trial of an action upon a check tends to show that the holder, a corporation, had knowledge that the check was originally delivered upon a condition which had not been fulfilled and that Its payment had been stopped, and the holder accepts it in payment of a past indebtedness of the immediate assignor, the direction of a verdict for the holder is erroneous, as the question whether it was a holder “ in due course ” within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Law (L. 1897, ch. 612, §§ 91, 94, 95) must be submitted to the jury.</p>

<p>Municipal Court of the city of Hew York — Attachment — Entry of judgment against non-resident without personal service of summons — Code C. P., §§ 8906, 8918.</p> <p>An attachment cannot issue out of the Municipal Court of the city of New York upon the ground of the non-residence of the defendant unless he is a non-resident of the State of New York. Where he is merely a non-resident of the county of New York the attachment is void, and, therefore, where he was not served personally with the summons no judgment CEtn be entered against him under the statutes (L 1882, ch. 410, § 1329; Code C. P., § 2918) permitting such entry “ where property of the defendant has been duly attached by virtue of a warrant of attachment</p>

<p>Iiien — Sale of personalty, for storage charges, violative of I<. 1897, ch. 418, § 81, as amd. L. 1899, ch. 369, § 1.</p> <p>Where a person, with whom household, goods have been stored, sells them for unpaid storage charges without complying with the statute relative to the enforcement of liens on personal property by sale, the sale is void as to the owner of the goods.</p>

<p>negligence — Incorrect charge as to conduct of parties in a collision.</p> <p>Where, upon the trial of an action brought by the owner of a cab against a corporation with whose motor car he collided, the court, in response to a request of the defendant to charge that it is entitled to a verdict if its motorman acted with the care of an ordinarily prudent person, says, "If the plaintiff was prudent and did all a man could do, and the accident occurred, it was the defendant’s fault ”, there must be a new trial, as the jury have been instructed that, if the plaintiff was prudent, the defendant was negligent as matter of law, no matter what may have been the conduct of its motorman.</p>

<p>Municipal Court of the city of New York — Eight to discontinue.</p> <p>A plaintiff may discontinue an action in the Municipal Court of the city of New York at any time before the action is submitted, and where this right is refused him a judgment rendered for the defend ant must be reversed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Negligence — Incorrect charge as to the burden of proof.</p> <p>A refusal of the court, in an action based on negligence, to charge at the defendant’s request that “ Inasmuch as the burden of proving the negligence on the part of the defendant and the freedom from negligence on the part of the plaintiff rests upon the plaintiff, if the evidence in the case is evenly balanced, the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant ” is prejudicial to the latter and requires a reversal of a judgment for the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, third district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

Appeal-from a judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, and from an order denying a motion to set aside the direction dismissing the complaint and a new trial.

<p>Appeal from a judgment rendered at Trial Term dismissing the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The action was upon a policy of life insurance.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

The covenant of the lease upon which the action was brought reads as follows: “It is hereby covenanted and agreed between the parties hereto, that in case the premises hereby leased shall be sold by the said party of the first part, during the term of the written lease and the purchaser shall demand possession thereof at any time prior to the expiration of the term herein specified, the said party of the first part shall pay to the said party of the second part the sum of…

<p>¡Pleading — ¡Remedy where “ defenses ” are provable under a general denial — Demurrer.</p> <p>Where the defendant interposes a general denial, so-called defenses, containing matter provable under the general denial, are insufficient and, therefore, demurrable. The proper remedy is not by a motion to strike out.</p>

Appear from an order of the Special Term, directing a satisfaction of the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and dismissing proceedings supplementary to execution thereon. The defendant was indemnitor to the plaintiff, surety for the Greater New York Amusement Company, against which company the firm of Park & Tilford recovered a judgment, which the plaintiff surety paid subsequently.

<p>Examination before trial — When granted — Vacating.</p> <p>An order to examine an adverse party before trial will not be granted unless it appears that certain material facts are peculiarly within his knowledge and that the moving party has no other means of establishing them.</p> <p>Semble, that the fact that the party to be examined may be present at the trial is not a sufficient ground for vacating such an order.</p>

Application made on notice to the city by a land owner whose land was assessed for its share of the expenses of the extension and opening of a city street, to vacate the order of this court dated May 7th, 18-98, appointing commissioners of estimate and assessment herein, and the report and all the proceedings of such commissioners herein, and also the order of this court confirming the same dated February 4th, 1899, on the ground that they are void. • ■

This action is brought by plaintiff as receiver appointed in supplementary proceedings upon a judgment recovered by default on or about January 24, 1900, by one Anna George in the County Court of Lewis county against the defendant Nicholas Henry for the sum of $379.27, to set aside various conveyances made by said defendant of real and personal property to defendant Nicholas J. Henry, his son, and by the latter of some of said property to his wife, the defendant.

Action brought under the Personal Property Law (L. 1897, ch. 417) by the plaintiff, a creditor of E. Peter Kirley, an alleged insolvent debtor, to attack as fraudulent a chattel mortgage executed by him to the defendant, Frederick S. Easton.

<p>Surplus money proceedings in an action of foreclosure^ -</p>

<p>Divorce — Notice of modification of judgment forbidding defendant to marry again — L. 1897, ch. 452 — Alimony.</p> <p>Under the statute permitting the court, in which a judgment for a divorce has been rendered, to modify the judgment so as to allow a defendant convicted of adultery to marry again upon satisfactory proof of subsequent uniform good conduct during five years, no notice need be given to the plaintiff wife of the application as she has no interest in the penalty for her husband’s adultery, it being imposed solely in the interests of the public.</p> <p>Where the question of alimony is reserved by the judgment, its modification and the husband’s subsequent remarriage do not affect the first wife’s right to renew her motion for alimony where she has done nothing to estop herself from enforcing it.</p>

<p>Application for a certificate of reasonable doubt.</p>

<p>Interpleader — Claimants under conflicting benefit certificates.</p> <p>The defendant issued a benefit certificate to John Brophy for benefit of his wife and after her death this was surrendered and a new one was issued to his daughter Honora who held it until her father’s death. Upon the alleged false representation, made during the life of the father that this had been lost, the defendant issued a new one to Honora, which was also surrendered and a new one was issued in certain proportions to the plaintiff, to Honora and to a son John. The plaintiff claimed under this certificate and Honora claimed the whole fund.</p> <p>Held, that the claimants should be interpleaded and the fund paid into court by the insurer. .</p>

<p>Demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>Uitoontested divorce case.</p>

<p>Action for annulment of a marriage on ground that plaintiff was under the age of legal consent.</p>

<p>Motion to confirm a report of a referee appointed to take and state an account of the profits of a business.</p>

<p>New York city — Taxpayer’s and attorney’s right to inspect record of annual assessments for general taxation — L. 1897, ch. 378, § 1545.</p> <p>Under the charter of the city of New York, one who is a taxpayer, and also attorney for clients who have been assessed or who desire to know whether they have been assessed for taxes on realty and personalty, has a right to examine the annual record thereof for 1901, but, in view of the number of books and their constant use in the public business, his inspection will be limited to assessments affecting himself and his clients, who must be named in the order and it must also specify the time and manner of examination.</p>

