State v. Rogers

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 STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RODERICK ROGERS
                (SC 20469)
          McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

                                   Syllabus

Convicted of the crimes of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and
    assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed. The defendant and his
    cousin, A, had been driving when they stopped to pick up the defendant’s
    friend, J. They then drove to a housing complex, where the defendant
    and J exited the car and shot five individuals, one of whom died. The
    defendant and J returned to A’s car and left the scene. Because A was
    on probation, he wore a global positioning system (GPS) device that
    tracked his movement. Thereafter, the defendant and J were arrested,
    and their cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Prior to trial, the
    defendant filed a motion in limine seeking either the preclusion of
    evidence of information pertaining to the location of his cell phone or
    a hearing pursuant to State v. Porter (

) to determine the
    scientific reliability of such evidence. The trial court did not rule on the
    defendant’s motion, and he did not renew it at trial. The state never
    disclosed an expert witness, but, when jury selection began, the state
    provided the defendant with a list of witnesses, which included W, whom
    it identified only as a police officer. Seven days before evidence began,
    the state provided the defendant with W’s resume and a copy of a
    slideshow presentation, prepared by W, that purportedly charted the
    location of the defendant’s and J’s cell phones, and A’s GPS device
    around the time of the shooting. J filed a motion in limine to preclude
    W’s testimony because of the state’s untimely disclosure of W as an
    expert on cell site location data. The defendant’s counsel did not file a
    similar motion, join J’s motion, or raise any concerns regarding the
    untimely disclosure at the hearing on J’s motion. The court denied J’s
    motion, and, at trial, W’s testimony and cell site location data showed
    that J, but not the defendant or A, had been near the crime scene at
    the time of the shooting. The defendant did not object to W’s testimony
    or the cell site location data and did not request a Porter hearing at
    that time. While cross-examining W, the defendant’s counsel emphasized
    that the data showed that the defendant had been with A in locations
    other than the crime scene, both before and after the shooting. After
    the defendant and J were convicted, the defendant appealed to the
    Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had admitted
    into evidence W’s testimony regarding the cell site location information
    without first conducting a Porter hearing, as required by this court’s
    decision in State v. Edwards (

). The Appellate Court disagreed and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. During the pendency
    of the defendant’s appeal to this court from the Appellate Court’s judgment, this court reversed J’s conviction on the ground that the trial
    court had abused its discretion when it allowed W to testify without
    first granting J’s request for a reasonable continuance to obtain his
    own cell site information expert. Thereafter, this court granted the
    defendant’s petition for certification to appeal to this court, and the
    defendant claimed that, even though he admittedly failed to preserve
    any objection to the state’s untimely disclosure of W, this court should
    exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to
    grant him the same remedy as J because they were tried jointly and
    suffered the same harm. The defendant also claimed on appeal that this
    court should review the merits of his unpreserved claim that the trial
    court improperly had failed to conducted a Porter hearing in accordance
    with Edwards. Held:
1. This court declined the defendant’s request to exercise its supervisory
    authority over the administration of justice to reverse his conviction,
    despite his failure to preserve any objection to the state’s untimely
    disclosure of W as an expert witness, as the defendant and J were not
    similarly situated or similarly harmed by the state’s untimely disclosure
    of W: W’s testimony regarding the cell site location data was less prejudicial to the defendant than it was to J insofar as it did not place the
    defendant near the crime scene at the time of the shooting, as it did
    with J; moreover, W’s testimony demonstrated, and the defendant’s
    counsel emphasized during cross-examination of W, that the defendant
    and A were together and not at the scene of the shooting both before
    and after it occurred, which suggested that defense counsel may have
    had strategic reasons for not objecting to W’s testimony; furthermore,
    the state’s case against the defendant was strong, as multiple witnesses
    identified him as the shooter, and a probation officer testified that he
    had witnessed A pick up the defendant from his home before the shooting
    and the defendant arrive back home after the shooting, whereas W’s
    testimony was central to the state’s case against J, who could not be
    identified as the shooter by any eyewitness; accordingly, because the
    defendant was not similarly situated to J, it was not anomalous to treat
    the defendant and J differently, and fairness and justice did not require
    the reversal of the defendant’s conviction.
2. This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved Porter claim:
    the trial court never ruled on the defendant’s pretrial motion in limine
    requesting a Porter hearing, he did not renew that request at trial, and
    this court recently rejected the same arguments that the defendant
    raised in the present case and determined that the retroactivity of the
    nonconstitutional evidentiary rule announced in Edwards, namely, that
    a Porter hearing is required to assess the scientific reliability of expert
    testimony concerning cell phone location information, does not relieve
    a defendant of his obligation to preserve such a claim; moreover, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the requirement of preservation
    did not frustrate judicial economy by forcing attorneys to raise any
    conceivable legal claim in the hope that the law would change in the
    future.
            Argued May 2—officially released August 16, 2022

