State v. Ward

 (2019).
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 (2020)                                189

   Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Also on the brief were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General,
and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
   Rosalind M. Lee, Rosalind Manson Lee LLC, Eugene, filed
the brief for amici curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyer’s
Association and Oregon Justice Resource Center.
   FLYNN, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
   Balmer, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
190                                                              State v. Ward

           FLYNN, J.
          Defendant was convicted of aggravated and felony
murder. After being arrested for that crime, and before
being appointed counsel, defendant was twice interrogated
while in custody. The trial court suppressed the statements
that defendant made during the first interrogation, because
the court determined that officers conducting that interrogation continued to question defendant after he invoked his
right to remain silent, in violation of defendant’s Article I,
section 12, rights against self-incrimination. But the trial
court refused to suppress defendant’s statements from the
second interrogation, because it determined that the officers
who conducted that interrogation obtained a valid waiver
of defendant’s Article I, section 12, rights. The trial court
thus suppressed statements that defendant made during
the first interrogation but not those he made during the second interrogation. A jury found defendant guilty, and he was
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
         On review, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that the state failed to prove
that defendant validly waived his rights before the second
interrogation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and we
further conclude that the error requires a reversal of defendant’s conviction and a remand for a new trial.1
      I. INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 12
         Before describing the relevant facts, we describe the
basic constitutional principles that frame the dispute in this
case. Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall … be compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” Or Const, Art I,
§ 12.2 That constitutional provision guarantees a right to
     1
       We also allowed review to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit a trial court from imposing life without the possibility of parole on a person with intellectual disabilities. Because we remand for a new trial, we do not reach defendant’s sentencing
argument.
     2
       The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is similar. It specifies that “[n]o person shall … be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.” US Const, Amend V. Defendant does not separately challenge
the validity of his waiver under that federal provision.
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remain silent and a “derivative or adjunct right to have the
advice of counsel in responding to police questioning.” State
v. Turnidge (S059155),

359 Or 364, 399

374 P3d 853

 (2016).
As part of the constitutional guarantee, if a person in custody or other similarly compelling circumstances unequivocally invokes one of the rights guaranteed by Article I,
section 12, rights, then “police must honor that request and
stop questioning.” State v. McAnulty,

356 Or 432, 455

338 P3d 653

 (2014) (citing State v. Davis,

350 Or 440, 459

256 P3d 1075

 (2011) (“[I]f there is a right to remain silent that
is guaranteed by Article I, section 12, it is a right to insist
that the police refrain from interrogation after a person who
is in custody or otherwise in compelling circumstances has
invoked the right to remain silent.”)).
         Even a person who has initially invoked those rights
may later waive them, but the state bears the burden of proving a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver “under the
totality of the circumstances.” State v. Nichols,

361 Or 101, 107

390 P3d 1001

 (2017). In addition to the general “totality
of the circumstances” inquiry, to ensure that any waiver is
knowing as well as voluntary, officers must provide a person
with the so-called Miranda warnings—that the person “has
a right to remain silent and to consult with counsel and that
any statements that the person makes may be used against
the person in a criminal prosecution.”3 State v. Vondehn,

348 Or 462, 474

236 P3d 691

 (2010). Those warnings are
required for a valid waiver in part “[b]ecause a custodial
interrogation is inherently compelling.”

          II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
         With that legal overview as a guide, we describe the
pertinent facts in a manner consistent with our obligation
to accept “ ‘the trial court’s findings of historical fact if evidence in the record supports them.’ ” See McAnulty,

356 Or at 449

 (quoting State v. James,

339 Or 476, 481

123 P3d 251

(2005)).

    3
      Oregon’s Miranda warnings are named for the decision of the United States
Supreme Court, which requires the same warnings under the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Vondehn,

348 Or at 470

. On an independent
state-law basis, this court has required the same warnings “to effectuate the
protections afforded by Article I, section 12.”

192 State v. Ward

The murder victim was the great-grandmother of
defendant’s cousin, Joda Cain, who lived with the victim
in Washington County. Before the murder, Cain had purchased a plane ticket for defendant to fly from his home in
Kansas City to Portland. Defendant, who was 19 at the time
and has intellectual disabilities, boarded the plane without
identification by falsely claiming to be a minor.4 Cain and a
friend picked defendant up from the airport and took him to
the victim’s home.
The friend fell asleep at the home around midnight
and awoke to hear the victim screaming. He heard defendant demanding money and heard Cain say, “Just do it.” The
friend then heard sounds of someone being attacked, and he
fled the house. The next morning, police found the victim’s
body in her bedroom. She had been beaten to death with a
small sledgehammer that police found at the scene. A trail
of blood led from the victim’s bedroom to the garage, and her
car was missing.
The same morning, a state trooper spotted the victim’s car weaving erratically on the interstate in eastern
Oregon. Cain was driving, and defendant was a passenger. After a high-speed chase, police forced the car to stop
and arrested Cain. Defendant ran away but was quickly
arrested, too. Evidence in the car and blood on defendant’s
clothes tied defendant to the murder.
An officer read defendant his Miranda warnings
at the scene and then took him to the Union County Jail,
where defendant was again given Miranda warnings and
then interrogated. When one of the officers asked if defendant was “going to visit with us here today at all?” defendant
gave a negative response that the officer acknowledged by
asking, “No?”5 But the officers then repeated Miranda warnings and continued the interrogation by telling defendant
that Cain had decided to “be honest.” They told defendant