<p>Motioe for writ of mandamus.</p>

<p>Motion by plaintiff for an injunction pendente lite.</p>

<p>Motion upon the minutes, to set aside the verdict of a jury and to grant a new trial.</p> <p>Action upon a policy of fire insurance issued by the defendants, as underwriters of the Peoples Lloyds. ' The policy was for the sum of $1,500, and under its terms, each of the ten defendants became severally liable for one-tenth of the amount.</p>

<p>Joint judgment — Extinguished and unassignable when paid in full by some of-the defendants.</p> <p>Where a joint foreign judgment against sureties has been paid in full by some of them it is extinguished, whatever may have been the intention of the parties, and, therefore, it cannot subsequently be assigned by the creditor to another surety (who paid nothing for it, and had paid no part of the debt) in order to enable his assignee to recover of still another surety, as upon a money demand and not for contribution, the whole sum named, in the, bond or judgment, against the principal.</p>

<p>Statute of Frauds — Ratification of lease — Real Property Raw, R. 1896, ch. 547, §§ 207, 224 — Injunction.</p> <p>Where agents, not thereunto authorized by writing, lease premises for a term of five years, and consent to subsequent assignments of the lease, and the principal, with knowledge of the facts, subsequently conveys the premises during the term by a deed which specifically recognizes the existence of the lease, there is a ratification thereof which would make it a fraud upon the tenant in possession to permit the grantee of the premises, with notice actual and constructive, to evict the tenant or set up an adverse title, whether or not the lease he void because made for a term exceeding one year and executed by an agent or agents not “ thereunto authorized by writing,” as required by the Beal Property Law (L. 1896, ch. 547, § 207).</p> <p>Semble, that section 224 of said law applies to said lease, and that under that section the authority to the agent might be oral merely.</p>

<p>Motion for an injunction.</p>

<p>Demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>Liquor Tax Law — Revocation of certificate for false statements as to. consents.</p> <p>,> A liquor tax certificate must be revoked where there have been false material representations, in the application statement upom which the certificate was issued, in regard to consents by owners of' buildings occupied exclusively as dwellings within the statutory, radius of two hundred feet.</p>

<p>Proceeding- for the vacation or at least for the reduction of an assessment on real estate belonging ifco the relator.</p>

<p>Cebtioeabi to review an 'assessment against the personal property of the relator.</p>

<p>Pleading — Qualified denials — General denial — Separation of new matter — Repetition of denials.</p> <p>A defense which contains neither a specific nor a general denial and only certain pretended denials, so qualified as to be ineffective, must be stricken out.</p> <p>A denial of each and every allegation of the complaint “ except as herein admitted, qualified or controverted ”, cannot be sustained unless the excepted matter is so clearly specified that there can be no doubt as to what was intended to be covered by the general denial.</p> <p>Where new matter is alleged and it is impossible to say what is covered by the general denial, the plaintiff is entitled to have the denials distinctly specified and separated from the new matter.</p> <p>Where a defense contains repetitions of prior attempted denials, the repetitions should be stricken out as redundant.</p>

<p>Assignment for creditors — Clerk hire — Attorneys — Auctioneer's fees — Taxation of costs — Citation — Filing claims — Personal taxes preferred — Laches.</p> <p>Although as a rule an assignee for creditors should convert the assigned estate into cash at the earliest practicable moment, he will be allowed clerk hire for three months where that period was necessary for collecting the estate and for inventorying, assorting and selling a stock of goods.</p> <p>An assignee cannot employ attorneys to perform services which require only ordinary business judgment.</p> <p>In the counties of New York and Kings, the commissions of an assignee’s auctioneer are not now limited to two and one-half per cent.</p> <p>Costs, expenses and disbursements should be taxed on notice to all parties who appeared in the proceeding but, where they have been taxed without notice, the court has power to tax them de novo on a motion to confirm the report of a referee to pass the assignee’s account.</p> <p>The cost of publishing the citation to creditors is taxable.</p> <p>A creditor may file a claim after distribution and before final decree.</p> <p>A claim of the city of New York for personal taxes has preference over all other claims against the estate, but where the city had' never made its claim a lien and had delayed presenting it to the assignee for more than two years after the assignment and until motion made to confirm the referee’s said report, the court post-</p> <p>poned its payment to that of the costs, expenses and commissions.</p>

<p>Constitution of New York Stock Exchange — Sale of membership to pay debts applies only to transactions among members — Demurrer.</p> <p>Where the administrator of a deceased member of the New York Stock Exchange sues it for the proceeds of a sale made by it of his membership upon his death and subsequently paid to a member who was not such at the time when the debt arose but became such thereafter, an answer setting up that, pursuant to the constitution of the Exchange, its committee on membership duly disposed of the membership upon the death of the member and in that manner made the payment complained of, presents no defense as the provisions of the constitution in that behalf apply only to transactions upon the floor of the Exchange between members.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Not available to try disputed title to office — Quo warranto.</p> <p>Where a person alleges that a policy, necessary by the constitution of a corporation to his holding the offices of secretary and director thereof, has been illegally cancelled by it and that he has been illegally deposed from his offices, and the corporation answers that he has never legally held them, he cannot maintain mandamus against it nor thereby attack the title of a successor elected by it, as the matter involves a disputed' title to office and the remedy is by an action in the nature of quo warranto.</p>

<p>Action to foreclose a mortgage for $43,000, executed on May 2, 1895, by Edward L. Lawrence to the plaintiffs as executors and trustees of William Pretzfeld. On the same day Lawrence conveyed the premises to Mary J. Stockton, subject to the mortgage, alid she, in '¡November, 1895, mortgaged the premises to one Theodore J. Miller. In 1896, the executors of William Pretzfeld foreclosed for interest only, the premises were conveyed by the referee to William H. Siegman, subject to the mortgage, and the Miller mortgage was paid out of the surplus. ■ William H. Siegman subsequently conveyed the premises to Ralph Weil, subject to the. mortgage, who contracted to sell them to Augustus Van Horn Stuyvesant, and in the action-by the latter against the former for specific performance, in which the plaintiff therein alleged that the title was hopelessly bad, the title was held good and the complaint was dismissed. 26 Mise. Rep. 445. This judgment was reversed in 41 App. Div. 551, and the title, held unmarketable, among other reasons, because Mary J. Stockton had been sued in the foreclosure action under the name of Emma J. Stockton. In the present action she claimed that the same was not maintainable and that she had a right to redeem, while Ralph Weil, made defendant, claimed that, in view of the previous decision, he was a mortgagee in possession and was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the holder of the Miller mortgage.</p>

<p>Hearing ou habeas corpus to procure the release of the four defendants, who.were committed for trial by City Magistrate Hogan for violation of section 505 of the Penal Code. -</p>

<p>Action for the construction of a will.</p>

<p>Equity — • Enjoining servant having special skill from performing similar services for another — Discoveries made during his employ- . ment.</p> <p>Equity may enjoin an employee, having special knowledge or skill not readily obtainable from anyone else and who refuses to render further services, from performing similar services for any person other than the employer, but will not interfere unless it is affirmatively shown by the employer that the employee has knowledge or skill which cannot easily be supplied by others.</p> <p>The rule that, where an employee has agreed to give his employer the benefit of any discoveries or inventions he may make while employed, equity will enjoin him from using them to the detriment of his employer, has no application where the employer fails to show specifically any discovery or invention made by the employee during the term of 'his employment.</p>

