State v. Thomas

286                   June 11, 2025              No. 534

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
                LEVI WILLIAM THOMAS,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
              Josephine County Circuit Court
                   23CR03701; A182389

  Pat Wolke, Judge.
  Submitted April 23, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Rond Chananudech, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Emily N. Snook, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  POWERS, J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)             287

        POWERS, J.
         Defendant pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of
a vehicle (UUV), ORS 164.135, and reckless driving, ORS
811.140, and he was sentenced to probation on both counts.
As part of the sentence for UUV, the trial court revoked
defendant’s driving privileges for one year and imposed a
$15 “License Suspension Assessment.” See ORS 809.240(1)(a)
(providing that a trial court shall revoke driving privileges
upon conviction of an offense that results in mandatory
revocation under ORS 809.409); ORS 809.409(4) (addressing revocation for a conviction of any felony “with a material element involving the operation of a motor vehicle”);
ORS 809.267 (providing that a “court shall add a $15 fee
to the judgment in any case in which the court gives notice
to the Department of Transportation of the suspension or
restriction of a defendant’s driving privileges”). On appeal,
defendant argues that the court lacked authority to revoke
his driving privileges and impose the assessment because
operation of a motor vehicle is not a “material element” of
the crime of UUV for purposes of ORS 809.409. We affirm.
          Defendant’s argument is predicated on the view
that, in determining whether a conviction is for a felony
“with a material element involving the operation of a motor
vehicle” under ORS 809.409, the trial court must look only
to the statutory elements of the offense and not the factual
circumstances supporting those elements. However, we
recently rejected that view of the statute in State v. Schriner,

, 

 (2024), rev allowed, 

(2025), which was decided after defendant filed his opening
brief. In Schriner, we construed “material element” in ORS
809.409(4) to mean “that the factual circumstance supporting the elements of the offense must be closely related to
the operation of a motor vehicle.” Id. at 884. Thus, a “court’s
determination whether a qualifying conviction requires it
to order the revocation of a person’s driver’s license must
be based on the entire factual record supporting the conviction.” Id. at 885.
        Here, as in Schriner, there does not appear to be
any dispute that the factual circumstances supporting the
elements of defendant’s offense were closely related to the
288                                         State v. Thomas

operation of a motor vehicle. Defendant was charged with
and pleaded guilty to having “unlawfully and knowingly
operate[d] a motor vehicle, to wit: GMC Jimmy, without
the consent of the owner.” Because the trial court was permitted to consider those factual circumstances under ORS
809.409(4), and not just the statutory elements of the offense
of UUV, we affirm the revocation of defendant’s license and
imposition of the related $15 assessment.
        Affirmed.