No. 486 June 4, 2025 41
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
LUKE HOKULE WALTERS,
Petitioner,
v.
PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD,
Respondent.
Psychiatric Security Review Board
102478; A175054
Submitted June 3, 2024.
Harris S. Matarazzo filed the brief for petitioner.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Robert A. Koch, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
42 Walters v. PSRB
KAMINS, J.
Petitioner seeks review of an order by the Psychiatric
Security Review Board (PSRB) following a “five year” jurisdictional hearing finding him under its jurisdiction, continuing him on “conditional release,” and denying his community treatment provider’s request that he be “discharged”
from the PSRB’s jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that he is
no longer under the PSRB’s jurisdiction because he is no longer affected by a qualifying mental disorder and requests
that the PSRB order his discharge. ORS 161.346(1)(a);
ORS 161.351(1). We agree with petitioner that, based on the
record as a whole, no reasonable person could find that he
continues to have a qualifying mental disorder, and so we
reverse.1
I. BACKGROUND
The PSRB has exclusive jurisdiction over individuals with a qualifying mental disorder who are found guilty
except for insanity of a felony and present a substantial danger to others. ORS 161.327. If the PSRB, however, finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that a person under its jurisdiction “is no longer affected by a qualifying mental disorder,
or, if so affected, no longer presents a substantial danger to
others that requires regular medical care, medication, supervision or treatment,” the PSRB must release that person from
its jurisdiction. ORS 161.351(1); ORS 161.346(1)(a);.2
1
Our conclusion that the PSRB failed to establish that petitioner has a qualifying mental disorder obviates the need to address petitioner’s second assignment
of error, arguing that, in the event that the PSRB is correct that he has a qualifying mental disorder, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the
PSRB’s determination that petitioner presents a “substantial danger to others.”
2
ORS 161.346(1)(a) provides:
“When the Psychiatric Security Review Board conducts a hearing under
ORS 161.315 to 161.351, the board shall enter an order and make findings in
support of the order. If the board finds that a person under the jurisdiction of
the board … [i]s no longer affected by a qualifying mental disorder, or, if so
affected, no longer presents a substantial danger to others, the board shall
order the person discharged from commitment and conditional release.”
ORS 161.351(1) provides:
“Any person placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board under ORS 161.315 to 161.351 shall be discharged at such
time as the board, upon a hearing, finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the person is no longer affected by a qualifying mental disorder or, if
Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 43
A “qualifying mental disorder” is defined by the
legislature mostly by what it is not: It does not include
“an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct, nor does the term include any
abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder.” ORS
161.295(2).3 By rule, the PSRB has interpreted “qualifying
mental disorder” to mean, as relevant here,
“any diagnosis of a psychiatric condition which is a significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that
is associated with distress or disability causing symptoms
or impairment in at least one important area of an individual’s functioning and is defined in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5-TR) of the
American Psychiatric Association.”
OAR 859-010-0005(15)(b); see also ORS 161.387 (the PSRB
“may promulgate such interpretive rules as the board
deems necessary or appropriate to carry out its statutory
responsibilities”).
Petitioner has been under PSRB jurisdiction since
2010, after he assaulted a stranger with a tire iron and
pleaded guilty except for insanity to first-degree assault. At
that time, petitioner believed he was in a “holy war with
the forces of evil” and was diagnosed with schizoaffective
disorder and bipolar I disorder, both “qualifying mental
disorders.” Petitioner was initially placed at Oregon State
Hospital (OSH) and, in 2015, was conditionally released to
Kellogg Creek, a long-term transitional residential treatment program. At the time of petitioner’s conditional release,
several of his treating psychiatrists at OSH noted that he
displayed “little if any symptoms suggestive of ongoing
so affected, no longer presents a substantial danger to others that requires
regular medical care, medication, supervision or treatment.”
3
ORS 161.295, in full, provides:
“(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of a qualifying
mental disorder at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to
conform the conduct to the requirements of law.
“(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the term ‘qualifying mental disorder’ does not include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, nor does the term include
any abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder.”
44 Walters v. PSRB
bipolar disorder” and was not on any medications for treatment of bipolar disorder.
