State v. B. Y.

                                                      208
274
319 Orv.App
State
2022     B. Y.                                                                                      April 20, 2022




                 Argued and submitted July 7, 2021; reversed and remanded for reconsideration
                               of disposition, otherwise affirmed April 20, 2022


                                       In the Matter of B. Y.,
                                              a Youth.
                                       STATE OF OREGON,
                                            Respondent,
                                                 v.
                                               B. Y.,
                                             Appellant.
                                   Columbia County Circuit Court
                                        19JU00173; A172581
                                                  

    Youth appeals from a dispositional judgment committing him to the Oregon
Youth Authority for placement in a youth correction facility for one year, to be
served consecutively to his commitment from prior cases. Youth makes two
assignments of error. First, he assigns error to the trial court’s order to run the
commitment consecutively to his commitment from prior cases. Second, youth
requests plain-error review of the juvenile court’s imposition of a one-year
commitment when the statutory maximum was 364 days. ORS 419C.501(1)(d).
Held: The juvenile code does not, as written, authorize the imposition of consecutive commitments; thus, the juvenile court erred when it ordered that youth’s
commitment run consecutive to his prior commitment. Additionally, the Court of
Appeals would accept the state’s concession and exercise its discretion to correct
the plainly erroneous imposition of a one-year commitment.
                    Reversed and remanded for reconsideration of disposition; otherwise affirmed.




                    Ted E. Grove, Judge.
   Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause for appellant.
Also on the brief was Youth, Rights & Justice.
   Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before James, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Kamins, Judge.
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 (2022)                           209

  KAMINS, J.
   Reversed and remanded for reconsideration of disposition; otherwise affirmed.
  Lagesen, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
210                                             State v. B. Y.

        KAMINS, J.
         Youth appeals from a dispositional judgment committing him to the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) for placement in a youth correction facility for one year, to be served
consecutively to his commitment from prior cases. Youth
makes two assignments of error. First, he assigns error to
the trial court’s order to run the commitment consecutively
to his commitment from prior cases. Second, he assigns
error to the trial court’s imposition of a one-year commitment when the statutory maximum is 364 days. We conclude that a juvenile court does not have authority to impose
consecutive commitments and that the imposition of a one-year commitment amounted to plain error. We reverse and
remand for the juvenile court to reconsider its disposition
and otherwise affirm.
          In 2017, youth was committed to the custody of the
OYA for three and a half years in a combined disposition
and spent most of his time committed to a youth correction
facility. At one point, youth was paroled and subsequently
ran away from his placement. When police attempted to
apprehend him, he refused to follow the officer’s order to
stop and lie on the ground and was then charged with conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the
offense of interfering with a peace officer, ORS 162.247, a
Class A misdemeanor. Youth admitted to the charge, and in
October 2019, the juvenile court ordered him to serve a one-year commitment to OYA, to be served consecutively to the
2017 commitment, which was set to end in November 2020.
         Youth timely appealed, assigning error to the juvenile court’s order imposing the commitment consecutively to
his commitment from prior cases and to the court’s imposition of a one-year commitment for a Class A misdemeanor.
         By way of background, juvenile delinquency proceedings consist of two stages that are roughly comparable
to conviction and sentencing in adult criminal cases. State v.
Barrett, 

, 

 (2011). The first stage
is the adjudication, where the juvenile court determines
whether a youth has committed an act that would be a crime
if committed by an adult. 

 The second is the juvenile
court’s determination of the consequences that should follow
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from the adjudication, which is called the disposition. Id. at
402. ORS 419C.501(1) outlines durational limits on different
types of dispositions, one of which includes commitment to
the OYA, which is the type of disposition youth in this case
received. Under ORS 419C.501(1) and (2), a juvenile court
disposition can be for an indefinite period, but, similarly to
adult sentences of incarceration, the statute imposes limitations on commitments and periods of institutionalization. It
is that limitation that we address in this opinion.
         Youth argues that, because the juvenile code is sui
generis, the court’s dispositional authority must be explicit.
See Kelley v. Gibson, 