4
Messages offered at trial indicate that defendant did so at the direction of
Cain, but the reason for defendant’s deception is not relevant to our analysis.
5
The trial court explained that it could not determine from the interrogation
video whether defendant responded by shaking his head to indicate “no” or verbally indicated that he did not want to talk, but the court found that the officer’s
“no” was verbalizing a negative response by defendant.
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that Cain had described the murder and car theft as entirely
defendant’s responsibility and encouraged defendant to give
his “version of events.” As described in defendant’s brief, he
“largely maintained his silence,” but made at least some
statements that the trial court suppressed.
After the interrogation, defendant was held at the
Union County Jail for four days, until two detectives from
Washington County arrived. Before driving defendant back
to Washington County, the detectives read Miranda warnings to him, and defendant responded “yes” when asked if he
understood those rights. During the four- to five-hour drive
to Washington County, the detectives did not talk to defendant about the case. But upon arriving at the Washington
County Sheriff’s Office, the detectives took defendant into a
“soft” interview room, meaning it was furnished more like a
living room than a typical jail interview room.
At that point, without repeating Miranda warnings
or asking defendant whether he wanted to waive his rights,
the detectives began questioning defendant. Defendant
answered questions without repeating his earlier assertion
that he did not want to talk. The detectives made no threats
or promises and described the tone of the interview as a
“very relaxed conversation.” Defendant’s ability to communicate did not appear to the detectives “to be impaired by
any sort of substance or mental problems,” and his answers
appeared to “make sense in a contextual fashion.” In
response to the questions, defendant denied knowing anything about the murder, denied ever being in the victim’s
bedroom, and denied having her blood on his clothing. He
told the officers that Cain had woken him late at night asking if he wanted to go for a ride, and, when asked why he
had run after police stopped the car, defendant answered
that he was afraid he would go to jail for lying about his age
when he flew to Portland.
Defendant was eventually indicted for two counts
of aggravated murder and two counts of felony murder.
Before defendant filed the pretrial motion to suppress that
is at issue on review, the trial court conducted two other
proceedings that are pertinent to defendant’s arguments
on review. In the first, the court found that defendant was
194 State v. Ward

unfit to proceed with trial as a result of his intellectual disability and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital for
treatment. The court based that finding on the report from a
court-ordered psychological evaluation in which the author,
Dr. Stover, concluded that defendant had a “mild” intellectual disability that made him unable to aid and assist his
attorney or meaningfully participate in his defense at that
time.
Nine months later, the trial court held another
hearing and determined that defendant had the capacity to
stand trial. The court based that decision on a later report
from Dr. Stover, who had concluded that defendant “gained
trial competency” through education about the legal process,
although he recommended accommodations so that defendant would better understand his attorneys’ legal advice.
During the same hearing, the prosecutor confirmed that the
state would not be seeking the death penalty because it conceded that defendant “does, in fact, suffer from an intellectual disability” that would make it constitutionally impermissible to impose that penalty, under the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia,

536 US 304

122 S Ct 2242

153 L Ed 2d 335

 (2002).
         After the ruling that the case would proceed toward
trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements that he
had made to the officers during the first interrogation in
Union County and the second interrogation in Washington
County. The trial court agreed with defendant that the officers had violated defendant’s rights during the first interrogation by continuing to question him after he made an
unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent. But
the court determined that defendant’s statements from
the second interrogation, four days later, were admissible.
The court reasoned that defendant’s earlier invocation of
his right to remain silent did not preclude the Washington
County interrogation because a “reasonable period of time”
had passed and the interrogation was conducted by new
officers who provided new Miranda warnings before interviewing defendant in a “soft room.” The court emphasized
that the officers had made “no threats or promises” and that
“there was nothing to indicate” to the officers “that there
was anything mentally or emotionally upsetting” defendant.
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        At trial, the state introduced defendant’s statements
from the second interview and argued that the statements
were “provable lies” and, thus, evidence of defendant’s “consciousness of guilt.” The jury found defendant guilty of both
aggravated murder and felony murder, and the court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
          Defendant appealed and challenged multiple trial
court rulings, including the court’s denial of defendant’s
motion to suppress the statements from his second interrogation. Defendant argued that the state failed to meet its
burden to prove that the second interrogation was supported
by defendant’s valid waiver of his rights under the circumstances of this case. He pointed to the earlier violation of
his right to remain silent when the Union County officers
ignored his invocation of that right, to the fact that he was
held in custody for days without an opportunity to obtain
legal advice (because appointment of counsel was delayed
until after his arraignment upon arriving in Washington
County), and to the fact that the renewed advice of rights
was separated in time and distance from the interrogation
in Washington County. Finally, he argued that the court
could not ignore the circumstance of his intellectual disability, which he contended made the Miranda violation, the
extended incarceration without access to legal advice, and
the lack of contemporaneous warnings more significant for
defendant than for the average person in custody. The Court
of Appeals rejected defendant’s challenges, and this court
allowed review.
                      III.   ANALYSIS
         On review, defendant renews his argument that
the trial court erred in concluding that defendant validly
waived his Miranda rights prior to the Washington County
interrogation, given “the peculiar factual circumstances of
defendant’s detention” combined with the “innate difficulties” created by his intellectual disability. Defendant points
first to the officers’ failure to honor his initial invocation
of his right to remain silent, which, he argues, shaped his
understanding of Miranda rights. Defendant also points to
the fact that he was then held for four days without being
“afforded an opportunity to have counsel appointed, much
196                                                           State v. Ward

less to meet with counsel,” and that the Washington County
interrogation took place hours after the detectives provided
the second set of Miranda warnings—rather than when
defendant’s “recollection of his rights was fresh.” Finally,
defendant argues that the “unusual sequence of events”
must be considered in the context of his “heightened susceptibility to failing to understand” his rights as a result of his
intellectual disability.
        The state insists that the trial court ruled correctly,
but the state also raises a threshold issue regarding the
standard by which we must review the trial court’s ruling.
We begin by addressing that preliminary issue.
A.    Standard of Review
         On review, the state urges a distinction between the
standard of review that applies to the question whether a
defendant waived his rights “voluntarily” and the standard
of review that applies to the question whether a defendant
waived his rights “knowingly and intelligently.” The state
argues that, in evaluating whether the trial court erred,
this court should treat as essentially a factual inquiry the
question of whether defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights and should defer to the trial court’s determination in that respect.6 But appellate review of the trial
court’s waiver determination is not limited in the way that
the state contends.
         As the state acknowledges, whether the circumstances of a particular case demonstrate a voluntary waiver
is a question of law that we review without deference to the
trial court, although we are bound by the trial court’s factual findings if there is evidence to support them. See State
v. Jackson,