While at Kellogg Creek in 2016, petitioner’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Kim, diagnosed him with schizotypal
personality disorder with narcissistic traits, which she
believed explained why other providers incorrectly diagnosed petitioner with schizoaffective disorder and bipolar
disorder with psychotic features, as those diagnoses present
with similar symptoms. Schizotypal personality disorder,
like other personality disorders, is not a qualifying mental
disorder. ORS 161.295(2). In an opinion requested by the
PSRB, Dr. Kim opined that petitioner did not present with
any psychotic symptoms at that time or at any point in the
previous nine years. Dr. Kim also noted that, other than
several days of treatment with an antipsychotic medication
in 2002, petitioner had never been treated with an antipsychotic or other psychotropic medication. She wrote that
“[her] opinion is that the symptoms that were interpreted
as psychosis[ ] can be entirely accounted for by [petitioner’s]
personality disorder and an adjustment disorder (in 2002).”
In Dr. Kim’s treatment notes, she also wrote that
petitioner “does not meet criteria for a bipolar or psychotic
disorder.” Dr. Kim also reported that petitioner “experienced
an episode of adjustment disorder in 2002 following family
stressors and homelessness,” but his symptoms “resolved in
the absence of sustained treatment.” Accordingly, Dr. Kim
recommended petitioner be discharged from PSRB jurisdiction, and petitioner petitioned the PSRB for discharge.
At petitioner’s discharge hearing back in 2017, the
PSRB considered Dr. Kim’s recommendation. The PSRB
also considered an evaluation from an independent clinical and forensic psychologist, Dr. Duncan. That evaluation
opined that petitioner continued to have bipolar I disorder,
albeit largely in remission with continued monitoring and
support. The PSRB also considered an opinion from an evaluator from Clackamas County. The county evaluator recommended continued jurisdiction, given the lack of agreement
between Dr. Kim and Dr. Duncan, but also noted that she
“had never seen firsthand evidence of a [qualifying mental
disorder]” and that the symptoms displayed by petitioner
Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 45
“may be attributed to a personality disorder.” The PRSB
continued its jurisdiction over petitioner.
In 2017, petitioner transferred from Kellogg Creek
to a treatment program run by Cascadia. At the time of
transfer, an evaluation at Cascadia concurred with Dr. Kim
that petitioner had a diagnosis of “alcohol use disorder, in
sustained remission in a controlled environment, cannabis use disorder, and other specified personality disorder.”
That evaluation specifically ruled out bipolar disorder as a
diagnosis.
At Cascadia, petitioner began treatment with a new
psychiatrist, Dr. Mohandessi. In May 2018, Dr. Mohandessi
reported that petitioner’s current diagnosis was narcissistic personality disorder and that petitioner did not meet the
criteria for any other psychiatric disorder. Cascadia accordingly petitioned the PSRB for a jurisdictional discharge.
At petitioner’s discharge hearing in 2018, however,
the PSRB again continued its jurisdiction over petitioner,
finding that he continued to suffer from a mental disorder, “most likely [b]ipolar [d]isorder.” The PSRB based this
on the historical bipolar diagnoses from OSH and Kellogg
Creek (prior to Dr. Kim’s diagnosis), as well as a diagnosis
reported by Dr. Mohandessi in April, prior to him concluding that petitioner no longer had bipolar disorder.4
In 2019, while still under Cascadia’s care, petitioner
relapsed several times on alcohol and marijuana. In one of
those instances, petitioner drove while under the influence
and ended up climbing a tree in front of a stranger’s home.
Cascadia’s treatment team reported that the incident was
motivated by petitioner’s substance use and inability to set
healthy boundaries around substances in the community.
In July 2019, Dr. Mohandessi, for the first time, wrote
in his treatment notes that petitioner’s current psychiatric
disorders “include Adjustment Disorder and Narcissistic
Personality Disorder.” Dr. Mohandessi did not include any
4
It is not clear why Dr. Mohandessi reported that petitioner had bipolar disorder in 2018. His testimony at petitioner’s hearing in 2020 was that he had
never diagnosed petitioner with bipolar disorder and that sometimes old diagnoses “carry over.”
