116 October 8, 2025 No. 877
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of A. P.,
a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
A. P.,
Appellant.
Deschutes County Circuit Court
23JU02700; A182652
Owyhee Weikel-Magden, Judge pro tempore.
Submitted August 13, 2025.
Erica Hayne Friedman and Youth, Rights & Justice filed
the brief for appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
O’CONNOR, J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 344 Or App 116 (2025) 117
O’CONNOR, J.
In this juvenile delinquency case, youth appeals
from a supplemental judgment and challenges the juvenile court’s imposition of a restitution award. The juvenile
court awarded restitution to youth’s high school for damages
caused by a fire youth started at the school.
Youth raises a single assignment of error on appeal,
challenging the juvenile court’s order that she pay the high
school $5,821.97 in restitution. She argues that the state’s
restitution evidence was untimely, that she did not waive
an objection to the untimely presentation of the restitution
evidence, and that the high school’s labor costs cannot be
awarded as restitution. The state responds that it timely
presented restitution evidence and that the juvenile court
correctly included the school’s labor costs as part of the restitution award. We affirm.
Whether a youth waived their right to contest restitution and whether a juvenile court erred in concluding
that damages qualify as restitution both present legal questions that we review for errors of laws. See State v. R. D. M.,
330 Or App 692, 694,
544 P3d 425 (2024) (review of restitution order in juvenile delinquency matter); see also State v.
Minor,
297 Or App 461, 464,
443 P3d 695 (2019) (reviewing
restitution waiver issue for legal error in an adult criminal
case). We are bound by the juvenile court’s fact findings if
they are supported by evidence in the record. R. D. M., 330
Or App at 694.
The state filed a delinquency petition in which it
alleged that youth was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for committing four acts that would constitute
criminal offenses if committed by an adult. The four acts all
arose from youth starting a fire or fires at her high school
on a single day. Prior to the juvenile court taking jurisdiction over youth, the state filed in the court a one-page document titled “Victim Restitution Information,” in which the
state asserted that youth owed the high school $5,821.97 in
restitution.
The parties reached a negotiated resolution. As
part of the agreement, at a hearing on August 3, 2023,
118 State v. A. P.
youth asked the court to permit her to enter a “no contest”
admission to one count of reckless burning, an act that
would violate ORS 164.335 if committed by an adult. The
court agreed, and it asked the state to summarize the evidence it would present if the case proceeded to trial. The
state described the factual bases for the reckless burning
allegation and said that “the total damage was valued to
be $5,821.97 with the damage, the school operations and
clean up and (inaudible) have to take the kids home.” The
court asked the state if that was “likely to be the final restitution number[.]” The state replied, “I believe so[.]” Youth
agreed that the state could present that evidence and that
a judge could believe “that those things happened[.]” The
court accepted the no contest admission to reckless burning
and found youth within the court’s jurisdiction.
At the disposition hearing on August 17, 2023,
youth told the court that the parties would “need a hearing
to address the issue of restitution.” A community justice officer from the Juvenile Department recommended that the
court extend the supervision term “just a bit” to help facilitate youth’s restitution payment. The state explained that
restitution would be about $6,000, and it asked the court to
schedule a restitution hearing approximately 30 days later
to allow it time to obtain the documents and attempt to
resolve restitution with youth’s attorney. Youth’s mother told
the court that she was “a little worried about restitution[.]”
Youth agreed on a date for the restitution hearing that was
about 30 days later, and the court scheduled the hearing.
On September 11, 2023, the state filed an amended
victim restitution information worksheet that asserted that
youth owed the school $8,027.78 in restitution. The court
held a restitution hearing on September 18, 2023, at which
the parties made many of the same arguments they raise
on appeal and the state presented evidence of the school’s
damages. A school employee testified about the costs of the
school’s response to the fire and attempted fire and the costs
of repairing the damage. The court admitted into evidence a
spreadsheet created by the employee that tracked the costs,
including labor costs. The court continued the hearing to
permit the parties to file memoranda on the contested issues.
