Volume 341 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiff, S, sought to recover damages from the defendant attorney for alleged statutory (§ 52-564) theft in connection with the defendant's conduct during prior judicial proceedings involving the foreclosure of a municipal lien filed against S's real property. The defendant, acting as B Co.'s attorney, commenced the prior action to foreclose the lien, which B Co. had purchased from a municipality. During the foreclosure action, S was defaulted for failure to appear, and the court thereafter rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. After the running of the law days, and approximately six months after title vested in B Co., the defendant filed a certificate of foreclosure in the municipal land records. B Co. subsequently sold the property to a third party. S alleged in the present action that the defendant, with the intent to deprive S of his property or to appropriate the property to B Co., had perpetrated a fraud on the trial court during the foreclosure proceedings by knowingly making materially false representations about the state marshal's inabil- ity to serve process on S and about the value of S's property, which purportedly led the court to render the foreclosure judgment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the present action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that, because all of the defendant's alleged conduct occurred during the foreclosure proceed- ings, S's statutory theft claim was barred by the litigation privilege, which affords attorneys absolute immunity from liability for certain statements made or conduct during judicial proceedings. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that all of the defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct occurred within the underlying foreclosure proceedings and that the balancing of policy considerations weighed in favor of applying absolute immunity to S's claim of statutory theft. On the granting of certification, S appealed. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly determined that the litigation privilege afforded the defendant absolute immunity from liability for statutory theft, this court having concluded, after considering the underlying pur- pose of the judicial proceedings, the similarity between statutory theft and claims of defamation and fraud, and the availability of other reme- dies, that the policy considerations raised by the parties supported applying absolute immunity to S's statutory theft claim: a. S's statutory theft claim did not challenge or subvert the purpose of the underlying foreclosure proceeding but, instead, challenged the defendant's role as an advocate for his client, B Co., in a judicial proceed- ing, which S acknowledged was properly brought in light of his failure to pay his property taxes, and the litigation privilege absolutely bars causes of action arising from attorney advocacy; moreover, it was clear from the elements of statutory theft, which requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant stole the plaintiff's property or received and concealed stolen property, that S's claim of statutory theft did not challenge the purpose of the underlying foreclosure proceeding; furthermore, S's statu- tory theft claim was premised on the defendant's allegedly false or mis- leading communications to the court during that proceeding, and communication is a necessary advocacy tool that the litigation privilege protects, regardless of the false or malicious nature of the communi- cation. b. The fact that S's statutory theft claim was more akin to claims of defamation and fraud, which are protected by the litigation privilege, than to claims of vexatious litigation and abuse of process, which are not protected by the litigation privilege, militated in favor of applying the privilege in the present case: S's statutory theft claim, like a defama- tion claim, was premised on the communication of false statements, and S alleged that the defendant fraudulently took his property by false pretenses, which constitutes statutory theft under this court's case law interpreting § 52-564; moreover, it was of no consequence that the defen- dant made the false statements at issue to a court rather than to S himself, as the plaintiff's statutory theft claim was nonetheless premised on false communications. c. Certain alternatives, other than civil liability, including the filing of a grievance against the defendant or a collateral action challenging the defendant's allegedly fraudulent actions, were available to the plaintiff to address the defendant's alleged conduct; moreover, the plaintiff did not cite to any federal or state precedent holding that absolute immunity does not apply to a claim of statutory theft or a similar type of claim. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that, even if the litigation privilege applies to claims of statutory theft, it was inapplicable in the present case to the extent that the defendant's delayed recording of the certificate of foreclosure on the land records and his role in the subse- quent sale of the property purportedly occurred outside the scope of the foreclosure action: the defendant, in his capacity as B Co.'s attorney in the foreclosure proceeding, was required by statute (§ 49-16) to record the foreclosure certificate on the land records, and, thus, that act was conducted in connection with, and as a required step in, the foreclosure proceeding; moreover, with respect to the defendant's conduct in assisting B Co. with the sale of the property, although the plaintiff alleged that B Co. had ultimately sold the property to a third party, the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant was involved in the sale of the property in any way or that he otherwise committed statutory theft in relation to that sale. Argued April 28—officially released September 29, 2021

The plaintiffs, the town of South Windsor and its zoning enforcement officer, O, sought an injunction and the assessment of fines against the defendant homeowner, who was using her property to store salvage and debris that she had obtained in connection with a cleaning business that she operated. O notified the defendant in 2014 that she was in violation of the town's blight ordinance and zoning regulations, and ordered her to remove the debris from her property. In December, 2016, a fire occurred on the property, and the fire marshal subsequently initiated an arson investigation. In light of the pending investigation, both the police and the defendant's insurance carrier instructed the defendant not to touch or remove anything from the property. Thereafter, on February 24, 2017, O issued the defendant a notice of violation, informing her that her property was in violation of the town's blight ordinance and directing her to remove the debris, as well as a cease and desist order, which identifed the defendant's creation of a junkyard in a residential zone as a zoning violation and directed her to stop depositing material on her property. The defendant did not appeal from either notice or the cease and desist order, and the plaintiffs commenced the present action in an effort to compel her compliance, alleging that the defendant had violated the town's blight ordinance and zoning regulations. Pointing to the instructions she received not to touch or remove anything during the arson investigation, the defendant raised the special defense of legal impossibility, which the trial court ultimately failed to credit. With respect to the zoning claim, the trial court found that the defendant had been wilfully violating the town's zoning regulations since at least the date on which the cease and desist order was issued. Accordingly, the trial court imposed a daily fine pursuant to statute (§ 8-12), commencing on February 24, 2017. The trial court also issued an injunction, precluding the defendant from, inter alia, storing salvage on her property. On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion in imposing the fines because, although it was undisputed that the defendant was prohibited from removing items from her prop- erty for some period of time following February 24, 