46 Walters v. PSRB
explanation in his notes as to why he included an adjustment disorder as one of petitioner’s then-current psychiatric
disorders. It is not clear if Dr. Mohandessi was referencing
Dr. Kim’s opinion (that petitioner had an adjustment disorder in 2002), if it was related to petitioner’s more-recent
relapses, or something else.
Shortly after Dr. Mohandessi wrote that petitioner’s then-current disorders included an adjustment disorder, Jones, a licensed professional counselor at Cascadia
who worked with petitioner, wrote in her treatment notes
that petitioner’s symptoms appeared to qualify him for an
adjustment disorder with depressed mood:
“[Petitioner’s] diagnosis has been unclear since his
entry into the Cascadia program. Over the past year, his
symptoms have become more comprehensible and clearer
to diagnose. He has not met criteria for Bipolar Disorder as
he has not been observed to experience a manic episode or a
major depressive episode since his entry into the Cascadia
program. However, he has been observed to experience
hopelessness and sadness after a stressful event that is
out of proportion to the severity or intensity of the stressor.
As a result his diagnosis has been changed from Bipolar
Disorder to Adjustment disorder with depressed mood.”
Jones also wrote that petitioner presented with “symptoms
of depressed mood, low self-worth, feelings of failure, avolition, anhedonia, disorganization, and impulsive behaviors.”
In August 2020, Cascadia requested jurisdictional
discharge on the basis of petitioner not having a qualifying
diagnosis.
Petitioner’s “five-year” jurisdictional hearing
was held in 2020. ORS 161.336(6).5 Prior to that hearing,
Dr. Mohandessi reported to the PSRB that petitioner’s current diagnoses include narcissistic personality disorder and
adjustment disorder and that, due to these diagnoses, petitioner does not meet the criteria for a qualifying mental
5
The PSRB is required to hold a hearing after a person under its jurisdiction
has been on conditional release for five years. ORS 161.336(6). At that hearing, the
PSRB “shall review the person’s status and determine whether the person should
be discharged from the jurisdiction of the board.” Id. Cascadia’s request for jurisdictional discharge coincided with the time for petitioner’s “five-year” hearing.
Cite as
341 Or App 41 (2025) 47
disorder to maintain current PSRB jurisdiction.6 The PSRB
also received a report from a forensic psychologist, Dr. Orf,
who was retained by petitioner. In that report, Dr. Orf concluded that petitioner met the criteria for diagnoses of narcissistic personality disorder; other specified personality
disorder, schizotypal traits; and, alcohol use disorder—none
of which are qualifying mental disorders. Cascadia again
recommended jurisdictional discharge of petitioner.
At petitioner’s hearing, the PSRB heard testimony
from Dr. Mohandessi, Dr. Orf, and a member of petitioner’s
treatment team at Cascadia. All three testified that petitioner did not have a qualifying mental disorder. The state
opposed jurisdictional discharge, arguing that petitioner
was still affected by his “historical diagnoses of a mood disorder of some kind.” The state did not explain, at the hearing, whether it was referring to petitioner’s historical diagnosis of bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, or some other
mood disorder.
The PSRB denied petitioner’s request for discharge
on the basis of petitioner having a qualifying mental disorder, but it did not explain in its order what mental disorder
the PSRB believed petitioner to have. Petitioner petitioned
for judicial review. In 2022, while the petition was pending,
the PSRB withdrew its order and entered a continuation
of conditional release with a new order on reconsideration
that stated petitioner’s exact qualifying mental disorder—
adjustment disorder with depressed mood—and it is from
that order that petitioner seeks our review.7
II. ANALYSIS
“When a person over whom the [PSRB] exercises
jurisdiction … is adversely affected or aggrieved by a final
order of the [PSRB], the person is entitled to judicial review
of the final order.” ORS 161.348(1). “We review agency
6
Dr. Mohandessi also reported that, when active, petitioner’s diagnoses do
not make him a danger to others.
7
The PSRB alerts us to the fact that petitioner’s conditional release was
later revoked in February 2022 and, at the time of filing, he resided at the OSH.
