State v. Schult

376                      September 10, 2025         No. 808

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                     STATE OF OREGON,
                      Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                v.
                  STEVEN JAMES SCHULT,
                     Defendant-Appellant.
                Multnomah County Circuit Court
                     19CR70795; A179078

   Jerry B. Hodson, Judge.
   Argued and submitted August 28, 2024.
   Stacy M. Du Clos, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
   Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Pagán, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.*
   PAGÁN, J.
   Reversed and remanded.




______________
   * O’Connor, Judge vice Mooney, Senior Judge.
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 (2025)   377
378                                                            State v. Schult

           PAGÁN, J.
          Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction,
following a bench trial, for one count of first-degree sodomy,
ORS 163.405 (Count 1), and eight counts of first-degree sexual
abuse, ORS 163.427 (Counts 2, 4, and 6-11).1 The convictions
stemmed from allegations made against defendant by his
partner’s niece. On appeal, defendant raises five assignments
of error, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a warranted search, the exclusion
of a portion of his expert’s testimony, and the admission of
evidence showing his sexual interest in children. We reverse
and remand based on defendant’s first assignment of error
regarding the warrant to search his electronic devices, and
therefore do not reach the remaining arguments.
                       MOTION TO SUPPRESS
         Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warranted
search of his home and electronic devices. Specifically, he
challenges the admission of evidence obtained from his phone
and his computer, and from a sketchbook containing drawings that he created. The state concedes that the court erred
in not suppressing the sketchbook and the evidence obtained
from defendant’s computer; however, the state maintains that
any error in that regard was harmless. We accept the state’s
concession, but disagree regarding harm and conclude that
the admission of the sketchbook and computer evidence was
not harmless. With respect to the search of defendant’s phone,
we conclude that the warrant was a “mixed warrant,” containing both valid and invalid search commands. State v. Turay,

, 

 (2023). We therefore reverse and
remand for further proceedings to determine what evidence
must be suppressed, and to create a record as to whether any
evidence was untainted by the constitutional violation.
A. Factual Background
        “In reviewing whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause, we consider only those facts put
     1
       The trial court acquitted defendant of two counts of first-degree sexual penetration, ORS 163.411 (Counts 3 and 5), and one count of using a child in a display
of sexually explicit conduct, ORS 163.670 (Count 12).
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before the magistrate in the supporting affidavit, along with
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.” State
v. Cannon, 

, 

 (2019). We
recite the facts accordingly.
         Detective Dressler, the detective assigned to this
matter, submitted the search warrant for defendant’s residence in June 2018. In the affidavit, Dressler discussed his
training and experience and described the specific investigation into defendant as follows.
         The alleged victims in this case are two children,
T and R. T’s mother, Trelstad, caught T, who was five years
old at the time, and another similar-aged child taking videos of their private parts using a tablet. When asked where
she had learned that behavior, T told her mother that she
learned it from Uncle Steven, defendant.2 On May 20, 2018,
T was interviewed at CARES NW by a physician and a forensic interviewer, during which she reported that defendant
“did inappropriate stuff.” Dressler recounted the report of
another police officer who had viewed the video of the interview, in which T disclosed that the inappropriate behavior
happened while she was at her aunt and uncle’s house, in
the playroom or living room, when her aunt, Morgan, would
leave the house. She disclosed that defendant had touched
multiple intimate parts of her body with his hands and
tongue and had exposed his genitals to her more than once
and had her touch his penis. T further reported that defendant had attempted to take pictures of T’s private parts with
his phone, which she believed to be black with a gray cover.
She additionally reported having witnessed defendant inappropriately touching her younger brother, R, and seeing R
touch defendant’s penis at least once.
       Dressler interviewed Trelstad on June 6, 2018, at
which point Trelstad reported that she and the children
had previously lived with defendant and Morgan, and that
defendant and Morgan had been caring for R for the previous
year and a half. Upon T’s disclosure of the abuse, Trelstad
removed R from the home. Trelstad reported that she had
had concerns about defendant over the years that he had
    2
      Defendant had been in a relationship with T’s paternal aunt for over ten
years, but they were not married. He is not related to T by blood.
380                                                          State v. Schult