Cite as 344 Or App 116 (2025) 119
The juvenile court held another hearing on
September 28, 2023. At the conclusion of that hearing, the
court ruled that youth had admitted at the jurisdictional
hearing that the state could prove youth owed $5,821.97 in
restitution. The juvenile court concluded that it could rely on
that admission when imposing restitution. It also concluded
that the state had established that youth’s conduct caused
$8,027.78 in economic damages but it imposed a restitution
award of $5,821.97 because the state did not timely present
evidence of the greater amount. The juvenile court entered
a supplemental judgment and money award that requires
youth to pay the high school $5,821.97 in restitution. This
appeal followed.
The state must present to the juvenile court evidence of the nature and amount of restitution owed by a
youth “prior to or at the time of adjudication[.]” ORS 419C.450
(1)(a). The state must present that evidence before the juvenile court rules that a youth is within the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. State v. M. A. S., 302 Or App 687, 703-05,
462
P3d 284 (2020).
In this case, the juvenile court’s findings at the jurisdictional hearing and its reliance on those findings when
imposing restitution require us to reject youth’s assignment
of error. Youth admitted at the jurisdictional hearing that
the state could present evidence that she caused the high
school $5,821.97 in damages, youth knew that the state
believed that was the final amount of restitution and youth
told the court that it could so find. Youth’s admission relieved
the state of its burden to present evidence of the nature and
amount of $5,821.97 in restitution to the school. See State v.
Porter, 202 Or App 622, 626-27,
123 P3d 325 (2005) (explaining that a stipulation and a judicial admission are “statement[s] [made] for the purpose of dispensing with the need
for proof,” that waive a party’s “right to require the other
party to prove a particular fact.”).
The juvenile court accepted the admission and
found youth within its jurisdiction. The juvenile court’s
finding based on youth’s admission satisfies the timing
requirement in ORS 419C.450(1)(a). Youth’s admission at
the jurisdictional hearing also waived her right to contest
120 State v. A. P.
the restitution award of $5,281.97. The juvenile court correctly concluded that it “gets to rely on” youth’s admission
when imposing restitution. See Porter, 202 Or App at 627
(explaining that a stipulated fact is conclusively proven and
can be withdrawn only for fraud, mutual mistake, or the
actual absence of consent). The juvenile court refused to
include the additional amount of restitution sought by the
state after the jurisdictional hearing because youth had
not admitted to that amount. The court imposed only the
amount of restitution that youth admitted the state could
prove and that the court could find.
Youth argues that our decision in State v. L. G. S.-S.,
307 Or App 208,
475 P3d 922 (2020), requires us to reverse.
That case, youth argues, stands for the rule that “the state’s
failure to present the required restitution evidence before
the adjudication is complete renders any subsequent restitution order unlawful under ORS 419C.450(1)(a),” even when a
youth has entered an admission. We understand youth’s point
to be that the state’s representation at the jurisdictional hearing of the amount of damages was not evidence and thus the
state failed to comply with ORS 419C.450(1)(a) in this case.
L. G. S.-S. is distinguishable from this case, as the juvenile
court concluded and as the state argues on appeal.
In L. G. S.-S., at the jurisdictional hearing, the state
told the court that it did not expect to request restitution,
and it had provided no information about the nature and
amount of damages. Id. at 210. The youth admitted liability
for restitution on all counts.
Id. The state presented evidence
of economic damages to an insurance company at a later
hearing, and the court imposed restitution over the youth’s
objection that the late request violated ORS 419C.450.
Id.
at 210. We reversed, concluding that the state had failed to
meet the timing requirement in ORS 419C.450 because “[a]t
the time that [the] youth was adjudicated … the state did
not present evidence to the court of injury, loss, or damage
to” the insurance company.
Id. at 212.
Here, the state filed a notice that alleged that youth
owed the high school $5,812.97 in restitution. Youth admitted that the state could present evidence that her conduct
caused the high school that amount in damages and that
Cite as 344 Or App 116 (2025) 121
a court could so find. Youth’s admission and the juvenile
court’s acceptance of it at the jurisdictional hearing satisfied
the requirement in ORS 419C.450(1)(a). Unlike in L. G. S.-S.,
the nature and amount of damages to the victim was established at the time of adjudication.
We acknowledge that at the subsequent disposition hearing both youth and the state asked the court to
schedule a restitution hearing. Those requests indicated
that the parties believed there were outstanding issues concerning restitution for the court to resolve. And there were,
as we summarized above. But the parties’ after-the-fact
characterization of the adjudication hearing or their misunderstanding of the legal effect of youth’s admission does
not alter what occurred at the adjudication hearing. Youth
waived her argument that the $5,821.97 in damages were
not economic damages to the high school.