Motion directing the clerk to docket the judgment for costs against defendant to the end that an execution may he issued far the collection thereof under section 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

<p>Tax — Waiver of defects in roll — Title of assessors not assailable collaterally — Review of valuation.</p> <p>Where a railroad corporation appears generally before town assessors on “grievance day” and objects to the assessed valuation of its realty as excessive and unequal, succeeds in procuring its reduction to some extent and makes no objection to the form or details of the assessment-roll, it is precluded, upon a subsequent review by certiorari, from objecting to irregularities in the assessment-roll, even though they might have been fatal if objected to in the first instance.</p> <p>In the proceeding before the town assessors their title to office cannot be tried or assailed successfully by the railroad corporation.</p> <p>Where the railroad corporation duly objects before the assessors to the valuation, the fact that its attorney in his affidavit laid down an erroneous rule of law as governing the assessment, does not preclude the court from reviewing on the merits the .assessors’ determination of value.</p>

<p>Foreclosure — Determination of priority of liens on reference to compute.</p> <p>Upon the foreclosure of a trust mortgage given by a corporation to secure its bonds and covering not only its actual realty and personalty, but also its future acquired personalty, the court may, under a complaint of the trustee alleging that it has a lien on both classes of personalty and that a bank, made a defendant, has a lien subordinate to the mortgage — an allegation not denied by the bank — authorize the referee, to compute the amount due, to determine what property is covered by the mortgage and to that end may direct him to determine the validity and priority of a levy on execution made by the bank, before the appointment of a receiver of the mortgagor, upon personal property acquired by the mortgagor after the execution of the mortgage.</p> <p>The rule, that the validity of a paramount lien cannot be tried in an action to foreclose a subsequent lien, has no application where the rival lienor claims under the mortgagor and by virtue of transactions occurring after the mortgage was given.</p>

<p>Actioh" by plaintiffs as heirs of law of Jane Eliza Ifathewson to have a clause in her will, devising all her property to her son Addison G., declared void and to have it declared that she died, intestate.</p> <p>The defendant has demurred to the' plaintiffs’ complaint on the-ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.</p>

<p>Sale — Election — Assignment of contract.</p> <p>Under an agreement for the lease or sale of a piano, giving the other party an option to purchase it for a fixed sum and further providing that he shall become liable for its value if it is destroyed while in his possession or is not returned on demand, his election to purchase is final, and. therefore where he subsequently defaults in payment and thereafter offers to return the piano such offer cannot excuse him, upon its subsequent destruction by fire while in his possession, from paying the owner its price or value.</p> <p>Mise.] . Supreme Court, March, 1901.</p> <p>The right to retake the piano and terminate the contract, reserved in terms solely to the vendor, gives the vendee no right to terminate by an offer to return the piano upon becoming dissatisfied.</p> <p>Where a contract assigned as security for a loan is, upon payment, redelivered to the owner and the assignment destroyed, title to the contract is restored to the owner and he may thereafter lawfully assign the contract to another. :</p>

<p>Liquor Tax Taw — When rear doors of dwellings are “ entrances ” — ■ Consents.</p> <p>Rear doors of dwelling-houses communicating by rear yards with the street are “ entrances ” of the dwelling-houses within the meaning of the Liquor Tax Law and therefore where they are within 200 feet of the nearest entrance of a place where traffic in liquors is to he carried on, consents of the owners of the dwelling-houses are necessary to the granting of a certificate.</p>

<p>Legacy — Demonstrative — Disposition of surplus income of an annuity — Suspension of power of alienation.</p> <p>A legacy in the words “I give nine thousand dollars to Maria Uppenkamp * * * which are invested as follows ”, a list of securities being set forth, is demonstrative and not specific and the value of the securities in excess of nine thousand dollars passes as in intestacy where no other provision of the will embraces or controls it.</p> <p>A bequest to a brother of an annuity, payable from the income of shares of the testatrix in a corporation, to the extent of six hundred dollars “ until he will be fifty years old; after that time (in 1904) ” the whole capital to be given to his daughter or, in case of her death to the brother and his wife, is not assailable as suspending the power of alienation for a period not measured by lives, gives the brother only six hundred dollars per annum, and, in the absence of a residuary clause in the will, entitles the daughter to the surplus income of the shares as the owner of the next eventual estate, if the gift be deemed contingent, or, if it be deemed vested, entitles her thereto as increase belonging to the person in whom ownership has been vested by a specific bequest.</p>

<p>Issues of law upon demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>Action by a trustee in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Motion to vacate attachment.</p>

<p>Prooeedixtgs under the Liquor Tax Law. Motion to confirm the report of the referee.</p>

Action in equity to intercept moneys due for publishing the session laws of 1899, upon the ground that the contesting defendants’ newspaper, the Wyoming County Times, had not been legally designated by a majority of the Democratic supervisors of Wyoming county, as claimed by the defendants, and that the designation of the plaintiffs’ newspaper, the Democrat-Review, by the Democratic supervisors the preceding year, holds good for the succeeding year of 1899.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment entered upon a verdict of $250 in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.

<p>Appeal from an order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial, on the ground that a witness of the plaintiff gave perjured testimony at the trial.</p>

<p>Work, labor and services — Evidence aliunde, as to the terms of a written contract.</p> <p>Where the issue in an action is whether work performed by the plaintiff for the defendants is within a written agreement therefor or is extra work, and the agreement refers to drawings and specifications which are recited as “ annexed ” but which in fact were not annexed nor produced by the plaintiff on the trial, the defendants have a right to put in evidence specifications, relating to the building and upon which as they allege the plaintiff estimated, in order to show what the written agreement covered and that the alleged extra work was within it.</p>

<p>Bills and notes — Consideration by exchange of obligations.</p> <p>A promissory note, executed to another in exchange for his promissory note of equal amount, has a sufficient consideration and valid inception, and therefore its subsequent discount and transfer before maturity at an usurious rate of interest can afford the maker no defense against the holder.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Action to recover chattels alleged to have been sold on false representations.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order vacating an execution against the defendant, alleged to have been issued in violation of a stay.</p>

<p>Appeal by defendants from a judgment in- favor of plaintiff, entered upon a verdict directed by the court.</p>

<p>Motion for retaxation of costs.</p>

•Application under section 135 of the Election Law (Laws of 1896, chap. 909), as amended by Laws of 1897, chap. 379, § 23, for an inspection of the void and protested ballots filed in the office of the clerk of the county of New York in sealed packages by the inspectors of election, pursuant to the provisions of said statute.

<p>'Actios for the construction of a will.</p>

Action to recover for services in sprinkling roads in the borough of Queens from August 1 to Hovember 1, 1899.