been a part of the family, including because he was a nudist
and would often walk around without clothes on. She also
shared that the children’s father, who was deceased, had
located photographs of naked children in defendant’s belongings, approximately 7-10 years earlier. Trelstad had heard
that the family confronted defendant about the photographs
and that he had responded that the images were artwork.
         The remainder of the affidavit consisted of Dressler’s
general knowledge, and that of a fellow detective, Tobey,
concerning digital devices and their use and operation, as
well as common behaviors and actions of people who have a
sexual interest in children.
         Based on that information, Dressler stated that it
appeared that defendant has a sexual interest in children
predating the birth of T, and that he had acted on that
interest in molesting both T and R. He further stated that it
appeared that defendant had photographed and attempted
to photograph T’s genitals for sexual purposes. He concluded
that there was probable cause to believe that defendant committed the crimes of sexual abuse in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, using a child in a display of sexually
explicit conduct, and encouraging child sexual abuse in the
first and second degree; and that evidence of those crimes
would be present in any electronic devices on defendant’s
person or located in his residence. A magistrate issued a
warrant to seize and search any mobile device, computer,
laptop, and accessory to find the following evidence:
       “1. Videos, photographs, or images of children who are
    naked or engaged in sexually explicit conduct;
        “2.   Videos, photographs, or images of [T]; and
       “3. Communications related to child molestation or the
    creation, distribution, or sharing of child pornography.”3
        Upon executing the warrant, the police seized defendant’s phone and computer and conducted a forensic search
     3
       Those search categories were listed in the warrant affidavit. Although the
warrant did not identify those specific categories of evidence, the parties agree
that the warrant should be read in light of the specific search commands identified in the affidavit, and we agree. State v. Mansor, 

, 

 (2018) (“[T]he contents of the affidavit assist us in determining the scope of
the search that the warrant permitted.”).
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of both devices. Evidence from the phone included photographs and videos of T and R playing at defendant’s home;4
evidence of Google and YouTube searches for naked children
and children in the bathroom; and a search query conducted
on March 19, 2018, for “is the child victim of sexual abuse
telling the truth?” The search of the computer resulted in the
discovery of a number of recordings entitled “this bullshit,”
documenting Morgan questioning T about her disclosure.
The police also seized a sketchbook containing cartoon drawings of naked figures that defendant drew, which defendant
admitted during an interrogation made him appear guilty
in light of the allegations against him. The photos and videos of T and R, the internet history, the recordings, and the
sketches were all admitted as exhibits at trial.
B.   General Legal Framework
         Challenges to search warrant particularity implicate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, and
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.5
When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, “a presumption of regularity arises, based on the fact that an
independent magistrate has already determined that probable cause exists; therefore, the defendant bears the burden
of proving the unlawfulness of a warranted search.” State v.
Hargrove, 

, 

 (2023). When a
search warrant includes a duly incorporated affidavit, then
“the contents of the affidavit assist us in determining the
scope of the search that the warrant permitted.” State v.
Mansor, 

, 

 (2018).
        The particularity analysis of a warrant is informed
by “two related, but distinct, concepts,” specificity and overbreadth. 

. Specificity requires that “the search
be as precise as the circumstances allow and that undue
rummaging be avoided.” State v. Rose, 

,

, rev den, 

 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A search warrant “must be sufficiently

    4
      The children were fully clothed in the photos and videos. Defendant is in
the videos, wearing only boxer-briefs, playing with R.
    5
      Defendant raises arguments under both the federal and state constitutions.
Because we are remanding this matter under state law, we do not separately analyze the federal issues.
382                                            State v. Schult

specific in describing the items to be seized and examined
[so] that the officers can, with reasonable effort ascertain
those items to a reasonable degree of certainty.” Mansor, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a
search warrant must not be overbroad, that is, it “must not
authorize a search that is broader than the supporting affidavit supplies probable cause to justify.” 