                             Procedural History

   Substitute information charging the defendant with
four counts of the crime of assault in the first degree,
and with one count each of the crimes of murder, conspiracy to commit murder and criminal possession of
a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Fairfield, where the court, Kavanewsky, J.,
granted the defendant’s motion to sever the charge of
criminal possession of a firearm and the state’s motion
to consolidate the case for trial with that of another
defendant; thereafter, the cases were tried to the jury;
verdict of guilty; subsequently, the state entered a nolle
prosequi as to the charge of criminal possession of a
firearm, and the court, Kavanewsky, J., rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the
defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, the case
was transferred to the Appellate Court, Lavine, Alvord
and Beach, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Megan L. Wade, assigned counsel, with whom, on
the brief, was James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, for
the appellant (defendant).
  Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino,
state’s attorney, and C. Robert Satti, Jr., former supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
                         Opinion

   D’AURIA, J. In this certified appeal, we must determine whether the reversal of a codefendant’s conviction
necessitates the reversal of a defendant’s conviction
despite the defendant’s failure to preserve the issue at
trial when the defendant and codefendant were jointly
tried and the codefendant properly preserved the issue.
Specifically, the defendant, Roderick Rogers, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of one count of murder in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-54a (a), one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a
(a) and 53a-48, and four counts of first degree assault
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5). On
appeal, he claims that, in light of this court’s recent
decision in State v. Jackson, 

, 

 (2020), in which his codefendant, Raashon Jackson,
was granted a new trial premised on his properly preserved objection to the state’s untimely disclosure of
an expert witness, this court should exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to
reverse his conviction, even though he did not join in
Jackson’s objection to the untimely disclosed expert,
because they were tried jointly and suffered the same
harm. Additionally, he requests that this court overrule
our recent decision in State v. Turner, 

,
686–87, 

 (2020), and review the merits of
his unpreserved Porter1 claim under State v. Edwards,

, 

 (2017). We affirm the judgment of conviction.
  We begin by briefly summarizing the facts the jury
reasonably could have found, as recited recently in
Jackson’s certified appeal from the Appellate Court’s
judgment. ‘‘On September 10, 2013, [the defendant]
called his cousin, David Anderson, for a ride from [his]
home in Bridgeport. Before Anderson arrived, a social
worker, William Muniz, came to [the defendant’s] house
at 2:10 p.m. to discuss a job opportunity. [The defendant] informed Muniz that he had to leave but would
be back in one hour. As Muniz was leaving, Anderson
arrived. Because Anderson was on probation, he wore
a global positioning system (GPS) device that tracked
his movements.
   ‘‘Anderson and [the defendant] left the house in
Anderson’s car, and [the defendant] directed Anderson
to drive toward Palisade Avenue, on the east side of
Bridgeport. On Palisade Avenue, [the defendant] saw
[Jackson], a friend whom he called Red Dreads, and
directed Anderson to stop the car. [Jackson] got into
the backseat of Anderson’s car. [The defendant] then
directed Anderson to drive to the ‘Terrace,’ a reference
to the Beardsley Terrace housing complex located in the
north end of Bridgeport. After arriving at the housing
complex, [the defendant] told Anderson to park on a
side street off Reservoir Avenue. [The defendant] asked
Anderson if he had an extra shirt, and Anderson told him
to check the trunk. [The defendant] asked Anderson to
wait because he and [Jackson] would be right back.
[Jackson] and the defendant got out of the car, went
to the open trunk, shut the trunk, and walked down
a hill.
   ‘‘At that time, a group of young men was gathered
outside the housing complex. [Jackson] and the defendant approached the group, remarked, ‘y’all just came
through the Ave shooting Braz, you all f’ed up,’ and
either [Jackson] or the defendant began shooting at
the group. One of the shooting victims, LaChristopher
Pettway, sustained a fatal gunshot wound to his back.
Four other victims, Tamar Hamilton, Leroy Shaw, Jauwane Edwards, and Aijahlon Tisdale, sustained nonfatal wounds.
  ‘‘[Jackson] and the defendant then left the scene of
the shootings and returned to Anderson’s car. [The
defendant] told Anderson to drive down Reservoir Avenue. Anderson then drove to the corner of Stratford
Avenue and Hollister Avenue, where Anderson parked
the car on the side of the street. [Jackson] got out of
the car, and Anderson drove [the defendant] home.
[The defendant] called Muniz at 2:46 p.m., and Muniz
returned to [the defendant’s] home by 3 p.m.’’ State v.
Jackson, supra, 334 Conn. 797–98.
   On September 16, 2013, the defendant was arrested.
Id., 798. That same day, he sent Jackson a text message
stating that ‘‘[d]ey taken [me].’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. Jackson was subsequently arrested.
Id. Both men were charged with murder, conspiracy to
commit murder, and four counts of assault in the first
degree. Id., 798; see id., 799 n.2. The trial court granted
the state’s motion to consolidate for trial the defendant’s case with Jackson’s case, and the two were tried
jointly before a jury. See id., 798.
   At trial, Anderson testified as a cooperating witness
for the state. See id., 798. Over defense counsel’s objection, the state also presented the testimony of an expert
on cell site location information (CSLI), Sergeant
Andrew Weaver of the Hartford Police Department,
who testified to the location of Jackson’s and the defendant’s cell phones, and Anderson’s GPS monitor. Id.,
798–99.
   The jury found both the defendant and Jackson guilty
on all counts, and the court sentenced the defendant
to a total effective term of forty-five years of incarceration. He then appealed, challenging certain of the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings. See State v. Rogers, 