2017, the trial court, in assessing the fines, had failed to consider the effect of the arson investigation on the defendant's ability to comply with the cease and desist order. Because the trial court made no finding as to the precise date the defendant regained control of her property, the Appellate Court remanded the case for a new trial on the zoning violation claim and affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the Appel- late Court improperly remanded the case for a new trial as to liability, rather than a proceeding limited to damages, in connection with the plaintiffs' zoning violation claim: because there was no dispute remaining regarding the defendant's liability for the zoning violation, the only question pertained to the effect of the defendant's legal impossibility defense in relation to the trial court's assessment of fines under § 8-12, which was a factual matter within the province of the trial court and discrete from its underlying finding of liability; accordingly, this court reversed in part the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to reverse the trial court's judgment only as to its assess- ment of fines and remedies in connection with the zoning violation claim, and to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings as to damages and remedies. Submitted on briefs June 21—officially released October 1, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of felony murder, the defendant appealed. The defendant and his brothers, S and B, had robbed the victim as he returned home at night after closing the bar he owned, during or after which the victim was shot and killed. Twelve years after the incident, A, the estranged wife of S, provided a written statement to the police that implicated the defendant and his brothers in the victim's death. A, who knew that the defendant and his brothers were affiliated with gangs, delayed providing information to the police, pur- portedly out of fear that the defendant and his brothers would retaliate against her or her family. S had regularly abused A throughout their marriage and, following the victim's murder, had threatened to kill her, their children, and A's mother. While the defendant was incarcerated on unrelated charges during the twelve years after the shooting, he instructed A to write salacious letters to him so that he could discredit her if she were to testify against him. At trial, A's testimony was crucial to the state's case, and, therefore, the reason for her twelve year delay in coming forward and the credibility of her statement inculpating the defendant and his brothers were central issues. In affirming the defen- dant's conviction, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court had improperly admitted evidence that he and his brothers were affiliated with gangs and that A and her children had been relocated by the state following her statement to the police. The Appellate Court also rejected the defendant's claim that his constitu- tional rights to present a defense and to confront the witnesses against him was violated insofar as the trial court declined to admit into evidence the letters that A had sent to the defendant and precluded defense counsel from questioning A about the circumstances surrounding the termination of her employment from a hospital and her birth control practices. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, renewing the evidentiary claims that he raised in the Appellate Court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting, through A's testimony, evidence of the gang affiliations of the defendant and his brothers: that evidence was probative of the reason why A feared the defendant and his brothers and why she waited twelve years before providing her statement to the police, and that evidence was not merely cumulative of other evidence, as it was the only evidence that explained why A feared not only S, but the defendant and B as well, why she feared retaliation from individuals acting on their behalf, and why she believed that there was no place she could go where she would be safely out of their reach, even while they were incarcerated for unrelated charges or convictions; moreover, the trial court minimized the prejudicial impact of the evidence by twice instructing the jury that it could consider it solely in evaluating A's credibility as to why she waited twelve years before coming forward and by barring any other witness from testifying that the defendant and his brothers were affiliated with gangs; furthermore, A's testimony on this issue was relatively brief, and the prosecutor made only a brief reference to it in his closing argument. 2. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting, through A's testimony on direct examination, evidence of the state's relocation of A and her children following her statement to the police; that evidence was highly relevant to A's claimed fear of the defendant and his brothers and to demonstrate that her fear remained even after they were incarcerated, which was a central focus of defense counsel's efforts to impeach A's credibility, as the jury reason- ably could have concluded that A's willingness to subject herself to the upheaval and disruption of moving herself and her children multiple times was credible evidence of her belief that she and her family were not safe and that A's relocation explained her willingness to testify against the defendant and his brothers, despite her long-standing fear of retaliation; moreover, the state did not exploit the relocation evidence, as A's testimony on the issue was relatively brief, the questions posed to her and her responses thereto did not directly implicate the state in a way that might suggest that the prosecutor was vouching for her credibility, and the prosecutor made only a brief reference to it during closing argument; furthermore, the evidence was not presented in such a way as to suggest that A was in the state's witness protection program because of direct threats by the defendant. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the prejudi- cial effect of the salacious letters that A had written to the defendant outweighed their probative value, and, therefore, the defendant could not establish that his constitutional rights to present a defense and to confront the witnesses against him were violated by that court's decision to preclude the letters from being admitted: the sexually graphic lan- guage used in the letters and, more generally, the letters themselves, lacked probative value, and, although the trial court treated the letters as independently probative of whether A was fearful of the defendant, the admission of the letters was not necessary to prove that A was not fearful of the defendant, as she essentially admitted that she had a good relationship with him and had no reason to fear him, as long as she did not inculpate him in the crime; moreover, to the extent that the defendant claimed that the trial court's exclusion of the letters deprived him of the opportunity to effectively impeach A's credibility, he failed to demon- strate how the specific contents of the letters bore on that issue. 4. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the defendant's claim that his constitutional rights were violated insofar as the trial court precluded defense counsel from questioning A about the circumstances sur- rounding the termination of her employment from a hospital and her birth control practices was not constitutional in nature and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding these two lines of inquiry: the trial court correctly concluded that the circumstances surrounding the termination of A's employment were simply too remote and would have injected a collateral issue into the trial and that further inquiry into A's birth control practices, after defense counsel questioned her about why she continued to have children with S after the victim's murder, would have inappropriately focused on a matter far too attenu- ated from the material issues in the case; moreover, even if this court concluded that the trial court should have permitted some inquiry into these two matters, such error was harmless because the defendant had ample opportunity at trial to impeach A with respect to her purported fear of S and those lines of inquiry were merely cumulative of other evidence calling into question the genuineness of that fear. Argued February 18—officially released November 3, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his criminal trial counsel, P, had provided ineffective assistance insofar as she failed to conduct a proper investigation, to present available evidence supporting his self- defense claim, and to raise a third-party culpability defense. On the day of the shooting, the petitioner was arguing with the victim. Certain individuals who witnessed the incident agreed that an initial gunshot was fired by someone other than the petitioner or the victim. Several witnesses then saw the petitioner pull out a gun and fire in the direction of the victim. The petitioner fled the scene, and the witnesses heard more gunshots. At the habeas trial, the habeas court heard testimony from the petitioner, as well as eight witnesses, including six individuals, A, X, Y, J, W and R, who witnessed the events surrounding the shooting but who were not called by P to testify during the petitioner's criminal trial. A was the petitioner's sister, X was A's daughter and the petitioner's niece, Y was the sister to A and the petitioner, J was a friend of the petitioner and the victim, W was a close friend of the victim, and R was an acquaintance of both the petitioner and the victim. The court did not hear testimony from P because she had died prior to the habeas trial. The habeas court rendered judgment granting the habeas petition, reasoning that P's failure to call A, X, Y, J, W and R to testify at the petitioner's criminal trial prejudiced him by unduly diminishing his con- stitutional right to present a defense. On the granting of certification, the respondent appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the habeas court's judgment, concluding that the petitioner had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption that P had exercised her reasonable, professional judgment. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court clarified that, in cases such as the present one, in which the attorney who allegedly provided ineffective assistance is unavailable to testify at the petitioner's habeas trial, the framework of the inquiry into counsel's performance is not altered merely because of that unavailabil- ity, and the Appellate Court in the present case placed undue emphasis on the petitioner's failure to present P's testimony, as the petitioner's claim regarding P's performance turned on the objective reasonableness of the possible strategic reasons that P might have had rather than on P's subjective state of mind; moreover, this court's plenary review of the petitioner's ineffective assistance claims required it to examine the record of his criminal trial in the absence of P's testimony, as that record served as an informative window through which this court could identify P's possible strategic reasons and consider the objective reasonableness of those reasons, and such an approach was consistent with that taken in Connecticut and federal case law; furthermore, a habeas court's inquiry into the reasonableness of counsel's actions is not limited to a review of the criminal trial record, although the habeas court's evaluation of counsel's performance should begin with a thorough review of that record, as a court's conclusion is strong when it is based in evidence divined from the record, and when the criminal trial record does not reveal the reasons for counsel's decisions, the habeas court is required to affirmatively entertain other possible reasons and to rely on the presumption of reasonable, professional assistance. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that P's performance was constitutionally deficient on the ground that she had failed to adequately investigate and to call six eyewitnesses whose testimony would have supported his self-defense claim: P's failure to investigate X and Y was objectively reasonable, as P reasonably might have declined to investi- gate them given that their potential bias as close family to the petitioner might have undermined their credibility, that they were young at the time of the shooting, and that their testimony did not directly support a claim of self-defense; moreover, P's decision not to call A and J was objectively reasonable, as A's testimony did not directly support a claim of self-defense, P reasonably could have concluded that A's bias as the petitioner's sister might have undermined her credibility such that the damaging effect of her testimony would have outweighed its benefit, and the criminal trial record strongly supported the possibility that P made a strategic decision not to call J so that P would have a stronger basis on which to attack the sufficiency of the state's evidence regarding the requisite intent to commit murder, even though such a decision might have weakened the petitioner's self-defense claim; furthermore, irrespective of P's performance with respect to W and R, her failure to investigate or to call them as witnesses did not prejudice the petitioner, as this court could not conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the result of the petitioner's criminal trial would have been different if P had called W or R to testify in light of the facts that their testimony that the victim had a gun at the scene was duplicative of the testimony of the state's key witnesses at the petitioner's criminal trial, that W's testimony would have contradicted the petitioner's criminal trial testi- mony regarding a critical fact, and that R observed the shooting from a distance and could not identify the individuals who were present at the scene. 3. There was no merit to the petitioner's claim that P's performance was constitutionally deficient on the ground that P had unreasonably failed to raise a third-party culpability defense as a result of her inadequate investigation and decision not to call J and W as witnesses at the criminal trial; although J's and W's testimony that the victim's brother, K, fired his gun and the medical examiner's testimony regarding the path through which the bullet travelled after entering the victim's body may have supported an inference that the fatal gunshot was fired by K, not the petitioner, P reasonably may have believed that the third-party culpabil- ity defense was weaker than the petitioner's self-defense claim because the state had strong evidence to counter a third-party culpability narra- tive, as all of the witnesses testified that the victim did not fall to the ground until after the petitioner fired his gun, suggesting it was the petitioner's shot, and not the first shot fired, that struck and killed the victim. Argued May 3—officially released November 5, 2021

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on commercial property owned by the defendants that was comprised of parcel A and parcel B, and secured by a promissory note. A remedies provision in the mortgage agreement between the parties permitted the plaintiff to seek foreclosure by sale of both parcels. After the defendants defaulted on the promissory note, the plaintiff commenced the present action and requested that the trial court render judgment of foreclosure by sale of both parcels. After a trial, the court concluded that foreclosure by sale, rather than strict foreclosure, was the most appropriate remedy. The court determined that it was not bound by the remedies provision in the mortgage agree- ment but considered it as one factor in its balancing of the equities. In addition, the court, in balancing the equities, considered, inter alia, that the plaintiff successfully bargained for the right to select the remedy of foreclosure by sale and that it is generally an abuse of discretion not to order a foreclosure by sale when, as in the present case, the fair market value of the property substantially exceeds the amount of the debt. The trial court ordered the sale of both parcels, either together or separately depending on the defendants' preference, to protect the plaintiff's interest in its security and to ensure