 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he gravamen of an overbreadth
challenge is an asserted lack of probable cause for the invasion of interests in privacy in premises or items.” Cannon,

 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Evidence is the proper object of a search warrant as long
as there is a nexus between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Probable cause must be examined in terms
of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a
particular apprehension or conviction.” State v. Goode, 

, 120, 

 (2024), rev den, 

(2025) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
C. Analysis
         Defendant raises four distinct challenges to the
trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to the warrant. He asserts that the warrant
was overbroad in allowing a search for evidence of crimes
other than those alleged against T and R; that the warrant
was insufficiently specific with respect to the date range of
the search; that the warrant was overbroad in authorizing
the seizure and search of all electronic devices when there
was only probable cause for a single specific device; and that
the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing
the sketchbook, which was not a digital device. The state
concedes that the court erred in not suppressing evidence
from the computer and sketchbook, and we agree; nevertheless, the state maintains that any error was harmless. We
conclude that the error was not harmless with respect to
the evidence discovered on the computer, and reverse and
remand. Furthermore, we conclude that the warrant was
overbroad in ways that impacted the search of the phone,
and we remand for further proceedings to determine what,
if any, evidence was discovered as a result of the overbroad
warrant.
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 (2025)                                  383

    1. The admission of the evidence obtained from the
       computer was not harmless error.
         The warrant authorized the police to seize, test,
review, and analyze “mobile devices, computers, or laptop computers, and accessories associated with any seized
device,” and to present any such devices to a computer forensic examiner for a search of its contents. Defendant argues
that the affidavit did not provide any case-specific reasons to
believe that devices other than defendant’s cell phone would
include objects of the search. He maintains that the affidavit’s general assertions based on the detective’s training and
experience did not demonstrate that it was more likely than
not that each of defendant’s electronic devices would contain evidence of sexual abuse, an attempt to photograph T,
or child pornography. The state acknowledges that, without
additional information concerning defendant’s use of his computer or how it interacted with other devices, the affidavit did
not provide probable cause to search defendant’s computer.
         We agree. The warrant did not establish probable
cause to search defendant’s computer, and the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence
that was discovered on the computer. See State v. Cantrell,

, 

 (2023) (holding that a
warrant affidavit establishing probable cause to search a
single device did not establish probable cause for each device
authorized to be searched in the warrant); Cannon, 

 (noting that general statements based on
the officer’s training and experience with technology and
sex crime investigations did not provide probable cause to
search a broad array of the defendant’s electronic devices).
         We therefore turn to the state’s argument that
any error was harmless. In assessing whether a conviction
should be affirmed notwithstanding the improper admission of evidence, we consider the following question:
   “Is there little likelihood that the particular error affected
   the verdict? The correct focus of the inquiry regarding
   affirmance despite error is on the possible influence of the
   error on the verdict rendered, not whether this court, sitting as a fact-finder, would regard the evidence of guilt as
   substantial and compelling.”
384                                           State v. Schult

State v. Davis, 

, 

 (2003). “A criminal
defendant who assigns error to the exclusion or admission of
evidence ‘must establish that the error was not harmless.’ ”
State v. Gibson, 

, 

, cert den,

 (2005) (quoting State v. Lotches, 

, 

 (2000), cert den, 

 (2001)). In
making the determination of whether there is little likelihood that a particular error affected the verdict, “we examine the record as a whole and consider the error and the
context in which it occurred.” State v. Durando, 

