State v. Larson

No. 662               July 23, 2025                  145

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
               KENDRA FAYE LARSON,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
              Douglas County Circuit Court
                 23CR15856; A183046

  Steve H. Hoddle, Judge.
  Submitted June 24, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.
   Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  JACQUOT, J.
  Affirmed.
146                                             State v. Larson

        JACQUOT, J.
        Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for ten
counts of second-degree animal neglect, ORS 167.325. In one
assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred by
denying her motion to suppress statements she made before
she received Miranda warnings and statements she made
after she was Mirandized. We affirm.
         Officers responded to a call about an “odor of death”
coming from a trailer parked in a store parking lot. They
confirmed the presence of the odor and entered the trailer to
find a deceased dog and multiple other dogs in “[v]ery poor”
condition. Officers began removing the dogs from the trailer.
        Defendant arrived at the scene at some point when
the dogs were being removed. Upon her arrival, defendant
had a one-to-two-minute encounter with officers:
      “[FIRST OFFICER]: Is this your RV?
      “[DEFENDANT]:       Yeah.
      “[FIRST OFFICER]: Did you park it here?
      “[DEFENDANT]:       Yeah.
       “[FIRST OFFICER]: Okay. You’re gonna want to talk
   to that deputy right there.”
          “[SECOND OFFICER]: Hey there.
      “[SECOND OFFICER]: (Inaudible.)
      “[SECOND OFFICER]: Okay. I’m Deputy Atterbury
   with the Sheriff’s Office. Just so you know, I’m recording.
   Okay.
      “[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
       “[SECOND OFFICER]: So the reason we’re here today
   is because we [got] a call about this trailer. Okay. We show
   up and can smell an obvious smell of death. Okay.
      “[DEFENDANT]: It’s, it’s been two days since I’ve
   been able to clean any of the kennels.
      “[SECOND OFFICER]: Okay. What about the dead
   dog?
      “[DEFENDANT]: What dead dog?
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)              147

      “[SECOND OFFICER]: One of your dogs is deceased.
   So when was the last time you were here with this trailer?
      “[DEFENDANT]: Last night. And I got off work
   around midnight and came over and fed everybody.
      “(Brief pause.)
      “[SECOND OFFICER]: Alright. Real quick. Before I
   ask any more questions I’m just gonna advise you of your
   rights.”
        Defendant was read her Miranda rights, and she
confirmed that she understood them. Officers continued
questioning defendant about the contents of the trailer,
and defendant answered with detailed responses, providing
in-depth information about the trailer, the dogs, and the last
time she provided care to the dogs.
          At trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained in the search and seizure and later amended
it to include statements she made before and after she was
Mirandized. The trial court denied the motion as to the evidence at issue in this case.
         In one assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress
statements she made before she received Miranda warnings because the encounter with officers constituted compelling circumstances and required Miranda warnings under
Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, and that
statements she made after she was Mirandized violated her
right to remain silent. “We review the trial court’s denial
of a motion to suppress statements for legal error.” State v.
Nieman, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2011). “We are bound by the trial court’s historical
findings of fact if there is evidence in the record to support
them.” Id.
         The right against compelled self-incrimination is
constitutionally guaranteed in Article I, section 12, of the
Oregon Constitution, which states in relevant part, “[n]o person shall be … compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” As part of this constitutional guarantee,
officers must give Miranda warnings before questioning “a
person who is in full custody or in circumstances that create
148                                              State v. Larson

a setting which judges would and officers should recognize
to be compelling.” State v. Shaff, 

, 

 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The question of whether compelling circumstances existed
is decided based on how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have understood the encounter. 

 In
undertaking that inquiry, we consider four factors: “(1) the
location of the encounter, (2) the length of the encounter, (3) the
amount of pressure exerted on the defendant, and (4) the
defendant’s ability to terminate the encounter.” 

