Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

340 Or. App. 450

State v. Callen

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided May 14, 2025

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2025-05-14

Applies OR 811 § 811.140 · OR 813 § 813.010

Affirmed · Decided 2025-05-14

450                   May 14, 2025                No. 424

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                  SHARON CALLEN,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
               Union County Circuit Court
                  21CR20835; A179846

  Thomas B. Powers, Judge.
  Submitted September 25, 2024.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.
Sharon Callen filed the supplemental brief pro se. Ernest
G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section,
and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public
Defense Commission, filed the supplemental brief for
appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Kate E. Morrow, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 
340 Or App 450
 (2025)   451
452                                               State v. Callen

         SHORR, P. J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for
driving under the influence of intoxicants, ORS 813.010(4),
and reckless driving, ORS 811.140. Defendant raises three
assignments of error through counsel and two supplemental
pro se assignments of error. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
         Initially, we provide a brief overview of the facts and
later recount the particular facts relevant to our analysis
of each assignment of error. Following reports by two other
drivers about defendant’s erratic driving, Oregon State Police
troopers arrived at a rest stop where defendant was parked to
investigate. The troopers asked her to perform field sobriety
tests, developed probable cause that she was impaired, and
took her into custody for driving under the influence of intoxicants. A breath test showed that she had zero percent blood
alcohol content. Defendant’s urine tested positive for oxycodone and trazodone. She was charged with driving under
the influence of intoxicants and reckless driving. Defendant
opted for a bench trial, and was found guilty of both charges.
        In defendant’s first assignment of error, she argues
that the trial court erred in overruling her objection to
Trooper Rohlf’s testimony about his drug recognition expert
(DRE) training. At the outset of Rohlf’s testimony, he
explained his duties for the Oregon State Police, including
that he was a DRE. Defendant objected:
       “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m gonna
   object to this line of questioning as far as Trooper Rohlf
   being a DRE. That’s not a subject of today’s testimony and
   it seems like a backdoor attempt by the state to get his credentials as a DRE in and trying to evaluate this particular
   situation.
      “THE COURT: What’s the evidence basis for the
   objection?
      “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: As of right now, it would
   simply be relevance, Your Honor.
      “…
      “THE COURT: —so why is it relevant?
Cite as 
340 Or App 450
 (2025)                                  453

       “[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, the training and
   experience of an officer who is making observations in the
   field about possible intoxicants. And his DRE training ties
   directly into that, those observations, that he has to make
   on the scene in order to develop probable cause. And then
   to determine what tests to perform down the road if there
   are tests to be performed down the road.
      “I’m just laying foundation for what Trooper Rohlf is
   qualified for.
      “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, and if there’s no DRE
   performed, Your Honor, then that’s—it is irrelevant.”
         The court overruled the objection:
       “THE COURT: No, it’s—yeah, the objection is overruled. The training, experience, qualifications, background
   of a witness is generally relevant, it’s foundational.
       “I don’t know what he’s going to be testifying about, but
   we have a—if there is a trooper involved in an investigation
   of a DUII, it’s certainly relevant that his background—or
   that his background as to DUII assessments at roadside. I
   mean that’s all, that’s right in the wheelhouse; so the objection is overruled.”
Rohlf then explained that his DRE training included learning about the different drug categories and the signs of
impairment for each of those categories. That training also
included identifying when a person is “on multiple different types of drugs.” He testified that, based on his roadside
observations, he would have taken defendant into custody
for impairment.
         On appeal, defendant renews her argument that
the trooper’s testimony about his DRE training was not
relevant because the DRE protocol was not performed and
the trooper did not and could not rely on that testing as a
basis for his conclusions. The state counters that Rohlf’s
DRE training was relevant because it showed that he had
specialized knowledge in recognizing signs of impairment.
At the outset, we note that defendant argues for the exclusion of the evidence only on relevance grounds, and does not
argue that it was inadmissible for other reasons. Therefore,
we consider only whether evidence of Rohlf’s DRE training
was relevant under the circumstances of this case.
454                                             State v. Callen