, 

 (2018). Relevant to the
present appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial
court improperly had admitted into evidence maps
depicting the location of his and Jackson’s cell phones
and related testimony without first conducting a Porter
hearing, as required by our recent decision in Edwards.

. The Appellate Court rejected each of the defendant’s evidentiary claims and affirmed the judgment of
conviction. See 

 689–90. This court then granted the
defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.2 Additional facts and procedural history will follow as
required.
                            I
   Recently, in Jackson, we reversed that defendant’s
conviction based on his properly preserved objection to
the state’s untimely disclosure of Weaver as an expert.
Specifically, we held that the trial court had abused its
discretion by failing to afford Jackson a reasonable
continuance and that this error was harmful. See State
v. Jackson, supra, 334 Conn. 809–10. Notwithstanding
that he did not independently object, or join Jackson’s
objection, to the state’s untimely disclosure of Weaver,
the defendant requests that this court exercise its supervisory authority to either reverse his conviction or
review his unpreserved claim that the untimely disclosure prejudiced him. Specifically, he argues that this is
an exceptional circumstance because he and Jackson
were tried jointly, and it would be unfair for Jackson’s
conviction, but not his conviction, to be reversed based
on a failure of preservation when both he and Jackson
were similarly harmed. He contends that the present
case is similar to federal cases in which courts have
reversed a defendant’s conviction based on an unpreserved claim when the defendant was tried jointly with
a codefendant, and the codefendant properly preserved
and succeeded on the claim. Because we determine
that Jackson and the defendant in the present case were
not similarly situated and, thus, not similarly harmed
by the state’s late disclosure of Weaver, we decline to
exercise our supervisory authority to either reverse the
defendant’s conviction or to review his unpreserved
claim.
   Approximately six months before trial started, the
trial court ordered the state to disclose any experts to
the defense. The state never specifically disclosed any
witness as an expert. Rather, when jury selection began,
the state provided the defendant with a list of 128 potential witnesses, including Weaver, whom it did not identify as an expert but as a member of the Hartford Police
Department. Id., 801. Seven days before evidence began,
however, the state provided the defendant with Weaver’s resume and a copy of a PowerPoint computer software presentation Weaver had prepared, which the
state would argue charted the locations of cell phones
associated with the defendant and Jackson, as well as
the GPS unit worn by Anderson around the time of
the shootings. Id. In response, the day before evidence
began, Jackson’s counsel moved in limine, seeking to
preclude Weaver’s testimony based on the state’s
untimely disclosure of Weaver as a CSLI expert. Id.,
801–802. Counsel for the defendant did not file a similar
motion or join Jackson’s motion. The trial court held a
hearing on Jackson’s motion several days after evidence
began but before Weaver testified before the jury. Id.,
802. Counsel for Jackson argued that the state’s late
disclosure prejudiced Jackson and that the proper remedy was either a reasonable continuance of six weeks
or suppression of the testimony. Id., 804. At no time
during the hearing did counsel for the defendant object
to the untimely disclosure, join Jackson’s motion, or
raise any concerns regarding the untimely disclosure
before the trial court. The trial court ultimately denied
Jackson’s motion, including his request for a continuance, despite determining that the delay was avoidable.
Id., 804–806.
   At trial, Weaver testified before the jury ‘‘that the
state’s attorney’s office had provided him with logs for
Anderson’s GPS monitor and call records for three
phone numbers, and asked him to map the location of
both Anderson’s GPS monitor and of phone calls made
and received for two of the phone numbers, which the
state attributed to [Jackson] and the defendant. Using
commercial mapping software, Weaver plotted these
locations, which were depicted on the maps as a person
figure in the center of 120 degree pie shaped coverage
areas. The placement of the figure in the center did not
mean that was the exact location of the cell phone;
rather, it meant that the phone was generally within
the cell tower’s coverage area.
   ‘‘Weaver’s PowerPoint presentation contained fifteen
different snapshots of time. The maps and descriptions
indicated Anderson’s GPS location and whether the
defendant’s or [Jackson’s] cell phone connected to a
cell site with a ‘generally expected coverage area’ in
which Anderson’s GPS was located.’’ Id., 807. Snapshot
one depicted Anderson’s GPS in the east end of Bridgeport prior to the shooting. Snapshots two and four
depicted the defendant’s phone as being in the same
coverage area as Anderson’s GPS in the east end of
Bridgeport prior to the shooting but moving westward
toward the crime scene. Neither the defendant’s nor
Jackson’s cell phone is depicted in snapshots three,
five, six, seven, or eight, which show Anderson’s GPS
moving closer to the crime scene. Snapshot nine, however, shows that Jackson’s phone connected to a cell
site whose coverage area included the location of
Anderson’s GPS and the location of the shootings near
the time of the shooting. Snapshots ten through twelve
also showed Jackson’s phone as being in the same coverage area as Anderson’s GPS immediately after the