364 Or 1, 21

430 P3d 1067

 (2018) (analyzing the
voluntariness of a statement as a question of law). The state
also acknowledges that we have never held that a purely factual standard applies to whether a waiver was knowing and

    6
      Although not entirely clear, it appears that the Court of Appeals may have
accepted the state’s characterization of the standard by which courts should
review whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent. See State v. Ward,

295 Or App 636, 655

 (2019) (concluding that the record contains “constitutionally sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent”).
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intelligent. However, the state views the standard of review
for whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent as an open
question, and it urges us to follow the Ninth Circuit, which
has described as “essentially a question of fact” whether a
waiver of federal Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent.
U.S. v. Doe,

155 F3d 1070

, 1074 (9th Cir 1998); see also U.S.
v. Rodriguez-Preciado,

399 F3d 1118, 1127

 (9th Cir 2005). Of
course, we are not bound by decisions of the Ninth Circuit—
or any other federal circuit—even on questions of federal law.
State v. Moyle,

299 Or 691, 707

705 P2d 740

 (1985); see also
Van De Hey v. U.S. National Bank,

313 Or 86

, 95 n 9,

829 P2d 695

 (1992) (“only decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States are binding on this court in the interpretation of federal law”).7 Thus, we understand the state to cite Rodriguez-Preciado merely as an example of persuasive analysis that
this court should adopt for purposes of Article I, section 12.
         We agree with the state’s implicit premise—and
that of the Ninth Circuit—that the inquiry into whether a
waiver is knowing and intelligent can be distinct from the
inquiry into whether the waiver was voluntary. See State v.
Haynes,

288 Or 59, 64-65

602 P2d 272

 (1979) (“[K]nowledge
of these [Article I, section 12,] rights is not conclusive on the
separate issue of voluntariness.”); see also State v. Joslin,

332 Or 373, 386

29 P3d 1112

 (2001) (“[D]efendant’s waiver
of that right under Article I, section 12, although voluntary,
was not knowingly made and, therefore, was invalid.”). We
also emphasize that, regardless of whether the “knowing
and intelligent” component of a valid waiver is—like the
voluntariness component—a legal determination, the determination in a particular case will be based on underlying
factual findings by which this court is bound if there is any
evidence to support them. See Jackson,

364 Or at 21

 (articulating rule with respect to voluntariness determination).

    7
      With respect to issues arising under Article I, section 12, we have sometimes looked for guidance to Fifth Amendment decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, “particularly” because that court first required “the warnings
that this court later required to effectuate the protections afforded by Article I,
section 12.” Vondehn,

348 Or at 470

. But Vondehn also makes clear that we must
independently determine the scope of Article I, section 12, rights and, indeed,
reached a different conclusion about the significance of a Miranda violation
under Article I, section 12, than the US Supreme Court had reached under the
Fifth Amendment.

Id. at 475-76

.
198                                              State v. Ward

         But the state fails to explain why we should be
persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s rule that only one part
of the valid-waiver test involves a legal question. Indeed,
Rodriguez-Preciado provides no analysis for its rule that
“knowingly and intelligently,” unlike “voluntarily,” should
be reviewed as a factual determination. Nor does the case
on which Rodriguez-Preciado relied, Collazo v. Estelle, 940
F2d 411, 416 (9th Cir 1991), or the case on which Collazo
relied, Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F2d 813, 823 (9th Cir 1990),
overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Preston,

751 F3d 1008

(9th Cir 2014).
         If this court has never expressly rejected the state’s
proposed bifurcated standard of review for the three components of a valid waiver, we do so now. This court’s Article I,
section 12, case law has treated the question of whether a
waiver of constitutional rights was “knowing and intelligent” as ultimately a question of law, just as the question of
whether the waiver is voluntary is ultimately a question of
law. For example, in State v. Singleton,

288 Or 89

602 P2d 1059

 (1979), this court considered whether the defendant,
who initially invoked his Miranda rights, validly waived
those rights at a later point. After describing it as the state’s
burden “to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived” his Article I, section 12, rights, this
court explained that “the question of waiver is not simply a
question of historical fact, but one which requires the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”

Id. at 104

. This court then considered “the historic facts of
this case in the light of the constitutional standards” and
held that the defendant “made a knowing and intelligent
waiver” of his constitutional rights.

Id. at 108-09

.
        As our approach in Singleton illustrates, we review
whether the state has proven a valid waiver as ultimately a
legal question—“the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found”—even when the dispute focuses on
whether the defendant “knowingly and intelligently” waived
his Article I, section 12, rights.

Id. at 104

. See also Haynes,

288 Or at 70

 (identifying information that, under certain
circumstances, police categorically must provide to permit
a determination that the defendant “knowingly and intelligently” waived Article I, section 12, right to counsel); State v.
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Acremant,

338 Or 302, 321

108 P3d 1139

 (2005) (describing
a single standard of review for whether a waiver is “knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstance”—that, “[a]lthough we are bound by its findings of historical fact, we review a trial court’s conclusions regarding
a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel for legal error”).
Moreover, reviewing as a question of law all requirements
for a valid waiver of Article I, section 12, rights aligns with
how this court reviews other questions that bear on whether
officers have honored those rights. See State v. Avila-Nava,

356 Or 600, 609

341 P3d 714

 (2014) (“[W]hether a defendant’s statements amounted to an unequivocal invocation of
the right against self-incrimination, an equivocal invocation,
or no invocation at all, is a question of law,” although “what a
defendant said or did not say, is a question of fact.”).
         The state, nevertheless, argues that treating the
knowledge requirement for a valid waiver as a question
of fact is analogous to how we treat other “questions of a
person’s awareness and understanding.” The state points,
as examples, to cases that identify questions regarding a
criminal defendant’s mental state or condition as a question of fact for the jury to decide. See State v. Herrera,

