State v. Jackson

712                    May 29, 2025                 No. 458

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
               HEATHER RAE JACKSON,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                 22CR34488; A181629

  Michelle P. Bassi, Judge.
  Argued and submitted April 3, 2025, Central Catholic
High School, Portland.
   David L. Sherbo-Huggins, Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest
G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section,
Oregon Public Defense Commission.
   Kyleigh M. Gray, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General,
and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
  Affirmed.
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 (2025)                             713

        SHORR, P. J.
        Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for
menacing, ORS 163.190, assigning error to the trial court’s
denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA).
Because we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient
to support the conviction, we affirm.
        We review the denial of an MJOA by examining the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, making reasonable
inferences, could have found the essential elements of the
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hall, 

, 

 (1998). We state the facts in accordance with that standard.
          While driving on Interstate 5, defendant swerved
into the left lane directly behind G’s truck, almost hitting
his back bumper, and began closely tailing him. G tapped
his brakes to get defendant to back off. As soon as she was
able to, defendant switched lanes to pass G. As she was passing, G “gave her the middle finger.” Defendant responded by
brandishing a gun and pumping it up and down in the air as
she passed at around 90 miles per hour. G called 9-1-1 and
sped up to follow defendant and get her license plate number. Soon after, a police officer detained defendant and saw a
gun on the floorboard of her car. As a result, defendant was
charged with one count of menacing. At the subsequent jury
trial, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal after the
state presented its evidence. The court denied that motion.
The jury found defendant guilty of menacing. This appeal
followed.
         On appeal, defendant argues that she was entitled
to a judgment of acquittal because the state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the elements of menacing. Specifically, defendant contends that her gesture with
the gun did not give rise to an objectively reasonable fear
of imminent serious physical injury. Defendant emphasizes
that she never pointed the gun at G, and she drove away
immediately. She contends that the gun gesture could, at
most, be construed as a warning to G not to further escalate
the situation. The state responds that, viewing the evidence
714                                          State v. Jackson

in the light most favorable to the state, a jury could conclude
that defendant’s brandishing of the gun constituted a threat
to imminently shoot G.
         “A person commits the crime of menacing if by
word or conduct the person intentionally attempts to place
another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury.”
ORS 163.190(1). We have previously concluded that pointing a gun directly at a person constitutes menacing. State
v. Lockwood, 

, 

 (1979).
We have also concluded that making threats with a gun,
although not pointed at the victim, can demonstrate intent
to threaten immediate injury. State v. McAuliffe, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2016).
In McAuliffe, the defendant suggested to a 9-1-1 dispatcher
that he was going to shoot at an airplane that had been flying low over his property all summer. Id. at 261. Defendant
was found on his porch with a shotgun, but there was no
evidence that he actually fired or pointed the gun at the
plane. Id. at 265. Based on the history of the conflict and
defendant’s statements and actions, we concluded that the
evidence supported a conclusion that the defendant had the
intent to threaten immediate injury. Id. at 265-66.
         Similarly, in State v. Severson, 

, 558-
59, 

, rev den, 

 (2023), we considered
the denial of an MJOA in the context of menacing where
the defendant threatened to bludgeon the victim with a
meat tenderizer. Although the victim was in a locked room,
which the defendant did not attempt to enter, we concluded
that, in the context of a heated domestic dispute, the defendant’s behavior “support[ed] a reasonable inference that the
threats of harm were imminent.” Id. at 559.
         We also consider State v. Hejazi, 

,

 (2023), which defendant relies heavily on in
support of her argument that her conduct did not constitute
menacing. In Hejazi, we concluded, among other things, that
the defendant’s threats to kill an attorney and his family,
which were made on the sidewalk outside of a courthouse,
were not sufficient to support a conviction for menacing. 

. We noted that the threats lacked any temporal
indication and that the defendant had walked quickly away
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 (2025)                                              715

from the attorney after making the threat. 

. We
therefore concluded that the defendant’s conduct “did not
create a situation supporting an inference that the serious
harm was imminent.” 

          This case is more like McAuliffe and Severson than
Hejazi. Defendant’s brandishing of a deadly weapon intensified the argument beyond the conflict that was present
in Hejazi, which did not involve weapons. Here, defendant
waved a gun threateningly in the context of an escalating
road rage incident. In that context, a rational factfinder
could conclude that, although defendant did not point the
gun directly at G, defendant’s conduct would have caused a
reasonable person to fear imminent serious physical injury.1
Even if a rational factfinder could also come to a different
conclusion, our task on appeal “is not to weigh the evidence,
it is only to determine whether there was legally sufficient
evidence to support the challenged conviction.” McAuliffe,

. Here, the evidence was legally sufficient
to support the menacing conviction.
           Affirmed.




    1
      That G pursued defendant’s car while calling 9-1-1 does not change our
conclusion that defendant’s conduct in these circumstances could give rise to G’s
objectively reasonable fear of imminent serious physical injury at the moment
defendant brandished the gun.