Volume 342 — Connecticut Reports

The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant's lengthy prison sentence had been imposed in connection with his conviction of kidnapping in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, and attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree. In his motion to correct, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner insofar as the sentencing court relied on materially false information, namely, a baseless and subsequently discredited theory alleging the rise of teenage superpredators who would terrorize society. The defendant specifically claimed that the sentencing court improperly imposed his sentence on the basis of its characterization of the defendant as a ''charter member'' of that group of superpredators. The trial court rejected the defendant's claim, concluding, inter alia, that the evidence supported the determina- tion that the defendant fit the definition of a ''superpredator,'' regardless of the validity of that theory, and that the sentencing court's remarks about the superpredator theory were not central to its sentencing deci- sion. On appeal from the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion, the defendant claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding that the sentencing court did not substantially rely on materially false information in sentencing him. Held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the superpredator theory constituted materially false and unreliable evidence on which the sentencing court substantially relied in imposing the defendant's sentence: this court reviewed social science research and government reports and concluded that the super- predator theory was baseless when it originally was espoused by a university professor in the mid-1990s and has since been thoroughly debunked and universally rejected as a myth; moreover, this court deter- mined that, in the context of the sentencing of the defendant, a Black teenager, the sentencing court's invocation of the baseless superpredator theory was especially detrimental to the integrity of the sentencing procedure, as the sentencing court relied on materially false, racial stereotypes that perpetuate systemic racial inequities, which historically have pervaded the criminal justice system, and as the sentencing court treated the characteristics of youth, namely, impulsivity, submission to peer pressure, and deficient judgment, as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor, in violation of the precedent of this court and the United States Supreme Court; furthermore, the sentencing court substan- tially relied on the materially false superpredator theory when it sen- tenced the defendant, as that court gave explicit attention to the theory when it expressly referenced the defendant's supposed status as a char- ter member of the superpredator group prior to imposing the defendant's sentence, and the court's discussion of the superpredator theory through- out its brief sentencing remarks demonstrated that the sentencing court's view of the defendant was shaped by the theory that there was a group of youths, including the defendant, who were destined to live an irre- deemable life of violence; accordingly, the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence was reversed, and the case was remanded with direction to grant the defendant's motion and for resentencing. Argued January 11, 2021—officially released January 21, 2022

Pursuant to the Public Accommodation Act (§ 46a-64 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of . . . sex . . . [or] to discriminate, segregate or separate on account of . . . sex . . . .'' Pursuant further to that act (§ 46a-64 (b) (1)), the provisions of § 46a-64 prohibiting sex discrimination ''shall not apply to . . . separate bath- rooms or locker rooms based on sex.'' The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the commission's human rights referee, who found that the defendants, E Co. and C Co., had not engaged in discriminatory public accommodations practices by providing sepa- rate women's only workout areas in their otherwise public fitness facili- ties. The complainants, two members of the defendants' respective gyms who both identified as male, filed complaints with the commission after they experienced delays in completing their workouts because they had to wait for other members to finish using the equipment in the coed portions of the facilities. The human rights referee concluded that the defendants did not violate § 46a-64 by maintaining women's only work- out areas and dismissed their complaints. On appeal to the trial court, that court recognized that a women's only workout area is neither a bathroom nor a locker room but nonetheless concluded that the defen- dants' provision of such areas did not violate the sex discrimination provisions of the Public Accommodation Act because there was an implied customer gender privacy exception encompassed within § 46a- 64 (b) (1). In so concluding, the court considered the privacy interests underlying the bathroom and locker room exceptions, as well as the burden that the elimination of women's only areas would place on women of certain religious practices. The trial court observed that, without an implied gender privacy exception, the provision of other types of separate facilities, such as showers, dressing rooms and hospital rooms, would constitute a violation of the act. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment dismissing the commission's administrative appeal, from which the commission appealed. Held that the trial court incor- rectly concluded that § 46a-64 (b) (1) contains an implied gender privacy exception that exempted the defendants' provision of women's only workout areas from the act's general prohibition against sex discrimina- tion, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to render judgment sustaining the commission's administrative appeal: it was undisputed that the defen- dants' gyms are places of public accommodation and that their provision of women's only workout areas constitutes a discriminatory practice under the act unless subject to a statutory exception, and, because women's only workout areas did not fit within the plain meaning of the terms ''bathroom'' or ''locker room,'' as gleaned from their dictionary definitions, this court concluded that the exceptions set forth in § 46a- 64 (b) (1) plainly and unambiguously did not encompass women's only workout areas; moreover, if the legislature had intended to include an additional exception to the act's general ban on sex based discrimination in public accommodations, it could have done so, as it did in the statute (§ 46a-60 (b) (1)) providing for an exception to the general ban on sex discrimination when sex constitutes a bona fide occupational qualifica- tion for a position of employment, and interpreting § 46a-64 (b) (1) to include an implied gender privacy exception would be inconsistent with the maxim that remedial statutes, like the act, should be construed liberally but that exceptions to remedial statutes should be construed narrowly; furthermore, the legislative history indicated that the legisla- ture had rejected a version of the act that exempted the provision of separate facilities for males and females ''based on considerations of privacy and modesty'' as being too broad and subjective, instead adopt- ing the cabined exception limited to ''separate bathrooms or locker rooms based on sex''; in addition, the fact that this court's construction of § 46a-64 may lead to results unintended by the legislature, as posited by the parties, the referee and the trial court with respect to lactation and dressing rooms, was not a reason to depart from the plain and unambiguous statutory text of the statute, and the sensitivity of the determination of where to limit antidiscrimination protections on the basis of sex rendered the issue uniquely well suited for consideration in the first instance by the legislature. Argued May 5, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The plaintiff sought to dissolve her marriage to the defendant. Thereafter, the defendant filed a cross complaint in which he sought enforcement of a postnuptial agreement that the parties had executed, which set forth terms for the distribution of property and for determining support awards in the event of the dissolution of the parties' marriage. The plaintiff subsequently filed motions for pendente lite alimony, attorney's fees, and expert fees. The trial court, relying on this court's decision in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (169 Conn. 147), concluded that it was not required to determine, prior to deciding the plaintiff's motions, whether the parties' postnuptial agreement was enforceable and deferred its decision on that issue until the end of trial. The court, after considering each party's financial resources and the fact that the plaintiff was com- pletely reliant on the defendant for financial support during the marriage, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff pendente lite alimony, attor- ney's fees, and expert fees. The defendant appealed from the trial court's orders, claiming that the trial court incorrectly had determined that it did not need to consider the enforceability of the parties' postnuptial agreement prior to awarding the plaintiff pendente lite alimony and litigation expenses. Held that the trial court properly relied on Fitzgerald and acted within its discretion in deferring its decision on the enforce- ability of the parties' postnuptial agreement until the end of trial, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's orders: the trial court's broad equitable powers and discretion in deciding matters arising in a dissolution action include the discretion to defer a decision on the enforceability of a marital agreement until the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate all issues in the case at a trial on the merits; moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention that Fitzgerald was distinguishable from the present case because it involved a separa- tion agreement rather that a postnuptial agreement, the underlying prin- ciple in Fitzgerald, that the validity of a marital agreement may be assessed when the case is tried on its merits, applies equally to all marital agreements, including prenuptial, postnuptial and separation agreements, and there was no merit to the defendant's assertion that this court had indicated in Bedrick v. Bedrick (300 Conn. 691) that reliance on Fitzgerald in the context of postnuptial agreements is mis- placed; furthermore, although this court was not unsympathetic to the defendant's argument that the holding in this case could work an injus- tice because the plaintiff would not have the means to make the defen- dant whole if the trial court ultimately determined, after a trial, that the parties' postnuptial agreement is enforceable and that it precludes an award of pendente lite alimony and litigation expenses, the defendant was not without a remedy in such circumstances, as the trial court could ultimately adjust any final financial orders to compensate the defendant for pendente lite payments that previously had been made in contraven- tion of the agreement. Argued September 17, 2021—officially released January 27, 2022