shooting, with the data showing that those two travelled
eastward. Snapshot thirteen is the first snapshot to
depict the cell phones of both the defendant and Jackson, as well as Anderson’s GPS, with all three located
in the east end of Bridgeport in the same coverage area
approximately twenty-five minutes after the shooting.
Weaver opined that these maps showed that the
‘‘phones moved together or met with [each other] before
and/or after . . . the [victim’s] murder. They either
traveled to or traveled from [the crime scene together].
[The defendant’s phone] moved toward the [victim’s]
murder with [Anderson’s] GPS. And [Jackson’s] phone
. . . moved away and then . . . they actually made
phone calls all together . . . within this area of Stratford and Hollister [Avenues] after the homicide.’’
   On cross-examination, counsel for the defendant
asked Weaver if all of the snapshots depicting the location of the defendant’s phone showed that he was in
the east side of Bridgeport. Weaver answered, ‘‘yes.’’
Additionally, defense counsel asked Weaver to confirm
that none of the snapshots depicting the location of the
crime scene showed the presence of the defendant’s
phone. Weaver again responded affirmatively.
   In addition to the CSLI evidence, at trial, the state
offered significant evidence regarding the defendant’s
role in the shooting. Specifically, the state offered the
testimony of Muniz, who stated that he met with the
defendant at his house at approximately 2:10 p.m.,
which was prior to the shooting, to discuss a job opportunity but that the defendant said that he had to leave
and would be back in about one hour. Muniz testified
that he saw a white car arrive and the defendant leave
in that white car. He then testified that the defendant
later called him at approximately 2:46 p.m., which was
after the shooting occurred, to inform him that he was
back home, and that he met the defendant at his home
at approximately 3 p.m. Additionally, the state offered
the testimony of Anderson, who stated that the defendant called him and asked for a ride; that he picked up
the defendant at his house in a white Nissan Maxima;
that the defendant directed him where to drive; that
the defendant saw Jackson and that Jackson got into
the car; that the defendant told him to park and then
got out of the car with Jackson; that he stayed in the
car until the defendant and Jackson returned; and that
he then drove away. Most importantly, the state offered
evidence from three victims of the shooting, Hamilton,
Shaw, and Tisdale, all of whom identified the defendant
as the shooter.
   Although the defendant and Jackson were tried
jointly, we granted Jackson’s request for certification
to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court
approximately eighteen months before we granted certification to appeal in the present case.3 On appeal
before this court in Jackson, Jackson claimed, among
other things, that, in light of the state’s untimely disclosure of Weaver after jury selection began and only one
week before evidence commenced, the trial court
abused its discretion by either failing to preclude Weaver’s testimony or failing to grant a reasonable continuance. State v. Jackson, supra, 334 Conn. 809–10. This
court agreed with the trial court that the delayed disclosure was avoidable: ‘‘The state’s failure to prepare for
trial in a timely fashion is not a valid reason for a late
disclosure of an expert witness to the defense.’’ Id.,
813. We concluded that the trial court had abused its
discretion, however, in failing to afford Jackson a reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert, although
not necessarily six weeks long, as Jackson had
requested. See id., 816. Additionally, we determined that
this error was harmful: ‘‘The state’s case was based
primarily on the testimony of Weaver and Anderson.
There is no doubt that Weaver’s expert testimony was
central to the state’s case because his testimony and
PowerPoint presentation were the only objective evidence that placed [Jackson’s] phone in the same area
as [the defendant’s] phone and Anderson’s GPS around
the time of the shootings. Although several eyewitnesses identified [the defendant] as a shooter, the identity of the second suspect was a central issue in the case,
and the only objective evidence identifying [Jackson]
as the second suspect was Weaver’s expert testimony.
There can be little doubt that jurors would have viewed
as highly convincing Weaver’s expert opinion; the testimony was presented in technical terms and used
impressive visual displays to convey important information, and it came from a law enforcement officer unconnected to the department that investigated the crime.
. . . No eyewitnesses identified [Jackson] as one of
the perpetrators. Moreover, [Jackson’s] DNA was never
found in Anderson’s car.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote
omitted.) Id., 818–19. As a result, we reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial. See id., 822.
  On appeal before this court, the defendant now
claims that, in the interest of justice, we should exercise
our supervisory authority to afford him the same remedy as Jackson, despite his undisputed failure to preserve any objection to the state’s untimely disclosure
of Weaver as an expert witness. ‘‘[W]e will reverse a
conviction under our supervisory powers only in the
rare case [in which] fairness and justice demand it. . . .
[The issue at hand must be] of [the] utmost seriousness,
not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also
for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a
whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Turner, supra, 

