State v. Thompson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “When an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of that issue between the same parties in any future proceeding. E.g., Edwards v. State, 328 Ark. 394 , 943 S.W.2d 600 ; cert. denied, 522 U.S. 950 (1997) (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994)). In order to establish collateral estoppel, proof of the following is required: 1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; 2) the issue must have been actually litigated; 3) the issue must have been determined by a final and valid judgment; and 4) the determination must have been essential to the judgment. Edwards, 328 Ark. at 401-02 , 943 S.W.2d at 603 .”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. McWhorter v. McWhorter · Carwell Elevator Co., Inc. v. Leathers

2. “The same-elements test, commonly referred to as the “Blockburger” test, is as follows: [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 , and authorities cited. In that case this court quoted from and adopted the language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 : “A single act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 . The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Blockburger analysis in United States v. Dixon, [ 509 U.S. 688 (1993)], therein denouncing the “same conduct” test. The Court stated in Dixon: The collateral estoppel effect attributed to the Double Jeopardy Clause, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), may bar a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts. But this does not establish that the government “must... bring its prosecutions ... together.” It is entirely free to bring them separately, and can win convictions in both. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 705 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dilday v. State

3. “When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state of the United States or another state or territory thereof, a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is an affirmative defense to a subsequent prosecution in this state under the following circumstances: (1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as set out in § 5-1-112, and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct unless: (A) The offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other, and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil[. ]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Williams