The plaintiffs, C and R, former state employees who are members of Tier II and Tier IIA, respectively, of the State Employees Retirement System (SERS), appealed to the trial court from the ruling of the defendant, the State Employees Retirement Commission. C's last day of paid state employment was in October, 2012, and R's last day of paid state employ- ment was in October, 2015. Thereafter, C and R each submitted an application for disability retirement benefits to the Retirement Services Division, which received R's application in March, 2016, and C's applica- tion in April, 2016. The Medical Examining Board for Disability Retire- ment granted the plaintiffs' applications, and payment of their benefits commenced on the first day of the month following the Retirement Services Division's receipt of their respective applications. Accordingly, R's benefits became payable on April 1, 2016, and C's benefits became payable on May 1, 2016. The plaintiffs subsequently filed with the com- mission a petition for a declaratory ruling, claiming that, under the State Employees Retirement Act (§ 5-152 et seq.), payment of disability retirement benefits commences on the day after an employee's last day of paid state employment. The commission rejected the plaintiffs' claim, concluding instead that disability retirement benefits are payable on the first day of the month after the Retirement Services Division receives the employee's application. The commission noted that, although the act is silent as to when disability retirement benefits become payable, the attorney general had issued an opinion in 1981, in which he concluded that, under Tier I of SERS, such benefits are not payable from the date of the employee's termination of employment. Moreover, the commission observed that it had implemented that interpretation of the act on a number of occasions since 1981 and that the legislature had not overruled that interpretation. In the plaintiffs' administrative appeal before the trial court, that court upheld the commission's ruling on the ground that the commission's interpretation of the act was entitled to substantial deference because it was time-tested and reasonable. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' administrative appeal, from which the plaintiffs appealed. Held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claims that the trial court improp- erly deferred to the commission's interpretation of the act on the basis that that interpretation was neither time-tested, insofar as it was not formally articulated or adopted pursuant to formal rule-making or adjudi- catory procedures, nor reasonable, insofar as the provisions of the act clearly and unambiguously provide that disability retirement benefits become payable on the day after the employee's last day of paid employment: a. The commission's interpretation of the act was time-tested: even if an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to no deference unless it had been adopted pursuant to formal rule-making or adjudicatory procedures, the commission attached to its ruling an exhibit showing that, since 1986, it has issued decisions in a number of cases applying the rule that disability retirement benefits commence on the first day of the month after the application is received, this court repeatedly has afforded deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute, as reflected in the agency's rulings in specific cases, and the plaintiffs did not explain why these cases were not issued pursuant to adjudicatory procedures; moreover, unlike agency interpretations that are set forth only in private correspondence and internal documents, which are not entitled to judi- cial deference, the commission's interpretation of the act in the present case had been formally articulated pursuant to adjudicatory procedures, namely, in the specific cases it cited in its exhibit; in addition, the attorney general's 1981 opinion had been distributed to the heads of all state agencies shortly after it was issued, presumably so that agencies could make the substance of the opinion known to any SERS member who inquired about the date on which disability retirement benefits become payable. b. There was no merit to the plaintiffs' claim that the commission's interpretation of the act, which was based on the attorney general's 1981 opinion, was unreasonable because it conflicted with the legislature's 1983 amendments to the act adopting tier II of SERS: the provisions (§§ 5-169 (j) and 5-192l (c)) of the act on which the plaintiffs relied did not specify the date that payment of retirement disability benefits commences but, rather, distinguished between the member's date of disability and date of retirement, nothing in the act indicated that the date a member becomes eligible for retirement disability benefits and the date that benefits become payable are identical, and, accordingly, the 1983 amendments did not clearly indicate that the attorney general's interpretation of the act was incorrect; moreover, although the act is silent regarding when disability retirement benefits commence and its express provisions do no compel the interpretation that the commission adopted, that interpretation was nonetheless reasonable, especially in view of the fact that the provisions of the act were negotiated by the state and representatives of the state employee unions pursuant to collective bargaining, and approved and codified by the legislature, and neither those parties nor the legislature, which were all presumed to have been aware of the attorney general's 1981 opinion and the commission's deci- sions applying its interpretation of the act, has sought to renegotiate the agreement or to amend the provisions of the act to reflect a different understanding, even though the legislature has amended the act several times since 1981; furthermore, because the express terms of the act provide that, for normal retirement, early retirement and hazardous duty retirement, retirement occurs after the date that an application is filed, and payment of retirement benefits commences on the day of retirement, it was reasonable for the commission to treat disability retirement consis- tently with these other forms of retirement; in addition, having disability retirement benefits become payable on the first day of the month after an application for such benefits is received allows the state to predict at any given time its potential liability for the payment of such benefits, changing the rule could subject the state to claims for retroactive pay- ments from members who are already retired, and it was appropriate for this court to defer to the commission's reasonable interpretation of the act in light of the gap that the legislature left in the act by failing to specify the date on which an employee's disability retirement benefits begin. 2. There was no merit to the plaintiffs' claim that the commission, as a fiduciary of the plaintiffs, had the burden of proving, by clear and con- vincing evidence, fair dealing with respect to its use of an unwritten practice to set a start date for disability benefits: when a breach of fiduciary duty is alleged, the burden of proof shifts to the fiduciary to prove fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence only when the dominant party is the beneficiary of the transaction or obtains a possible benefit, and, in the present case, the plaintiffs did not allege that the commission took advantage of its fiduciary relationship with SERS mem- bers to benefit itself; moreover, even if it were unfair for the commission to apply its unwritten interpretation of the act, the plaintiffs failed to raise a colorable claim because it would be anomalous to conclude that the commission must apply the plaintiffs' preferred interpretation, which also is not expressly set forth in the act or related regulations. Argued January 12, 2021—officially released February 1, 2022

Pursuant to the statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 52-584) setting forth the limitation period for actions brought against hospitals for negligence or medical malpractice, among other actions, such actions may not be ''brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . . .'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant hospital and its holding company for negligence for injuries she sustained while admitted to the hospital. On February 10, 2015, the plaintiff, while on fall prevention protocol, fell while using the restroom and sustained injuries to her shoulder and neck. She was discharged from the hospital two days later. On April 6, 2015, while receiving follow-up care at her physician's office, a staff member in that office informed the plaintiff that a nurse or nurse's aide should have been responsible for her safety while she was an inpatient at the hospital. On May 22, 2017, the plaintiff delivered the present action to the state marshal for service of process. Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff's action was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in § 52-584. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, reasoning that the plaintiff suffered actionable harm from the fall and injuries on February 10, 2015, and, having received a statutory ((Rev. to 2015) § 52-190a (b)) ninety day extension of the two year limitation period set forth in § 52-584, should have commenced her action on or before May 10, 2017. The trial court thus determined that the plaintiff's action was time barred insofar as she commenced her action on May 22, 2017. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court, relying on this court's decision in Lagassey v. State (268 Conn. 723), construed the term ''injury,'' for purposes of § 52-584, as synonymous with ''actionable harm,'' which occurs when the plaintiff discovers or should have discov- ered that the harm complained of was caused by the negligence of the defendant. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court should not have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because the evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff discovered her injury as contemplated by § 52-584. On the granting of certification, the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff commenced her action within two years from the date of her ''injury,'' as that term is understood in the context of § 52-584, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court's judgment: Connecticut case law was clear that the term ''injury,'' as used in § 52-584, means ''actionable harm,'' which occurs when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the harm complained of was caused by the negligence of the defendant, and the fact that the plaintiff averred that she did not know the cause of her fall or that the defendants were responsible for her safety while she was an inpatient at the hospital until April 6, 2015, was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding when her actionable harm occurred; moreover, there was no merit to the defendants' claim that, because the plaintiff's physical injuries from her fall were obvious, the Appellate Court improperly applied failure to diagnose or latent injury cases to the facts of this case, as the definition of ''actionable harm'' established in Lagassey and its progeny was applicable to all actions subject to § 52-584, regardless of whether the physical harm was obvious or latent; furthermore, the defendants could not prevail on their claim that the Appellate Court should have relied on this court's decision in Burns v. Hartford Hospital (192 Conn. 451), in which the plaintiff sustained obvious injuries, like the plaintiff in the present case, and in which the court determined that the limitation period set forth in § 52-584 began to run when the plaintiff sustained his injuries, as the plaintiff in Burns, unlike the plaintiff in the present case, became aware of the connection between his injuries and the defendants' negligence at the time that the injuries were sustained; in addition, contrary to the defendants' claim that, because Lagassey was decided after the statute (§ 1-2z) embodying the plain meaning rule became effective, the court in Lagassey improperly neglected to apply that rule and, pursuant to that rule, should have interpreted the term ''injury'' in § 52-584 to mean ''hurt, damage, or loss sustained,'' the court in Lagassey simply restated and followed this court's long-standing interpretation of ''injury'' for purposes of § 52-584 as actionable harm, this court saw no reason to abandon that long-standing interpretation in the present case, as the legislature, in enacting § 1-2z, did not intend for this court to overrule its prior interpretations of statutory language in cases decided prior to the enactment of § 1-2z, and the doctrine of stare decisis and the tenet of statutory interpretation that cautions against overruling case law involving this court's construction of a statute, if the legislature reason- ably may be deemed to have acquiesced in that construction, as in the present case, counseled against accepting the defendants' invitation to revisit Lagassey's interpretation of § 52-584. Argued November 17, 2020—officially released February 2, 2022