286 Or 349, 360

594 P2d 823

 (1979) (“[T]he decision of whether
the defendant has a mental disease or defect [for purposes
of affirmative defense] is a question of fact for the jury” if
there is enough evidence “to permit reasonable persons to
conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of mental disease or defect.”); State v. Wolleat,

338 Or 469, 478

111 P3d 1131

 (2005) (in context of discussing the
mental state element of kidnapping, explaining that, “in
most cases the question of whether the defendant intended
to interfere substantially with the victim’s liberty will present a question of fact for the jury”).
          But those examples do not involve the standard
for proving a waiver of a constitutional right. Rather, they
describe statutory elements that must be proven for a jury to
find a defendant guilty or not guilty of a crime—an inquiry
that is inherently factual. See State v. Lotches,

331 Or 455, 498

17 P3d 1045

 (2000) (explaining that this court reviews a
jury’s finding of guilt “solely to determine whether a rational
factfinder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
200                                                           State v. Ward

the state, and accepting all reasonable inferences and credibility choices, could find the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt”). By contrast, the question here involves
whether the police violated defendant’s constitutional rights
by interrogating him without obtaining a valid waiver. As
our past decisions indicate, we determine the answer to that
ultimate question as a matter of law, although we defer to
the trial court’s findings of the underlying historical facts.
Acremant,

338 Or at 321

.
B.    The Framework for Analyzing this Case
         As we have explained above, a defendant’s statements obtained during a custodial interrogation are admissible only if the state proves that the defendant was given
Miranda warnings and made a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of those rights under the totality of the circumstances. Nichols,

361 Or at 107

.8 We emphasize “totality” because the opinion of the Court of Appeals and the
arguments advanced by the state both highlight individual
circumstances that, in isolation, might demonstrate that
defendant validly waived his Article I, section 12, rights.
         The Court of Appeals first considered the impact
of the earlier violation by asking if it “tainted” defendant’s
later statements to the extent that they “cannot properly be
seen as the product of a truly voluntary waiver of the right
against self-incrimination.” State v. Ward,

295 Or App 636, 650

 (2019). The court answered that question
by applying the standard that this court has established for
determining whether a defendant’s statements—or other
evidence—must be suppressed solely as the product of the
earlier constitutional violation.

 at 650-53 (quoting and
discussing State v. Jarnagin,

351 Or 703, 713-18

277 P3d 535

 (2012)). After concluding that the violation was not
sufficiently egregious to require suppression by itself, the
Court of Appeals looked separately at the delay between the
    8
      In addition to determining whether the state proved a valid waiver of
Article I, section 12, rights, some cases require a separate inquiry into whether
statements following a waiver were voluntary. See McAnulty,

356 Or at 459

(analyzing validity of waiver and “voluntariness” of subsequent statements
separately); Acremant,

338 Or at 321-25

 (2005) (same). We do not understand
defendant to contend that his statements were involuntary apart from his waiver
argument.
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Miranda warnings that the officers read immediately before
driving defendant to Washington County and the interrogation that occurred several hours later. Id. at 654. With
respect to that temporal gap, the court considered whether
“a reasonable person could believe that his or her rights have
changed since the time they were originally given,” and the
court concluded that the “circumstances did not require the
police to readminister Miranda warnings closer in time to
the interrogation.” Id. at 654-55.
         That analytical framework presents several challenges. First, Jarnagin expressly cautioned that the standard the Court of Appeals quoted does not apply to cases in
which the question is whether the defendant validly waived
his rights despite an earlier violation; rather, the standard
“applies to derivative statements; … a different calculus
applies when a defendant remains in custody and officers
seek to remedy an earlier Miranda violation.”9

351 Or at 716

n 8. As we have emphasized, when the state contends that
a defendant validly waived his rights despite an earlier violation, “there is a presumption that the waiver was involuntary and the state has a ‘heavy burden’ to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
those rights.” Singleton,

288 Or at 104

. Second, by limiting
the inquiry to whether the Washington County statements
were the product of a voluntary waiver, the Court of Appeals
overlooked the extent to which an earlier violation can affect
whether a later waiver is knowing and intelligent, as well
as voluntary. We have emphasized that a particular harm
that occurs when police have refused to honor a suspect’s
invocation of Article I, section 12, rights is that the violation

    9
      Although the resolution of this case ultimately does not turn solely on the
effect of the initial violation, we caution that the Court of Appeals’ application
of the Jarnagin factors may have underestimated the significance of the Union
County violation on defendant’s later decision to speak with the Washington
County officers. For example, the court reasoned that the nature of the violation
in this case was not especially “flagrant,” Ward,

295 Or App at 651

, but this court
has strongly suggested that such a conclusion should be limited to violations that
consist of “the officers fail[ing] to recognize that the circumstances had become
sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warnings.” State v. Swan,

363 Or 121, 133

420 P3d 9

 (2018) (quoting Jarnagin,

). As we emphasized in
Swan, “by contrast” to cases like Jarnagin, when officers ignored the defendant’s
invocation of his Article I, section 12, right to counsel and asked numerous questions, “the violation was flagrant and repeated.” Id. at 134.
202                                            State v. Ward

may have “created the impression that the assertion of one’s
rights was meaningless.” State v. Foster,

288 Or 649, 656

607 P2d 173

 (1980). Finally, considering whether the violation, alone, or the delay, alone, requires suppression of
defendant’s Washington County statements falls short of
the question that ultimately concerns the court: whether
the state proved, under the totality of the circumstances,
that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of the Article I, section 12, rights at the time of the
Washington County interrogation. See Nichols,

361 Or at 107

 (describing standard).
         In addressing that question, the state’s arguments
in this court continue to focus too narrowly on only some
of the relevant circumstances. Specifically, the state argues
that it established a valid waiver with the evidence that
defendant answered questions after having been advised of
his Miranda rights and having indicated that he understood.
If the state were drawing on a clean slate—without an earlier refusal to honor defendant’s invocation of rights—then
the state might be correct that it could prove a valid waiver
with that evidence alone. See Nichols,

