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341 U.S. 112

71 S. Ct. 605

Docket No. 476.

Woodward v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 11, 1951.

Decided April 23, 1951.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1951-04-23

3 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““We are persuaded by the policy against drawing such a distinction [between adoptive and natural siblings] in the family relationship. Contemporaneous legal treatment of adopted children as though born into the family is a manifestation of that policy. See Carpenter v. United States [ 168 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1948)]; McDonald v. United States, 91 F.Supp. 163 (D.C.D.Mass.1950). Consequently, we hold that a brother by adoption is a permissible beneficiary under § 602(g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940.” 2”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Wanvig v. United States

“(a) The insured shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of insurance maturing on or after August 1, 1946, and shall, subject to regulations, at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries of such insurance without the consent of such beneficiary or beneficiaries.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Roecker v. United States

Relies on Woodward v. United States · Woodward v. United States · Carpenter v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed · 9–0 · Decided 1951-04-23

How this case has been cited

Cited by 37 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1994 · most notably Berryhill v. United States (1952), Glawe v. Rulon (1960)

28 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

16019511960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Claude T. Wood argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Louren G. Davidson.

¶2Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge, John R. Benney, Paul A. Sweeney and Herman Marcuse submitted on brief for the United States, respondent.

¶3Flavius B. Freeman argued the cause for Haizlip, respondent. With him on the brief was Jean Paul Bradshaw.

¶4Per Curiam.

¶5Petitioner brought this action against the United States to secure the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance Policy taken out by Evelyn Haizlip, a member of the Women’s Army Corps. Before insured’s death in 1945, petitioner, described by insured as her “brother,” had been designated as beneficiary. The husband of the insured was interpleaded as a conflicting claimant. If petitioner, who was insured’s brother by virtue of an adoption decree, is not within the permissible class of beneficiaries under § 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940,* the husband is entitled to the proceeds in this case.

¶6*113The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court which had held that an adopted brother was not a permissible beneficiary under § 602 (g). 185 F. 2d 134 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1950). See also the prior opinion of that court in this proceeding, 167 F. 2d 774 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1948). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had reached a directly contrary conclusion under similar circumstances. Carpenter v. United States, 168 F. 2d 369 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1948). Our grant of certiorari was limited to the question whether a brother by adoption is within the permissible class of beneficiaries under § 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940. 340 U. S. 929 (1951).

¶7We have examined the Act, its legislative history and related statutory provisions and have considered the various inferences drawn from the legislative materials by counsel. The short of the matter is that Congress has not expressed itself in regard to the question before us. In resolving the conflict of decisions, we must determine whether the word “brother,” as used in this federal statute, restricts the policyholder’s choice of beneficiaries to brothers of the blood. We are persuaded by the policy against drawing such a distinction in the family relationship. Contemporaneous legal treatment of adopted children as though born into the family is a manifestation of that policy. See Carpenter v. United States, supra; McDonald v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 163 (D. C. D. Mass. 1950). Consequently, we hold that a brother by adoption is a permissible beneficiary under § 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940.

¶8Reversed.

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