Convicted of the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in connection with the shooting death of the victim inside a nightclub, the defendant appealed to this court. Prior to the shooting, the defendant and several other individuals, including T, H and M, arrived at the nightclub. About forty-five minutes later, the victim arrived with his cousin, W, and a few friends. The victim's group and the defendant's group were at opposite ends of the nightclub's main room. Soon there- after, the defendant made his way toward the area where the victim's group was standing and stood behind them. Immediately after someone in the defendant's group threw a bottle at the victim's group, the defen- dant stepped forward, aimed a handgun at the back of the victim's head, and fired. The victim fell to the ground, and the defendant ran and exited the nightclub. Video from before, during and after the shooting was captured on surveillance cameras in or around the nightclub. Multi- ple witnesses who either knew the defendant or were acquainted with him provided testimony at the defendant's trial identifying him in the surveillance footage. On appeal to this court from the judgment of conviction, held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of four lay witnesses, T, H, M, and S, identifying the defendant as one of the persons depicted in the surveillance footage of the interior and exterior of the nightclub where the shooting occurred insofar as their testimony improperly embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, in violation of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 7-3 (a)): in State v. Gore (342 Conn. 129), this court amended § 7-3 (a) of the Code of Evidence to incorporate an exception to the ban on lay opinion testimony that embraces an ultimate issue for opinion testimony that relates to the identification of a criminal defendant depicted in a surveillance video or photograph, and such testimony is admissible if, in accordance with the provision (§ 7-1) of the Code of Evidence governing the admissibility of lay opinion testimony, it is rationally based on the perception of the witness and is helpful to a clear understanding of that witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; moreover, testimony identifying a defen- dant in surveillance footage meets the requirements of § 7-1 if there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the footage than is the jury, and that determi- nation should be based on consideration of several factors, in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the witness' general familiar- ity with the defendant's appearance, the witness' familiarity with the defendant's appearance, including items of clothing worn, at the time that the surveillance video or photographs were taken, a change in the defendant's appearance between the time the surveillance video or photographs were taken and the time of trial, or the subject's use of a disguise in the surveillance footage, and the quality of the video or photographs, as well as the extent to which the subject is depicted in the surveillance footage; in the present case, S, T and H had sufficient general familiarity with the defendant, as S was the defendant's foster mother, and all three witnesses had known the defendant for many years, and, although the degree of M's general familiarity with the defen- dant was low, she, T and H were with the defendant on the day of the shooting and were familiar with his appearance at the time that the surveillance footage was taken; furthermore, the fact that the defendant's appearance had changed between the time that the surveillance footage was recorded and the time of trial, as well as the quality of the video, weighed in favor of the admissibility of the challenged testimony. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly had admitted the expert testimony of E, a forensic examiner, regarding an enhanced video that he compiled from the raw surveillance footage of the nightclub and in which he tracked the movement of certain individuals throughout the nightclub using alphanumeric codes, on the ground that E's testimony invaded the province of the jury, in violation of § 7-3 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence: this court determined that expert testimony pertaining to the identification of a defendant in surveillance footage is admissible if it comports with the requirements of the provision (§ 7-2) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence governing the admissibility of expert testimony, and the trial court correctly con- cluded that E's testimony met those requirements, as E's experience and training in the area of forensic video analysis were extensive, his skill and knowledge were directly applicable to the jury's task of interpre- ting the surveillance footage, his expertise enabled him to analyze the surveillance footage in a manner that was beyond the ability of the average person, and his testimony and the enhanced video itself likely were helpful to the jury; moreover, E never identified the defendant as the shooter, the identity of the defendant as the shooter in the video was a determination left to the jury, and, therefore, E's testimony did not invade the province of the jury; accordingly, the trial court acted within its broad discretion in admitting E's testimony. 3. This court declined to address the defendant's claim concerning whether the trial court had incorrectly concluded that defense counsel opened the door to certain of E's testimony on redirect examination regarding the surveillance footage, because, even if that conclusion had been incorrect, the defendant failed to demonstrate that any error was harm- ful; although this court found it troubling that the trial court permitted E to testify, during redirect examination, that the notes of a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that the individ- ual labeled with a certain alphanumeric code in the enhanced video and who shot the victim was the defendant, insofar as the trial court, in doing so, undermined all attempts to distance E's testimony from directly identifying the defendant as the shooter, the state presented overwhelm- ing evidence that the individual in the video who was assigned that specific alphanumeric code shot the victim and that that individual was the defendant. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a special credibility instruction as to P, a witness who was in prison at the time of the defendant's trial and who, according to the defendant, should have been treated as a jailhouse informant when he testified that, one month before the shooting, he observed the defendant with a gun and acknowledged on cross-examination that he was hoping to receive favorable treatment in exchange for the information he pro- vided: the rule requiring a special credibility instruction for jailhouse informants did not apply to P's testimony, as that testimony did not relate to an inculpatory statement or confession that the defendant made to P while they were incarcerated together but, rather, concerned P's observations of the defendant outside of the prison context; moreover, although this court previously had expanded the special credibility instruction requirement to include informants who receive no promise from the state in exchange for their testimony and incarcerated wit- nesses who testify that the defendant confessed or made inculpatory statements to them outside of prison, it declined to adopt a rule requiring such an instruction for testimony regarding observed events but did not foreclose the possibility that a trial court could exercise its discretion to give a special credibility instruction when the witness' testimony relates to an event rather than to a statement; furthermore, defense counsel impeached P's credibility effectively during cross-examination, and counsel presented testimony from an expert witness who testified about the unreliability of jailhouse informants. (One justice concurring separately) 5. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly had denied his motion to suppress the out-of-court and in-court identifi- cations of the defendant made by W, who was the victim's cousin, was present at the nightclub on the night of the shooting, and had ''bad blood'' with one of the individuals in the defendant's group, this court having determined that, even if the identifications should have been suppressed, any error in admitting them was harmless: the state's case was strong and did not rely on eyewitness testimony but relied, instead, on the fact that the defendant was captured in the surveillance video shooting the victim; moreover, defense counsel impeached W's credibil- ity thoroughly and effectively during cross-examination, highlighting many inconsistencies in W's stories as they evolved each time he met with law enforcement, and also highlighting that W waited for approxi- mately three and one-half years to come forward to the police, that he was incarcerated and faced a lengthy sentence when he did finally come forward, and that he had a motive to lie because he was testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement; furthermore, the testimony of the defendant's expert witness concerning the unreliability of jailhouse informant testimony further reinforced W's motivation to lie, the trial court gave a special credibility instruction as to W, reminding the jury that W was testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement, and W's testimony was cumulative of other, more persuasive evidence. 6. The defendant's claim that the state had presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of the crime of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver that the gun in question have a barrel length of less than twelve inches was unavailing: although the gun that the defendant allegedly was holding when he shot the victim was not introduced into evidence and no person testified that he or she saw the gun on the night of the shooting, that gun was visible in the surveillance footage and appeared to be approximately the size of the shooter's hand; moreover, the expert testimony of a firearm and tool mark examiner and the testimony of P that, approximately one month prior to the shooting, he saw the defendant in possession of a semiautomatic hand- gun that was slightly larger than P's own hand, provided further support for a finding that the gun barrel was the requisite length. Argued November 19, 2020—officially released February 7, 2022

Pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 4-160b (a)), ''[t]he Office of the Claims Commissioner shall not accept or pay any subrogated claim or any claim directly or indirectly paid by or assigned to a third party.'' The plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of the decedent, J, sought to recover damages from the state for the allegedly wrongful death of J, who died while under the medical care of certain of the state's employees at a state university hospital. The plaintiff had filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, seeking permission to bring a medical malpractice action against the state for the alleged negligence of those state employees in prescribing certain medications to J, which allegedly resulted in J's death. Before the plaintiff received a decision from the claims commissioner, however, he filed a separate negligence action against the pharmacy that had filled J's prescriptions, C Co., and certain of C Co.'s corporate affiliates. Thereafter, the plaintiff received authori- zation from the claims commissioner and commenced the present action. Subsequently, the plaintiff's action against C Co. was settled for $2 million. The state then moved to dismiss the present action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of sovereign immunity, claim- ing that, in light of the settlement with C Co., the medical malpractice claim against the state had been ''indirectly paid by . . . a third party'' within the meaning of § 4-160b (a). The trial court denied the state's motion to dismiss, concluding that § 4-160b (a) applies only to subro- gated or assigned claims and not to payments made by joint tortfeasors. On appeal from the trial court's denial of the state's motion to dismiss, held that the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the state was not ''indirectly paid by . . . a third party'' within the meaning of § 4-160b (a) by virtue of the plaintiff's settlement with C Co., and, accordingly, this court upheld the trial court's denial of the state's motion to dismiss: the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the state was not paid indirectly by a third party when C Co. paid the plaintiff $2 million to settle the plaintiff's action against C Co., as this court previously had concluded that the term ''claim,'' which is defined in relevant part by statute (§ 4-141 (1)) as ''a petition for the payment or refund of money by the state,'' must be read to refer to claims for monetary damages against the state, the negligence action against C Co. was not a ''claim,'' as defined by § 4-141 (1), because it was an attempt to recover monetary damages from a private corporation for its own independent acts of alleged negligence in causing J's death instead of a request for monetary damages from the state, and the settlement proceeds the plaintiff received in the plaintiff's action against C Co. constituted a direct payment to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the plaintiff's separate and distinct claim for monetary damages against C Co.; moreover, the common-law prohibition against double recovery, which precludes a plaintiff from recovering twice for a single loss, did not bar the plaintiff's claim against the state, as the amount of the plaintiff's loss had not been adjudicated on the merits, a judgment in damages had not been rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and no such judgment had been paid in full; furthermore, a plaintiff's settlement with one tortfeasor does not necessarily represent the plaintiff's fair, just and reasonable damages or constitute full compensation for the entire amount of his loss, and, to the extent the state believed that the plaintiff had been fully compensated for J's death in light of the settlement with C Co., the state could file a notice of apportionment or introduce evidence of that settlement in a trial to the court. Argued October 18, 2021—officially released February 9, 2022

