State v. Imeri

116                   July 23, 2025                No. 656

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                    EGZON IMERI,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
             Clackamas County Circuit Court
                  23CN05157; A182992

  Thanh H. Tran, Judge.
  Submitted May 15, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.
   Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  TOOKEY, P. J.
   Portion of judgment requiring defendant to pay $160 fine
reversed; otherwise affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)                              117

            TOOKEY, P. J.
         Defendant appeals a general judgment of contempt
entered by the Clackamas County Circuit Court after defendant admitted to two counts of contempt of court for violating a Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) restraining
order entered in Multnomah County. The trial court imposed
probation and a $160 fine. On appeal, defendant raises two
assignments of error: first, challenging the Clackamas
County Circuit Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the
proceedings against him based on his admitted violation of
the FAPA order, because the order was entered in another
county and the state failed to file a certified copy; and second, challenging the imposition of the $160 fine, because it
was not announced in open court. The state concedes that
the trial court erred as to defendant’s second assignment
but argues that defendant’s first assignment lacks merit
in light of our decision in State v. Lucier, 

,

, rev den, 

 (2024). The state’s concession
regarding the second assignment of error is well taken, and,
regarding the first assignment of error, we agree that our
decision in Lucier controls. Thus, we reverse and remand for
resentencing, and otherwise affirm.
         In defendant’s first assignment of error, he contends
that ORS 107.728(2)1 was the state’s “only source of jurisdiction to adjudicate a contempt allegation based on an order
entered by another court,” and that the Clackamas County
Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction. We rejected the
same argument in Lucier, in which the defendant argued
that the “Josephine County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce another county’s restraining order.” 

. We explained that, by enacting ORS 107.728, the
legislature exercised its “power to define the circuit courts’
subject matter jurisdiction, … expressly permit[ting] contempt proceedings on FAPA restraining orders to occur in
both the circuit court of the county that issued the order
and the ‘circuit court for a county in which a violation of the
   1
       ORS 107.728 provides, in pertinent part:
   “If contempt proceedings are initiated in the circuit court for a county in
   which a violation of the restraining order occurs, the person initiating the
   contempt proceedings shall file with the court a copy of the restraining order,
   certified by the clerk of the court that issued the order.”
118                                              State v. Imeri

restraining order occurs.’ ” 

 (emphasis in original).
That is, “the legislature has vested subject matter jurisdiction and contempt authority in two courts.” 

 We further
explained “that the legislature did not intend the requirement to file a certified copy of the restraining order to be
jurisdictional.” 

. Similarly, here, the state’s failure
to meet the statutory filing requirement did not deprive the
Clackamas County Circuit Court of subject matter jurisdiction, and defendant’s conviction is not reversible on that
ground.
         In defendant’s second assignment of error, he contends—and the state concedes—that the trial court erred
when it imposed a $160 fine for the first time in the written
judgment. We agree and accept the state’s concession. A trial
court errs as a matter of law when it imposes fines or fees
for the first time in a written judgment without announcing those penalties in open court. See, e.g., State v. Sankey,

, 847, 

 (2018) (concluding that
“it was error to impose … financial penalties outside the
presence of [the] defendant” and reversing the judgment as
to those penalties where the trial court had “declared at sentencing that it would waive all fees”). Here, the trial court
announced in open court that it would “not impose the fines
or fees.” When the trial court then imposed a $160 fine in
the written judgment, it erred as a matter of law.
        Portion of judgment requiring defendant to pay
$160 fine reversed; otherwise affirmed.