<p>Action to recover the amount of a wager.</p>

<p>Bes adjudieata — Cancellation of lis pendens — Code C. P., § 1674.</p> <p>Where the Appellate Division has decided, upon an appeal from an order granting, in an- action to compel specific performance of a contract to sell and deliver to the plaintiff a certain amount of pulp wood for a term of ten years, an injunction restraining the defendant from parting with certain wood-pulp lands to the detriment of said contract, and in alleged' violation of it, that the facts showed only a contract for a sale of chattels in regard to which equity would not under the circumstances undertake to decree specific performance and that the injunction was not justified, the Special Term must, upon the case coming up for trial, dismiss the complaint on the merits as it must be deemed to have been decided by the Appellate Division that the case presents no ground for equitable relief.</p> <p>A Us pendens can be cancelled only under the specific terms of Code C. P., § 1674, and that section gives the court no power to cancel it upon a mere dismissal of the complaint.</p>

<p>’Application to cancel and revoke liquor tax certificate upon ground that the consents of the owners of the premises were not obtained to traffic in liquors. .....</p>

<p>Bankruptcy Act — Preference — Knowledge of president when not imputed to his corporation.</p> <p>In an action brought against a bank by the trustee in bankruptcy of a firm, and of a senior member of the firm individually, it appeared that the bank had discounted for the firm, and held, certain of its drafts the acceptor upon which was insolvent, that in order better to secure the bank the acceptor made his demand note to one Paddock, that Paddock indorsed the note for accommodation at the same time waiving demand and notice of protest, that then or on the next day the said senior member of the firm transferred certain securities to him to secure him for his indorsement, that the •firm indorsed the note and delivered it to the hank, that the bank had no reason to believe that a preference to it over other creditors was thereby intended, and that two days later the firm filed a petition in bankruptcy. The said senior member of the firm was the president of the bank but was not its practical manager.</p> <p>Held, that the trustee could not recover of the bank the value of the securities transferred by the firm to Paddock as the transaction did not constitute a preference to the bank within section 60b of the ■■Bankruptcy Act of 1898.</p> <p>That the trustee could not recover of the bank the value of a mortgage assigned by said senior member of the firm to his son as security for a note made by said son and indorsed by a third party which was given to the said firm, which, in turn, discounted it at defendant’s bank and with the proceeds thereof paid certain other overdrafts.</p> <p>That Paddock, who was worth the amount of the note and who had acted in good faith, having made himself absolutely liable thereon, would be entitled to retain the securities for his own reimbursement.</p> <p>That the knowledge of the president of the bank as to his own insolvency or that of his firm could not be imputed to the bank, it appearing that he had been dealing with the bank as with a third party and in regard to his own affairs.</p>

<p>Trespass by discharge of city sewage — Bight to sue one joint trespasser — Injunction against a city.</p> <p>The discharge of city sewage upon the property of an individual is a taking of that property within the meaning of the Constitution, even though the sewer was constructed under legislative authority.</p> <p>Where several persons contribute to the harmful sewage the plaintiff may sue one separately provided the defendant is shown to have caused him substantial injury and the damages may be apportioned.</p> <p>After it has been legally determined that the plaintiff has been injured by the sewage of a city he is entitled to enjoin a continuance of the trespass, although the acts of the city were of such public necessity as the disposal of its sewage.</p> <p>The court, however, directed that the injunction should not become operative until one year from service of notice of entry of the decree in the action and, even longer, if more time should be required by the city to obtain appropriate legislation as to its sewage or establish a new system therefor.</p>

<p>Application for a certificate of reasonable doubt on a judgment of conviction in the Kings county court for perjury.</p>

<p>Action for an accounting by an executor.</p>

<p>Motion for a new trial in an action by the plaintiff, a contractor, for altering a building, against a surety for the defendant, the owner, in which the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Action for rent.</p>

<p>Uegligence — Sewing machine operator injured by a ne.edle breaking and piercing her eye.</p> <p>Where a sewing machine of standard make is found, after recent repair, to be loose in the needle bar and arm so that the needle would not pass through, but would strike the side of, the plate through which it passed, and, after complaint made by an operator of a few months’ experience to her foreman and an examination by a machinist and by him, he, standing over her, directs her to try the machine again and the needle then breaks and a portion pierces her eye, there is such negligence in allowing this defective condition to exist in-a proper appliance as justifies a recovery by the operator against -her employers for the injuries she received.</p>

<p>Action for commissions on a sale of real estate.</p>

Motion by the plaintiff to set- aside a verdict rendered after a jury trial of specific questions settled in an action for a divorce, on the ground of the defendant’s adultery, and decided adversely to the plaintiff.

Action for personal injuries received by being run over by a horse and wagon driven by the defendants’ servant. Motion foi a new trial for inadequate damages.

<p>Action for trespass.</p>

<p>Stock Corporation Law — Presumption, under foreign law, as to tenure of office of a director of a foreign stock corporation — Liability to creditors.</p> <p>Under the laws of a foreign State providing that the directors of a corporation shall hold office for one year and until others are chosen and qualified in their stead, a director of a foreign stock corporation (not moneyed or railroad) doing business in the State of New York, elected or appointed as such on Sept. 28, 1897, for one year, whose corporation failed to file with our Secretary of State an annual report in Jany., 1898, or at any other time, who himself failed to file within thirty days after Feb. 1, 1898, the verified certificate as to the condition of the company permitted by the Stock Corporation Law as amended by L. 1897, ch. 384, § 2, and for whom, although he had agreed to remain in the directorate for not more than two months, no successor as director was ever elected or appointed, is liable under the Stock Corporation Law for a debt contracted by the corporation in May and June, 1898, as it must be presumed that he was still a director at the last mentioned times.</p>

<p>Devise — Bequest — Implied revocation.</p> <p>A testatrix devised six lots to six relatives severally and also bequeathed a $40,000 mortgage in order to satisfy mortgages of about the same amount which existed on five of the six lots. About six months later she contracted to sell the six lots, subject to the mortgages, to a third person in return for $5,000, and a lot which was mortgaged for $30,000, but she died before the contract was closed or the deeds delivered. Her executors completed the contract upon her part under a power of sale to them and took in exchange the $5,000 and a deed of the lot, mortgaged for $30,000, running to the specific devisees. In an action by the executors to reform this deed so that they could dispose of the said lot among the residuary legatees and to have it declared that the bequest of the $40,000 mortgage, which had been paid in, was revoked,</p> <p>Held, that neither the devise nor the bequest to the specific devisees and legatees was impliedly revoked by the testatrix’ executory contract for the sale of the six lots, that they, were entitled to continue to hold the lot mortgaged for $30,000, and that the executors must apply the $40,000 to the payment of the mortgage on that lot and pay to the specific devisees and legatees the balance thereof as well as the $5,000..</p>

<p>Contempt — Punishment — Code C. P., § 2284.</p> <p>A member of the council of the city of New York who was served with a writ of peremptory mandamus, requiring the municipal assembly forthwith to assemble and authorize the city comptroller to issue corporate stock to pay the relator moneys due him on a city contract, forty minutes before the council adjourned on the day when it convened in compliance with the writ, and who was present when a contumacious resolution substantially refusing to obey -the writ was passed by the council, is guilty of a willful contempt of the writ, and, under Code C. P., § 2284, will be fined the costs, disbursements and counsel fees paid by the relator in prosecuting the contempt proceedings, as representing the latter’s actual loss or injury, and will also be committed to the county jail for ten days.</p>

<p>Action for the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien.</p>

<p>Certiorari to review an assessment.</p>

<p>Motion to discharge a judgment against the defendant and to stay the sheriff from enforcing it.</p>