361 Or at 108

 (concluding that those circumstances proved a valid waiver but
emphasizing that “nothing in the record suggests a lack of
knowledge, consent, or voluntariness about that decision”);
but see James,

339 Or at 488-89

 (rejecting suggestion that
a suspect’s statements made after Miranda warnings are
“presumptively admissible”); Joslin,

332 Or at 383

 (waiver
not knowing and intelligent when officers failed to advise
defendant both that “an identified lawyer has been hired or
appointed and is seeking to consult with a suspect who is
subject to custodial interrogation”). But the slate here was
not clean. The state’s argument fails to give adequate weight
to the violation that preceded the Washington County interrogation, a circumstance that the state bears a “heavy burden” to overcome. See Singleton,

288 Or at 104

.
         When a suspect in custody exercises the right to
remain silent, police must “scrupulously honor” that request.
McAnulty,

356 Or at 461

 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley,

423 US 96, 104

96 S Ct 321

46 L Ed 2d 313

 (1975)); Singleton,

288 Or at 102

 (same). When the prior violation consists of
a failure to scrupulously honor a defendant’s invocation of
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his Article I, section 12, rights, it can have a particularly
significant impact on a defendant’s later decision to answer
questions. See State v. Swan,

363 Or 121, 133-34

420 P3d 9

(2018) (highlighting the distinction as affecting whether
the violation is “egregious or flagrant” for purposes of determining if defendant’s statements were tainted by an earlier Miranda violation); Jarnagin,

 (same). Of
particular concern, it can “create[ ] the impression that the
assertion of one’s rights was meaningless.” Foster,

288 Or at 656

. Thus, if the state fails to “scrupulously honor” a defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent, as we emphasized in Singleton, then the state bears a “heavy burden”
to prove “that the defendant has subsequently waived those
rights.” 288 Or at 104.
         In those cases in which we have held that the state
proved a valid waiver despite a prior violation, we have
pointed to countervailing circumstances that are absent
from this record. For example, in concluding that the defendant in McAnulty had twice validly waived her Miranda
rights following an earlier violation, we emphasized that
the defendant first initiated the renewed conversation by
asking to speak privately with the officers because “she had
something to tell them.” 356 Or at 453, 459. We also emphasized that, when the officers next interrogated the defendant in McAnulty, they had freshly advised the defendant
of her Miranda rights immediately before the interrogation,
and she had signed a form expressly acknowledging that
she understood those rights. Id. Likewise in Jarnagin, in
which we concluded that the defendant had validly waived
his rights following an earlier unlawful interrogation, the
defendant had agreed to be transported from his home to
the police station to be interviewed and, upon arriving, was
given Miranda warnings, signed a written consent, and
made clear that he understood his rights by volunteering
that he could “at any time, decide that [he] would like a lawyer or not answer any further questions.”

351 Or at 712, 724

.10

    10
       In addition, as we highlighted in Swan, the Miranda violation in Jarnagin
consisted of the less “egregious” failure “to recognize that the circumstances
had become sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warnings.”

363 Or at 133

(quoting Jarnagin,

). Thus, Jarnagin identified the issue as “when
belated Miranda warnings will and will not suffice.”

351 Or at 721

.
204                                                          State v. Ward

Indeed, we have pointed to similar circumstances as aiding
the state’s ability to prove a valid waiver, even in the absence
of a prior constitutional violation. See State v. Meade,

327 Or 335, 341-42

963 P2d 656

 (1998) (even without a prior violation, affirmative waiver immediately following administration of Miranda warnings was “significant” to conclusion
that the defendant validly waived his rights).
         Here, however, the state can identify no similar circumstances that would aid the state in carrying its burden
to overcome the harm of the prior violation. Defendant did
not voluntarily travel to the Washington County interrogation room or in any way initiate a conversation about the
crime. Although defendant answered “yes” when asked if
he understood his rights, the state cannot point to the kind
of affirmative statements that, in Jarnagin, demonstrated
that the defendant had a meaningful understanding of the
words that had been recited to him.11 And the state cannot
point to evidence that defendant affirmatively consented to
be interrogated or affirmatively waived his rights. Indeed,
the only evidence of officers asking defendant whether he
wanted to speak with them is the evidence from Union
County, and defendant’s answer to those officers was that
he did not want to talk.
         Another circumstance that can ease the state’s burden following a violation of a defendant’s Article I, section 12,
rights is a sufficient gap in time—at least if the gap is followed by fresh Miranda warnings. See Jarnagin,

351 Or at 722-23

 (emphasizing the “substantial break in time”—
during which the defendant remained with a friend in his
own home—before he agreed to be interviewed at the police
station, was given fresh warnings, and affirmatively consented to waive his rights). Here, the state emphasizes that,
following the violation of defendant’s rights, four days passed
before the detectives provided new Miranda warnings, drove

    11
       We do not suggest that an inquiry into a defendant’s degree of comprehension is required in the ordinary case. Indeed, in a case that did not involve
overcoming the harm of a prior violation, we observed that “asking an accused
whether he understands the warning given him does very little, if anything,
to guarantee his understanding” and that “[w]e do not believe such an inquiry
and an affirmative response is necessary in order to assure compliance with
Miranda.” State v. Karcher,

252 Or 564, 566-67

451 P2d 110

 (1969).
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defendant to Washington County, and began a new interrogation. Given those circumstances, according to the state,
“any taint had long since dissipated.” But the state overlooks
countervailing factors that undermine the value of the gap
in time and fresh warning in this case.
         First, any value that the passage of time might
normally provide was diluted in this case by the fact that
defendant was held in jail during that entire time without
the benefit of advice from counsel. See Foster,

288 Or at 656-57

. As we emphasized in Foster, in concluding that a
waiver following a previous violation was not valid, the defendant had been held in custody “for over 30 hours” without
the benefit of legal advice that the defendant had requested.

 Similarly, in State v. Mendacino, we explained that the
72-hour gap between an unlawful interrogation and a later
interrogation—preceded by fresh Miranda warnings—was
insufficient to dissipate harm of the earlier violation because
the defendant remained in jail and did not consult with an
attorney between the interrogations.