That fact has no bearing on the legal issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding that, at the time of his five-year hearing, petitioner
continued to have a qualifying mental disorder.
48 Walters v. PSRB
orders for errors of law, substantial evidence, and substantial reason.” Rinne v. PSRB, 326 Or App 777, 781,
533 P3d
802 (2023), rev den,
371 Or 825 (2024). “Substantial evidence
exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed
as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that
finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). “Substantial reason exists
where the agency has articulated a rational connection
between the facts and the legal conclusion that the agency
draws from them.” Rinne,
326 Or App at 781.
A. PSRB Decision
At petitioner’s jurisdictional hearing,
Dr. Mohandessi, petitioner’s treating psychiatrist at
Cascadia, testified that, since a diagnostic clarification
assessment by his staff back in 2018, he did not believe that
petitioner had a qualifying mental disorder. He noted that,
especially in “treatment plan” reports, historical diagnoses
are often “carried over” from previous providers, but that he
had “never diagnosed [petitioner] with any type of bipolar
disorder be it specific or nonspecific,” and any adjustment
disorder petitioner once had was fully resolved:
“DR. MOHANDESSI: Well, previously, though this
is not a current or active diagnosis, at Cascadia we had
diagnosed him with adjustment disorder really due to life
stressors and his life circumstances. At that time, there
was considerable stress around his family, housing, but I
don’t—I don’t see those same stressors being present or
active at this time and he does not meet criteria currently
for an adjustment disorder diagnosis.”
(Emphases added.)
The PSRB also heard similar testimony from
Dr. Orf that petitioner no longer had a qualifying mental
disorder and that any adjustment disorder had resolved and
was not going to reoccur:
“DR. ORF: There’s a discussion of an adjustment disorder previously. I didn’t see the necessary documentation to
support an adjustment disorder diagnoses [sic]. Based on
my review of the more recent record those issues that were
present at the time have—have clearly resolved and adjustment disorder is not a cyclic disorder. It does not recur as
a specific diagnosis for a point in time. It’s a reaction to a
Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 49
stressor. So if it was present in the past an adjustment disorder is certainly resolved, at least at the time of my evaluation of [petitioner].”
(Emphases added.)
As the end of the hearing, the PSRB concluded that
petitioner was affected by a qualifying mental disorder
“as demonstrated by the underlying facts shown by the
evidence in the record and the testimony provided at the
hearing (see Exhibits 301, 309, 310, 318, 321, 323, 325, 326,
330, and 331, all of which diagnose [petitioner] with an
Adjustment Disorder).
“…
“This finding is supported by the evidence of longstanding mental health diagnoses that began in [petitioner’s] adolescence and persisted in adulthood for several
years both prior to and subsequent to his instant offense,
as evidenced in Exhibits 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 26, 33, 55, 86,
103, 115, 116, 120, 122, 129, 133, 195, 197, 240, 249, 257,
281, 290, and 309, all of which contain at least one qualifying mental health diagnosis.”
The PSRB also cited to evidence that petitioner presented
with symptoms of depression at his April 2019 mental health
assessment and to professional opinions found throughout
the record that petitioner was “most likely to experience
increased symptoms, particularly mood-related symptoms,
during significant periods of stress and copes with [those]
symptoms by using alcohol or other substances.” Finally,
the PSRB noted that petitioner’s mental-health-related
symptoms become more severe when petitioner lives independently and petitioner had not yet secured independent
housing, despite being approved for independent living
for over two years. The PSRB ultimately found that petitioner continued to be affected by an adjustment order with
depressed mood, a qualifying mental disorder.8
8
The parties appear to agree, as a threshold matter, that adjustment disorder with depressed mood is a qualifying mental disorder. A qualifying mental
disorder, by statute, is one that results in a person “lack[ing] substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the[ir] conduct or to conform the[ir]
conduct to the requirements of law.” ORS 161.295(1). In the absence of argument
from the parties, we express no opinion as to whether an adjustment disorder
meets the statutory standard.
50 Walters v. PSRB
Turning to the evidence supporting the PSRB’s
decision, the PSRB order offered a lengthy list of exhibits,
identified only by number and without further explanation.