that any value realized in excess of the amount owed would redound to the defendants' benefit. The defendants appealed from the trial court's order of foreclosure by sale, claiming that the court should not have considered the remedies provision in the mortgage agreement and that foreclosure by sale of both parcels was inequitable when strict foreclosure as to parcel A would have fully satisfied the defendants' debt. Held: 1. The trial court having determined the method of foreclosure and the amount of debt, the defendants appealed from a final judgment, and the fact that the trial court's decision contemplated further orders regard- ing the details of the foreclosure sale did not affect the finality of the judgment for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a foreclosure by sale of both parcels: although strict foreclosure might have technically satisfied the debt owed by the defendants if the plaintiff had taken title to parcel A, it would have left the plaintiff in a position that it specifically had not bargained for, namely, holding title to real estate; moreover, it was not clear that strict foreclosure would have made the plaintiff whole in the way it envisioned when it acquired the mortgage, because strict foreclosure might have been ordered only as to parcel A, as the appraised value of that parcel was slightly greater than the amount of the defen- dants' debt, the plaintiff thereby would have been required to release its interest in parcel B, and, if the plaintiff had been unsuccessful in selling parcel A at its appraised value, it would have lost the ability to satisfy any deficit by selling parcel B; furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the remedies provision in the mortgage agreement as one factor in its consideration, as there was no principled reason why the court should have been barred from consider- ing the contract language in the parties' agreement when there was no argument that the parties were not on equal footing in negotiating the mortgage, the defendants' concern about an unfair windfall to the plain- tiff as a result of a forced sale of both parcels was unwarranted, as any proceeds from such a sale that exceeded the amount of the foreclosure judgment and costs of the sale would be returned to the defendants, and strict foreclosure as to only one parcel would have defeated the plaintiff's purpose in encumbering the two parcels with one mortgage to secure the defendants' debt. Argued February 25—officially released November 9, 2021

Pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute (§ 52-592 (a)), ''[i]f any action, commenced within the time limited by law, has failed one or more times to be tried on its merits because . . . the action has been otherwise avoided or defeated . . . for any matter of form . . . the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action . . . for the same cause at any time within one year after the determination of the original action . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 52-549z), unless a demand for a trial de novo is filed with the court within twenty days after an arbirator's decision in a civil arbitration has been mailed to counsel, that decision shall become a judgment of the court. The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries that resulted after she slipped and fell while boarding a passenger railcar operated by the defendant. The plaintiff had previously commenced a similar action against the defendant, claiming that her injuries were caused by a wet floor inside of the railcar and that the defendant negligently failed to prevent her fall. Before the commencement of trial in the prior action, the court ordered the parties to submit to civil arbitration pursuant to statute (§ 52-549u). The arbitrator found in favor of the defendant, and notice of the decision was issued. As a result of issues with the mail and staffing issues at the law firm of the plaintiff's counsel, the plaintiff's counsel did not become aware of the arbitration decision until twenty- two days after the decision was mailed. Because neither party demanded a trial de novo within twenty days of the mailing of the arbitrator's decision pursuant to § 52-549z, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff then commenced the present action pursuant to § 52-592 (a), claiming that her failure to demand a trial de novo in the prior action was due to excusable neglect. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, and the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the action was not viable under § 52-592 (a) because the first action was tried on its merits by the arbitrator and had resulted in a judgment in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing the action and remanded the case with direction to render judgment for the defendant. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the plaintiff's action could not be saved by § 52-592 (a) because her prior action was tried on the merits, and, accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed: an arbitration pursuant to § 52-549u is a quasi- judicial examination of the parties' claims, the parties submitted evi- dence to the arbitrator, who was empowered to receive evidence and to find facts, and the arbitrator examined that evidence and rendered a decision on the merits; moreover, allowing a new action to be com- menced under § 52-592 (a) in a case such as the present one would undermine the finality mandated by § 52-549z, and a more expansive reading of the phrase ''tried on its merits'' in § 52-592 (a) that incorpo- rates forms of summary adjudication, other than a formal trial, that turn on the merits of the particular claims presented produced a result more harmonious with existing case law; furthermore, the plaintiff's reliance on the remedial nature of § 52-592 was unavailing, as the nature of the arbitration proceeding itself and the statutory requirement in § 52-549z that an arbitrator's decision shall become a judgment of the court if no demand for a trial de novo is filed within twenty days of the mailing of that decision to counsel indicated that the present case was considered on its merits, and requiring adherence to the judgment that followed worked neither a surprise nor an injustice on the plaintiff. (Two justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued May 6—officially released November 15, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the state had failed to satisfy its burden of disproving his claim of self- defense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court improperly had denied his motion for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. While the defendant and his girlfriend, K, were drinking and socializing at a bar, they began to argue, and K struck the defendant in the face with a beer bottle. K then left the bar with the keys to their vehicle, and the defendant followed her. At the request of a bartender, several patrons, including the victim, went outside to check on K. As K was seated in the driver's seat of the couple's vehicle, the defendant punched her in the face. The victim and another patron pulled the defendant away from K, and the defendant and the victim started to argue. Another patron intervened, and the situation appeared to have calmed down, but, moments later, the defendant shot the victim three times with a gun that he had removed from the vehicle and then fled the scene. Shortly thereafter, the defendant fled to Canada. At trial, the defendant asserted that he had acted in self-defense and offered his account of the events. He testified, inter alia, that, at the time of the shooting, he thought that the victim was reaching for a gun because the victim had threatened him and had reached into the waistband of his pants. Following his conviction, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct after learning that, during deliberations, a juror, J, had consulted a dictionary for the definition of ''manslaughter.'' Following a hearing, at which the jurors, including J, were individually questioned, the trial court, relying on the standard set forth in State v. Johnson (288 Conn. 236), denied the defendant's motion, concluding that no