288 Or 231, 238

603 P2d 1376

 (1979). Here, the state has offered no reason to
conclude that the days of incarceration did anything to minimize the harm from the earlier violation.
         Second, any value that the fresh Miranda warnings might normally have provided was undermined by the
fact that the detectives gave those warnings at the start of
the five-hour trip to Washington County. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that a short delay and change of location,
alone, generally will not preclude the state from proving a
valid waiver. See State v. Stevens,

311 Or 119, 138

806 P2d 92

 (1991) (“mere transfer to another car and another officer
did not necessarily require” renewed Miranda warnings).12
But this is not a case in which delay and a change of location
are the only obstacles to the state proving a valid waiver.
Instead, the relevant circumstances, here, began with the
officers in Union County ignoring defendant’s invocation
of his right to remain silent, then holding him in jail for

    12
       In Jarnagin, we quoted LaFave for the proposition that it is “generally
accepted that fresh warnings are not required after the passage of just a few
hours.”

351 Or at 725

 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King,
& Orin S. Kerr, 2 Criminal Procedure § 6.8(b), 805 (3d ed 2007)).
206                                              State v. Ward

four days without the opportunity to speak with counsel.
Thus, the question here is whether the manner in which
the Washington County detectives provided new warnings
was sufficient to overcome the harm of the prior violation—
the impression that invoking Article I, section 12, rights is
meaningless. See Foster,

288 Or at 656

. Under the totality
of the circumstances, the poorly timed warnings did little to
help the state meet its burden.
         Third, the state’s ability to meet its burden is
impaired by the limited record of what transpired as a
result of the Miranda violation. Both parties in briefing
have offered a general characterization of defendant’s statements after he invoked his right to remain silent, but—as
the Court of Appeals observed—“[t]he precise nature of
those statements is uncertain based on the record from
the suppression hearing.” Ward,

295 Or App at 649

 n 7. We
addressed a similar record deficiency in Swan, in which we
considered whether the state had met its burden to show
that the defendant’s decision to take a breath test was not
the product of a DUII interview that the state conducted in
violation of the defendant’s Article I, section 12, rights.

363 Or at 133

. The obstacle for the state in Swan was that there
was no evidence of what the defendant said during the DUII
interview and so “no way of knowing whether or how [the]
defendant’s decision to take the test was causally connected
to his earlier responses.”

Id. at 136

. Given the absence of evidence, we concluded that the state failed to meet its burden.

          The record in this case presents a similar obstacle for the state. As the Court of Appeals noted, the record
reveals that the state played a video recording of the unlawful Union County interrogation only up to a point shortly
after defendant invoked his right to remain silent, and
“[t]here is no indication that the court also was provided with
a transcript of the interrogation or otherwise reviewed what
defendant said to the police after invoking his rights under
Miranda.” Ward,

295 Or App at 649

 n 7. Thus, when the
trial court ruled at the conclusion of the suppression hearing that defendant provided a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, it necessarily did so with “no way of knowing
whether or how” statements that defendant or the officers
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made during the earlier, unlawful interrogation affected
defendant’s decision to answer questions when he reached
Washington County. See Swan,

363 Or at 136

. Accordingly,
we cannot assume that the court made any implicit findings
regarding the course of the unlawful interrogation that could
help the state meet its heavy burden to prove that defendant subsequently validly waived his Article I, section 12,
rights.
         Finally, defendant argues that all of the other circumstances that he has identified as preventing proof of a
valid waiver must be filtered through the lens of his established intellectual disability, which he describes as creating a “heightened susceptibility” to not understanding his
rights. In general, we agree that a defendant’s mental limitations should be considered when determining whether
the defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver under the totality of the circumstances. See Jackson,

364 Or at 30

 (“a defendant’s mental condition is a factor
that must be considered, as part of the totality of the circumstances, in determining whether a defendant’s confession was voluntary”); see also Meade,

327 Or at 341

 (even
without a prior violation, identifying as “significant” to valid
waiver inquiry the fact that the defendant was “highly educated”). The state contends, however, that defendant failed
to preserve this argument regarding his mental disability.
Defendant offers a complicated response that relies on a
statement in one written memorandum that his challenge
to the Washington County interrogation “incorporated by
reference” arguments from an earlier memorandum and on
the fact that the judge who decided the suppression motion
had earlier presided over the hearings regarding defendant’s competence to stand trial. He urges this court to
analyze the record below in light of the purposes of preservation. We decline to undertake that analysis, however,
because we conclude that this case does not turn on the
role of defendant’s intellectual disability. Considering all
of the other circumstances that we have identified—from
the Union County officers’ failure to honor defendant’s initial invocation of his right to remain silent, which shaped
his understanding of his rights; to the extended period of
incarceration without counsel; to the significant separation
208                                                             State v. Ward

by time and distance between new Miranda warnings and
the interrogation in Washington County; to the absence of
evidence that defendant initiated conversation or affirmatively waived his rights—we are persuaded that the state
failed to prove that it obtained defendant’s knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his Article I, section 12, rights
before the Washington County custodial interrogation.13
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s
motion to suppress his statements from the Washington
County interrogation.
C. Significance of the Erroneously Admitted Statements
        We also conclude that the error is one that requires
us to reverse defendant’s conviction. That determination is
governed by Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution, which provides, in part:
    “If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment
    of the court appealed from was such as should have been
    rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial[.]”
Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3. We have described our
obligation under that provision as one “to decide whether
there was ‘little likelihood’ that the error affected the jury’s
verdict.” McAnulty,

356 Or at 460

 (quoting State v. Davis,

336 Or 19, 32

77 P3d 1111

 (2003)). In McAnulty, we concluded that the erroneous admission of some of the defendant’s statements did not require reversal “on the particular
facts” of that case because the illegally obtained statements

     13
        This case does not call upon us to specify where the state fell short in its
proof of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Although we have occasionally described a waiver as invalid solely because it was not voluntary or solely
because it was not knowingly made, we have also identified circumstances that
affect all three components of a valid waiver. See, e.g., Vondehn,

348 Or at 474

(Miranda warnings “ensure that a person’s waiver is knowing as well as voluntary”). Our discussions in Singleton and Foster suggest that ignoring a suspect’s
assertion of Article I, section 12, rights can similarly affect all three components
of the inquiry. Foster,

288 Or at 656-57

 (explaining that the violation “created the
impression that the assertion of one’s rights was meaningless”); Singleton,

288 Or at 104

 (“when in such a case it is contended by the state that the defendant
has subsequently waived those rights there is a presumption that the waiver was
involuntary and the state has a ‘heavy burden’ to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights”).
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 (2020)                                   209

described the same kind of abusive conduct against the victim that the defendant later described in legally obtained
statements that we described as “more substantial admissions” of abuse of the victim.