, 

 (2002)
(“Because proceedings under the juvenile code are sui generis,
a juvenile court’s actions must be authorized by the statutes
that created it.”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2286
(unabridged ed 2002) (defining sui generis as “of its own kind
: constituting a class alone : unique, peculiar”). Specifically,
youth notes that, under the current version of the statute
that governs maximum dispositions, ORS 419C.501, there is
no authority granting a juvenile court permission to impose
consecutive commitments. Because no authority outside the
juvenile code can be interpreted as authorizing consecutive
commitments, youth contends that to grant that authority
would be contrary to the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile code.
         The state concedes that there is no express statutory authority for consecutive commitments but argues that
the legislature’s silence on that issue does not mean that the
legislature intended for juvenile courts to have no authority
to do so. The state points out that we have already interpreted the juvenile code to authorize consecutive commitments under a prior version of ORS 419C.501, former ORS
419.511 (1971), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373. State
ex rel Juv. Dept. v. T., 

, 

 (1976).
Citing legislative history that postdates that case, the state
argues that there was no legislative intent to remove that
authority with any of the subsequent changes made to the
juvenile code. Additionally, even absent legislation permitting the imposition of consecutive commitments, the state
maintains that it has long been settled law that trial courts
have inherent authority to impose consecutive sentences in
212                                                             State v. B. Y.

the adult context, and the reasoning applies with equal force
to juvenile courts. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 

, 

 (1968); State v. Norman, 

, 

 (1984), rev den, 

, cert den, 

;

 (1985).
         We review questions of statutory construction for
errors of law. State v. E. C.-P., 

, 

 (2017). When we interpret a statute, “[w]e ascertain the legislature’s intentions by examining the text of the
statute in its context, along with relevant legislative history,
and, if necessary, canons of construction.” State v. Cloutier,

, 

 (2011) (citing State v. Gaines,

, 

 (2009)). “In the absence
of any evidence to the contrary, we assume that the legislature intended to give those words their ‘plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning.’ ” State v. Ziska/Garza, 

,

 (2014) (quoting PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 

, 

 (1993)).
         The relevant language in the current version of ORS
419C.501, the statute governing limitations on the duration
of commitments, prescribes that “the period of institutionalization or commitment may not exceed” and then lists out
the maximums based on the category of offense.1 The plain

   1
       ORS 419C.501 provides:
       “(1) The court shall fix the duration of any disposition made pursuant to
   this chapter and the duration may be for an indefinite period. Any placement
   in the legal custody of the Department of Human Services or the Oregon
   Youth Authority under ORS 419C.478 or placement under the jurisdiction of
   the Psychiatric Security Review Board under ORS 419C.529 shall be for an
   indefinite period. However, the period of institutionalization or commitment
   may not exceed:
       “(a) The period of time specified in the statute defining the crime for an
   act that would constitute an unclassified misdemeanor if committed by an
   adult;
        “(b) Thirty days for an act that would constitute a Class C misdemeanor
   if committed by an adult;
        “(c) Six months for an act that would constitute a Class B misdemeanor
   if committed by an adult;
       “(d) Three hundred sixty-four days for an act that would constitute a
   Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
       “(e) Five years for an act that would constitute a Class C felony if committed by an adult;
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text is silent on how to deal with a situation where a youth
has been adjudicated for multiple offenses.

         Our statutory analysis is also informed by cases
previously construing the relevant statute or its predecessors. Cloutier, 

. A previous version of the statute
implicitly authorized consecutive dispositions for separate
offenses. T., 

 (citing former ORS 419.507(2)
(1975), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, and former
ORS 419.511(1) and (3) (1971)). The statute that governed
maximum dispositions in that case, former ORS 419.511
(1971), provided that the duration of disposition “shall not
exceed the maximum period of institutionalization or commitment authorized if the act had been committed by an
adult.” At the time that T. was decided, courts handling
adult criminal cases had inherent authority to impose consecutive sentences. Jones, 

. Therefore, a youth’s
maximum disposition would have included consecutive dispositions, as that was the law governing adults at that time.
T., 

.