Convicted of the crime of assault in the second degree in connection with an incident in which she attacked the victim, causing her to suffer a concussion and facial disfigurement, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction on the ground that there was no evidence that she intended to cause the victim serious physical injury. The defendant had been employed as a technology assistant at a school, and the victim was her supervisor. On the day of the incident, the defendant arrived late to work and was informed that the victim had the key to the information technology laboratory. When the defendant located the victim in a hallway, the victim asked her if she just arrived at work and advised her that, if she was having trouble getting to work on time, they could arrange a different schedule for her. The defendant became agitated and, putting her face directly in the victim's face, stated that she was not ''going to kill herself'' to get to work on time. When the victim told the defendant to ''get out of [her] face,'' the defendant called the victim a ''fucking bitch,'' punched her in the nose, and threw a cup of coffee at her. The victim tried to get away from the defendant, but the defendant pursued her down the hallway and, when the defendant caught up with her, began to scratch and punch the victim, as the victim pleaded with her to stop. When the victim fell to the floor, the defendant grabbed her by the hair and repeatedly slammed her head against a cinder block wall, causing the victim to black out. The defendant then stood over the victim and repeatedly kicked her in the side. Eventually, M, a paramedic who had just dropped off his son at the school, was able to pull the defendant off of the victim, after which the defendant became compliant and cooperative. The victim was subsequently diagnosed by medical person- nel with a nondisplaced fracture of the right nasal bone, a concussion, and severe postconcussion syndrome. At trial, the defendant testified that it was never her intention to cause the victim serious physical injury, explaining that, on the day of the incident, she was tired and experiencing considerable physical pain, that, when the victim, with whom she did not get along, confronted her in the hallway about being late, she became enraged, and that she could not recall most of what had transpired during the incident because she had blacked out. Held: 1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of assault in the second degree, as the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had intended to cause the victim to suffer serious physical injury and, acting with such intent, caused her to suffer two such injuries, namely, a concussion and facial disfigurement: there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant had intended to cause the victim to suffer serious physical injury, as the defendant, after expressing anger toward the victim and calling her a ''fucking bitch,'' committed numerous acts that indicated such intent, including punching the victim in the nose, throwing coffee at her, scratching the victim, grabbing the victim by the hair and repeatedly slamming her head against a cinder block wall, and kicking the victim while she was knocked down; moreover, the jury was not required to credit the defendant's testimony that, although she intended to hurt the victim, she did not intend to cause her serious physical injury, and was free to disbelieve the defendant's testimony that she did not recall most of what transpired after the assault began because she blacked out or because she was seized by uncontrollable rage. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly limited defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim regarding her pending civil action against the defendant, which arose out of the same incident that gave rise to the defendant's conviction, and improperly declined to admit into evidence the complaint in that civil action: a. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court's alleged error was not of constitutional magnitude, as the defendant's right to cross-exami- nation was not unduly restricted under either the federal or state constitu- tion: defense counsel was permitted to question the victim about the fact that she had filed a civil action against the defendant seeking money damages, about the allegations in the civil complaint pertaining to both the assault and her physical injuries, and about any inconsistencies between those allegations and her statements to the police and her testimony at trial; accordingly, the jury was able to appropriately draw inferences relating to the victim's credibility and reliability as a witness, as well as any financial interest that she may have had in the outcome of the case; moreover, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that the alleged error was of constitutional magnitude insofar as the trial court did not permit defense counsel to question the victim about the amount of damages that she sought in her civil action, as this court and the Appellate Court previously have sustained similar limitations on cross-examination regarding civil actions that arose out of the same circumstances that precipitated the criminal charges against the defen- dants in those cases. b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defense counsel from questioning the victim more extensively about the specific details of the victim's civil action against the defendant, as it reasonably could have determined that allowing defense counsel to probe the victim regarding the specific dollar amount claimed in the civil action and to introduce the complaint itself into evidence could have led to a more extensive inquiry by both parties regarding the basis for the victim's damages claims, thereby opening the door to collateral evidence concern- ing the victim's claims for past and future medical expenses, lost earnings and earning capacity, pain and suffering, and emotional distress, the latter a subject that the defendant herself sought to preclude the admission of, in her prior motion in limine, due to the prejudicial nature of that evidence; accordingly, the trial court struck an appropriate balance between the defendant's right to cross-examination and her own effort to preclude evidence of the emotional impact of the assault on the victim and her family, and defense counsel's inquiry, taken as a whole, was sufficient to establish the victim's potential interest or financial motive in testifying as she did. 3. The trial court correctly determined that M, a paramedic with ten years of experience and special training in diagnosing concussions, was quali- fied to testify as an expert witness regarding signs a paramedic looks for in evaluating a patient for a concussion: the court acted within is discretion in concluding that M had special knowledge suitable to aiding the jury in deciding the issue of whether the victim had sustained a serious physical injury as a result of the defendant's attack on her, and the fact that M did not physically examine the victim did not render his expert testimony inadmissible; moreover, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting M's expert testimony, any error was harmless, as M's testimony was merely cumulative of the testimony of three other expert witnesses. Argued October 22, 2021—officially released February 10, 2022

Pursuant to statute (§ 36a-492 (c)), the Commissioner of Banking ''shall automatically suspend the [license] of a mortgage lender'' on the date that its surety bond is cancelled, but no automatic suspension shall occur if, prior to that date, the lender either provides proof of reinstatement of the bond or secures a new bond, or the lender ''has ceased business and has surrendered [its license] in accordance with subsection (a) of section 36a-490 . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 36a-490 (a) (1)), any mortgage lender that holds a mortgage lender license and intends to permanently cease engaging in the business of mortgage lending shall file a request to surrender the license, and no surrender is effective until accepted by the Commissioner of Banking. The plaintiff, a mortgage lender, appealed from the trial court's dismissal of its administrative appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Banking to revoke the plaintiff's mortgage lender license. In 2018, the plaintiff and the defendant Department of Banking had been engaged in an enforcement proceeding that concerned the revocation of the plaintiff's license for reasons unrelated to the present appeal. In May, 2019, the issuer of the plaintiff's surety bond, which a lender is required to have in order to maintain its mortgage lender license, sent a notice to the plaintiff and the department, stating that the plaintiff's bond was going to be cancelled effective July 31, 2019. Upon receiving that notice, the department created a routine entry in the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry (NMLS), indicating that the plaintiff's failure to replace or reinstate the bond would result in an automatic suspension and revocation of the plaintiff's license. The department also sent a letter to the plaintiff on June 7, 2019, stating that its failure to have a bond in effect on July 31, 2019, would result in the automatic suspension of its license. The plaintiff delayed in responding to the letter but ultimately sent an e-mail to the department on July 29, 2019, stating that it was voluntarily surrendering its license. The Commissioner of Banking did not accept the plaintiff's purported surrender of its license and, on July 31, 2019, made an online entry in the NMLS reflecting that the plaintiff's license was suspended. The following day, the department sent a series of notices to the plaintiff informing it that its license was suspended. After a hearing, the commissioner upheld the suspension, concluding that the plaintiff's failure to maintain a surety bond supported the license revocation. In dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal, the trial court concluded, inter alia, that the commissioner had not abused his discretion in declining to accept the plaintiff's purported surrender of its license. On the plaintiff's appeal from the trial court's judgment, held that § 36a-492 and the relevant statutory scheme granted the commissioner the legal authority to suspend and revoke the plaintiff's mortgage lender license, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment: this court, having reviewed the text of § 36a-492 (c), concluded that the use of the word ''shall'' in that statutory provision was mandatory, and, therefore, the commissioner is statutorily required to suspend a mortgage lender license in the event of a surety bond cancellation unless the lender demonstrates that it had the bond rein- stated or secured a new bond, or that it ceased doing business and surrendered its license in accordance with § 36a-490 (a); in the present case, the commissioner was statutorily required to suspend the plaintiff's license insofar as the plaintiff's surety bond was cancelled, the plaintiff did not obtain a letter of reinstatement of the bond or secure a new bond, and it did not effectively surrender its license before the cancellation of the bond, because, even if this court construed the plaintiff's July 29 e-mail to the department as a request to surrender, there was no evidence in the record that the commissioner accepted that surrender, which is a prerequisite to the surrender of a license in accordance with § 36a- 490 (a) (1); moreover, in light of the ongoing enforcement proceeding between the plaintiff and the department, any surrender or request to surrender would not have been effective because, pursuant to statute (§ 36a-51 (c) (1)), a surrender or request to surrender a license during an ongoing enforcement action does not become effective ''except at such time and under such conditions as the commissioner by order determines,'' and the commissioner never set the time or conditions for the plaintiff's surrender or purported request to surrender its license; furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that the depart- ment or the commissioner should not be permitted to decline to take action on a request to surrender, and, in any event, there was no indica- tion that the department unreasonably delayed in responding to the plaintiff's purported request to surrender; in addition, the trial court correctly concluded that the department was not estopped from sus- pending and revoking the plaintiff's license on the basis of representa- tions the department made in its June 7 letter to the plaintiff, as it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to interpret that letter as any type of promise or to rely on the letter to the exclusion of the clearly applicable statutory scheme, which was explicitly referenced in that letter. Argued October 21, 2021—officially released February 16, 2022