, 

, adh’d to as modified on recons, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2014).
        We conclude that the denial of defendant’s motion
to suppress with respect to the evidence located on his computer was not harmless error. At trial, the court admitted
into evidence multiple audio recordings that were found
on defendant’s computer, documenting conversations that
defendant’s partner, Morgan, engaged in with T. In the
recordings, Morgan and other family members question
T regarding the disclosures she made to her mother and
grandmother, asking her who hurt her and what happened,
in an attempt to get a recording of her allegations. T is
mostly unresponsive to the questions, saying that she feels
shy, does not want to talk, or does not remember what she
told her mother and grandmother. However, she does say
that Uncle Steven “did it” and mentions him putting his
hands in her pants and rubbing “his thing” on her.
         The admission of those recordings had more than
a little likelihood of affecting the verdict. The state and
defense both emphasized the importance of the recordings
throughout the trial. In closing, the state repeatedly pointed
to the interviews as evidence of T withstanding immense
pressure and not caving to her aunt’s “horrible, inappropriate, and manipulative” efforts to get her to recant her allegations. The state also used the recordings to help explain
variations in T’s testimony between trial, the grand jury,
and the CARES interview, noting that she had withstood
an hour-long “enhanced interrogation technique interview”
by someone she loves and cares about, which could have
impacted her willingness to be open about the details of
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what happened to her. Defendant, on the other hand, used
the recordings as a basis for arguing that T was an unreliable reporter, and perhaps would not even know what the
truth was after all of the badgering that she was subjected
to. The state ultimately characterized the case as turning on
whether the court believed the child, and whether the court
believed her enough. The recordings were a pivotal part of
both parties’ arguments regarding T’s credibility. Therefore,
they had more than a little likelihood of affecting the verdict
and their improper admission was not a harmless error.6
     2. Overbreadth of search commands
         Because it will arise on remand, we turn now to
defendant’s arguments regarding the validity of the search
commands, as it relates to the search of his phone. As noted
above, defendant argues that the search warrant was overbroad in that it allowed a search for evidence of crimes other
than those for which there was probable cause, and that the
warrant was insufficiently specific with respect to the date
range of the search. We conclude that the warrant was a
“mixed warrant,” because it “combined some search categories that satisfied the constitution’s particularity requirement with others that did not.” Turay, 

. The
warrant is therefore presumptively invalid; however, as discussed in further detail below, we remand for the development of a factual record as to whether any of the individual
pieces of evidence were untainted by the constitutional violation. 

.
         We review whether the search categories challenged
on specificity grounds sufficiently describe, with particularity, the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. State v. Curry, 

, 

(2024). We review whether the search categories “authorize
a search that is broader than the supporting affidavit supplies probable cause to justify.” Mansor, 

 (quotation marks omitted).
    6
      The state concedes that the sketchbook was also improperly admitted,
as it was beyond the scope of the warrant for electronic devices. We accept the
state’s concession and agree that the sketchbook should have been suppressed.
Because defendant is entitled to a new trial based on the erroneous admission of
the evidence discovered on his computer, we need not engage in a discussion of
the harmfulness of the admission of the sketches.
386                                                          State v. Schult

           Defendant argues that the search commands
authorizing the police to search for “videos, photographs, or
images of children who are naked or engaged in sexually
explicit conduct” and for “communications related to child
molestation or the creation, distribution, or sharing of child
pornography” are unsupported by probable cause. Defendant
asserts that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to
search for crimes involving other children beyond T and R,
or that defendant was a collector or distributor of child pornography. We agree.
         The warrant affidavit documented T’s reports to
her mother that she had learned about taking pictures of
her private parts from defendant and her report to CARES
that defendant had attempted to take pictures of her private
parts with his phone. Those allegations established probable cause to search defendant’s phone for images of T.7 The
affidavit also documented T’s reports of sexual touching by
defendant, including of T and of R. Apart from those allegations, the only other facts particularized to defendant were
Trelstad’s reports that defendant was a nudist who would
often be unclothed at home, and the report that seven to
ten years earlier family members had confronted defendant
about photographs he had of naked children that defendant
characterized as artwork. None of those facts establish probable cause to search defendant’s phone for images of children
in general, and nothing specific to defendant makes it more
probable than not that defendant’s phone would contain any
communications relating to molestation or the creation and
sharing of child pornography. Although the affidavit contains extensive information from Dressler regarding his
and a fellow detective’s training and experience related to
the investigation of individuals with a sexual attraction to
children, none of that information is particularized to defendant or the investigation into T’s allegations. “To establish
probable cause, an affidavit must do more than allege facts
that support a mere suspicion that evidence will be found;
even a well-warranted suspicion does not suffice.” State v.

     7
       Defendant does not challenge the search command allowing a search for
“videos, photographs, or images of [T].” Defendant concedes that the warrant
affidavit established probable cause that his cell phone could contain evidence of
defendant creating or attempting to create images or videos of T.
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Cazee, 

, 

 (2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[P]robable cause must be based
on specific and articulable facts about the defendant, interpreted in light of the existing circumstances and the officer’s
training and experience.” 