actual prejudice had resulted from J's misconduct. Held: 1. The state presented sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of disproving the defendant's claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, there having been ample evidence to support a finding that, at the time of the shooting, the defendant did not subjectively or reasonably believe that the victim was about to draw a gun and to use deadly physical force against him: the evidence provided a reasonable basis for the jury to find that the victim was not armed and never acted in a violent or menacing manner toward the defendant and that, from the victim's perspective, the confrontation had deescalated and appeared to be resolved just before the shooting; moreover, the jury was free to discredit the defendant's version of events and to credit the testimony of the other witness and reasonably could have rejected the defendant's dubious explanation that he had retrieved his loaded gun, moments before shoot- ing the victim, to safeguard it rather than to use it to shoot the victim; furthermore, the jury could have given weight to the fact that, prior to the defendant's interview with the police, he never claimed to have acted in self-defense and the fact that, when he finally did so, he gave inconsistent accounts, and there was significant consciousness of guilt evidence from which the jury was free to infer that the defendant knew that his conduct was wrongful. 2. This court concluded that the presumption of prejudice articulated in Remmer v. United States (347 U.S. 227) applies when a defendant demon- strates that a juror consulted a dictionary definition of a material term that substantively differed from the legal definition of that term provided by the trial court, thereby shifting the burden to the state to prove that the exposure to the definition was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; in the present case, the defendant established his entitlement to the presumption of prejudice, as the dictionary definition that the juror consulted was of an essential legal term and it differed materially from the trial court's definition of the elements of manslaughter. 3. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, that court having correctly concluded that the juror misconduct caused no actual prejudice to the defendant, and, accordingly, the state's burden of proving that the misconduct was harmless necessarily was met: this court was not persuaded by the defendant's contention that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard simply because it framed its inquiry into the juror misconduct in terms of the misconduct's effect on the jurors' impartiality, as it was apparent that that court ascribed the proper, broader meaning to the term impartiality and that it used the term to encompass the critical questions relevant to a proper inquiry into the matter; moreover, the record clearly established that there was no reasonable possibility that any member of the jury relied on the dictionary definition to the defendant's detriment in reaching the verdict, as the trial court credited J's testimony that he had relied on only the court's instruction defining manslaughter and that the dictionary definition of manslaughter did not influence his decision in the case, and the other jurors credibly testified that their impartiality remained unaffected by any potential exposure to the extrinsic dictionary defini- tion, which dispelled any concern about their ability to be fair and impartial; furthermore, the trial court's conclusion was bolstered by the fact that the misconduct occurred before the court specifically directed the jury not to consult the dictionary and to rely exclusively on the elements noted in the court's instruction on the crime of manslaughter, and it was reasonable to presume that the jurors followed the court's instructions. Argued March 31—officially released November 23, 2021

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants. The defendants had executed a promissory note, which was secured by the mortgage on the defendants' property. The mortgage, which was guaranteed and insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), was later assigned to the plaintiff. Both the note and the mortgage contained provisions that conditioned the plaintiff's acceleration of the debt owed on the mortgage and the plaintiff's initia- tion of foreclosure proceedings, in the event of a default, on compliance with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulatory requirements. The defendants subsequently defaulted, and the plaintiff accelerated payment of the debt and commenced this fore- closure action. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, from which the defendants appealed to the Appellate Court. On appeal, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that compliance with the applicable HUD regulations was a condition precedent to acceleration of the debt and the initiation of foreclosure proceedings, the plaintiff was therefore required to prove compliance, and, because it had not done so, the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had proven its case was clearly erroneous. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the burden was on the defendants to plead and prove noncompliance with the HUD regulations and that they waived that special defense because they failed to assert it. On the granting of certification, the defendants appealed to this court, claiming that the Appellate Court had incorrectly determined that the burden was on them to plead and prove noncompliance with the applicable HUD regulations. Held that compliance with the applicable HUD regulations is a condition precedent to accelerating the debt and foreclosing on a mortgage that is guaranteed or insured by the FHA, such compliance, contrary to the Appellate Court's decision, must be pleaded and ultimately proven by the plaintiff lender, and, because the trial court did not require the plaintiff to establish compliance with the applicable HUD regulations, the case was remanded for a new trial limited to that issue: this court concluded, on the basis of its review of the applicable HUD regulations, their purpose, and the public policies that the compliance provisions in the note and mortgage were intended to advance, that those compliance provisions were intended to constrain the ability of lenders to accelerate the mortgage debt or foreclose without first providing homeowners with an opportunity to take informed steps to retain their homes, and, accordingly, the compliance provisions served as a condition precedent such that, if the condition of compliance was not fulfilled, the lender's right to acceleration and foreclosure did not come into existence; more- over, there was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that its compliance with the applicable HUD regulations was a condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent, as a lender's failure to comply with the applicable HUD regulations could not suspend a preexisting right to acceleration and foreclosure because there was no identifiable date on which the failure to comply occurred and no defined temporal period preceding the failure to comply during which the right to acceleration and foreclo- sure could have been asserted; furthermore, this court rejected the plaintiff's argument that, even if compliance with the applicable HUD regulations is a condition precedent to the foreclosure of a mortgage insured by the FHA, the defendant borrower should still shoulder the burden of pleading and proving noncompliance as a special defense, as HUD's policy statement with respect to the compliance provisions at issue and case law concerning that burden did not compel such a conclu- sion, and a lender is in the best position to know what specific steps it has taken to comply with the HUD regulations; accordingly, this court adopted a burden shifting procedure pursuant to which the plaintiff lender has the initial burden of pleading compliance with the applicable HUD regulations, if the defendant borrower contests compliance, he or she then has the burden of pleading noncompliance, after which the burden shifts back to the plaintiff lender to prove compliance, and, because the trial court never considered whether the plaintiff complied with the applicable HUD regulations, the Appellate Court's conclusion that, even if the burden was on the plaintiff to plead and prove compli- ance, evidence in the record supported the conclusion that it had met its burden was speculative. Argued February 26, 2020—officially released December 3, 2021