 (internal
citations omitted); see also State v. Stone, 

, 

 (2015) (same).
          These factors are neither exclusive nor mechanically applied. State v. Roble-Baker, 

, 

 (2006). When applying those factors, the court reviews
all the circumstances of the encounter to consider, “whether
the officers created the sort of police-dominated atmosphere
that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” 

Recently, this court upheld the principle that, “neither a traffic stop nor questioning someone suspected of a crime, without more, creates the kind of compelling circumstances that
require Miranda warnings.” State ex rel City of Pendleton,

, 

, rev den, 

 (2025).
             I. PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENTS
         Defendant argues that the encounter gave rise
to compelling circumstances because she was in a police-dominated atmosphere and her liberty was restrained. The
state responds that the encounter did not give rise to compelling circumstances because it resembled a traffic stop or
other routine investigatory detention.
A.    Location of the Encounter
          Both parties analogize the store parking lot to a
traffic stop location. Defendant argues that although questionings during a traffic stop normally do not give rise to
compelling circumstances, they can occasionally arise in
that context. See State v. Schwerbel, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2010) (determining that compelling circumstances existed during a traffic
stop in a motel parking lot).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)           149

        The state responds that the store parking lot was
a public place and that questioning during a traffic stop
in a public space can offset other factors that give rise to
compelling circumstances. See State v. Prickett, 

, 

 (1997) (determining that compelling
circumstances did not exist during a traffic stop on a public
highway).
         Here, the location of the encounter—a store parking
lot—weighs against a determination of compelling circumstances. See Schwerbel, 

 (concluding that a
motel parking lot location weighed against a compelling circumstance determination). Of course, as defendant points
out, the location alone is not determinative, and in conducting our inquiry the location of the encounter must be considered in conjunction with the other factors. See 

(pressure exerted on the defendant and the ability of the
defendant to terminate the encounter were more important
than the location in determining whether circumstances
were compelling); Prickett, 

 (considering
length of the encounter coupled with absence of coercion or
threat by the officer to the defendant along with location
in compelling circumstance determination). Thus, we now
turn to those other factors.
B.   Length of the Encounter
         Neither party disputes that the conversation was
short, lasting one-to-two minutes. Short encounters weigh
against a determination of compelling circumstances. See
Schwerbel, 

 (a 15-minute traffic stop
weighed against a determination of compelling circumstances); see State v. Nelson, 

, 

 (2017) (a 32-minute traffic stop was not an atypical
length for a detention and that it weighed against a determination of compelling circumstances); see also State v.
Moore, 

, 

 (2009), aff’d sub
nom State v. Moore/Coen, 

, 

 (2010),
cert den, 

 (2011) (a short encounter was the only
factor that weighed against a determination of compelling
circumstances).
150                                          State v. Larson

         The one-to-two minute conversation was short
and weighs against a determination of compelling circumstances. Therefore, the length of the encounter supports the
trial court’s determination of no compelling circumstances.
C. Pressure Exerted on Defendant
         Defendant argues that she was in a police-dominated
atmosphere where uniformed officers and vehicles were
present and actively searching her trailer and removing her
dogs. She argues that the second officer “exerted a significant amount of pressure on [her],” Schwerbel, 

, when he immediately approached her with criminal
evidence and allegations about the call officers received, the
“obvious smell of death,” and “the dead dog.” She contends
that officers did not express to her that she was being investigated for a non-criminal infraction and instead confronted
her with specific evidence of her criminal culpability. Cf.
Nelson, 

 (determining compelling
pressure was not exerted on the defendant when the officer
expressed to him that the traffic stop was transitioning to a
DUII investigation).
         The state responds that the encounter was the
functional equivalent of an investigatory detention and was
not atypical for a minimal detention because neither officer made threats, accused defendant of a crime, or touched
defendant while they were performing a community caretaking function. The state asserts that, because the second
officer explained to defendant why officers were called and
subsequently asked non-interrogative, investigatory questions about her knowledge of and connection to the trailer,
the encounter resembled the routine and salutatory practice
of informing a defendant of the reason why they are being
detained. See State v. Schmidtke, 

, 

 (2018) (determining that “merely informing [the]
defendant of the criminal activity for which the officer was
investigating and detaining [the] defendant” did not create
compelling circumstances because it was a routine part of
the detention procedure and was not made to prompt an
incriminating response from the defendant). The state concedes that there are times when a traffic stop or other investigatory detention can give rise to compelling circumstances,
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)            151

but it asserts that this encounter presents no such case. See
Nelson, 

 (describing that the threshold can be crossed when (1) a suspect is brought evidence of
probable cause for their arrest in a coercive manner, or (2)
a suspect is placed under a “heightened degree of confinement” where they are “in an enclosed space or restricting
his or her movements”).
         The pressure exerted on defendant was minimal
and weighs against a determination of compelling circumstances because although defendant was in a stressful
environment, the encounter resembled a routine detention
practice as evidenced by the fact defendant was informed by
officers why they were at the trailer before she was asked
questions about her connection to the trailer. See Schmidtke,