         Former ORS 419.511 (1971) was redesignated ORS
419C.501 in 1993, but the language stating that the period
of any disposition “shall not exceed the maximum period
of institutionalization or commitment authorized if the act
had been committed by an adult” remained the same. Or
Laws 1993, ch 33, § 246. ORS 419C.501 was again amended
in 1995 and the language linking maximum dispositions
with adult maximums was again unaltered. Or Laws 1995,
ch 422, § 85. That language was finally removed in 1999 and
replaced with the current language specifying maximum
commitment periods based on the category of offense, with

       “(f) Ten years for an act that would constitute a Class B felony if committed by an adult;
      “(g) Twenty years for an act that would constitute a Class A felony if
   committed by an adult; and
       “(h) Life for a young person who was found to have committed an act
   that, if committed by an adult would constitute murder or any aggravated
   form of murder under ORS 163.095, 163.107 or 163.115.
       “(2) Except as provided in subsection (1)(h) of this section, the period of
   any disposition may not extend beyond the date on which the young person or
   adjudicated youth becomes 25 years of age.”
214                                                            State v. B. Y.

only minor subsequent alterations. Or Laws 1999, ch 964,
§ 1.2
          The state contends that the legislative history of the
1999 amendments to ORS 419C.501 reveals that the legislature’s removal of that language did not reflect an intent
to strip juvenile courts of the dispositional authority that
we recognized in T. We agree that the legislative history
does not reveal that specific intent. Rather, the change was
inspired by a pending Court of Appeals case posing the question whether “the maximum time the youth could serve [was]
limited to the time an adult would actually serve if sentencing guidelines were applied.” Exhibit B, House Committee on
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Law, HB 3047, May 4,
1999 (testimony of Larry Oglesby, representing Oregon
Juvenile Department Directors’ Association). The bill’s work
group was concerned that “[t]hat interpretation would mean
that in some cases youth would have to be released back into
the community prematurely[.]” Id. According to legislative testimony, the aim of the amendment was to “restate[ ] the time
limit on the period of institutionalization or commitment in
terms of a specific number of years, rather than having it tied
to the length of time an adult could serve for those crimes.”
Id.; see also Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Criminal Law, HB 3047, May 4, 1999, Tape
178, Side A (statement by Larry Oglesby, representing Oregon
Juvenile Department Directors’ Association) (stating that the
purpose of the amendment was to “clarify that the time that a
youth can be committed to a youth correction facility is a specific length of time” as opposed to the time that an adult could
serve for the same offense, “which could be interpreted to be
reduced by sentencing guidelines, which would be a shorter
period of time”). The goal was for the amendment to “make
certain that the practice that has been in place successfully
for decades would continue.” Exhibit B, House Committee
    2
      Former ORS 419.511 (1971) and, prior to 1999, ORS 419C.501 referred
only to “dispositions” in the juvenile context. In 1999, ORS 419C.501 introduced
language referring to maximum “commitment” periods and differentiated those
from dispositions. Or Laws 1999, ch 964, § 1. In this opinion, when referring to
the statutes before the 1999 amendment, we use the term dispositions. When
referring to versions of ORS 419C.501 postdating 1999, our terminology reflects
the addition of the term commitments. Due to the fact that the disposition in this
case is a commitment to the OYA, we limit our discussion to the juvenile court’s
authority to impose consecutive commitments.
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on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Law, HB 3047,
May 4, 1999 (testimony of Larry Oglesby, representing
Oregon Juvenile Department Directors’ Association).
         Although the legislature did not specifically intend
to remove a juvenile court’s authority to impose consecutive
commitments with HB 3047 in 1999, that does not answer
the question of what the legislature understood its new text
to mean in 1999, given the significant intervening changes
to the way that criminal sentencing occurred. Indeed, the
legal premise of our interpretation that the previous version of the juvenile statute allowed for consecutive dispositions, which was drawn from criminal sentencing, no longer
existed by the time the legislature amended ORS 419C.501.
That earlier interpretation was based on the fact that adult
criminal courts had inherent authority to impose sentences
consecutively, an authority the legislature limited with the
codification of ORS 137.123 in 1987. Or Laws 1987, ch 2,
§ 12; ORS 137.123(5);3 see also State v. Crotsley, 

,
277 n 5, 

 (1989) (“[T]he legislature took care to
limit the circumstances in which the additional convictions
authorized by ORS 161.062 could be the basis of consecutive
sentencing.”). With the enactment of ORS 137.123, “the legislature intended to eliminate any inherent authority that
the court might have with respect to consecutive sentences.”
State v. Trice, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
State v. Brooks, 

