State v. J. S.

180                   October 8, 2025               No. 892

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 In the Matter of J. S.,
                        a Youth.
                 STATE OF OREGON,
                      Respondent,
                            v.
                          J. S.,
                       Appellant.
              Douglas County Circuit Court
                 24JU02292; A184744

  Steve H. Hoddle, Judge.
  Argued and submitted August 28, 2025.
   Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Shannon Storey,
Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public
Defense Commission.
   Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and O’Connor,
Judge.
  JACQUOT, J.
  Reversed and remanded.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)            181

        JACQUOT, J.
         Youth seeks reversal of the judgment committing
him to the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) for “24 months”
or “two years.” Youth was alleged to have engaged in conduct against two different victims, that, if committed by an
adult, would constitute menacing and fourth degree assault,
Class A misdemeanors. The juvenile court accepted an
admission from youth on each allegation. On appeal, youth
raises two assignments of error. In his first, youth argues
that the court plainly erred by accepting his admission without first properly advising youth of the maximum term of
commitment that could result from his admission or ensuring that youth understood how long he could be required to
stay in the youth correctional facility. In assignment of error
two, youth argues that the court erred by committing him
for longer than the allowable maximum.
        Turning first to youth’s second assignment of error,
we review whether the juvenile court exceeded its authority
under the juvenile code for legal error. See State v. D. S. H.,

, 

 (2025) (“We review the
juvenile court’s legal rulings for errors of law ….”). ORS
419C.501(1)(d) authorizes a maximum sentence of 364 days
for each allegation. The state concedes that the court erred
by committing youth for a term of “24 months” or “two
years.” We accept the state’s concession. Because there are
two allegations in this case, the maximum term would be
728 days. The court had legal authority to make the terms
of commitment consecutive, because, as it observed, there
were separate victims for each proven allegation; however,
the imposed commitment term of “24 months” or “two years”
exceeded the statutory maximum by two days. State v. B. Y.,

, 

 (2022), rev’d on other
grounds, 

, 

 (2023).
         Regarding youth’s first assignment of error, the fillin-the-blank admission form that youth signed listed the
two charges and 364 days as the maximum term of commitment. The form was also signed by youth’s attorney,
the state’s attorney, and the judge. During the colloquy
conducted before the court accepted youth’s admission, the
juvenile judge said “the penalty associated with your charge
182                                             State v. J. S.

is up to 364 days in a youth correctional facility. … And
it’s the same for both charges.” (Emphasis added.) After the
court accepted youth’s admission, the court and two probation officers discussed the requested commitment term, at
which point the court realized it could impose 364 days for
each of the admitted allegations. Youth’s attorney did not
question or object to the colloquy. Before pronouncing disposition, the juvenile court indicated it was going to order up
to two years in closed custody. Again, youth’s attorney did
not object or make any comment.
         Youth argues that he did not have knowledge of the
actual maximum length of commitment that was possible.
Youth argues that, at the time that the court accepted his
admission, he was only advised of a potential maximum of
364 days in closed custody. Youth requests that we reverse
under our plain error review standard. The state responds
that youth knew that the commitment period could be 364
days for each charge, and alternatively asserts that it is at
least not obvious and beyond reasonable dispute that youth
did not knowingly admit the allegations against him. The
state further argues that youth did not raise a concern once
the two-year commitment was discussed or before the court
entered a judgment.
         We review whether a youth’s admission was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent for legal error. State ex rel
Juv. Dept. v. Clements, 

, 

(1989) (so reviewing). For an error to be reversible under our
plain error discretion, it must be “an error of law, obvious
and not reasonably in dispute, and apparent on the record
without requiring the court to choose among competing
inferences.” State v. Vanornum, 

, 

 (2013).
         For an admission by a youth to be valid, the youth
must be aware, in a manner consistent with the youth’s age
and intelligence, of the consequences of their admission,
including the maximum disposition. See State v. C. L. E.,

, 

 (2021) (explaining, in the
context of reviewing the validity of an admission, that a
youth’s capability of understanding “var[ies] depending on
the circumstances of the case, the age and intelligence of
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)                              183

the child, as well as other factors”) (quoting State ex rel Juv.
Dept. v. Welch, 

, 

 (1972),
adh’d as modified on reh’g, 

, 

(1973)). When the record does not affirmatively demonstrate
that a youth’s admission was knowing and voluntary, and
there might be additional evidence that could be considered
by the juvenile court to determine the validity of the waiver,
it may be appropriate to remand for further proceedings.
Welch, 

.
         The record available to us—which includes an
admissions document signed by youth, his counsel, the district attorney, and the juvenile judge—listing 364 days as
the maximum—does not affirmatively demonstrate that
youth understood nor that he was advised of the maximum
potential 728-day term of commitment. Under Welch, a
juvenile court plainly errs by accepting a youth’s admission
without creating a record that affirmatively demonstrates
that the youth was aware of the consequences of the admission, including the maximum disposition associated with it.
         Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the juvenile
court to enter a corrected judgment not exceeding 728 days.
Because the matter must return to the juvenile court to correct the dispositional judgment, and because the purpose of
the juvenile system is rehabilitative,1 with an emphasis on
developmentally appropriate procedures,2 we exercise our
discretion to remand for further proceedings with respect
to the first assignment of error. As we concluded in Welch,
the appropriate disposition to redress the court’s failure to
create the necessary record is remand to create a record of
    1
      See ORS 419C.001(1) (the juvenile delinquency system is founded on “principles of personal responsibility, accountability and reformation”); ORS 419C.478(1)
(court may only commit youth to the legal custody of OYA if that is in the best
interest of the adjudicated youth); and ORS 419C.478(3)(b)(B) (only allowing commitment to OYA if the juvenile court determines it will lead to youth’s reform and
rehabilitation).
    2
      See ORS 419C.478(3)(b) (requiring the court to consider youth’s age and
mental or emotional conditions if it decides to commit youth to the OYA); ORS
419C.349(2)(a) (requiring older youth to be “of sufficient sophistication and
maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of [his] conduct” at the time of the
offense before they can be waived to adult court under statutes allowing waiver);
and ORS 419C.145(2), (4) (requiring the court to consider youth’s best interest,
relationships, educational status, and mental health in pre-adjudication detention decision).
184                                                            State v. J. S.

what youth’s understanding was at the time he waived his
right to trial. 

 (“the child must be apprised
of and understand the legal consequences of his admission
of jurisdiction”).3 On remand, the juvenile court should conduct a Welch analysis to determine what youth knew about
the maximum term of commitment at the time he entered
his admission. As in Welch,
      “It may be that additional evidence would disclose a knowing and voluntary waiver. If so, the entry of the plea was
      valid. If not, the plea itself must be set aside for further
      proceedings consistent with this and our former opinion.”

           Reversed and remanded.




    3
      In Welch, we also cited Raisley v. Sullivan, 

, 

(1972) (“The record must contain an affirmative showing of the voluntariness of
the plea.”).