         OEC 401 provides that relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” We review a trial court’s determination of relevance under OEC 401 for errors of law. State v. Titus, 
328 Or 475, 481
, 
982 P2d 1133
 (1999).
          Here, Rohlf testified that as part of his DRE training, he was trained to identify signs of impairment in seven
drug categories. He testified that he knew the effects of oxycodone on the body. He also knew the potential effects of
taking both oxycodone and trazodone together. Defendant
acknowledges, and we agree, that an officer’s “general training and experience relating to investigating DUIIs [is] relevant.” It follows that an officer’s more specialized DRE training in identifying drug impairment is similarly relevant.
Although the DRE protocol was not performed, the officer’s
DRE training made it more probable that he could accurately identify impairment in defendant than without the
training. See State v. Rambo, 
250 Or App 186, 194
, 279 P3d
361 (2012), rev den, 
353 Or 203
 (2013) (stating that the officer’s “considerable training and experience,” which included
DRE training, showed that he was qualified “to recognize
the symptoms of drug impairment in the course of a DUII
investigation”). The challenged testimony therefore meets
the “very low threshold” for admission as relevant evidence
that makes a fact of consequence more probable. Titus, 
328 Or at 481
. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s relevance objection to Rohlf’s testimony about his
DRE training.
         We turn next to defendant’s second assignment of
error, in which she argues that the trial court plainly erred
by relying on evidence outside the record when reaching its
verdict. In defendant’s testimony on her own behalf, she
seemed to attribute her driving in part to the windy conditions that day. In its spoken verdict on the reckless driving
count, the trial court explained:
      “I found the two other witnesses very credible.
      “I have no doubt that [defendant’s] car, you know, when
   you get buffeted about on and off with the winds.
Cite as 
340 Or App 450
 (2025)                              455

      “As somebody for who—because I can use my common
   sense and experience, just as any juror would. Having
   driven either from Joseph to Portland and back, or La
   Grande to Portland and back roughly once a month for the
   last ten years, I’ve experienced those driving conditions.
   And I understand that you can feel buffeted about. I’ve
   done it with gear on the top of a vehicle as well.
       “But the testimony of the other two witnesses was way
   beyond what a typical being buffeted by the wind would be.
   I found them credible.”
         Defendant did not object to the trial court’s use of
“common sense and experience” in rendering its verdict. On
appeal, she requests plain error review, arguing that the
trial court plainly erred in basing its verdict on evidence
outside the record. In response, the state asserts that the
trial court did not err in referencing its common sense and
experience, and any error would be unworthy of discretionary correction.
         Under plain error review, the court first determines
whether the error is plain. State v. Ortiz, 
372 Or 658, 664
, 554
P3d 796 (2024). For an error to be plain, it must be an error
of law, obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and apparent
on the record without requiring the court to choose among
competing inferences. 
Id.
 Next, we determine “whether the
error was harmless and, if not, whether we should exercise
our discretion to correct it.” State v. Horton, 
327 Or App 256, 262
, 535 P3d 338 (2023).
        In this case, it is debatable whether the trial court’s
reference to its experience driving in windy conditions on a
particular stretch of highway is plain error that is obvious
and beyond dispute. Jurors, and by extension trial courts
in a bench trial, “may rely on common experience or common knowledge in making reasonable inferences.” State v.
Clowdus, 
326 Or App 36, 39
, 530 P3d 525 (2023). Oregon
courts have previously held that common regional weather
patterns and their effects are a matter of common knowledge. See, e.g., Schukart v. Gerousbeck, 
194 Or 320, 332-33
,
241 P2d 882
 (1952) (taking judicial notice of rainy and windy
weather conditions common to the region in the winter to
determine whether such conditions would render a railroad
456                                             State v. Callen

crossing extra-hazardous). However, we need not determine
whether the trial court’s spoken verdict went beyond common knowledge. Even assuming the trial court committed
plain error that was not harmless, we would not exercise our
discretion in these circumstances.
         We undertake a review of plain error with “utmost
caution.” State v. Vanornum, 
354 Or 614, 630-31
, 317 P3d
889 (2013). In deciding whether to exercise our discretion
to correct plain error, we consider factors including the
gravity of the error, the competing interests of the parties,
the ends of justice in the particular case, and whether the
policies behind the general rule requiring preservation of
error have been served in the case in another way. Ailes v.
Portland Meadows, Inc., 
312 Or 376
, 382 n 6, 
823 P2d 956
(1991). Whether the trial court “could have easily corrected
its purported error” had the defendant objected is a “significant factor” in deciding whether to exercise discretion. State
v. Garcia, 
320 Or App 123, 138
, 512 P3d 839, rev den, 
370 Or 602
 (2022).
         Considering the particular record in this case, we
conclude that the gravity of any error and the ends of justice do not weigh in favor of reversal. Horton, 
327 Or App at 264-65
. Two other drivers, driving in the same conditions
as defendant, found defendant’s driving so concerning that
they separately called 9-1-1 to report her. Those witnesses
testified that she was tailgating, weaving “all over the road,”
almost hit other vehicles, and almost went off the road. Given
that evidence, the record suggests that the court’s reference
to its own driving experience did not have a significant risk
of affecting the verdict. 
Id. at 264
 (“The likelihood that the
error affected the outcome goes to its ‘gravity’ and to ‘the
ends of justice.’ ”). Indeed, the court relied on the evidence of
the two other witnesses to state that the manner of defendant’s driving went “way beyond” what might be a reaction
to common weather in the area. Moreover, any error could
have been cured by a contemporaneous objection. State v.
Reynolds, 
250 Or App 516, 523-24
, 280 P3d 1046, rev den,
352 Or 666
 (2012). Had defendant objected to the court’s
comments about its experience driving in windy conditions,
the court could have clarified that, even disregarding that
Cite as 
340 Or App 450
 (2025)                             457