. In determining whether
to exercise our supervisory powers to review an unpreserved claim, we consider the following factors: the
record must be adequate for review; all parties must
have had an opportunity to be heard on the issue; and
review must not create unfair prejudice to any party.4
See, e.g., Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown
& Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 

, 155–56,

 (2014).
  This court has not previously decided whether, under
our supervisory authority, a defendant is entitled to the
benefit of a codefendant’s preservation of an objection
when tried jointly. On two prior occasions, however,
this court has held that, under certain circumstances,
a defendant’s unpreserved claim may be treated as preserved if his codefendant, who was tried jointly with
him, preserved the same claim. Specifically, we have
held that ‘‘the failure by [a defendant] fully to challenge
the [ruling of the trial court] at trial would not be dispositive [of whether the defendant may raise the claim],
[if] his codefendant [who was tried jointly] adequately
alerted the trial court to the possibility of error in a
timely fashion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Dahlgren, 

, 599–600 n.9, 

 (1986), quoting State v. Pelletier, 

,

 (1985). Since Dahlgren, however, this
court has clarified that Pelletier and its progeny ‘‘[do]
not stand for the proposition that whenever a codefendant makes a trial motion in which the defendant did
not join, the silent defendant may raise the denial of
the motion in his appeal. . . . When a defendant does
not join a codefendant’s motion for tactical or other
reasons, the defendant cannot later complain of the
procedure on appeal.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gould, 

, 9 n.3,

 (1997). We have held that a defendant is
not entitled to the benefits of a codefendant’s properly
preserved objection if it would ‘‘not be anomalous to
treat the review of each of the defendants’ claims . . .
differently.’’ Id.; see also State v. Walton, 

,
55 n.20, 

 (1993) (same).
   The defendant in the present case does not specifically rely on this case law but, rather, makes a similar
argument in support of this court’s exercising its supervisory authority to either reverse his conviction or treat
his claim as preserved, contending that it would be
anomalous and unjust to treat similarly situated defendants differently. We decline, however, to either reverse
the defendant’s conviction or to treat his claim as preserved under either our supervisory authority or pursuant to Pelletier and its progeny because we see no
anomaly in treating the defendant in the present case
differently than Jackson when they are not similarly
situated in that they could not have suffered the same
prejudice from the same error. Specifically, unlike with
Jackson, the CSLI data never placed the defendant near
the crime scene at the time of the shooting. Rather, the
evidence at issue showed that the defendant was with
Anderson in the east end of Bridgeport both before and
after the shooting, which defense counsel emphasized
on cross-examination. Not only does this point show
that this evidence was less prejudicial to the defendant
than to Jackson, it also suggests that defense counsel
may have had strategic reasons for not objecting to this
evidence, further militating against review and reversal.
Additionally, unlike with Jackson, the state’s case
against the defendant was very strong, with multiple
eyewitnesses identifying him as the shooter. Moreover,
there was testimony from Muniz, which established that
Anderson had picked up the defendant prior to the
shooting and that the defendant then arrived back home
after the shooting. As a result, the defendant and Jackson were not similarly situated or similarly harmed by
the state’s untimely disclosure of Weaver as an expert,
and we cannot conclude that fairness and justice require
reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Therefore, we
decline to exercise our supervisory authority.5
    Our conclusion is consistent with holdings of courts
in other jurisdictions, which, likewise, have held under
their supervisory authority or as a matter of plain error
that a defendant’s conviction must be reversed, or his
unpreserved claim treated as preserved, only if his codefendant, with whom he was tried jointly, properly preserved the claim and the defendant was similarly
situated and equally harmed. See, e.g., Lawyer v. State,