Id. at 460-61

. Indeed, we concluded that the erroneous admission was “harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt” (the federal constitutional standard).

Id. at 462

. We reasoned that “the jury would have regarded
the improperly admitted evidence as duplicative or unhelpful,” relying on but distinguishing Davis, in which this court
reversed after concluding that erroneously excluded evidence was “influential because it substantiated the defendant’s version of events,” was not “ ‘duplicative or unhelpful’
to the jury,” and was “not cumulative, because the excluded
evidence was ‘qualitatively different than the evidence that
the jury heard.’ ”

 at 460-61 (quoting Davis,

336 Or at 33-34

Here, defendant explains that his illegally obtained
statements consisted of a series of easily disproven factual
assertions, including denying that he had ever been in the
victim’s room and denying that the victim’s blood had been
on his clothing. Defendant emphasizes that the value to the
state of offering defendant’s denials of easily proven facts
was that they tended to indicate defendant’s consciousness
of guilt. Indeed that is precisely the use that the state made
of the evidence: The prosecutor argued to the jury in closing
that “provable lies still are an indicator of one’s consciousness
of guilt” and added, “[W]ho lies to police, innocent people or
guilty people? I think you’ll all agree guilty people do.” As
in Davis, we conclude that the illegally obtained statements
provided the jury with evidence of defendant’s mental state
that was qualitatively different than the other evidence that
the state presented and tended to substantiate the state’s
theory that not only was defendant in the victim’s room, but
he also actively participated in the victim’s murder. Under
the circumstances, we cannot conclude that there was “little
likelihood” that the error affected the verdict. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
210 State v. Ward

BALMER, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The facts of this case are
tragic. The evidence at trial showed that defendant, who
has intellectual disabilities, likely was manipulated by
his cousin, Joda Cain, to engage in criminal conduct with
Cain during which defendant killed the victim—Cain’s
great-grandmother—with a hammer. A jury convicted defendant of aggravated murder and felony murder, and he was
sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.
The majority reverses defendant’s convictions and
remands the case for a new trial; as a result, it does not
reach defendant’s constitutional challenges to his sentence.
The majority concludes that the trial court, although it
granted defendant’s motion to suppress statements that
he made during an October 5, 2013, interview with police,
erred in denying the motion as to statements during a second interview on October 9. It also concludes that the error
was not harmless. I disagree with both of those conclusions.
The sequence of events concerning defendant’s statements is straightforward. On October 5, 2013, the night
that the victim was killed in Washington County, Cain and
defendant were apprehended in eastern Oregon after a high-speed car chase. Police read defendant his Miranda rights
at the time of his arrest. Defendant acknowledged that he
understood those rights. Later that night, police interviewed
defendant at the Union County Jail and again administered
Miranda warnings. They had already talked to Cain, who
told them that defendant had killed the victim. The police
asked whether defendant wanted to talk, and although he
indicated that he did not, they nevertheless asked him for
his side of the story. Defendant denied any wrongdoing. On
October 9, two detectives arrived from Washington County
to return defendant to Hillsboro. Those officers also gave
defendant Miranda warnings. As the majority notes, defendant said that he understood his rights, but he did not indicate whether he wanted to talk. No questioning occurred
during the five-hour drive. Back in Washington County
later that day, defendant was interviewed in the sheriff’s
office. The officers did not repeat the Miranda warnings
or ask defendant whether he wanted to waive his rights.
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Defendant responded to the officers’ questions. His answers
were consistent with his more general response during the
October 5 interview—that he didn’t do anything wrong.
         On defendant’s motion to suppress his statements,
the trial court concluded that the October 5 statements
should be suppressed because he had indicated to the officers that he did not want to talk, and they had improperly
continued their questioning after that refusal. As to the
October 9 statements, the trial court concluded that “defendant’s Miranda rights were appropriately read to him” by
the Washington County officers, that “he understood those
rights,” and that he “knowingly waived” them.
          The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling.
State v. Ward,

295 Or App 636

 (2019). It recognized the factors that we identified in State v. Jarnagin,

351 Or 703

277 P3d 535

 (2012), as being critical to the assessment of whether the waiver of the right to remain silent was
“truly voluntary.” Ward,

295 Or App at 650

. It specifically
noted that “a Miranda waiver may be tainted by a prior
Miranda violation.”

 Determining whether such a taint
exists “is fact intensive” and requires the court to decide,
“ ‘considering all the circumstances,’ ” whether a defendant’s
decision to speak to officers “ ‘is sufficiently a product of an
earlier Miranda violation that suppression is necessary to
vindicate’ ” the defendant’s rights.

 (quoting Jarnagin,

). As to the impact of the October 5 Miranda violation, the court noted that the violation was “not especially
‘flagrant’ ” or coercive, compared to other cases where a later
waiver was held to be involuntary; the officers had not used
“flagrantly coercive tactics in an effort to elicit an incriminating response.” Ward,

295 Or App at 651

. Indeed, “defendant maintained his innocence throughout the exchange
and made no patently inculpatory remarks.”

 The court
carefully examined each of the Jarnagin factors,

id. at 651-54

, as well as defendant’s argument that the delay
between the Miranda warnings given the morning of October 9
and the interview five hours later constituted an Article I,
section 12, violation,

id. at 654-55

. It discussed in detail the
trial court record, comparing the facts in the case to earlier
cases from this court and the Court of Appeals. It understood that it was required to base its determinations on the
212                                              State v. Ward

totality of the circumstances.

