State v. Basargin

758                   May 29, 2025                No. 464

  This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
   pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
        except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                STATE OF OREGON

               STATE OF OREGON,
                Plaintiff-Respondent,
                          v.
               DIONICII BASARGIN,
              aka Dionicii N. Basargin,
                Defendant-Appellant.
            Marion County Circuit Court
  23CR43925, 23CN04918; A183565 (Control), A183566

  Donald D. Abar, Judge.
  Submitted April 11, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Carla E. Edmondson, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
   Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.
  LAGESEN, C. J.
  Orders to pay per diem fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)                           759

           LAGESEN, C. J.
         Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon
constituting domestic violence, ORS 166.220; menacing constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.190; unlawful use of a
weapon, ORS 166.220; and menacing, ORS 163.190. On each
of the unlawful use of a weapon convictions, the trial court
sentenced defendant to 24 months in prison. On each of the
menacing convictions, the court ordered defendant to 180
days in jail and ordered him to “pay any required per diem
fees.” On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court’s
order that he pay per diem fees because that requirement
was not announced in open court at sentencing. The state
concedes the error. We agree with and accept the state’s concession. We reverse the orders that defendant pay per diem
fees and otherwise affirm.1
         A trial court errs in imposing a requirement to pay
a per diem fee in the judgment when that requirement was
not announced at sentencing, and typically the appropriate
remedy is a remand for resentencing. See State v. Barr, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2024)
(remanding for resentencing when requirement to pay per
diem fees was not announced in open court at sentencing).
However, because the trial court in this case stated on the
record its intent to “waive all financials,” we reverse the
orders that defendant pay per diem fees rather than remanding for sentencing. See State v. Sankey, 

, 847,

 (2018) (reversing portions of judgment requiring
the defendant to pay conviction fee and bench probation fee
without remanding for resentencing when the trial court
declared that it would “waive all fees”).
        Orders to pay per diem fees reversed; otherwise
affirmed.




   1
     As authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b), this matter is determined by a two-judge
panel.