 (emphasis in original).
Dressler’s statements about what people who have a sexual
interest in children “frequently” or “often” do are not specific
to defendant.
         The state maintains that defendant is mistaken in
his interpretation of the warrant as authorizing a search for
crimes other than those committed against T and R. The
state argues that defendant’s possession of images of naked
children or children engaged in sexually explicit conduct,
or communications about molestation or child pornography,
would have been evidence of defendant’s crimes against T
and R, as it would help establish defendant’s sexual interest
in children. However, in reading the affidavit as a whole in
a common-sense and realistic fashion, taking into account
both facts and inferences, Curry, 

, we conclude that the search commands were intended to discover
evidence of other crimes, in addition to those alleged against
T and R. The affidavit goes into extensive detail about the
common actions of child sex abusers, including the frequency
with which they share images and content via digital media,
methods used for gaining access to and grooming children,
and pornography viewing habits. However, none of that general knowledge related to the allegations against defendant.
There were no facts relating to defendant’s internet usage,
pornography habits, or communications with other individuals. Defendant was accused of abusing the very young children who were already in his household; there were no allegations of him communicating with minors via the internet,
social media, or any other digital means. Yet the affidavit
explicitly referred to investigating possible other crimes and
victims. For example, in a discussion about examining pictures, video, and other media on a suspect’s digital devices,
including location and other metadata imbedded within, the
warrant stated: “This information could be helpful in identifying unknown child victims whom the suspect encourage[d] or induced to create and transmit sexually explicit
images of themselves to the suspect.”
388                                                        State v. Schult

         We therefore conclude that the search categories
authorizing police to search for “videos, photographs, or
images of children who are naked or engaged in sexually
explicit conduct” and for “communications related to child
molestation or the creation, distribution, or sharing of child
pornography” were not sufficiently particular.8
D. Remedy
        We thus turn to the proper remedy. The improperly
seized evidence from defendant’s computer and sketchbook
must be suppressed. On remand, defendant may also raise
any arguments regarding suppression of any evidence that
derived from those unlawful seizures. See generally State
v. DeJong, 

, 

 (2021) (explaining the
process and burdens for challenging the admissibility of evidence deriving from a prior unlawful seizure).
         With respect to the search of defendant’s phone, the
unconstitutionally overbroad nature of some of the search
commands renders all evidence obtained pursuant to the
warrant presumptively subject to suppression. Turay, 

 (concluding that a mixed warrant to search a
digital device, consisting of both valid and invalid search
commands, created a presumption that the evidence discovered pursuant to the search of the device must be suppressed). As was the case in Turay, there is a minimal
factual nexus between the constitutional violation and
the challenged evidence, because the state discovered the
evidence during the execution of the warrant authorizing
the search of defendant’s digital devices; that nexus establishes the presumption in favor of suppression. 

.
However, the state has the opportunity to rebut the presumption by establishing what, if any, of the challenged evidence was untainted by the violation. 

. The record
is undeveloped as to how the unlawful search categories in
the warrant affected the data that the state extracted from
defendant’s cell phone. Therefore, remand for further proceedings and factfinding on that point is warranted, consistent with Turay.
   8
     Because further proceedings are necessary to determine what, if any, evidence is untainted by the improper search commands, we do not reach defendant’s
arguments regarding the specificity of the date ranges of the search commands.
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                              CONCLUSION
         For the reasons discussed above, the trial court
erred in not granting defendant’s motion to suppress, and
defendant is entitled to a new trial and additional proceedings to determine the extent of the evidence that must be
suppressed. That decision obviates the need to reach defendant’s remaining assignments of error, as the evidentiary
issues involved may arise in a different posture on retrial,
or not at all.9
           Reversed and remanded.




    9
      Any argument on remand regarding the admissibility of evidence under
OEC 404(4) should be reexamined in light of the updated jurisprudence on that
issue. See State v. Davis, 

, 

 (2024); State v. Martinez, 

, 

 (2024), rev den, 

 (2025).