, 

, rev den,

    3
     ORS 137.123(5) provides:
        “The court has discretion to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment
   for separate convictions arising out of a continuous and uninterrupted course
   of conduct only if the court finds:
        “(a) That the criminal offense for which a consecutive sentence is contemplated was not merely an incidental violation of a separate statutory provision in the course of the commission of a more serious crime but rather was
   an indication of defendant’s willingness to commit more than one criminal
   offense; or
        “(b) The criminal offense for which a consecutive sentence is contemplated caused or created a risk of causing greater or qualitatively different
   loss, injury or harm to the victim or caused or created a risk of causing loss,
   injury or harm to a different victim than was caused or threatened by the
   other offense or offenses committed during a continuous and uninterrupted
   course of conduct.”
(Emphasis added.)
216                                                            State v. B. Y.

 (2003) (“We agree with defendant that the
courts’ authority to impose consecutive sentences—or PSRB
terms—is now exclusively statutory, not inherent.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)).4
         We are thus faced with an issue of ambiguous legislative intent. On the one hand, the legislative history of HB
3047 does not suggest that the legislature intended, with
that bill, to strip a juvenile court of any of its dispositional
authority. On the other hand, the legislature had previously
enacted ORS 137.123, which reflected an intent to impose
limitations on a court’s authority to impose consecutive sentences in the adult context. The text, context, and legislative
history do not resolve the question before us.
         If the correct interpretation cannot be discerned
from the text, context, and legislative history of the statute,
we turn to canons of construction “to aid in resolving the
remaining uncertainty.” Gaines, 

. One such
canon instructs us to attempt to ascertain the result the
legislature would have most likely wanted had it thought
of the specific issue. See State v. Rodriguez, 

, 

 (2007) (“[W]hen all else fails, we attempt to
do what the legislature most likely would have done had it
thought of the specific issue.”). As discussed above, the legislature previously directly linked a juvenile court’s dispositional authority to that of an adult court. See former ORS
419.511(1) (1971) (explicitly linking the maximum dispositions for juveniles to the maximum sentences for adults).
It was that linkage—and the inherent authority of adult
courts—that formed the basis for the juvenile court’s previous authority to authorize consecutive dispositions. The legislature has since chosen to limit an adult court’s inherent
authority and break the link between juvenile commitments
and adult sentences.5 Thus, it seems that, if confronted with
the question whether a juvenile court retains unlimited
    4
      Although we have not had occasion to consider the impact of the legislature’s decision to limit the inherent authority of adult courts on the juvenile
court’s ability to impose consecutive commitments, we have concluded that the
consecutive sentence statute itself does not apply in the juvenile context. Trice,

.
    5
      As the legislative history demonstrates, the legislature’s eventual decision
to break that link was unrelated to consecutive sentencing or inherent authority—
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authority to impose consecutive commitments, the answer
would be “no.”
          Additionally, we know that part of the reason the legislature limited the inherent authority of adult courts with
regard to sentencing was a result of a different legislative
decision: to increase the number of convictions that a defendant could receive for the same criminal episode. See former
ORS 161.062 (1985), repealed by Or Laws 1999, ch 136, § 1;
ORS 161.067 (known as the “anti-merger statute”). The anti-merger statute instructs courts to record more convictions
for conduct that previously would have “merged” into a single conviction so that a defendant’s records more accurately
reflect the nature of their criminal conduct. See Crotsley, 

 (“The proponents of [the anti-merger statute]
clearly intended that criminal records accurately reflect all
crimes actually committed and that a person who commits
multiple crimes by the same conduct or during the same
criminal episode should have a criminal record reflecting
each crime committed rather than only a single conviction
which would not accurately portray the nature and extent
of that person’s conduct.”). However, in so doing, the legislature “took care to limit the circumstances in which the
additional convictions authorized by ORS 161.062 could
be the basis of consecutive sentencing.” See 

 at 277 n 5.
Those additional statutory violations authorized by the anti-merger statute apply in juvenile proceedings. See State v.
K. R. S., 

, 331, 

 (2019) (holding that principles of merger apply in the juvenile context).
Therefore, the same concerns that animated the legislative changes to consecutive sentencing in the adult context would apply to juvenile proceedings—to ensure that a
youth’s record accurately reflects the nature of the criminal
conduct but not allow those additional violations to serve as
a basis for consecutive commitments. That parallel further
reinforces the conclusion that the legislature would not have
intended for juvenile courts to retain unlimited discretionary authority to impose consecutive commitments.
          Finally—and critically—the legislative purpose of
the juvenile code is reformation, not punishment. See ORS
it was to ensure that statutory maximums, rather than the sentencing guidelines, applied to juvenile commitments.
218                                              State v. B. Y.