<p>Appeal from an affirmance by General Term of the City Court of the city of Hew York, of a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Negligence — Tenant injured by the fall of the carrying wheel of a dumb-waiter down its shaft.</p> <p>Where proof is made, in an action brought by the tenant of an apartment-house to recover damages of the landlord for injuries sustained by the fall, down the shaft of a dumb-waiter, of a part of its iron carrying wheel, that the dumb-waiter had been repeatedly out</p> <p>of order; that the janitress, the agent of the landlord, had had her attention called to this fact, and especially to the machinery and to the carrying wheel; that the latter was examined shortly after the accident and was found to be worn and rusted at the point where it broke; a refusal to dismiss the complaint of the tenant is justifiable as the case is one for the jury.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the General Term of the City Court of the city of New York reversing an order of the Special Term.</p>

<p>Appeal from affirmance by General Term of the City Court of the city of Hew York of an interlocutory judgment sustaining a demurrer to certain separate defenses.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the General Term of the City Court of the city of Hew York reversing an order of reference.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York for the second district.</p>

<p>Assault — Passenger, entering by the open front platform of a moving car, thrown into the street by the gripman.</p> <p>A person who has safely boarded a cable street car while in motion and by its open front platform is, as a passenger, entitled to protection from assault by the gripman, and where he at once seizes the passenger and throws him from the moving car into the street, a judgment, in favor of the corporation operating the ear entered in an action brought against it by the passenger for the injuries he received, must be reversed.</p> <p>Semille, that if it be assumed that, by entering the car by the front platform, the passenger had violated the rules of the corporation, it could not employ more than reasonable force in ejecting him, if he refused to leave.</p>

¡Appeal from judgment rendered by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of New York for the fifth district in favor of the plaintiff. Action for negligence.

<p>Appeal from a judgment rendered by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of New York for the tenth district, dismissing the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case for failure of proof.</p>

<p>Municipal Court of the city of Hew York — Has jurisdiction, of an action for deceit.</p> <p>Prior to the charter of the city of New York, passed in 1897, its District Courts had jurisdiction of an action for deceit and the</p> <p>present Municipal Court of said city has like jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Conversion — Possession oí a chattel obtained by a deviation from the terms of its deposit.</p> <p>The plaintiff deposited a ring with a stakeholder as security for a wager as to the weight of a diamond owned by the defendant, and it was agreed that the diamond was to be weighed, on notice, in the presence of the parties. The plaintiff received no notice, nor any intimation that he had lost the bet, until he saw the ring on the defendant’s handL</p> <p>Held, that the title to the ring did not pass and that, as the defendant had obtained possession of it through the stakeholder’s deviation from the terms of the agreement of deposit, the defendant was liable as for a conversion of it.</p> <p>That there was no occasion for the plaintiff to resort to the statute of gaming.</p>

<p>Husband and wife — His right to her earnings — Damages for accident to wife.</p> <p>Where a married woman, living with her husband, sues to recover damages for personal injuries caused her by alleged negligence, her earnings, from washing done for third parties, and contributed by her to the support of the family, cannot be proved as an element of damages, the rule being that her services and earnings belong to her husband unless they were rendered or received by her expressly upon her sole and separate account.</p> <p>Proof that her husband was temporarily incapacitated, and had been in a hospital for a week does not overcome the presumption that he was able to and did support her and consequently had a right to her earnings.</p>

<p>Bent — Occupation by a temporary receiver creates no personal liability.</p> <p>Proof that the temporary receiver of a voluntarily dissolving corporation, appointed under an order giving him possession only of its assets, occupied for seven weeks after his appointment premises which the corporation had rented for an unexpired year, and that he had promised to apply to the court for permission to pay the landlord the rent of a portion of the premises occupied by subtenants, does not make him personally liable for the rent under the lease, as there is no privity of contract or estate between the receiver and the landlord.</p> <p>The possible grounds of a temporary receiver’s liability for rent, as receiver and as an individual, considered.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant, rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, eighth district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>A contract to qualify a pupil to pass a particular examination is entire — Teachers’ power to punish unbecoming conduct.</p> <p>A teachers’ agreement to qualify a pupil to pass a particular examination is entire and part performance thereof is impossible; and therefore, where the pupil is properly suspended, after he has received part of the instruction, for conduct subversive of discipline, and thereafter sues the teachers to recover his tuition fee paid in advance, it cannot be apportioned, as the pupil has forfeited all of it.</p> <p>The faculties of all schools and colleges are vested with power to suppress and punish unbecoming conduct of pupils.</p>

<p>Principal and agent — General manager of a hotel may bind the owner to a local advertiser.</p> <p>A general manager of a hotel, having general supervision of its conduct, employees and departments, and in control except when the owner was there twice a day, has sufficient apparent authority to bind the owner for a two-line advertisement of the hotel for one year in a local newspaper. :</p>

<p>Landlord and tenant — Surrender and acceptance as affected by surrender of keys.</p> <p>A tenant’s surrender of the keys of demised premises accomplishes nothing as matter of law, and where their surrender to the janitor of the premises is not acted upon by the landlord, the tenant is not released from payment of rent.</p> <p>Where the receipt of the keys is coupled with a condition that, if the defendant fails to pay one hundred dollars before the first of the next month, he shall not be released from the unexpired term, his failure to make the payment renders the receipt of the keys ineffectual as an acceptance of a surrender of the premises.</p>

<p>Pledge — Estoppel of true owner — Reimbursement of innocent pledgee.</p> <p>Where an owner of chattels entrusts them to his agent with a general power to sell them, and the agent subsequently pledges them for a loan without his knowledge, the owner cannot recover them of the pledgee without repaying him advances which he made in good faith to the agent, as the owner has estopped himself by his conduct in vesting his agent with the indicia of ownership from asserting his own title against the innocent pledgee.</p>

<p>Principal and agent — A general agent oí a landlord may alter the terms of a lease.</p> <p>The general manager of the affairs of a landlord has power to modify the terms of á lease, which he himself fixed originally, by agreeing that, in view of a fire which occurred on the premises during the term, the rent of the month in which the fire occurred should be apportioned and that no rent should be charged until the premises had been restored to their original condition.</p>

<p>Evidence — Parol, inadmissible to vary contract under seal — Erroneous charge.</p> <p>Where a broker sues for commissions under a sealed contract for procuring the defendant a person willing to make him a loan on his premises, and the contract explicitly states that there is only one mortgage thereon, when the fact is that there are two, it is erroneous to permit the defendant to show that he informed the plaintiff of the existence of the second mortgage before the contract was executed, and for the .court to charge the jury that if they find the defendant did tell the plaintiff there was a second mortgage the plaintiff cannot recover, as the .evidence tends to vary the written contract, and the charge ignores its binding effect.</p>

■Appeal from an order of a justice of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, seventh district, borough of Manhattan, setting- aside a verdict of a jury in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff and granting a new trial.