We endeavor to group that lengthy list into several categories. The first group (exhibits 240, 257, 281, 290, 301, 309,
310, 318, 321, 323, 325, 326, 330 and 331) are all notes
from petitioner’s time at Cascadia. Those exhibits reflect
that the Cascadia treatment team diagnosed him with an
adjustment disorder and also reported that petitioner had
previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder (although
that diagnosis was no longer “current”). All but three of the
exhibits diagnosing petitioner with adjustment disorder
are from petitioner’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Mohandessi.
The remaining Cascadia exhibits consist of a mental health
assessment and treatment plan by Jones, a counselor, which
were based on Dr. Mohandessi’s diagnosis of adjustment
disorder (exhibits 309 and 310), and a letter from a social
worker at Cascadia, informing the PSRB of petitioner’s
intent to request a jurisdictional discharge based on that
exhibit (exhibit 326).
The next group of exhibits (exhibits 6, 7, 9, 11, 12,
13, 26, 33, 55, 86, 103, 115, 116, 120, 122, 129, 133, 195,
197, 240, 249, 257, 281, 290, and 309) all contain diagnoses of bipolar disorder. The bulk of those exhibits are from
petitioner’s initial treatment, upon entering PSRB jurisdiction, at OSH from 2010-2014. The exhibits not from petitioner’s initial admission to OSH include behavioral health
evaluations by Clackamas County in 2014 in preparation
for petitioner’s conditional release (exhibits 103, 120). Those
evaluations rely on the diagnoses of bipolar contained in the
OSH progress reports. That group of exhibits also contains
diagnostic reports in 2015 and 2016 continuing petitioner’s
diagnosis of bipolar (exhibits 129 and 195).
The next category of exhibits is one that, the PSRB
contends, reflect that petitioner “continues to suffer from
signs and symptoms of depression” and a lack of coping skills
causing petitioner to relapse with drugs and marijuana
(exhibits 7, 8, 12, 18, 19, 26, 72, 195, 249, 296, 302, 303,
309, 310, 312, 322, and 326). Those exhibits are treatment
plans, progress reports, and other reports, that reference
Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 51
symptoms of depression and poor coping skills.9 For example, in exhibit 322, petitioner’s case manager, Harris, wrote:
“Client is struggling with motivation and symptoms of
depression related to family issues, recent issue (urinating
in public) which resulting in him [sic] being excluded from
all public libraries, and barriers towards finding housing
in the community.”
B. Substantial Evidence
We conclude that the PSRB’s finding—that petitioner has a qualifying mental disorder of an adjustment
disorder with depressed mood10 —is not supported by substantial evidence for several reasons. First, all of the exhibits that the PSRB cited to in its order attribute that diagnosis to petitioner’s treatment team at Cascadia. At the time
of the hearing, however, that same treatment team unanimously testified that petitioner no longer had a qualifying
mental disorder. In fact, in contrast to the PSRB’s order,
there was no testimony at the hearing that petitioner had
an adjustment disorder at all.
In addition, petitioner’s treatment team at
Cascadia appears to have based its impressions entirely
from Dr. Mohandessi’s diagnosis. Although Dr. Mohandessi
did, in mid-2019, diagnose petitioner with adjustment order
with depressed mood, by December 2019, Dr. Mohandessi
opined that petitioner’s adjustment disorder was “in partial
remission with no medical intervention,” and at the hearing, Dr. Mohandessi testified that petitioner’s adjustment
disorder had resolved. That timeline appears consistent
with Dr. Orf’s testimony that an adjustment disorder is not
a “cyclic disorder” and does not “reoccur as a specific diagnosis;” instead, it is a “reaction to a stressor.”11
9
Some of these exhibits contain diagnoses of adjustment disorder and bipolar disorder; however, it appears that the PSRB is citing them here solely for the
exhibits’ mention of specific psychiatric symptoms that the PSRB finds significant.
For example, exhibit 249 is cited both as a reference to petitioner’s historic bipolar
disorder, as well as a reference to petitioner’s symptoms and lack of coping skills.
10
Although the PSRB referenced the historical diagnosis of bipolar disorder,
that does not appear to be the basis for its decision. The most recent diagnosis of
bipolar occurred in 2016, and it had been specifically ruled out by 2018.