The plaintiffs, H and the cotrustees of certain trusts of which H was a beneficiary, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the Probate Court, which concluded that H's brother, P, had validly exercised his testamentary powers of appointment under certain trusts established for his benefit by directing in his will that the proceeds of the sale of stock in a family corporation, H Co., be distributed to a charitable trust that P had established. P and his five siblings, including H, were each a beneficiary of two trusts established by their father in 2002 and 2005, which were governed by Illinois and Connecticut law, respectively. In 2011, P and his siblings, except H, transferred their shares in H Co. to separate trusts, which also were governed by Illinois law. Pursuant to P's 2002, 2005 and 2011 trust instruments, P was granted a nongeneral testamentary power of appointment over the H Co. shares held in trust for his use and benefit. P could exercise his power of appointment only by specific reference in his will, but not in favor of himself, his creditors, his estate, or the creditors of his estate. Furthermore, if P failed to validly exercise his power of appointment, his trust property would be distributed equally to the trusts of his surviving siblings. In addition, the H Co. shareholder's agreement provided that, if a sibling exercises his or her power of appointment with respect to the H Co. shares held in his or her trusts, those shares shall be sold, within nine months of the sibling's death, in equal amount to the surviving siblings' trusts. After an accident rendered P a quadriplegic, P established the charitable trust in 2016, the purpose of which was to provide financial assistance to quadriplegics and their caregivers and to fund quadriplegia related research and initiatives. P thereafter executed a will in which he stated that he was exercising his testamentary powers of appointment over the H Co. shares held in his 2002, 2005 and 2011 trusts and directed that the proceeds from the sale of the H Co. shares be distributed to the 2016 charitable trust. P died in 2017, survived by his five siblings, and his will was admitted to probate. The Probate Court concluded that P's exercise of his powers of appointment was valid and ordered the trustees of the siblings' respective trusts to fund the 2016 charitable trust with the net proceeds of the sale of the H Co. stock. On appeal to the trial court, the plaintiffs claimed that P's exercise of his powers of appointment was invalid under both Connecticut and Illinois law because the 2016 charitable trust was not funded prior to P's death. The trial court, however, upheld the decision of the Probate Court and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, which included P's siblings other than H, their descendants, the trustees of their family trusts, and the trustees of P's trusts. On the plaintiffs' appeal, held that the trial court correctly concluded that P effectively and validly exercised his nongeneral testamentary powers of appointment to direct the proceeds of the sale of the H Co. stock held in his 2002, 2005 and 2011 trusts to the 2016 charitable trust, even though the 2016 trust was unfunded at the time of P's death: under both Connecticut and Illinois law, the exercise of a nongeneral power of appointment is valid and effective if the donee expresses an intent to exercise the power of appointment and the donee complies with any conditions imposed on the exercise of the power of appointment by the donor; in the present case, it was undisputed that P expressed in his will a clear and unequivocal intent to exercise his powers of appointment, and P complied with the conditions imposed on the exercise of those powers by the 2002, 2005, and 2011 trusts, as the 2016 charitable trust was an organization other than P, P's creditors, P's estate, or the creditors of P's estate, and P exercised his powers by specific reference in a valid will that was admitted to probate; moreover, although the 2016 charitable trust was unfunded prior to P's death and, therefore, was not a valid and enforceable charita- ble trust during P's lifetime, a trust need not be funded contemporane- ously with the execution of the trust documents, and the 2016 charitable trust became valid and enforceable when it was funded, after P's death, through the exercise of P's powers of appointment in his will; further- more, contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, the fact that P appointed the proceeds of the sale of the H Co. stock to a trust, rather than a trustee, did not render the exercise of his powers of appointment invalid and ineffective, as a trustee may be temporarily absent without destroying the trust or preventing its creation, especially in light of the axiom that a charitable trust must be construed liberally in order to carry out the charitable purposes of the individual who created the trust. Argued April 1—officially released December 6, 2021

In accordance with this court's decision in Simms v. Warden (230 Conn. 608), when a habeas court denies certification to appeal from its judgment or ruling, a petitioner may obtain appellate review only if he or she demonstrates, first, that the habeas court's denial of the petition for certification to appeal constituted an abuse of discretion and, second, that the habeas court's judgment or ruling should be reversed on its mer- its. The self-represented petitioner, who had been convicted in 1996, pursuant to a guilty plea, of sexual assault in the second degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he should be allowed to withdraw that plea. The petitioner's prison sentence and period of probation imposed in connection with his 1996 conviction had concluded before he filed his habeas petition. At the time he filed his habeas petition, however, he was incarcerated in Maine because of a violation of the conditions of supervised release that were imposed as a result of a 2012 conviction under federal law for failing to register as a sex offender, a requirement that was imposed on the basis of his 1996 conviction. The habeas court declined to issue the writ for lack of jurisdiction and rendered judgment thereon, concluding that the petitioner was not in the custody of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, as a result of the 1996 conviction when he filed his habeas petition. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court's judgment pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (g)), which the habeas court denied, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court. In his Appellate Court brief, the petitioner claimed that the habeas court had incorrectly deter- mined that he was not in the custody of the respondent and that he should be allowed to withdraw his 1996 guilty plea because it was made unintelligently and involuntarily. The petitioner did not allege that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certifi- cation to appeal and did not ask the Appellate Court to construe his argument on the merits as a demonstration of the habeas court's abuse of discretion in denying the petition for certification. The Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, concluding that the petitioner failed to brief the threshold issue of whether the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court properly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the habeas court's judgment on the ground that the petitioner failed to allege or demonstrate in his brief submitted to the Appellate Court that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certifi- cation to appeal; to obtain appellate review when a habeas court denies a petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner must at least allege that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his or her petition for certification to appeal, either by expressly arguing specific reasons why the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certifica- tion or by expressly alleging that his or her argument on the merits demonstrates an abuse of discretion, and there is no exception to such requirement for self-represented petitioners, as to hold otherwise would render both § 52-470 (g) and the two part showing required by Simms meaningless. 