experience, its verdict was the same based on just the testimony in the case. Under the circumstances, we are unpersuaded that defendant’s claimed error merits the exercise of
our discretion.
         In defendant’s third assignment of error, she challenges the trial court’s imposition of a mandatory $1,000
fine without suspending it. In the state’s sentencing recommendations, it asked for, among other things, the statutory $1,000 fine and the $255 DUII fee. Defense counsel
requested that the $255 DUII fee be waived due to defendant’s financial situation. Defense counsel asked “that the
[c]ourt not impose any additional financial penalties” but
did not specifically ask for suspension of the $1,000 fine. The
court agreed that “seem[ed] appropriate” because of defendant’s “very limited ability to pay.” The court then gave its
sentence where it imposed the $1,000 fine and waived the
$255 DUII fee. Defendant did not object.
         On appeal, defendant acknowledges that her claim
of error is unpreserved and requests plain error review. She
further acknowledges that the fine was mandatory according to ORS 813.010(6)(b), but points out that the court had
discretionary authority to suspend execution of that fine.
See State v. Baccaro, 
300 Or App 131, 137
, 452 P3d 1022
(2019) (concluding that the trial court erred in imposing a
required fee not announced in open court because the defendant was denied the opportunity to ask the court to exercise
discretion in suspending execution). We understand defendant to argue that the trial court plainly erred by not suspending the fine because it did not understand that it had
the authority to suspend execution. We disagree that it is
obvious and apparent on this record that the court did not
understand its authority to suspend the $1,000 fine.
         As noted above, for an error to be plain it must be
an error of law, obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and
apparent on the record. Ortiz, 
372 Or at 664
. In support of
her argument that the trial court plainly erred, defendant
cites to State v. Loudermilk for the proposition that “the
court’s imposition of the fine without exercising discretion
was plainly erroneous.” 
288 Or App 88
, 90, 405 P3d 195
(2017). Loudermilk is inapplicable here. In Loudermilk, the
458                                            State v. Callen

trial court stated that it was imposing a mandatory fine
when, in fact, the fine was discretionary. 
Id.
 In this case, the
fine was not discretionary. Both parties agree that under
ORS 813.010(6)(b), when a defendant is convicted of DUII
for the first time, the court must impose a mandatory $1,000
fine. But, it is not clear from the record that the trial court
failed to appreciate its authority to suspend the execution
of the fine. Although the court noted that defendant had a
very limited ability to pay and waived other financial penalties, it did not state that it believed it had no discretion
to suspend execution of the $1,000 fine. We conclude that
defendant’s claimed error does not satisfy the requirements
of plain error, and therefore we may not review it.
         Finally, we turn to defendant’s two pro se assignments of error. We understand defendant’s first pro se
assignment to be that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. On appeal, the reviewing court’s role is not
to reweigh the evidence, State v. McNall, 
307 Or App 435, 440
, 476 P3d 1259 (2020), rev den, 
367 Or 496
 (2021), nor are
we free to speculate on what other theories might also be
supported by the evidence, State v. Howell, 
183 Or App 360, 364
, 51 P3d 706 (2002). We have reviewed the record and
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty
verdict on both charges.
         In defendant’s second pro se assignment of error,
she argues that her due process rights were violated because
(1) she was not given Miranda warnings before she was
asked to perform field sobriety tests; (2) upon her arrest,
her dog was seized without a warrant; and (3) during her
testimony, she was not allowed to question the accuracy or
credibility of the testimony of other witnesses. We conclude
that defendant has not established any trial court error that
violated her due process rights.
        Affirmed.

/340/orapp/450 · .json · Public domain