11
That timeline is also consistent with the description of an adjustment disorder contained in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders § 2,
Diagnostic Criteria & Codes, “Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorders” (5th ed
52 Walters v. PSRB
Moreover, all the evidence supporting the PSRB’s
determination that petitioner suffers from adjustment disorder consists of historical records authored by Dr. Mohandessi
or based on his diagnosis, yet the PSRB still discredited
Dr. Mohandessi’s testimony that petitioner did not have
adjustment disorder. We are mindful that the PSRB need
not defer to a treatment provider in finding that petitioner
remains affected by a qualifying mental disorder, provided
that its findings are supported by substantial evidence and
substantial reason. See Einstein v. PSRB, 330 Or 121, 128,
128 n 4,
998 P2d 654 (2000) (the PSRB is “not required to
accept” the testimony of a petitioner’s treating psychologist
“without considering the rest of the record”). But the PSRB’s
decision to discredit the testimony of a medical professional
must be made “in light of the other evidence in the record.”
Id. at 128 n 4. Here, there was no evidence in the record that
petitioner had a current diagnosis of a qualifying mental
disorder; rather, the PSRB relied on a historical diagnosis
from the very doctor it discredited.12
The PSRB’s reliance on old exhibits of a historical,
resolved diagnosis further calls its conclusion into question.
The PSRB cited to copious exhibits—exhibits 6, 7, 9, 11, 12,
13, 26, 33, 55, 86, 103, 115, 116, 120, 122, 129, 133, 195,
197, 240, 249, 257, 281, 290, and 309—that all contained
historical mental health diagnoses other than adjustment
disorder, mainly of bipolar disorder, to support its finding
that petitioner has an adjustment disorder. But there was
no evidence in the record that a historical diagnosis of bipolar disorder is linked to a current diagnosis of adjustment
disorder. No witness testified to that connection, and no
exhibit contained any indication that petitioner’s historical
2013) (an adjustment disorder, “[b]y definition … lasts no longer than 6 months
after the stressor or its consequences have ceased.”).
12
The PSRB order explained its decision to disregard the testimony from
Dr. Mohandessi by asserting that Dr. Mohandessi’s opinion that petitioner does
not have a qualifying mental health diagnosis “is fairly recent and appears to
overlook or at least be inconsistent with recent record written by other members
of [petitioner’s] treatment team.” However, as discussed above, the cited exhibits
from Cascadia not authored by Dr. Mohandessi did not contain independent diagnoses. The PSRB further cited exhibit 301 as evidence that Dr. Mohandessi had
diagnosed petitioner with bipolar as recently as 2019. However, Dr. Mohandessi
testified that he never held that opinion and explained that exhibit 301 reflected
a “carry-over” diagnosis.
Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 53
diagnosis somehow predisposed him to the current diagnosis. If anything, the only evidence to connect petitioner’s
prior and current diagnoses demonstrated that symptoms
of a narcissistic personality disorder (not an adjustment disorder with depressed mood) could be confused with bipolar
disorder.13
In short, petitioner’s treatment team and independent evaluators all consistently averred that petitioner no
longer had a qualifying mental disorder. The PSRB’s order
relied on historical, resolved diagnoses and thus was not
supported by substantial evidence.14
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
13
The PSRB also noted in its order that evidence of certain symptoms—
specifically, of depression and relapses in response to stressors—would allow a
reasonable person to conclude that petitioner has an adjustment disorder with
depressed mood, whether active or in remission. While the PSRB cited to numerous exhibits related to petitioner’s symptoms, those exhibits do not support that
petitioner continues to have a qualifying diagnosis.
14
As mentioned, our disposition obviates the need to address the PSRB’s
finding that, due to a qualifying mental disorder, petitioner is a danger to others. However, we note that there was ample evidence in the record pertaining
to petitioner’s dangerousness, including the violent event that brought him into
PSRB jurisdiction, as well as a general lack of insight into his responsibility for
violence. While Dr. Mohandessi testified that petitioner lacks a qualifying diagnosis, he also testified that petitioner does present a danger to others.