 (Fla. App. 2010) (holding that court
would review defendant’s unpreserved claim and
reverse his conviction when codefendant, who was
tried jointly with defendant, properly preserved and
succeeded on same claim, and both defendants were
similarly situated in that their defenses were ‘‘closely
intertwined’’); People v. Robinson, 

,

, 

 (1963) (holding that,
‘‘in the interests of justice,’’ court would review defendant’s unpreserved claim and reverse his conviction
when codefendant, who was tried jointly with defendant, properly preserved and succeeded on same claim
and error was equally harmful to both defendants);
State v. Montwheeler, 

, 

 (2016) (holding that when, during joint trial, codefendant properly preserved claim, ‘‘the ends of justice
militate[d] in favor of correcting the [defendant’s unpreserved] error’’ because both ‘‘defendants presented a
unified theory of defense [and, thus] the trial court’s
error harmed both defendants’’); Rivera v. People, 

 (2016) (‘‘disparate treatment of identically
situated [codefendants] constitute[d] ‘manifest injustice,’ ’’ even if issue was raised by one defendant but
waived by another, overriding any interest associated
with complying with preservation requirements); Williams v. People, 

, 1032 n.3 (2013) (‘‘when
one [codefendant] receives reversal on appeal by raising
an issue that a second [codefendant] neglected to brief,
the interests of justice require providing the second
[codefendant] with the same remedy’’ unless error
affects defendants differently); see also United States
v. Cardales-Luna, 

 (1st Cir.) (when
defendant failed to preserve claim raised by codefendants whose convictions were upheld, ‘‘ ‘accepted principles of stare decisis militate[d] strongly in favor of
resolving identical points in the same way for identically
situated defendants’ ’’), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (2011); United States v.
Babwah, 

 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing defendant’s conviction based on unpreserved claim when
codefendant properly preserved claim and defendants
were tried jointly and equally harmed, as manifest injustice would occur if conviction was not reversed);
United States v. Olano, 

 (9th Cir.
1991) (it would be ‘‘manifestly unjust’’ to deem waived
claim of inherently prejudicial procedural error when
codefendant’s conviction was reversed but both defendants ‘‘suffered the same prejudice from the same fundamental error in the same trial’’), rev’d on other
grounds, 

, 

, 

 (1993); United States v. Rivera Pedin, 

, 1526–27 n.9 (11th Cir. 1988) (‘‘it [is] anomalous
to reverse some convictions and not others when all
defendants suffer from the same error’’); United States
v. Gray, 

 (5th Cir. 1980) (‘‘[b]elieving it
anomalous to reverse some convictions and not others
when all defendants suffer from the same error, we
consider the arguments to be adopted’’), cert. denied
sub nom Fennell v. United States, 

, 

, 

 (1980), and cert. denied sub
nom. Wright v. United States, 

, 

, 

 (1980), and cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (1981), and cert.
denied sub nom. Barker v. United States, 

,

, 

 (1981); United States
v. Anderson, 

 (6th Cir. 1978) (‘‘under
the unique circumstances of this case [in which the
codefendant preserved his claim and the defendant was
equally harmed] it would be a manifest injustice to allow
[the defendant’s] conviction to stand while ordering a
new trial for [his codefendant]’’). But see United States
v. Massara, 

, 707 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)
(‘‘[The defendant] asserts [that] he filed [his] motion
[to challenge, for the first time, the jury instruction at
trial that was the basis for the reversal of his codefendant’s conviction] directly after learning [that] his
[codefendant] . . . obtained reversal of her conviction
on this ground. But [the codefendant], unlike [the defendant], raised the jury instruction issue on direct
appeal.’’).
   Because the defendant in the present case is not
similarly situated to Jackson, it is not ‘‘anomalous’’ to
treat him differently than Jackson, and, thus, fairness
and justice do not require that we exercise our supervisory authority to reverse the defendant’s conviction or
treat his claim as preserved.
                             II
  The defendant next requests that we overrule our
recent decision in State v. Turner, supra, 334 Conn.
671–72, in which we held that, although the new rule
announced in State v. 

,
applied retroactively, this retroactivity did not excuse
a defendant’s failure to preserve his Porter claim. The
defendant argues that we should revisit our prior decision because our holding in Turner ‘‘belies logic,
eschews the important policy considerations that
underlie the general rule of retroactivity, and renders
illusory any benefit defendants may have gained from
retroactive application of newly announced rules.’’ He
asserts that, in reaching our holding in Turner, this
court did not consider the purpose of the general rule
regarding retroactivity—to ensure a law’s integrity and
consistent application. The defendant contends that the
retroactive effect of the new rule announced in
Edwards should excuse any preservation issues, and,
thus, we should review his Porter claim despite his
failure to raise it at trial. We decline to overrule our
holding in Turner and, thus, decline to review the defendant’s unpreserved Porter claim.
  As discussed in part I of this opinion, the defendant
did not object to Weaver’s testimony or the corresponding slideshow depicting the location of his phone, Jackson’s phone, and Anderson’s GPS. Although the
defendant filed a motion in limine before trial regarding
any CSLI, requesting either the preclusion of this evidence or a Porter hearing,6 the trial court did not rule
on this motion. The defendant did not renew his request
at trial.
   After the defendant’s trial, but while his appeal before
the Appellate Court was pending, this court released
State v. 