<p>Appellate Term — Its power to grant a new trial in the Municipal Court for newly discovered evidence — Code C. 3?., § 3057.</p> <p>The expression “ error of fact in the proceedings not affecting the merits of the action and not within the knowledge of the justice,” as used in Code Civ. Pto., § 3057, relative to the grounds of appeal in justice’s court, does not refer to any error or mistake of the justice in finding the facts, but relates to errors of fact affecting the regularity and validity of the proceedings, and not appearing on the record, such as death, coverture or infancy.</p> <p>Semble, that the Appellate Term has no statutory authority to grant a new trial for newly discovered evidence in an action brought in the Municipal Court of the city of New York where the appeal is from the judgment, and will not seek authority to relieve the defeated party where bis affidavits for the new trial present evidence which is merely cumulative.</p>

<p>Sale — Offer and acceptance.</p> <p>After vendors had written vendees the lowest price they would take for their goods, the vendees advised forwarding the goods and wrote: “ We will no doubt obtain satisfactory prices.” The vendors</p> <p>forwarded the goods, after receipt of the answer, and wrote: “ Please do the best you can.”</p> <p>Held, that the vendees had not accepted the terms of the first letter of the vendors, and were not liable to them for the price stated therein as the lowest which the vendors were willing to take.</p>

<p>Negligence — Improper refusal to charge as to preponderance of evidence.</p> <p>Where the court refuses to charge, in an action predicated upon negligence in which the plaintiff succeeded, that if upon the whole ease the evidence is equally balanced, either upon the question of the defendant’s negligence or that of the plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence, the jury must find for the defendant, there must be a new trial as the defendant is entitled to the charge.</p>

<p>Benefit insurance — Illegal suspension of member — An agent to receive dues represents the society •— Unreasonable rules as to remedies within the society.</p> <p>Under the constitution of a fraternal benefit insurance order authorizing the suspension of a subordinate lodge or court for failure to make to the supreme court of the order certain payments required by it, and further declaring that all payments made to an officer of á subordinate court shall be received by him as agent of the member making the payment, the supreme court of the order cannot lawfully suspend a member, in good standing with his own</p> <p>court, and his entire court, for the failure of the financial secretary thereof to make to the supreme court the payment required by it, as an agent of such an order to transmit dues and assessments remains, in spite of the provision of its constitution, an agent of the order at large and payment to him is payment to the order at large.</p> <p>A provision of the constitution of such an order declaring that no member shall proceed at law against its supreme court until be has exhausted all remedies and appeals given him by its constitution and laws is applicable to breaches of internal regulations, and can be given no force where the question at issue is purely one of the law of agency, capable of final decision by courts of law only.</p> <p>The latter rule is particularly just in a case where the final appeal from suspension, if taken by the member, would have laid to a supreme court of the order presided over by the very person who had suspended the subordinate court of the member, where the said supreme court has already made return, to a writ of mandamus herein, declaring the member incapable of reinstatement because of physical disability, and where an appeal to the said supreme court would cause a delay of over a year and compel the relator to appear before that body in the distant State of California.</p>

<p>'Action for libel.</p>

Action by a constable of the town of Oyster Bay in Nassau county against the said town to recover the amount of certain statutory fees for the arrest of persons charged with crime, conveying them to and from jail, the service of legal process, etc., which are a town charge by statute. '

<p>Crimes — Warrant designating the defendant by a fictitious name — Code Grim. Pro., § 152.</p> <p>A proper .warrant issued by a magistrate upon legal proof, by deposition, of the commission of a crime, the time and place when and where it was committed, and the means of identifying the person who committed it, is not invalidated by the fact that the defendant, whose real name was not then known, was therein described as “ John Black No. 1,” it not being denied, upon the hearing of writs of habeas corpas and certiorari taken out by the person arrested, that he was not the- person described in the deposition and warrant as “ John Black No. 1.”</p>

<p>The nature of the action and the material facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Action to recover salary as a doorman of the police force of the police department of the city of New York. Motion to reduce verdict which was directed by the court in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount claimed.

<p>Action by administrator de bonis non against surety on the 'bond of deceased administrator, his predecessor.</p>

<p>Action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. Demurrer to separate defenses and counterclaim of the answer.</p>

<p>False imprisonment — Complaint — Demurrer.</p> <p>A complaint for false imprisonment which, among other things, alleges that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of her liberty for one hour “ -without reasonable cause or without any right or authority so to do ” is not demurrable for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as it sufficiently alleges that the imprisonment was illegal.</p>

<p>Motion to confirm the report of commissioners in street opening proceedings.</p>

Action by plaintiff claiming to be subrogated to the rights of Theodore Seiz, whose property was insured by plaintiff under a policy giving it the right of subrogation in case the property was injured by fire through the negligent acts of others. Plaintiff charges that defendant’s negligence caused the fire and damage complained of and sues to recover the amount paid.

<p>Surety — Contribution — Status • of successive accommodation indorsers — Proof of their agreement to be bound jointly.</p> <p>An action for contribution' may be maintained by sureties, who have paid the debt of the principal, against the representative of a deceased cosurety.</p> <p>Where, however, the parties are successive accommodation indorsers of notes of the principal,they are not cosureties and subject to the doctrine of contribution unless they have specially agreed to be bound jointly and not severally. Their liabilities inter se are in such case to be determined by the law merchant.</p> <p>Their agreement' to be bound jointly may be proved by parol or be evidenced by the circumstances of the case.</p>

Application under section 16 of the Liquor Tax Law for a special meeting in the town of Moreau, Saratoga county, for a resuhmission to the electors of said town of the local option questions provided by said section.

<p>Action to reform a conveyance of water rights alleged to have been fraudulently obtained. Demurrer to complaint.</p>

Action by plaintiff to reform and as reformed to recover,upon a policy of fire insurance issued to said plaintiff by the defendant.

<p>This is an action by an attorney to enforce his lien for com» pensation.</p>

<p>Stock Corporation Law — Construction of section 34, added by L. 1899, ch. 354 — Statute of Limitations — Demurrable “ defences ” setting up no new matter.</p> <p>Section 34, added to the Stock Corporation Law in 1899, was not intended to shorten the regular three-year Statute of Limitations, applicable to a creditor’s action to hold a director personally liable for a debt of the corporation for a failure to file an annual report of its condition, in a case where the debt of the creditor has matured before such failure and whose right of action against the director has consequently accrued, but was intended to apply only to a creditor whose debt had not accrued at the time of such failure, and who therefore had no existing right of action.</p> <p>The true construction of the section is that, where the debt has not accrued before such failure or default, the director shall not be liable unless served with the notice, prescribed by the section, within three years after such default; and, in order to save rights existing at the enactment of the section, the proviso was added that actions based on any existing default might be begun in 1899, or thereafter if such notice had been given in 1899 — meaning thereby, that the action would be in time if brought within the regular three years, and three years from the default had expired, or would expire before 1900, and, that it might Be brought in 1900, if brought upon said notice and within the regular three years, although three years from the default would run beyond 1899.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff creditor bases each of.his causes of action on an allegation that he has paid a certain debt of the corporation, and that it thereby became indebted to him, “ defences,” alleging the evidence by which the defendant proposes to prove in each ease that the plaintiff did not pay the debt, are demurrable, as no new matter is set up by them, no defence, taking all the allegations of the complaint to be true, is afforded by them, and the facts in question, if provable, are provable under the denial.</p>

Action for damages for breach of the plaintiff’s contract of membership. The defendant is a fraternal mutual benefit corporation incorporated under the laws of the commonwealth of Massachusetts. The plaintiff became a companion or member of it and received his benefit certificate on August 21, 1882.