2. To ensure that the courthouse doors are not shut on potentially meritorious claims as a result of a technicality or an understandable ignorance of procedures, this court exercised its supervisory authority to direct that the Judicial Branch's Notice of Appeal Procedures (Habeas Corpus) form be revised to include language that explicitly describes the require- ment that a petitioner expressly claim in his or her appellate brief that the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied his or her petition for certification to appeal and explain how that discretion was abused. 3. Even if the Appellate Court had considered the petitioner's arguments regarding the merits of his claim that the habeas court incorrectly deter- mined that he was not in the respondent's custody when he filed his habeas petition, those arguments did not support the petitioner's claim, made for the first time in his appeal to this court, that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal: contrary to the petitioner's claim, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss (532 U.S. 394) does not permit a habeas petitioner to file a habeas petition that solely and directly challenges a conviction for which the petitioner is no longer serving the sentence imposed in connection with that convic- tion; moreover, the petitioner was not in custody for his 1996 conviction on the ground that he was required to register as a sex offender as a result of that conviction, as the sex offender registration requirement is remedial rather than punitive and, therefore, was not a part of his sentence but was a collateral consequence of his conviction, which generally is insufficient to satisfy the requirement that a habeas peti- tioner be in custody for purposes of filing a habeas petition. Argued March 24—officially released December 23, 2021

The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction precluding the defendant owner and defendant operator of a hotel located in a residential zone in the town of Madison, from hosting a series of free, weekly outdoor concerts on a grassy strip of land in a town park that is immediately adjacent to the hotel property. The hotel predates the enactment of the Madison zoning regulations, and, therefore, its operation was grandfathered and is permitted as a preexisting, nonconforming use in the residential zone. In addition, because the park existed in the residential zone prior to a 1979 revision to the town zoning regulations that requires a landowner to obtain a special exception to establish a park in a residential zone, it was grandfathered and is permitted as a preexisting, nonconforming use. The hotel scheduled, organized, and funded the concerts, and obtained the requisite permits from the town to host them. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendants, by hosting the concerts, had violated the town zoning regulations because the use of the park for concerts was an illegal expansion of the hotel's preexisting, nonconform- ing use of the hotel property. The trial court, relying on Crabtree Realty Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission (82 Conn. App. 559), granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The trial court rea- soned that, because the hotel could not host the concerts on the hotel property without illegally expanding that property's nonconforming use, it could not host the concerts on the grassy strip in the park without also violating the use restrictions applicable to the hotel property. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding, inter alia, that the trial court had improp- erly considered the restrictions applicable to the hotel property in evalu- ating the legality of the hotel's use of the grassy strip to host the concerts. The Appellate Court determined that the permitted uses of the grassy strip included all of the permitted uses of a park under the applicable zoning regulations, including free outdoor concerts. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the Appellate Court had improperly applied plenary review to the trial court's determination that the hotel's use of the grassy strip of land in the park illegally expanded the hotel's nonconforming use of the hotel property: the trial court's determination was predicated on the application of an incorrect legal standard, as Crabtree Realty Co. was not persuasive authority, and, even if it were, it did not support the trial court's determination, which ostensibly was based on a theory that the defendants' hosting of the concerts, in contributing to the hotel's business, annexed the grassy strip to the hotel; accordingly, because the trial court's factual findings were predicated on a misapprehension of the law, the court did not make the requisite findings necessary to conclude that the hosting of the concerts on the grassy strip violated the town zoning regulations, and the court's decision to grant the permanent injunction could not stand. 2. There was no merit to the plaintiffs' claims that the Appellate Court misapplied the actual use doctrine in concluding that the concerts were a permitted use of the park and that the defendants were required to prove that the park was actually used for concerts prior to the enactment of the special exception requirement in 1979; the Appellate Court cor- rectly determined that the park was irrevocably and actually committed to its use as a park prior to the 1979 enactment of the special exception requirement and that the defendants' use of the park to host free concerts was within the bounds of the permissible uses of the park, as defined in the town zoning regulations. 3. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the concerts were permitted under the town zoning regulation that limits the use of parks to active and passive recreational activities insofar as the trial court unequivocally found that the concerts, although free, were commercial rather than recreational in nature: the commercial nature of the concerts was irrelevant to the legal determination regarding the permissible uses of the park, and the trial court's focus on that issue was misguided; moreover, the trial court's analysis improperly made the permissibility of hosting a concert in the park turn on the subjective intent of the host, in violation of the zoning principle that zoning may be used only to regulate the use of land, not the user. Argued February 22, 2021—officially released January 5, 2022

The plaintiff bank, J Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant T. T's husband, R, had executed and delivered to J Co. a promissory note for a loan on December 11, 2006. T was not a signatory on the note. On the same date, T signed a mortgage deed for her property, which recited that it was given to secure a note dated December 11, 2006, that was signed by T as the borrower. The mortgage deed did not reference R. J Co. commenced its foreclosure action after the note went into default. J Co. subsequently withdrew the foreclosure action as to R, as he had been granted an unconditional discharge of the debt associated with the note in a separate bankruptcy proceeding. Thereafter, another bank, M Co., was substituted as the plaintiff, and it filed an amended complaint in which it sought, inter alia, a judgment of foreclosure and equitable reformation. The trial court rendered judgment for T on M Co.'s foreclosure and reformation claims, concluding that M Co. did not sustain its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was entitled to the equitable remedy of reformation of the mortgage deed. M Co. appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. On the granting of certification, M