. In Edwards, we
held for the first time that expert testimony regarding
cell phone data is the type of scientific evidence Porter
contemplated, and, thus, a Porter hearing was required
to ensure that this testimony was based on reliable
scientific methodology. See 

 129–33. Specifically, in
Edwards, ‘‘the state offered the testimony of Detective
Christopher Morris of the Wethersfield Police Department regarding cell phone data and maps he generated
therefrom. . . . The defendant objected to the admission of the maps and requested a Porter hearing, which
the trial court denied. . . . On appeal in Edwards, the
defendant argued to this court that the trial court
improperly had failed to qualify Morris as an expert
and denied his request for a Porter hearing. We agreed.
. . . Specifically, we concluded that Morris should have
been qualified as an expert witness before the court
allowed him to testify regarding cell phone data because
of his superior knowledge on this subject. . . . Additionally, we determined that expert testimony regarding
cell phone data is the type of scientific evidence contemplated by Porter, and, thus, a Porter hearing was
required to ensure that his testimony was based on
reliable scientific methodology. . . . Nevertheless, we
applied an evidentiary harmless error analysis, concluding that these errors had not harmed the defendant.’’
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) State v. Turner,
supra, 334 Conn. 671–72.
  In light of our decision in Edwards, on direct appeal
to the Appellate Court, the defendant in the present
case raised a Porter claim for the first time, arguing
both that it was preserved,7 and, alternatively, that the
rule of retroactivity overcame his failure to preserve
this claim. State v. 

and n.16. The Appellate Court held that the defendant’s
Porter claim was not preserved and that, although the
rule in Edwards was retroactive, retroactivity did not
cure this lack of preservation. See 

, 686–87 n.16.
   The defendant then sought certification to appeal to
this court on the issue of whether his unpreserved Porter claim was reviewable in light of the retroactivity of
the new nonconstitutional rule in Edwards. While the
defendant’s appeal was pending before this court, however, we decided this very issue in State v. Turner,
supra, 334 Conn. 671–72. Specifically, the defendant in
Turner did not preserve his Porter claim at trial, either
by objecting to the admission of the CSLI testimony or
the cell tower coverage maps, or by requesting a Porter
hearing. Id. After the defendant’s criminal trial in
Turner, but while his appeal was pending before the
Appellate Court, we released our decision in Edwards.
As a result, on appeal before this court, the defendant
in Turner argued that the rule in Edwards applied retroactively, and, as such, he was not required to preserve
his Porter claim at trial to receive the benefit of the
new rule. We held that, although the rule in Edwards
was retroactive; see id., 677; ‘‘[r]etroactivity of new,
nonconstitutional evidentiary rules does not relieve a
defendant of his obligation to preserve the claim.’’ Id.,
679. In so holding, we relied on the following principles:
(1) that the trial court need not hold a Porter hearing
unless one is specifically requested; (2) we previously
have held that, although new, nonconstitutional evidentiary rules are retroactive, the defendant still was
required to preserve his claim at trial to be entitled to
review; (3) fairness principles did not require application of the new rule in Edwards to all defendants; and
(4), absent a timely objection, the record was inadequate to determine the defendant’s Porter claim; see
678–80; because ‘‘we have no way of knowing whether
the state would have presented additional evidence to
support [the expert’s] methodology and to show that
the cell tower coverage maps were derived from this
methodology if the defendant had requested a Porter
hearing.’’ Id., 681–82. Accordingly, in Turner, we declined
to review the defendant’s Porter claim.
  ‘‘Our determination of whether we should overrule a
prior decision is guided by the doctrine of stare decisis,
which counsels that a court should not overrule its
earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and
inescapable logic require it.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Bischoff, 

, 762, 

 (2021). ‘‘[W]e have always required a departure from
precedent to be supported by some special justification.
. . . Such justifications include the advent of subsequent changes or development in the law that undermine[s] a decision’s rationale . . . the need to bring [a
decision] into agreement with experience and with facts
newly ascertained . . . and a showing that a particular
precedent has become a detriment to coherence and
consistency in the law . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sepega v. DeLaura, 

, 798–99 n.5, 

 (2017).
    Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, we considered in Turner the same arguments that he raises in
the present case. Specifically, we noted that this court
consistently has held that ‘‘[r]etroactivity of new, nonconstitutional evidentiary rules does not relieve a defendant of his obligation to preserve the claim.’’ State v.
Turner, supra, 