We would affirm even if we were to reach the merits of youth’s argument that the school’s labor costs did not
constitute economic damages. The juvenile court concluded
at the restitution hearing that the state established that the
high school’s damages constituted economic damages that
the court could impose as restitution.
The definition of restitution that applies in criminal
cases, ORS 137.103(3), also applies in juvenile delinquency
proceedings.1 ORS 419A.004(29); State v. J. M. E., 299
Or App 483, 486,
451 P3d 1018 (2019). We agree with the
state that the evidence presented at the restitution hearing allowed the juvenile court to find that youth’s conduct in
setting the fires required the school to divert employee time
and resources from other duties, causing the school to incur
monetary losses. Those monetary losses qualify as economic
damages under the criminal restitution statute.
Labor costs constitute economic damages caused by
a youth’s conduct that would be criminal if committed by an
adult when those costs would not have been incurred “irrespective of specific violations of the law.” State v. Carachuri,
330 Or App 443, 446-48,
544 P3d 410, rev den,
372 Or 588
1
ORS 137.103(3) provides, “ ‘Restitution’ means full, partial or nominal payment of economic damages to a victim. Restitution is independent of and may be
awarded in addition to a compensatory fine awarded under ORS 137.101.”
122 State v. A. P.
(2024) (holding that labor costs incurred by a county when
repairing damage to a guardrail caused by the defendant
constituted economic damages within the meaning of the
criminal restitution statute even though the county would
have paid the same wages if the defendant had not damaged
the guardrail); State v. Marquez, 139 Or App 379, 384,
912
P2d 390, rev den,
323 Or 483 (1996) (affirming a restitution
award for a county’s labor costs for employees to fix damage
to the county’s computer system caused by the defendant’s
criminal conduct because the defendant’s criminal conduct
caused the county to divert employee resources to fix the
damage); see also State v. Lindsly,
106 Or App 459, 461-62,
808 P2d 727 (1991) (affirming restitution award to a telephone company for investigation expenses incurred after
the defendant fraudulently gained access to the company’s
computer network); State v. Louden,
101 Or App 367, 369-
70,
790 P2d 1182 (1990) (affirming restitution award for a
power company’s labor and service expenses for repairing
damage to an electrical meter caused by the defendant). In
that circumstance, a youth would be civilly liable for the
expenses. The labor costs and expenses thus constitute economic damages that a court may impose as restitution.
By contrast, labor costs incurred “irrespective of
specific violations of the law” are not economic damages
caused by a youth’s conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult and may not be imposed as restitution.
See Carachuri, 330 Or App at 447 (explaining that principle in the context of adult restitution). For example, when
a defendant escaped from custody while serving a prison
sentence, the labor costs of the Department of Corrections
Fugitive Apprehension Unit in apprehending the defendant
were “not recoverable under any theory of civil liability[.]”
State v. Wilson, 193 Or App 506, 511,
92 P3d 729 (2004).
We thus reversed a trial court judgment imposing a restitution award for those costs.
Id. Similarly, the costs associated
with delinquency investigations or prosecutions do not qualify as economic damages caused by a youth’s conduct and
may not be recovered as restitution. See Carachuri, 330 Or
App at 447 (adult restitution; citing State v. Herfurth,
283 Or
App 149, 158-59,
388 P3d 1104 (2016), rev den,
361 Or 350
Cite as
344 Or App 116 (2025) 123
(2017) and State v. Mann,
329 Or App 279, 288-94,
540 P3d
582 (2023)).
Here, the high school’s labor costs qualify as economic damages. Like in Carachuri, Lindsly, Louden, and
Marquez, the trial court relied on evidence that youth’s conduct in starting a fire at the school caused school employees
to respond to the fire and repair the damage caused by it.
Those costs were not incurred irrespective of specific violations of the law. The costs were incurred because of youth’s
conduct and would be recoverable in a civil proceeding for
damages arising out of youth’s conduct. Accordingly, the
juvenile court did not err when it imposed $5,281.97 in restitution to the school.
Affirmed.