Co. appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's decision declining M Co.'s request to reform the mortgage deed executed by T to reference the fact that it was given to secure a note executed by R, as this court could not conclude that the absence of a finding by the trial court that the parties intended the mortgage deed signed by T to secure R's note was clearly erroneous: the language of the mortgage deed, the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the mortgage, and the conduct of the parties in relation to the mortgage deed and the note did not necessarily support M Co.'s claim that the parties intended the mortgage deed to secure the note signed by R, as the language of the mortgage deed did not mention R or any note executed by him, there was no evidence that M Co. or its predecessors in interest ever spoke with T prior to her execution of the mortgage deed or required her to secure the note as a condition of R's receipt of the net loan proceeds from the note, T did not attend the closing, and R used most of the proceeds he received to pay off credit cards that were his exclusive responsibility; moreover, although the mortgage deed referenced a note with the same date and in the same amount as the note that R signed, which M Co. claimed must be the note T agreed to secure, the evidence presented with respect to this issue fell short of the very high burden required to demonstrate mutual mistake, as M Co.'s immediate predecessor in interest acknowl- edged that T did not borrow any money from it or J Co., M Co. conceded that the mortgage deed was not intended to secure any note signed by T, and M Co. failed to present any testimony regarding whether J Co. intended T's signature on the mortgage deed to secure the note signed by R. 2. The Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's determination that M Co. was not entitled to foreclose the mortgage executed by T because T was not a borrower on the note; there was no merit to M Co.'s claim that foreclosure was the proper equitable relief on the grounds that it was undisputed that T entered into a mortgage transaction and common sense dictated that she intended her property interest to serve as security for the note contemporaneously executed by R, as the mortgage deed, as executed, was a nullity because it secured a nonexistent debt, and, accordingly, this court could not conclude that M Co. was entitled to foreclose a mortgage for a debt for which T was not responsible and that was not referenced in the mortgage deed. Argued October 22, 2020—officially released January 11, 2022

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation. The defendant previously had been convicted of two felony offenses and received a suspended sentence and five years of probation. The conditions of the defendant's probation prohibited him from vio- lating any state or federal criminal law and from possessing any ''fire- arm,'' as that term was defined by statute (§ 53a-3 (19)). While the defendant was serving his term of probation, he was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a firearm after the police found an airsoft pellet gun in his residence while executing a search warrant. In light of that arrest, the defendant was charged with violating the condi- tions of his probation. The court held an evidentiary hearing, at which a detective, W, testified that the airsoft pellet gun functioned as intended by its manufacturer in that it used air to push round, plastic projectiles out of the barrel. In response to a question from the court, however, W could not say whether it was capable of discharging a projectile with enough velocity to ''put a person's eye out.'' At the close of evidence, defense counsel moved for, inter alia, a finding of no violation of proba- tion, claiming that the state had failed to establish that the airsoft pellet gun was a firearm within the meaning of § 53a-3 (19), which defines ''firearm'' in relevant part as ''any . . . weapon . . . from which a shot may be discharged . . . .'' The court denied that motion and, instead, found that the airsoft pellet gun was a firearm under § 53a-3 (19) because it was capable of discharging a shot, namely, a six millimeter pellet. Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendant had violated the conditions of his probation prohibiting him from violating the law and possessing a firearm, and rendered judgment revoking the defendant's probation, from which the defendant appealed. Held that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's factual finding that the airsoft pellet gun found in the defendant's residence was a firearm within the meaning of § 53a-3 (19), and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to find no viola- tion of probation and to render judgment in accordance with that finding: pursuant to this court's previous construction of the phrase ''weapon . . . from which a shot may be discharged,'' as used in § 53a-3, the state, in order to prove that an instrument is a weapon capable of discharging a shot, must produce sufficient evidence to establish that it was designed for violence and that it was capable of inflicting death or serious bodily harm; in the present case, there was no evidence establishing the purpose for which the airsoft pellet gun was designed, and, in the absence of such evidence, it was pure speculation as to whether it was a toy designed for recreational use or an instrument designed for violence; moreover, the state failed to present any evidence from which it reason- ably could be inferred that the airsoft pellet gun in this case was capable of inflicting death or serious bodily harm, especially in light of W's inability to say whether it discharged its pellets at a velocity sufficient to injure a person by, for example, putting his or her eye out; accordingly, the trial court's factual finding that the airsoft pellet gun was a weapon capable of discharging a shot for the purpose of the definition of ''fire- arm'' under § 53a-3 (19) was clearly erroneous. Argued December 15, 2021—officially released January 14, 2022

The defendant appealed from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court following the termination of a stay in the defendant's bankruptcy case. The trial court had ruled that the defendant lacked standing to raise a defense in the foreclosure action that she failed to identify as an asset of the estate in the schedule of assets that she filed in her bankruptcy case, which was being adjudicated while the foreclosure action was pending. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court's ruling and affirmed the judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, claim- ing that the Appellate Court improperly treated a defense to a foreclosure action as being the same as claims and counterclaims, which, under the United States Bankruptcy Code, are property of the bankruptcy estate that must be disclosed. Held that the defendant's appeal was dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted, this court having determined, after examining the record and considering the par- ties' briefs and arguments, that there was no useful purpose in answering the certified question, the practical import of which was not apparent: the defendant's claim on appeal failed to characterize the Appellate Court's holding properly and to address the applicable legal issues, the parties' focus on whether the case law regarding nondisclosed claims and counterclaims in bankruptcy actions applied to nondisclosed defenses provided no useful guidance to this court on how to address the issues that arose from the Appellate Court's decision, and the parties failed to address whether a defense to a foreclosure proceeding is prop- erty under Connecticut law, whether the Appellate Court correctly con- cluded that, to the extent such a defense was not property, the defen- dant's failure to disclose constituted a misrepresentation of the property's value, and what remedy should follow from such a misrepre- sentation; moreover, because it dismissed the defendant's appeal, this court took no position as to the correctness of the Appellate Court's deci- sion. Argued October 18, 2021—officially released January 18, 2022