. We explained that it did
not undermine fairness principles to treat the defendant
in Edwards differently than the defendant in Turner
because they were not similarly situated—one preserved the claim while the other did not. See id., 677,
680. This distinction was important because the defendant’s failure to request a Porter hearing in Turner
affected the adequacy of the record before this court.
See id., 680. Moreover, our holding was consistent with
the purpose of the retroactivity rule, which grants
‘‘ ‘[c]omplete retroactive effect’ ’’ only to a new constitutional rule or a new judicial interpretation of a criminal
statute. Id., 677 n.6.
   Nevertheless, the defendant contends that our holding in Turner frustrates judicial economy by forcing
attorneys to raise any conceivable legal claim in the
hope that the law changes in the future. We disagree.
Little more than two years have passed since our decision in Turner, and we are unaware of any detrimental
effect caused by our holding. Moreover, our decision
in Turner is of relatively recent vintage, and we are
unaware of, and the defendant has not cited, changes or
developments in the law that undermine our decision’s
rationale. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 

, 151
n.4, 

 (2021) (declining to overrule precedent
of relatively recent vintage without showing that precedent creates unworkable scheme). As explained, this
court has long held that it is not inconsistent for a new
nonconstitutional rule to apply retroactively but to still
require preservation of the claim at issue. Accordingly,
we decline to overrule our holding in Turner and, thus,
decline to review the defendant’s unpreserved Porter
claim.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
    See State v. Porter, 

, 

 (1997), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (1998).
  2
    We granted certification limited to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Does this
court’s decision in State v. Jackson, [supra, 

], which directed
that the conviction of the defendant in that case [Jackson] be reversed,
require that this court also reverse the conviction of Jackson’s codefendant
in the present case?’’ (2) ‘‘Is the defendant’s unpreserved claim regarding
the state’s late disclosed expert witness on cell site location information
reviewable?’’ And (3) ‘‘[w]as the testimony of the state’s late disclosed
expert on cell site location information, as well as any evidence admitted
in connection with that testimony, harmful to the defendant?’’ State v. Rogers,
335 Conn. 917A, 

 (2020).
   3
     This court delayed granting certification to appeal in the present case
pending our resolution of the certified appeal in Turner, which raised a
similar issue regarding the retroactive application of Edwards to an unpreserved Porter claim. See part II of this opinion.
   4
     The defendant also argues that exceptional circumstances justify the
exercise of our supervisory authority because this court created new law
in Jackson by providing additional guidance to trial courts regarding the
need for a continuance when experts are involved. We disagree. In Jackson,
we did not alter in any way the applicable legal principles or create any
new standard but, rather, applied settled legal principles to the facts at issue.
   The defendant further argues that Jackson constituted a change in the
law as to this case, and, thus, our holding in Jackson that the trial court
abused its discretion in not granting a reasonable continuance and that this
error was harmful equally applies to the present case. This argument ignores
the fact that Jackson and the defendant were not similarly harmed by
this error.
   5
     The defendant alternatively requests that this court exercise its supervisory authority to adopt a presumption that, unless explicitly stated on the
record otherwise, an objection by one defendant will be presumed to be
joined by all defendants when they are tried jointly. As discussed, however,
this court already has recognized a rule that this court may treat as preserved
an unpreserved claim that a codefendant, who was tried jointly with the
defendant, properly preserved if the defendant is similarly situated and
equally harmed. The fact that the defendant does not satisfy this rule does
not justify this court’s exercising its supervisory authority to create a presumption more beneficial to the defendant. Moreover, fairness and justice
principles do not require that we adopt the defendant’s proposed rule and
overrule our prior case law when the preexisting rule creates no injustice,
as the defendant is not similarly situated to Jackson.
   6
     ‘‘In Porter, we followed the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 

, 

,

 (1993), and held that testimony based on scientific evidence
should be subjected to a flexible test to determine the reliability of methods
used to reach a particular conclusion. . . . A Porter analysis involves a
two part inquiry that assesses the reliability and relevance of the witness’
methods. . . . First, the party offering the expert testimony must show that
the expert’s methods for reaching his conclusion are reliable. . . . Second,
the proposed scientific testimony must be demonstrably relevant to the
facts of the particular case in which it is offered, and not simply be valid
in the abstract. . . . Put another way, the proponent of scientific evidence
must establish that the specific scientific testimony at issue is, in fact,
derived from and based [on] . . . [scientifically reliable] methodology.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Turner, supra, 

;
see also Conn. Code Evid. § 7-2, commentary (discussing requirements and
scope of Porter).
   7
     On appeal to this court, the defendant does not dispute that his Porter
claim is unpreserved.