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dissolving her marriage to the defendant. During the course of pretrial proceedings, the plaintiff failed to comply with certain of the trial court's standing trial manage- ment orders. As a result of numerous motions for continuances, discov- ery disputes and the plaintiff's failure to comply with the orders, the trial court held several hearings and status conferences during which the plaintiff repeatedly would attempt to speak to the court directly instead of through counsel. In response, the trial court would advise the plaintiff to speak through counsel and granted continuances to allow her to confer with counsel. Throughout trial, the plaintiff continued to fail to comply with trial management orders and failed to submit her more than 500 exhibits to the court in an organized fashion, in violation of the court's pretrial orders concerning the submission of exhibits. Ultimately, the trial court awarded the plaintiff approximately 50 percent of the marital assets but ordered the plaintiff to pay certain of the defendant's legal fees and imposed sanctions on her for her failure to comply with the court's orders regarding the submission of exhibits. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court's judgment should be reversed because the court improperly had prejudged her credibility and displayed judicial bias. In support of her claim, the plaintiff referred to two sets of comments that the court had made during the course of the proceedings. Because neither the plaintiff nor her counsel objected to those comments, she sought to prevail on her unpreserved claim under the plain error doctrine. The first set of comments occurred during a telephonic conference when the court was in recess. During that conference, while the plaintiff and her counsel were on hold, the court could be heard on an audio recording saying ''I just am not [going to] have that stupid woman talk,'' and saying to the court clerk during another recess that ''[a]t least she'll pay for an expedited report,'' and that that was ''because of [the plaintiff],'' and that the plaintiff ''was [going to] be a mess until we get it done.'' The second set of comments occurred during the course of trial, when the trial court stated ''[j]ust know it's a complete waste of time'' and asked ''[a]re you having a good time yet?'' On appeal from the trial court's judgment, held that the plain error doctrine did not require reversal of the trial court's judgment, as the court's comments did not constitute obvious error resulting in manifest injustice: although the court's comments were intemperate, no reason- able person would question the trial judge's impartiality, as the com- ments were isolated remarks made on brief occasions, after years of litigation, during a twenty-eight day trial that took place over the course of one year, and, when the comments were viewed in context, they merely showed a momentarily and understandably exasperated jurist attempting to advance a lengthy and contentious proceeding; moreover, the comments did not reflect an opinion derived from an extrajudicial source, the court awarded the plaintiff approximately 50 percent of the marital assets, and the court repeatedly accommodated the plaintiff and patiently sought to unravel the morass of discovery and procedural issues that occurred during the litigation without declaring a mistrial; furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that the trial court's award of attorney's fees and sanctions for her failure to comply with the trial management orders resulted in a denial of her due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard, as the trial court repeat- edly gave the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding her failure to comply with the court's orders and gave her multiple opportunities to comply even though she failed to do so. Argued October 13, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

Convicted of various crimes, including murder, in connection with a home invasion, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence a dual inculpatory statement made by a codefendant, C, to E, a fellow prison inmate. The defendant's cousin, N, had included the defendant and C in N's plan to rob the victim, with whom N had previously engaged in drug transactions. N drove the defendant and C to the area of the victim's home, which the defendant and C eventually entered. After encountering the victim, C shot and killed him. While in custody on an unrelated charge, C recounted the events of the home invasion, including the defendant's role, to E, who surreptitiously recorded the conversation. At trial, the recording of C's conversation with E was admitted as a statement against penal interest under the applicable provision (§ 8-6 (4)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. In addition, defense counsel, in order to advance a theory of third-party culpability, sought to have the defendant's sister, M, testify about a purported confession that P, N's cousin, made to M. The trial court excluded M's testimony regarding P's confession on the ground that it was not sufficiently trustworthy. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting into evidence C's dual inculpatory statement to E: a. The admission of C's statement did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation under the United States constitution: in Crawford v. United States (541 U.S. 36), the United States Supreme Court indicated that statements of a defendant's coconspirator to a fellow inmate incul- pating the defendant are nontestimonial, and, subsequently, federal and state courts have consistently rejected claims that the admission of statements between inmates or between an inmate and an informant that inculpate a defendant violate the defendant's right to confrontation; moreover, in determining whether the admission of such statements implicates a defendant's right to confrontation, courts have undertaken an objective analysis of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements and the encounter during which they were made in order to assess the primary purpose and degree of formality of that encounter; in the present case, C's statement to E was elicited under circumstances in which the objectively manifested purpose of the encounter was not to secure testimony for trial, as C made his statement in an informal setting, namely, his prison cell, to his cellmate, E, who questioned C in a sufficiently casual manner to avoid alerting C that C's statement was going to be relayed to law enforcement. b. The admission of C's statement did not violate the defendant's confron- tation rights under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution: although the defendant urged this court to depart from the federal stan- dard and to hold, under the state constitution, that a statement qualifies as testimonial if the reasonable expectation of either the declarant or the interrogator/listener is to prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution, this court was not convinced that the defen- dant established the necessary predicates for departing from the federal standard, as an analysis under the six factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) did not support a more protective interpretation under the state constitution; moreover, although this court noted that it might be compelled to reach a different result under a slight variation of the facts, in the present case, the court had a fair assurance that government officials did not influence the content or the making of C's statement, as there was no evidence to suggest any involvement by the state's attorney's office in orchestrating the inquiry or that the police coached E on what questions to ask or what facts they were seeking to learn, and, because the conversation between C and E was recorded, the trial court could ascertain the extent to which, if any, C's answers may have been shaped or coerced by E. c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting C's statement under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence as a statement against penal interest: although the fact that the statement was made thirteen months after the commission of the crimes weighed against its admission, and although E and C, who were fellow inmates for only a short period of time, did not share the type of relationship that would support the statement's trustworthiness, C's account of the home inva- sion was consistent with the physical evidence in almost all material respects, the statement was clearly against C's penal interest, as he cast himself as the principal actor in the commission of the crimes, and C's statement and the circumstances surrounding the making of that statement had none of the characteristics that historically has caused courts to view dual inculpatory statements as presumptively unreliable when offered to prove the guilt of a declarant's accomplice. 2. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had properly excluded P's confession to M, which the defendant attempted to offer through M's testimony as a statement against penal interest under § 8- 6 (4): the trial court reasonably concluded that P's purported confession, in which he admitted that it was he, and not the defendant, who accompa- nied C into the victim's home, was not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted as a statement against penal interest, as much of the evidence that the defendant characterized as corroborative indicated only that P may have played some role in connection with the home invasion, not that P had been present in the victim's home; moreover, P's confession was made more than one year after the incident, and M claimed to have told no one except the defendant about P's confession for more than three and one-half years after P made the confession, delays that pro- vided M with the opportunity to learn of the details of the prosecution's theory of the case. Argued February 22, 2021—officially released March 22, 2022

Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and two counts of risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly had overruled defense counsel's objections to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to excuse two prospective jurors, C and N, and that his conviction of two counts of risk of injury to a child violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. C is an African-American, and N is also a member of a racial minority. The prosecutor had explained that the basis for the peremptory challenges to C and N was their stated distrust of law enforcement and/or the criminal justice system. Specifically, the prosecutor relied on N's state- ments during voir dire indicating that she previously had been convicted of a crime for which she received a pardon, that she had resented the police at the time she was arrested but no longer felt that way, and that her husband's friend had previously pleaded guilty to sexual assault but that she did not believe the truth of the allegations against him. With respect to C, the prosecutor relied on the fact that, although C had disclosed an incident involving a larceny on his juror questionnaire, he also revealed during voir dire an undisclosed conviction resulting from an assault of a police officer, for which C believed he was unfairly prosecuted. Defense counsel objected to the peremptory challenges on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky (476 U.S. 79), which prohibits a party from challenging pro- spective jurors solely on account of their race. The trial court overruled the Batson challenges, concluding that the reasons proffered by the prosecutor, namely, N's resentment toward the police and her criminal conviction resulting in a pardon, as well as C's prior arrest for a serious crime for which he believed he was unfairly prosecuted, were race neutral and not a pretext for discrimination. From the judgment of conviction, the defendant appealed. Held: 1. The trial court did not commit clear error in determining that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the jury selection process in the present case was tainted by purposeful discrimination: a. The defendant conceded that the distrust of law enforcement and/or the criminal justice system is a race neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge under federal constitutional law, and this court declined to conclude, on the basis of the record in the present case, that such negative perceptions constitute a facially discriminatory reason for exercising a peremptory challenge under the Connecticut constitution: although neither the text nor the history of the relevant provisions (article I, §§ 1, 8, 19 and 20, as amended) of the Connecticut constitution shed any light on the scope of permissible reasons for peremptory challenges, federal precedent provided no support for the defendant's claim, and sister state precedent did not provide overwhelming support for that claim, this court's recent decision in State v. Holmes (334 Conn. 202) signaled a shift in this state's precedent toward ensuring the impartiality of juries by addressing the problems of implicit bias and disparate impact during jury selection; moreover, in Holmes, this court recognized that significant public policy and sociological reasons support the conclusion that a negative perception of law enforcement is not a race neutral reason for excluding a prospective juror, considering the disparate impact those reasons have on racial minorities and, to that end, announced in that case the creation of the Jury Selection Task Force to study and propose changes to the jury selection process in Connecticut that would remedi- ate the issue of racial discrimination and implicit bias in jury selection; nonetheless, principles of judicial restraint counseled against this court's making a new constitutional pronouncement on this issue, as the Jury Selection Task Force recently had proposed a new rule of practice to address these concerns, the proposed rule had been submitted to the judges of the Superior Court for consideration, and the rule-making process was ongoing; accordingly, this court declined to hold in the present case that greater protection was warranted under the Connecti- cut constitution than is provided under the existing federal Batson scheme. b. The trial court's finding that the reasons proffered by the prosecutor for peremptorily challenging C and N were not a pretext for impermissible discrimination was not clearly erroneous; the record indicated that the prosecutor questioned all of the prospective jurors in a similar manner as to whether they, or someone close to them, had ever been arrested or charged with a crime, any affirmative responses to those questions were followed by questions regarding the details of any arrest or charge and whether it would influence the prospective juror, the more extensive questioning of C with regard to his criminal history was reflective of the incomplete answers that he provided in his questionnaire and during voir dire rather than reflective of a racially discriminatory intent, and there was no evidence of a pattern of discrimination by the prosecutor in excluding prospective jurors of a particular race. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated because risk of injury to a child, with which the defendant was charged, is a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree: even if it was assumed that the offenses in question arose from the same act or transaction, the defendant failed to show that those crimes constituted the same offense for double jeopardy purposes under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299), and this court, in a recently decided case, State v. Tinsley (340 Conn. 425), rejected the defendant's argument that, notwithstanding the distinct elements of each offense charged, a court should consider the facts alleged in the information when determining whether the statutory ele- ments of each offense are the same under Blockburger; in the present case, the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree each required proof of a fact that risk of injury to a child did not, as sexual assault in the first degree required proof that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim and was more than two years older than the victim, sexual assault in the fourth degree required proof that the defendant intentionally subjected some- one under the age of fifteen to sexual contact, and the particular risk of injury offenses of which the defendant was convicted required proof of neither of those facts; moreover, because the defendant did not argue that that the legislature had intended that risk of injury to a child, on the one hand, and sexual assault in the first or fourth degree, on the other, should be considered the same offense, he could not rebut the presumption that those crimes did not constitute the same offense under Blockburger. Argued February 26, 2021—officially released March 22, 2022

A jury found the defendant guilty of intentional manslaughter in the first degree, reckless manslaughter in the first degree, and misconduct with a motor vehicle, among other crimes. The defendant had been driving her vehicle at a high rate of speed when she struck the driver's side of the victim's vehicle. The defendant then ran her vehicle into the victim's vehicle from behind, causing the victim's vehicle to strike a tree, which resulted in the victim's death. At the defendant's sentencing hearing, the state moved to vacate the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction, citing to State v. Polanco (308 Conn. 242) and its progeny, in which this court held that the proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation arising out of cumulative convictions is to vacate one of the convictions rather than merging them. The trial court granted the state's motion and vacated the intentional manslaughter conviction for sentenc- ing purposes. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the jury's verdict of guilty of intentional manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and miscon- duct with a motor vehicle, the latter of which involves the criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle that causes the death of another person, was legally inconsistent because each of those crimes requires proof of a mutually exclusive mental state. The Appellate Court deter- mined that neither reckless manslaughter nor misconduct with a motor vehicle was inconsistent with intentional manslaughter but agreed that the defendant's conviction of reckless manslaughter and misconduct with a motor vehicle was legally inconsistent insofar as the defendant could not have consciously disregarded the risk of the victim's death while simultaneously failing to perceive that same risk of death. The Appellate Court rejected the state's argument that the proper remedy for the legal inconsistency was to remand the case with direction to reinstate the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction and, instead, reversed the judgment of the trial court in part, vacated the defendant's conviction of reckless manslaughter and misconduct with a motor vehicle, and ordered a new trial as to those counts and the intentional manslaughter count. The state, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court improperly ordered a new trial on the intentional manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and misconduct with a motor vehicle counts instead of reinstating the defendant's intentional man- slaughter conviction and resentencing the defendant: although the state did not dispute that the defendant's conviction of reckless manslaughter and misconduct with a motor vehicle was inherently inconsistent and, therefore, was properly vacated by the Appellate Court, this court had clarified in Polanco and its progeny that the adoption of vacatur as the appropriate remedy for cumulative convictions did not preclude the reinstatement of a defendant's vacated conviction if it was vacated to avoid a double jeopardy violation and was not affected by the legal inconsistency that necessitated the reversal of the controlling offense or offenses of which the defendant had been convicted; in the present case, the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction was vacated for the purpose of avoiding a double jeopardy violation, as a review of the record demonstrated that, at the defendant's sentencing hearing, the prosecutor specifically cited to case law concerning vacatur that was developed and applied in the context of double jeopardy violations and indicated that the vacatur request was consistent with the state's theory at trial that the two strikes to the victim's vehicle arose from a single act that was either intentional or reckless, and the prosecutor was apparently under the belief that vacating one of the manslaughter counts was necessary to avoid the imposition of cumulative punish- ments; moreover, the vacated intentional manslaughter conviction was not affected by the legal inconsistency that necessitated the vacating on appeal of the defendant's conviction of reckless manslaughter and misconduct with a motor vehicle, namely, the impossibility of con- sciously disregarding the risk of the victim's death while simultaneously failing to perceive that same risk of death, because the crime of inten- tional manslaughter requires the jury to find only that the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person and that she caused the death of such person or of a third person, not that she had a specific mental state with respect to creating a risk of death; accordingly, because the defendant's intentional manslaughter convic- tion was not tainted by the inconsistency in the jury's verdict and was vacated to avoid a potential double jeopardy violation, this court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court as to the remedy for the jury's inconsistent verdict only, upholding the Appellate Court's vacating of the defendant's conviction of reckless manslaughter and misconduct with a motor vehicle but remanding the case with direction to reinstate the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction, to sentence the defendant on that count, and to resentence her on her conviction of two other counts unrelated to the counts of manslaughter and miscon- duct with a motor vehicle. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed on the alternative ground that that court incorrectly had concluded that her intentional manslaughter con- viction was not inconsistent with her conviction of reckless manslaugh- ter and misconduct with a motor vehicle: a. The defendant's conviction of intentional manslaughter and reckless manslaughter was not legally inconsistent: the crime of intentional man- slaughter requires only that the defendant had the intent to cause serious physical injury to a person and caused the death of such person or of a third person, whereas the elements of reckless manslaughter include the requirement that the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death to another person, and, therefore, the mental state requirements for the two offenses did not relate to the same result; accordingly, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant simultaneously acted intentionally and recklessly with respect to different results, in that she specifically intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim and, in so doing, consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her actions created a grave risk of death to the victim. b. The defendant's conviction of intentional manslaughter and miscon- duct with a motor vehicle was not legally inconsistent: the mental state required for misconduct with a motor vehicle, namely, that the defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the manner in which she operated her vehicle would cause the death of another person, was not mutually exclusive with the mental state required for the crime of intentional manslaughter, namely, that the defendant had the intent to cause serious physical injury; because the defendant could have intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim, as required for intentional manslaughter, while, at the same time, have failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the manner in which she operated her vehicle would cause the victim's death, as required for misconduct with a motor vehicle, the mental state elements of each crime did not relate to the same result. Argued October 20, 2021—officially released March 29, 2022