Id. at 650, 654, 655

. The Court
of Appeals did everything our precedents ask of it.
         The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that
defendant’s October 9 statements were not derived from
or the product of the October 5 Miranda violation and that
police were not required to give additional Miranda warnings later on October 9, after the initial warning before the
drive.

Id. at 655

. The court concluded that there was “constitutionally sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that
defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to remain silent on October 9.”

When the Court of Appeals has applied what is
essentially the correct legal standard, the fact that this
court might disagree with the lower court’s application
of the law to the facts of a particular case is usually not
a reason to allow review. That is simply “error correction,”
because the case does not necessarily “present[ ] a significant issue of law.” ORAP 9.07(1). To be sure, we sometimes
do allow review simply in order to correct errors by lower
courts, including the Court of Appeals, and I do not disagree
with that practice. But we should do so sparingly, and I do
not think we should have allowed review here.
That said, the majority does provide some clarification of the proper consideration of whether a waiver of rights
under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution is “voluntary,” “knowing,” and “intelligent.” 367 Or at 196-200. As
with many other determinations that trial courts and juries
make, and that appellate courts are charged with reviewing, those determinations may “ultimately” be legal questions that courts review for “legal error.” However (as the
majority recognizes), those legal conclusions are crucially
based on facts—evidence and permissible inferences and
presumptions—that are found by factfinders. And, as the
majority again correctly observes, we are bound to accept
those underlying factual findings “if there is any evidence
to support them.” 367 Or at 197. I agree with the majority’s
description of those distinctions.
But the majority discusses those issues primarily to
reject the state’s arguments to this court. The majority faults
the Court of Appeals’ approach to the Article I, section 12,
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analysis, stating that it “may have accepted the state’s characterization” of the “knowing and intelligent” inquiry as essentially factual, and thus subject to a more deferential standard
of review. 367 Or at 196 n 6. It reaches that conclusion based
on the Court of Appeals’ statement that there was “constitutionally sufficient evidence for the trial court to find” a knowing and voluntary waiver. Id. (quoting Ward,

295 Or App at 655

). That is not a very charitable reading of the Court of
Appeals’ decision. Perhaps the Court of Appeals should have
said that there was a “sufficient factual basis for the trial
court to reach the legal conclusion that defendant had made
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.” That, after all,
is what the Court of Appeals plainly meant when it used the
sentence quoted by the majority to sum up its previous nine
pages of detailed analysis of the factual record and the controlling case law. More importantly, the approach taken by
the Court of Appeals—the consideration of the various factors we identified in Jarnagin and the comparison to cases
such as State v. Mendacino,

288 Or 231

603 P2d 1376

 (1979),
and State v. McAnulty,

356 Or 432

338 P3d 653

 (2014)—is
essentially the same kind of careful review that the majority undertakes. The majority gives greater weight to certain
facts than the Court of Appeals did, and, as a result, reaches
a different legal conclusion.1 But, in my view, little in the
majority opinion articulates a substantially different rule of
law than the Court of Appeals applied or identifies a serious
analytical error, other than that court’s ultimate legal conclusion regarding the validity of defendant’s waiver.
       Of course, it is within the authority of this court to
review Court of Appeals’ legal rulings, including its

     1
       For example, the majority, although agreeing with the Court of Appeals
that resolution of the Miranda issue “does not turn solely on the effect of the initial violation,” nevertheless concluded that that court “may have underestimated
the significance” of the earlier violation. 367 Or at 201 n 9. Similarly, the majority
acknowledges that the Court of Appeals considered both the possible taint from
the earlier Miranda violation and the delay between the new Miranda warnings
given before the drive to Washington County and the questioning several hours
later, but it nevertheless asserts that the Court of Appeals failed to consider those
factors together as part of the “totality of the circumstances.” 367 Or at 202. But
the Court of Appeals did understand that it was required to determine whether
defendant’s waiver was “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of
the circumstances,” Ward,

295 Or App at 650

 (internal quotations omitted), and
it appears to me that it did so.
214                                              State v. Ward

application of legal standards to specific circumstances. I
agree with the Court of Appeals’ assessment of the totality
of the circumstances as meeting the standard required for a
valid waiver. But the legal issue is a close one, and although
the majority reaches a different conclusion, its legal analysis
does not appear to me to differ significantly from that of the
Court of Appeals. For that reason, we probably should not
have allowed review of this case.
         I turn to the question of whether the error found by
this court—the trial court’s failure to suppress defendant’s
statements during the October 9 interview—was prejudicial, that is, whether there was little likelihood that the
error affected the jury’s verdict. McAnulty,

356 Or at 460

.
         The majority sets out defendant’s statements: that
he didn’t know anything about the murder, hadn’t been in
the victim’s bedroom, and didn’t have the victim’s blood on
his clothes; that Cain had awakened him at night and asked
if he wanted to go for a ride; that he had run when he and
Cain were stopped by police in eastern Oregon because he
was afraid he would go to jail for lying about his age when
he had flown to Portland. 367 Or at 193. The majority concludes that, because defendant’s statements were lies that
could easily be disproved, they indicated defendant’s “consciousness of guilt,” id. at 209, and thus “tended to substantiate the state’s theory that … [defendant] actively participated in the victim’s murder.” Id. Even if that were true,
given the other evidence presented at trial, it is apparent
that defendant’s statements provided little additional probative evidence of his guilt.
         Miranda warnings were first developed to protect
against coerced confessions of guilt, truthful or not. Of
course, defendant’s statements here are not those kinds of
statements: nothing defendant said could remotely be considered a true (or false) confession. Nor are they the kind of
partially inculpatory statements that might give police leads
to seek other evidence of defendant’s guilt. And, because
defendant did not testify, they were not used for impeachment purposes.
        Yes, defendant’s statements were easily disproved.
But the overwhelming evidence that disproved them would
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