<p>Motion to strike out irrelevant matter from the complaint under section 545 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

<p>Liquor Tax Law — Submission of local option questions — L. 1900, ch. 367, § 3.</p> <p>The provisions of the statute (L. 1900, ch. 367, § 3), requiring a town clerk at least ten days before a town meeting to print and post notices that the local option questions will be voted upon at the town meeting, are mandatory, and there is no jurisdiction to take the vote on these questions where this requirement of the statute has been disregarded and omitted by the town clerk.</p>

The plaintiffs and defendant had entered into a contract xvhereby plaintiffs were to excavate and remove rock and dirt on the premises of the defendant, corner of Oolumbus avenue and Eightieth street, in the.city of Hew York, for $3,600. All of this amount had been paid, but plaintiffs brought this action to recover for three items of extra work, as follows: 1. Eor excavating area on Oolumbus avenue and Eightieth street. 2.

<p>Motion by the defendant to modify judgments in actions for a divorce and for sequestration of his property.</p>

Action by the plaintiffs as judgment creditors to have certain transfers of personal and real property made by defendant Adickes to her children, the codefendants, adjudged fraudulent, and null and void as against her creditors. Demurrer to complaint. The facts sufficiently, appear in the opinion of the court.

<p>Action against a surety — Defense putting in issue the identity of the undertaking — Demurrer.</p> <p>A complaint against a surety on an undertaking alleged that thereby he bound himself to pay the plaintiff any judgment the latter might finally recover against the principals, and that such a judgment was recovered and remained unsatisfied in part. A separate defense of the surety alleged that the judgment was recovered by default, was opened on condition that his principals gave an undertaking to secure any judgment thereafter recovered, that the undertaking referred to in the complaint was given to secufe it, and not the judgment in the complaint, and that after a trial the principals recovered in the action a judgment against the plaintiff which had been affirmed on two appeals. The surety did not expressly deny that the judgment mentioned in the complaint was not the final judgment in the action. On demurrer,</p> <p>Held, that the separate defensé was not demurrable, as merely stating the legal conclusion that the judgment mentioned in the complaint was not the judgment referred to in the undertaking, and that, under the defense, the surety would be entitled to show that the undertaking was not intended "to cover the alleged final judgment set forth in the complaint.</p>

Action to recover damages for breach of contract. Demurrer to answer. The fácts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

Application to confirm the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment in ahoverentitled proceeding. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

<p>Contract — Under a complaint alleging performance recovery cannot be had on facts excusing non-performance — Quantum meruit — Counterclaim.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff, a corporation, sues for services and its allegations of performance of the contract and of indebtedness to it thereunder are denied, it cannot recover, under its complaint, by proving facts which excuse non-performance.</p> <p>Where parties enter into an executory contract for services during a certain period and at a fixed rate, and, after a dispute as to the terms of the contract, agree to terminate it, further services rendered by the contractor may be recovered for as upon a gumtum, meruit.</p> <p>A counterclaim dependent upon the executory contract falls with it,</p>

<p>Action to recover trust funds belonging to plaintiff of which the defendants became possessed.</p>

<p>Liquor Tax Law — Submission of local option questions — L. 1900, ch. 367, § 3.</p> <p>The provisions of the statute (L. 1900, ch. 367, § 3), requiring a town clerk, at least ten flays before a town meeting, to print anfl post, and at least five days before the vote is taken, to publish in one newspaper, notice that the local option questions will be voted upon at the town meeting, are directory merely, and although he wholly fails to comply with the staute, the vote cast at the town meeting is valid where it appears that sample ballots. containing each of the four propositions to be voted upon were mailed to the electors, that public meetings were held for discussing the local option questions, that individuals freely distributed in the town circulars in regard to such questions, and that the .vote as to them was larger than that cast for any candidate.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order assessing a tax of five per cent, upon the bequest and devise of the residue of the estate of Nathan E. Graves, deceased, to trustees for the purpose of founding and maintaining a charitable and benevolent institution to be known as “ Graves’ Home for the Aged.”</p>

<p>Action for partition.</p>

<p>Action for damages.</p>

This is an action for admeasurement of the plaintiff’s dower in a house and lot. Her deceased husband owned the property and devised it to her for life, remainder to his children. He owned no other real estate. He left no debts and the said real property was unencumbered. The widow’s dower was never admeasured. She took possession of and received the rents and profits of the entire property from the death of the husband in 1890.

<p>Annulment of marriage for fraud — Palming a substituted child upon one as an inducement to Mm to marry its alleged mother — Code C. P., § 1743, subd. 4.</p> <p>An action to annul a marriage, upon the ground that the consent of one of the parties was obtained by fraud, will lie where the husband proves that his wife induced him to marry her by falsely representing to him that she had borne him a child, then living, and by palming upon him as his a child which was neither his nor hers.</p> <p>Frauds which go to the essence of the marriage contract are to be rated in the same manner as other frauds respecting contracts.</p>

<p>Motion to strike out the answer as sham. The answer is a general denial only.</p>

<p>Negligence — Verdict against evidence — Contributory negligence of parent of an infant.</p> <p>Where the testimony of seven distinterested witnesses of an accident to the plaintiff, acquits the defendant of negligence and contradicts the weak testimony of four witnesses for the plaintiff, a verdict in her favor must be set aside as against the weight of evidence.</p> <p>Semble, that it is contributory negligence for a mother, who had been sitting in front of the house where she lived with a very young child on her lap, to leave it alone in a chair while she went across a narrow street for some ice, thus permitting the child to attempt to cross the street alone, where it was injured by a horse car.</p>

<p>Habeas Gobpus proceedings.</p>

<p>Deed — Description not conveying the fee of a- street to its center.</p> <p>The rule, that' as between grantor and grantee a description bounding the premises by a street designated on a map presumptively includes the fee of a street to its center, is controlled by the apparent intention of the parties and the rule does not apply to a description bounding a plot on all sides by certain streets for certain distances named in feet and inches, it appearing that these distances agree with those stated on a map of the plot theretofore filed by the grantor, that they comprise the quantity of land stated in the deed, that the inclusion of the bounding streets to their centers would increase that quantity one-half, and that the grantor subsequently conveyed- the streets to the town in which the plot was located.</p>

Action to recover of defendant, the assignee of a lease and tenant in possession of the premises, certain sums which plaintiff has paid to the owner of the ground, as ground rent and taxes to preserve the lease and prevent its termination.