419C.001(1) (“The system is founded on the principles of personal responsibility, accountability and reformation within
the context of public safety and restitution to the victims
and to the community.”); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Reynolds,

, 

 (1993) (“Juvenile courts are
concerned with rehabilitation, not punishment.”). “[W]hen
a specific issue is not addressed clearly in a statute or its
legislative history, we use the broader purpose of the statute
as a guide in our attempt to discern what the legislature
would have intended had it considered it.” Angle v. Board of
Dentistry, 

, 

 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is irreconcilable with the
rehabilitative and reformative purposes of the juvenile code
to increase a juvenile’s maximum exposure to commitment
time while limiting that exposure in adult courts.
          We conclude by acknowledging that the dissent’s
view is entirely plausible given that several different statutes authorize juvenile courts to exercise broad discretion.
However, when it comes to the duration of commitments, the
legislature explicitly limited discretion and delineated precise terms of commitment directly connected to the specific
offense. ORS 419C.501(1). Although, as the dissent correctly
points out, our interpretation displaces the status quo, the
“status quo” following the 1999 amendments was based on
habit and inertia. 319 Or App at 222 (Lagesen, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Juvenile practice had
evolved in a certain manner, and, as is often the case, little thought was given to how that practice was grounded in
statute. Post-1999, it simply wasn’t. When the legislature
chose to amend the statute to specify particular terms of
commitments for particular offenses, the act of commitment
stopped being governed by discretionary or inherent authority. If the legislature meant to grant juvenile courts the discretion to impose consecutive commitments at that point, it
needed to say so.
         We are unable to confidently ascertain the legislature’s policy decision—if it has made one at all—regarding
a juvenile court’s authority to impose consecutive commitments. See State v. Walker, 

, 

(2014) (“[O]ur role is not to draft or revise the laws, or to
refine the policy reflected in the law.”). Because the juvenile
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code does not, as written, authorize the imposition of consecutive commitments, the juvenile court erred when it
ordered that youth’s commitment run consecutive to his
prior commitment.
         Youth next assigns as plain error the juvenile
court’s imposition of a one-year commitment when the statutory maximum was 364 days. ORS 419C.501(1)(d). Youth
acknowledges that he did not preserve that argument but
asks us to exercise our discretion to review the claim as
plain error. ORAP 5.45(1). The state concedes the error. We
agree with and accept the state’s concession, and we exercise our discretion to correct the error because it can be corrected with a minimum of judicial resources and the state
has no interest in a youth serving an unlawful disposition.
See State v. Ramos, 

, 

 (2013)
(exercising its discretion in similar circumstances).
         Reversed and remanded for reconsideration of disposition; otherwise affirmed.
        LAGESEN, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part.
        I agree with the majority’s resolution of youth’s second assignment of error; however, with respect to the first
assignment, I would affirm the judgment of the juvenile
court. Although the majority opinion’s construction of the
statutes is a reasonable one, I would reach a different conclusion based on the structure and purpose of the juvenile
code.
         As ably explained by the majority opinion, the juvenile code does not expressly address how long a juvenile
court may commit a youth to the Oregon Youth Authority
when the youth is found to be within the juvenile court’s
delinquency jurisdiction for conduct that, if committed by an
adult, would constitute multiple criminal offenses. For several reasons, I would conclude that, in such circumstances, a
juvenile court may impose consecutive commitment periods.
        As an initial matter, the structure of ORS 419C.501
suggests that juvenile courts have broad discretion to determine the duration of a commitment period for offenses other
220                                                State v. B. Y.