.
         We note that the trial court found that some questions were asked in an authoritative manner based on
review of body cam footage, however, those statements were
presented as part of the routine detention practice and
served an investigatory purpose of identifying defendant’s
knowledge of the trailer and its contents. Therefore, defendant’s reliance on Schwerbel is unpersuasive because defendant was not confronted in a coercive manner with evidence
of the crime officers were investigating. See Schwerbel, 

 (determining officer statements “exerted
a significant amount of pressure on” the defendant to
answer questions because the defendant knew the officer
was going to detain him after the officer informed him that
he committed a crime and gathered evidence for an arrest).
Alternatively, defendant’s reliance on Nelson does not support her argument because although she was not explicitly
notified of the investigatory shift, she was read her Miranda
rights once officers confirmed that defendant had knowledge of the trailer’s contents which is similar to the officer
in Nelson who was found not to have exerted pressure on
the defendant when the officer gathered independent information about the defendant’s sobriety and expressed to the
defendant that the traffic stop was transitioning to a DUII
investigation. Nelson, 

. Therefore, this
152                                             State v. Larson

factor supports the trial court’s determination of no compelling circumstances.
D. Ability to Terminate the Encounter
         Defendant argues that her liberty was restrained
when she was told by an officer that she was “gonna want to
talk to” another officer and that the request was an unusual
demand in a criminal investigation rather than an ordinary
procedure in a traffic stop. Cf. 

 (observing that it
is “routine” for an officer to ask a driver to remain in a vehicle during a traffic stop). Viewed together with the police-dominated atmosphere, she argues that she would reasonably understand that she was required to remain at the
scene, cooperate with officers, and answer their questions.
Additionally, she argues that she was not, “at that point in
time, free to end the encounter,” but rather that she was to
be questioned before officers would let her leave. Moore, 

 (emphasis in original).
         The states responds that although defendant may
not have felt free to leave and was asked questions that were
relevant to criminal liability, nothing before the reading of
her Miranda rights made the encounter more compelling
than a traffic stop or other investigatory detention. It argues
that, like a traffic stop, the circumstances were not compelling, “even if the person questioned does not feel free to go,
so long as the traffic stop is no more lengthy or coercive than
is typical.” Nelson, 

.
         The ability of defendant to terminate the encounter was not impeded and weighs against a determination
of compelling circumstances because although she did not
feel free to leave, she did not face the types of coercion or
physical restraints that would impede her ability to end the
encounter. Thus, defendant’s reliance on Moore is unpersuasive because although defendant did not feel, “at that
point in time, free to end the encounter,” 

(emphasis in original), when she was told she was “gonna
want to talk to” another officer, she misapplies her circumstances to the defendant in Moore. In Moore, the defendant’s
liberty was restrained when the defendant was handcuffed
in the back of a police vehicle and questioned by officers.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)             153

 Unlike the defendant in Moore, defendant did not face
the same or similar physical restraints that led the Moore
court to determine that compelling circumstances existed.

 Additionally, being told that she was “gonna want to talk
to” another officer resembles a traffic stop request that is not
coercive or unusually lengthy in nature. See Nelson, 

 (the officer asking the defendant to temporarily
remain in his vehicle, making momentary physical contact
with the defendant to stop the defendant’s physical movement in another direction, and requesting that the defendant walk towards the police vehicle were a routine part
of the investigation and not the type of coercive or usually
lengthy behavior that would restrain the defendant’s liberty or give rise to compelling circumstances). Although it is
understandable that defendant did not feel that she was free
to leave, she does not explain how her liberty was restrained
in a way similar to Moore or Nelson. Therefore, this factor
supports the trial court’s determination of no compelling
circumstances.
        In conclusion, the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress statements she made before
she received Miranda warnings.
           II. POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS
        Defendant argues that because her pre-Miranda
statements violated her right to remain silent, “the state has
a heavy burden” to establish that defendant validly waived
her rights by providing her post-Miranda statements. State
v. Ward, 

, 

 (2020) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). However, as explained
above, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion to suppress statements she made before she received
Miranda warnings. Therefore, her argument fails.
        Affirmed.