The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant planning and zoning commission, which had denied their application for a special permit to construct a crematory on property owned by one of the plaintiffs in a business park in the town of Bethel. The property is located in a business park in one of the town's two industrial zones. Prior to submitting their application, the plaintiffs proposed a text amendment to the town's zoning regulations that would make the operation of a crematory a specially permitted use in the town's indus- trial zones. The commission approved the text amendment, and the plaintiffs submitted their special permit application and an application to construct and operate a crematory on the property. After public hearings, the commission voted to deny both the plaintiffs' special permit application and their application to construct and operate a crematory. The commission reasoned that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that their application satisfied the general standards for special permits set forth in the relevant provision (§ 8.5.E) of the town's zoning regulations. Relying on the Appellate Court's deci- sion in St. Joseph's High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission (176 Conn. App. 570), the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal, concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission's denial of the plaintiffs' special permit application based on the general criteria for special permits set forth in § 8.5.E. The plain- tiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. On the granting of certifica- tion, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the Appellate Court misinterpreted and improperly expanded its holding in St. Joseph's High School, Inc.: the Appellate Court's holding in St. Joseph's High School, Inc., that a planning and zoning commission may deny an application for a special permit on the basis of generalized considerations but must rely on specific evidence that relates directly to the site under consider- ation was consistent with this court's precedent requiring that the review of a a special permit application must involve a fact specific inquiry related to the specific site proposed, and the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court reliance on that case was proper; moreover, this court declined the plaintiffs' request to impose a rebuttable presump- tion that a specially permitted use in a zoning district is compatible with other uses in the district, as the particularized, fact intensive scrutiny the plaintiffs proposed is embedded in the existing standard. 2. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the commission's denial of the plaintiffs' special permit application was supported by substantial evidence, as the reasons enumerated by the commission for denying the application were not supported by site specific facts that pertained to the considerations enumerated in § 8.5.E of the town regulations but, rather, were grounded in facts regarding crematory operations generally, development decisions motivated by general objections, and evidence not pertinent to the required considerations, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and directed that court to reverse the trial court's judgment and to remand the case with direction to sustain the plaintiffs' appeal and to order the commission to approve the plaintiffs' special permit application: a. There was not substantial evidence of adverse environmental effects on which to deny the plaintiffs' application; the evidence and data pur- portedly demonstrating adverse environmental effects were not specific to the site of the proposed crematory or did not address the mode of operation proposed for the plaintiffs' crematory, and the only environ- mental evidence specific to the plaintiffs' proposed facility indicated that it would not likely have an adverse environmental effect. b. There was not substantial evidence that the proposed crematory would have a detrimental effect on neighboring properties and residences or the development of the district: in the absence of specific evidence that the proposed crematory negatively affected neighboring properties, various testimony elicited at the public hearings, including that of the president of a company located on property abutting the plaintiffs' prop- erty, that a crematory in the business park would place the park at a competitive disadvantage, decrease property values, and cause property and business owners to sell their properties, rethink expansion plans, or leave town, amounted to mere speculation, and those generalized concerns did not rise to the level of substantial evidence of adverse economic impact sufficient to support the commission's denial of the plaintiffs' special permit application; moreover, testimony from neigh- boring property owners that they would not have purchased their respec- tive properties if they had known about the proposed crematory, and testimony from the owner of several properties in the business park that he had listed those properties for sale as a result of his emotional and psychological opposition to the crematory, reflected speculative con- cerns and a generalized ''not in my backyard'' objection that could not, by itself, serve as substantial evidence for denying the plaintiffs' special permit application. c. There was not substantial evidence to support the commission's deter- mination that the proposed crematory did not comply with the town regulations because it would require an excessive amount of excavation and fill activity and would have a negative effect on commercial business: although the topography of the site required the plaintiffs to obtain an excavation and fill permit, the commission did not cite to any evidence, such as particular standards or measurements, to support its determina- tion that the excavation and fill activity was excessive, and the fact that the plaintiffs originally preferred to locate the crematory in an existing building instead of constructing a new building was not relevant to the suitability of the location that was ultimately proposed; moreover, the commission did not cite to any evidence on which it relied in determining that businesses may have a decreased ability to attract and to retain customers, and a review of the record revealed no such evidence. d. There was not substantial evidence to support the commission's con- clusion that the proposed crematory did not comply with the general standards in the town regulations because of the plaintiffs' inability to screen the crematory from the view of neighboring properties; the evi- dence on which the commission relied, namely, testimony from individu- als objecting to viewing or being exposed to the crematory and a study on the effect of a crematory on residential housing sales in a town in Wyoming, did not constitute substantial evidence insofar as the study was not specific to the site of the proposed crematory and in light of the absence of evidence as to how the proposed facility would be so stylistically inconsistent with the remainder of the business park as to affect property values. Argued September 17, 2021—officially released April 5, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea under North Caro- lina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), of risk of injury to a child and strangulation in the third degree in connection with a domestic violence incident in which he assaulted the victim in the presence of their minor child, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petitioner's trial counsel, C, had engaged in numerous plea negotiations, and the state made several plea offers, each one calling for a guilty plea and incarceration. Subsequently, C convinced the trial court to fully suspend the period of incarceration in light of the victim's recantation with respect to the incident. The petitioner ultimately pleaded guilty in exchange for a suspended sentence and probation. In his habeas petition, the petitioner alleged that C's performance violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel insofar as C failed to inquire about the petitioner's immigration status and failed to properly advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Specifi- cally, the petitioner alleged that C had access to information that the petitioner was not a United States citizen and failed to inform the peti- tioner that he would almost certainly be subject to deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea to the felony of risk of injury to a child. At his habeas trial, the petitioner presented testimony from C and the prosecutors involved in the petitioner's criminal case. The petitioner also testified before the habeas court that he did not know whether he would have gone to trial if he had been properly advised of the immigra- tion consequences of his plea. The habeas court found that the prosecu- tors testified credibly that they were not willing to consider dropping the risk of injury charge against the petitioner and, therefore, that there was no evidence that there was another, more favorable plea offer that was available to the petitioner. The habeas court concluded that, even if it were to presume that C's performance was deficient, the petitioner did not prove that he would have rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial, or have accepted an alternative offer. Accordingly, the habeas court denied the petitioner's habeas petition. The petitioner ultimately was deported after the habeas court rendered judgment denying his petition. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed. Held that the habeas court properly denied the petitioner's habeas petition, as the petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing that, but for C's allegedly deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the state's plea offer and proceeded to trial, and, therefore, the petitioner failed to establish prejudice: the petitioner admitted at his habeas trial that, even with the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge that he would be deported, he was not sure that he would have proceeded to trial; moreover, notwithstanding the petition- er's claims that there was a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the state's plea offer and proceeded to trial insofar as the state's case against him was not very strong and his testimony indicated that he would have made decisions that favored better immigration conse- quences, those factors could not overcome the petitioner's own testi- mony at the habeas trial that he still was not sure whether he would have proceeded to trial; furthermore, the habeas court made a specific and undisputed factual finding that there was no more favorable plea offer available to the petitioner in light of the credible testimony of the prosecutors that they would not have considered dropping the risk of injury charge against the petitioner, and the petitioner's testimony during the habeas trial that he would have approached the plea agreements ''differently'' was of no legal import insofar as he had failed to establish that there were any reasonably probable and more favorable alternatives available to him. Argued October 20, 2021—officially released April 12, 2022

Convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. Prior to the shooting, the defendant was involved in a dispute with the victim, after which the victim drove by the defendant's apartment and shot the defendant, and the defendant fired back at the victim. The defendant's close friend, A, thereafter stated an intention to seek revenge against the victim. Approximately two weeks later, the victim was shot and killed at a café in New London. In an interview with the police after the victim's murder, the defendant told them that, on the night of the victim's murder, he and A had traveled directly from Boston to a nightclub in Norwich located approximately twelve miles away from the café, thereby indicating that he and A were not present at the café at the time of the murder. The defendant and A were subsequently charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder, but the conspiracy charges were dismissed prior to trial. The trial court granted the state's motion to join the cases against the defen- dant and A for trial. At trial, A's girlfriend, E, testified that A told her that he had shot someone on the night the victim was killed. Bullet casings from the scene of the shooting at the defendant's apartment and from the murder scene were submitted to the state forensic laboratory. A ballistics analyst, P, examined the evidence and generated a written report containing his findings. S, who also was employed at the labora- tory, served as a technical reviewer of P's report. P died before trial and was therefore unavailable to testify. The state subsequently sought to admit testimony from S, and the court denied the defendant's motion to preclude S's testimony. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder as a principal or an accessory. The Appellate Court affirmed the defen- dant's conviction, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in joining the defendant's case with A's case for trial: the state's case against the defendant and the state's case against A both arose from the shooting death of the victim, most of the state's evidence would have been admissible against both the defendant and A if their cases had been tried separately, and the defendant's and A's defenses were not antagonistic because each served as the other's principal alibi witness, the defendant and A both having claimed that they were together at a certain nightclub at the time of the shooting; moreover, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that joinder was improper on the ground that E's testimony regarding A's admission that he had shot someone on the night of the victim's murder could not have been admitted into evidence against the defendant under the coconspira- tor exception to the hearsay rule, because, contrary to the defendant's claim, that hearsay exception is applicable even in cases, such as the present one, in which the defendant is not facing a conspiracy charge at the time of trial. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the admis- sion into evidence of certain information regarding the location of his cell phone (CSLI) around the time of the victim's murder violated his fourth amendment rights insofar as the police obtained that information without a warrant: the admission of the defendant's CSLI was harmless because evidence other than the defendant's CSLI placed the defendant close to the crime scene at the time of the victim's murder, including CSLI from the cell phone of A, who maintained at trial that he and the defendant were together the entire evening, and there was additional evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant and A had lied about being at the Norwich nightclub at the time of the murder, including testimony from a witness that he saw the defendant and a man matching A's description entering that nightclub fifteen to twenty minutes after the witness was told that the victim had been shot; moreover, there was evidence that the defendant and A were driving in a rented silver vehicle on the night of the murder, and witnesses testified that a man matching A's description ran from the scene of the shooting and entered a vehicle matching the description of the rented vehicle, the defendant's and A's DNA were found in that vehicle, and a substance found in the interior of that vehicle possessed genetic characteristics similar to those of the victim. 3. Although the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the defendant's right to confrontation was not violated when the trial court allowed S, an employee of the state forensic laboratory to testify about certain findings made by P, a ballistics analyst with the same laboratory who was unavailable to testify at the defendant's trial, the admission of S's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: a. The defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was violated when the trial court allowed S to testify about certain of P's findings regarding the ballistics evidence in the case, the defendant having been deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine P with respect those find- ings; although S was asked about his own analysis and conclusions in connection with his independent review of the ballistics evidence, S was also asked during direct examination about certain evidence that P had reviewed, and about which P had made findings, but that S had no recollection of reviewing himself, and, because, in those instances, S relied solely on P's findings rather than his own, the state indirectly communicated P's findings to the jury through S's testimony. b. The admission of S's testimony about P's findings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as S's testimony was cumulative of other evidence, including S's testimony regarding his analysis and conclusions based on his independent review of the evidence, from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that the firearm that the defendant used to fire back at the victim at the defendant's apartment was the same weapon that was used to kill the victim; moreover, other evidence presented at trial provided the jury with a strong evidentiary basis to conclude that the defendant had ready access to the type of firearm that was used to murder the victim, and there was other compelling evidence of the defendant's guilt, including DNA evidence, motive, and evidence that placed the defendant close to the café at the time of the victim's murder. Argued October 14, 2021—officially released April 12, 2022

The plaintiff C sought to recover compensatory and punative damages from the defendants, K and T Co., for, inter alia, breach of a partnership agreement in connection with a failed business venture. In 2004, C and K had agreed to form a partnership to pursue investment opportunities. In furtherance of that agreement, they established numerous companies, including and principally T Co., an investment advisory company incor- porated in the Cayman Islands. C and K each held a 50 percent equity interest in T Co. through entities controlled by C and K. The shares of stock representing C's interest were owned by A Co. and H Co., and the shares of stock representing K's interest were owned by P Co. Over time, C and K's relationship deteriorated, and, in 2012, with no notice to C, T Co.'s board of directors voted to remove C as a director, which left K exclusively in charge of T Co. Thereafter, K proceeded to treat T Co. and its assets as his own, and C was excluded from any involvement in T Co.'s affairs. A Co. and H Co. subsequently filed a petition in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands to wind up T Co. and to liquidate and divide its assets between K and C. P Co. opposed the petition by asserting as an affirmative defense that C had breached his fiduciary duty to T Co. in numerous ways. The Cayman Islands court granted the petition and rejected P Co.'s affirmative defense, concluding that there was no merit to any of the allegations against C. Meanwhile, K, through P Co., brought an action in federal court against C, A Co., and other related entities. T Co. was thereafter substituted as the plaintiff in the federal action and claimed that C had breached his fiduciary duty to T Co. in numerous ways. T Co.'s specific allegations against C substantially reprised the allegations P Co. had asserted in the winding up proceeding. Following the decision of the Cayman Islands court, the District Court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants in the federal action on the ground that T Co. was collaterally estopped from pursuing its claims. While the federal action was still pending, C filed the present action against K and T Co., alleging, breach of partner- ship agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, and libel per se. The libel claim was predicated on a 2013 press release K had issued following the decision of the Cayman Islands court, in which K accused C of stealing T Co.'s customer database and misappropriating its business opportunities, and of paying Cayman Islands liquidators to interfere in the federal action. Following a trial, at which C's expert witness on damages, S, testified that the press release had cost C more than $20 million in lost profit, the jury returned a verdict in favor of C, awarded him $9.4 million in damages, and authorized the imposition of punitive damages, which the trial awarded in the amount of approximately $3 million. K filed a motion to set aside the verdict, arguing, with respect to the verdict on the libel claim, that the record was devoid of evidence supporting S's testimony regarding lost profit because his testimony was predicated on the false assumption that C's hedge fund and private equity fund had $250 million under management in 2012 when it was undisputed that C and his companies had no money under management at that time. The trial court denied K's motion to set aside the verdict, concluding that any error involving the admission of S's testimony was harmless because it was clear that the jury, having awarded C only $4 million in compensatory damages in connection with the libel claim, did not fully accept S's testimony and because, although the jury was instructed that it could award C compensatory damages only if he proved that he lost profits as a result of the harm to his reputation from the press release, that instruction was an incorrect statement of the law, as C was not required to prove actual damages or lost profits in a libel per se case. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment for C, from which K appealed. Held: 1. K could not prevail on his claim that C's claims in the present action were barred by the federal compulsory counterclaim rule (Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (a) (1)) on the ground that they were compulsory counterclaims in the federal action, as that rule was inapplicable because there had been no decision on the merits of the claims T Co. asserted in the federal action; in light of the equitable principles of res judicata, estoppel, and waiver underlying rule 13 (a) (1), a court need not apply the rule when to do so would be unjust, such as when a decision on the merits was not rendered in the prior action, and, therefore, regardless of whether K had been a party to the federal action, rule 13 (a) (1) would not bar C's claims in the present action because the District Court determined that T Co. was collaterally estopped from pursuing it claims in the federal action, and it would be anomalous for this court to conclude that C's claims were barred by principles of res judicata, estoppel, or waiver due to C's failure to assert them as counterclaims in an action that itself was barred by those principles. 2. There was no merit to K's claims that C's breach of partnership agreement and breach of fiduciary duty claims failed as a matter of law under Karanian v. Maulucci (185 Conn. 320), in which the court indicated that, if partners adopt the corporate form to insulate against personal liability, they cease to be partners, and that any partnership C and K created ceased to exist when they incorporated T Co., among other entities, in 2006: Karanian did not control C's claims because, unlike the partners in that case, who intended to and did reorganize their partnership into a corporation, there was no evidence in the present case that C and K ever intended to adopt the corporate form in place of their partnership, but, rather, the evidence indicated that C and K's partnership was an overarching entity comprised of numerous compa- nies owned by C, K, and their families, acting in concert to further the remunerative goals of the partnership, and K cited no authority holding that a partnership cannot operate in such a manner; moreover, insofar as K claimed that the evidence did not support a finding that he and C were ever partners, although the evidence of a partnership was not overwhelming, it was sufficient to support the jury's finding of an oral agreement between C and K to carry on, as co-owners, a business for profit and that they carried on that business from 2004 until at least 2013. 3. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting S's testimony on damages with respect to C's libel per se claim: it was undisputed that S's testimony that C sustained more than $20 million in lost profit as the result of K's 2013 press release had no basis in fact; moreover, the trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could award special damages only if it found that C had proven lost profit and that instructional error was not harmless, as this court could not conclude that the jury would have awarded C $4 million in general damages in connection with C's libel claim but for that error, there was no other evidence to support the award for lost profit, and, therefore, the damages award could not stand; furthermore, because the record revealed that a component of the trial court's punitive damages award was a success fee for C's counsel in the amount of 25 percent of the total compensatory damages award, which included the $4 million award for C's libel claim, the punitive damages award also could not stand; accordingly, the judgment was reversed as to C's libel claim and the case was remanded for a new trial on that claim and for a hearing in damages. Argued October 13, 2021—officially released April 12, 2022