<p>Application for a peremptory writ of mandamus.</p>

<p>Offer of judgment — Nullified by material amendment of complaint — When interest cannot be added in order to determine whether the •offer is more favorable than the recovery.</p> <p>The effect of an offer of judgment must be determined by the state of the pleadings when the offer was served.</p> <p>The offer is rendered nugatory as to the defendant where the plaintiff subsequently serves an amende'd complaint abandoning one of his causes of action and increasing the other from $50 to $6,500.</p> <p>Where the damages are unliquidated, as in an action to recover the Reasonable value of services, interest cannot be added to an offer in determining whether it was more favorable to the plaintiff than the judgment he recovered.</p>

<p>New York city — 1. 1896, ch. 727, unconstitutional, in so far as it fails to require notice to be given persons assessed for benefits.</p> <p>The act (L. 1896, ch. 727, t§ 2) providing for the extension of Riverside Park in the city of New York and declaring that, except as provided in it, “ all provisions of law relating to the taking of private property for public streets or places in said city are hereby made applicable, so far as the same may be necessary for the acquiring of said land”, if permissibly construable as importing into the statute the provisions of other statutes requiring notice to be given to persons whose property may be taken by the city, contains, by its terms, Ho provisions requiring notice to be given persons assessable for benefits, and as the act contains no other provisions requiring notice to them, their assessments under it are invalid as they have been deprived of property “ without due process of law ”, in violation of the Constitution of the State of New York, art. I, § 6.</p> <p>The provisions as to assessments for benefit are not so identified with the general scheme of the act as to render it void because of their invalidity.</p>

<p>New York city — Assessment of benefits in a street opening — Damages for closing distinguished — D. 1895, ch. 1006.</p> <p>Where the opening of a proposed avenue in New York city will leave in front of the property of an owner, who formerly abutted on a street to which the city had no title and which was not a continuous thoroughfare, a strip of land ten feet by four over which he will have the same easements as the public, commissioners of estimate and apportionment, in assessing him for benefits, may, notwithstanding the fact that they have awarded him damages for the change of grade, properly take into consideration the benefit the property will derive from thereafter fronting, practically, on an avenue which is a continuous thoroughfare.</p> <p>Where the commissioners have not been given power under L. 1895, ch. 1006, to award the owner damages for closing the old street they can award none and he must obtain damages by proceeding under said act.</p> <p>If an assessment for a change of grade can be assessed to any extent upon blocks other than those where the change was made, the excess must be distributed in a manner which does not discriminate against any other block of the area of assessment.</p> <p>While it may not be the law that each block fronting upon a proposed avenue should be assessed for the whole cost of the land taken to make the avenue in front of it, the report of the commissioners will be sent back where it shows that the excess of the cost of the land taken and of the land damages has been unequally assessed upon the other blocks which front on the proposed avenue and are within the area of assessment.</p>

Motion to confirm the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

<p>Bankruptcy — Proof of voidable preference.</p> <p>Evidence deemed sufficient to show that creditors had reasonable cause to believe that transfers of property, made to them by a debtor firm after the • filing of a petition in bankruptcy and within four months of adjudication, were intended as a preference to them over other creditors of the same class, within section 60, subdivisions a and b of the bankruptcy act of 1898, and, consequently, were voidable by the trustee.</p> <p>Reasonable cause so to believe may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances but must amount to more than reasonable cause to suspect.</p> <p>Actions by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover of defendants payments made to them in alleged violation of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. ,</p> <p>The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Action upon a policy of life insurance.</p>

<p>Application for a peremptory writ of mandamus.</p>

<p>Negligence — Individual liability of a joint wrongdoer.</p> <p>A person who strings an electric light wire, used by him in lighting a village, in such a manner that it can arid at times visibly does come in contact with a telephone wire, affording a connection which might cut the electric light wire by heat and attrition, is guilty of negligence, and cannot escape personal liability to the widow and children of one who was killed by coming in contact with the electric light wire, upon its severance and fall, as found by a jury, from a cause which he might reasonably have foreseen, by showing that, some time before the accident, he had transferred the plant and business to a corporation, as, it appearing that he was the president thereof and owner of nearly all the stock, it is apparent that he had power and authority to have the corporation remedy the defect and, failing to have the corporation remedy it, he became a joint wrongdoer with it and may be sued separately.</p>

<p>Action to foreclose a mortgage.</p>

<p>Action by three joint makers of promissory note against co-joint maker’s executrix for contribution.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, third district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff. ' — - -</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, fifth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Oourt of the city of New York, ninth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiffs.</p>

<p>' Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, fifth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiffs.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, second district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of ETew York, first district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Ajeteal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, eighth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the -city of New York, first district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city, of New York, fourth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, fifth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, seventh district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, fifth district, borough of Manhattan., in favor of the defendants.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, eighth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, ninth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiffs.</p>

<p>Appeal from a dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, fourth district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Appeal from' a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, eleventh district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Eew York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Eew York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, first district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, seventh district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, second district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, seventh district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, first district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment and order ©f the General Term of the City Court of New York, which reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon a verdict directed by the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment rendered by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of New York for the second district in favor of the plaintiffs.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment rendered, in favor of the plaintiff by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of New York for the first district.</p> <p>Action upon assigned claim for legal services.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York for the second district.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment upon the verdict of a jury, rendered in favor of the plaintiff by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, for the ninth district, borough of Manhattan. Action for negligence.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment upon the verdict of a jury rendered by the "justice of the Municipal Court of the city of Few York for the seventh district.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment rendered by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of blew York, for the second district, in-favor of the plaintiffs.</p>

Afpeae from a judgment rendered by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of Dew York, second district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant. • ■ ■

<p>Appeal from judgment upon a verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, for the first district. Action for negligence.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment rendered by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, for the second district, in favor of the plaintiff. Action for goods sold and delivered.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment rendered by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, for the seventh district, in favor of the plaintiff.</p> <p>Action for rent.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment rendered by the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of ¡New York, for the tenth district, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the General Term of the City Court of the city of New York, affirming a judgment of the Trial Term, dismissing the complaint.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor bf the plaintiff, rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of Rew York, third district, borough of Manhattan. .</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendants, rendered,, in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, fourth district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, rendered in the Municipal Court of' the city of New York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the justice of the Municipal Court of the city of ¡New York, ninth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of ¡New York, ninth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, ninth district, borough of Manhattan, made on the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant, rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, eighth district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, first district, borough of Manhattan, dismissing the complaint, with costs.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant, rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan.</p>

<p>Ajppeal from a judgment of the City Court of the city of New York, in favor of plaintiffs.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff entered upon a verdict and from an order denying, a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Special Term denying a motion to vacate a warrant of attachment granted against the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial</p>

<p>Appeal from ap interlocutory judgment, overruling a demurrer to the answer of the defendant, alleging the pendency of a former action in bar. The action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries caused by alleged negligence.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Special Term, granting leave to reargue a motion made and decided at a former Special Term, and before another justice; the former order denying the plaintiff’s motion to advance the cause for trial on the short-cause calendar, and the latter order granting substantially the same motion.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order vacating an order of arrest granted on the ground of assault.</p>

<p>Appeal by the plaintiff from an order vacating an attachment granted against the defendant as a nonresident.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order denying a motion for an order directing that the above-entitled action and all further proceedings therein be carried on and prosecuted in the name of Eleanor E. B. Bichólas, as the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, directed by the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Special Term of the City Court of the city of New York, denying plaintiff’s motion to discontinue the action.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered on the verdict of a jury directed by the court, and from an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the defendant, and from an order denying motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict rendered by a jury in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying the defendant’s motion for a new; trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict of a jury in favor of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of a jury, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment rendered in their favor, and from an order denying their motion to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial.

<p>Appeal from an order denying a motion to punish the defendant, a judgment ^debtor, for contempt.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment for the plaintiff entered on a verdict and from order denying the defendants a new trial. Action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff from a wagon of the defendants, which was driven upon and into a part of a street car where the plaintiff was seated.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment for the plaintiff upon a verdict and from an order denying the defendant.a new trial. The action was for personal injuries sustained while boarding a car of the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from order confirming clerk’s taxation of costs.</p>

<p>Appeal from order of SpeciaVTerm, refusing leave to defendant to'serve a supplemental answer.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.</p>