than aggravated murder. It provides that “[t]he court shall
fix the duration of any disposition made pursuant to this
chapter and the duration may be for an indefinite period.”
        The text of the statute suggests only two limits on
that discretion. First, a commitment to the Oregon Youth
Authority cannot extend beyond a youth’s twenty-fifth birthday. ORS 419C.501(2). Second, the statute provides the maximum length of commitment for any given “act”:
   “However, the period of institutionalization or commitment
   may not exceed:
      “(a) The period of time specified in the statute defining
   the crime for an act that would constitute an unclassified
   misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
      “(b) Thirty days for an act that would constitute a
   Class C misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
      “(c) Six months for an act that would constitute a Class
   B misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
      “(d) Three hundred sixty-four days for an act that
   would constitute a Class A misdemeanor if committed by
   an adult;
      “(e) Five years for an act that would constitute a Class
   C felony if committed by an adult;
      “(f) Ten years for an act that would constitute a Class
   B felony if committed by an adult;
      “(g) Twenty years for an act that would constitute a
   Class A felony if committed by an adult[.]”
ORS 419C.501(1).
         That structure suggests that a juvenile court, in
determining the appropriate disposition for a youth who has
been adjudicated delinquent for multiple acts, has discretion to determine the appropriate length of the commitment
period in view of the factors identified in ORS 419C.411 (governing dispositions) and ORS 419C.478 (governing commitments to the Oregon Youth Authority), so long as that period
(1) does not extend past the youth’s twenty-fifth birthday
or (2) result in the period of commitment associated with
a particular act being longer than what is authorized for
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that particular act. In other words, it is a structure that
would appear to allow for the court to commit a youth to the
Oregon Youth Authority for a separate and distinct period
of time for each act the youth was adjudicated to have committed, if and when the factors governing a juvenile court’s
dispositional determinations weigh in favor of doing so.
         ORS 419C.411 supports that understanding. It, too,
indicates a legislative intention to grant a juvenile court
wide discretion to fashion a disposition that best addresses
the circumstances of a particular youth offender. It provides,
in relevant part:
      “(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (6)
   and (7) of this section, in determining the disposition of the
   case, the court shall consider each of the following:
      “(a) The gravity of the loss, damage or injury caused
   or attempted during, or as part of, the conduct that is the
   basis for jurisdiction under ORS 419C.005;
      “(b) Whether the manner in which the adjudicated
   youth engaged in the conduct was aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful;
       “(c) Whether the adjudicated youth was held in detention under ORS 419C.145 and, if so, the reasons for the
   detention;
      “(d) The immediate and future protection required by
   the victim, the victim’s family and the community; and
      “(e) The adjudicated youth’s juvenile court record and
   response to the requirements and conditions imposed by
   previous juvenile court orders.
      “(4) In addition to the factors listed in subsection (3) of
   this section, the court may consider the following:
       “(a) Whether the adjudicated youth has made any
   efforts toward reform or rehabilitation or making restitution;
      “(b) The adjudicated youth’s educational status and
   school attendance record;
     “(c)   The adjudicated youth’s past and present employment;
222                                                State v. B. Y.

      “(d) The disposition proposed by the adjudicated youth;
      “(e) The recommendations of the district attorney and
   the juvenile court counselor and the statements of the victim and the victim’s family;
      “(f) The adjudicated youth’s mental, emotional and
   physical health and the results of the mental health or substance abuse treatment; and
      “(g) Any other relevant factors or circumstances raised
   by the parties.”
ORS 419C.411; see ORS 419C.478(3)(e) (explaining that the
factors identified in ORS 419C.411 must be considered in
determining whether a youth should be committed to the
Oregon Youth Authority). Those considerations suggest that
the legislature intended for juvenile courts to have wide latitude to fashion an appropriate term of commitment for a particular youth, something that would be inhibited if a juvenile court is not permitted to impose a separate and distinct
period of commitment for each act committed by a youth. As
the state points out, this case illustrates the point. Youth
committed the act at issue while he was in the custody of the
Oregon Youth Authority because of a previous delinquency
adjudication. The record indicated that youth was not making much progress toward reforming his conduct, something
that caused the state to argue for, and the juvenile court to
conclude, that his existing period of commitment should be
extended by one year. To read the statutes to prohibit this
practice would risk hampering the delinquency code’s objective of rehabilitating youth offenders so they do not become
adult offenders.
          Finally, the fact that we previously have held that
juvenile courts have this authority weighs in favor this of
conclusion. Although State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. T., 

, 

 (1976), is not controlling on the question,
given the statutory amendments, it suggests that Oregon
juvenile courts long have been understood to have this
authority. Absent a clear indication from the legislature
that it intended to displace that status quo, I would conclude
that we should maintain it.
        Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part.